The Transatlantic Empire Is Already DEAD | Amb. Kishore Mahbubani

## The End of Western Domination The conversation presents a stark, unapologetic claim: the two-century experiment of Western global dominance is over. This is not framed as a sudden collapse but as the logical restoration of a historical norm. For most of recorded history China and India were the planet’s economic engines; the West’s 19th- and 20th-century ascendancy was the anomaly. The empirical shorthand offered in the exchange makes the point plainly: in 2000 the European Union’s economy dwarfed China’s eightfold, today they are roughly equal, and by mid‑century Europe is projected to be markedly smaller than China. Such shifts are not merely about GDP tables; they restructure deference, leverage, and the grammar of international recognition. This transformation carries political consequences. Declining relative power strains identities and habits of dominance. The conversation highlights how old reflexes—patronizing rhetoric, institutional entrenchment, and the reluctance to concede prerogatives—will collide with the rising reality of Asian power. The heart of the argument is pragmatic: if the architecture of global governance does not adjust its representation to reflect new material facts, its legitimacy will corrode. The challenge for Western states is not simply economic but civilizational: moving from reflexive global leadership to a posture that respects plural centers of gravity without dramatizing loss. ## Why the Global Transition is Violent One of the most urgent themes the discussion raises is why this structural transition has been accompanied by violence and instability. Wars in Ukraine and Gaza are invoked as immediate symptoms; structural causes extend deeper. The exchange suggests a mix of misperception, rigid alliance frameworks, and geopolitical incompetence as accelerants. For instance, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is condemned as illegal and brutal, yet the interlocutor argues that European geopolitical myopia—failure to assimilate Russia’s security anxieties—helped produce the crisis. That is a controversial but sobering claim: when rising or revisionist states read encirclement and react, diplomatic failures become combustible. At the same time, Asia’s largely peaceful rise is presented as exceptional rather than normative. Historically, rising great powers often clash with incumbents—Graham Allison’s “Thucydides Trap” is the specter—but China’s economic ascent has been remarkably non‑expansionist militarily. The conversation frames this as a gift the world should appreciate: a major power integrating economically without imperialist conquest. The implication is twofold. First, restraint by rising powers reduces the overall probability of systemic war. Second, if established powers attempt to block or reverse that rise by coercive measures, they risk producing the very violence they seek to avert. The lesson is clear: misreading the nature of a transition can turn an era of possibility into an epoch of conflict. ## Reforming the UN Security Council (The 7-7-7 Formula) 00:17:34 The ASEAN Model for a Multi-Civilizational World Institutional reform emerges as the practical centerpiece of the conversation. The UN Security Council’s current composition, frozen in 1945 arrangements, is criticized for misaligning representation with contemporary power realities. The proposal discussed — the 7-7-7 formula — attempts a pragmatic institutional redesign: seven permanent members (including the EU as a single seat and new additions such as India and Brazil), seven semi‑permanent rotating seats to accommodate regional claimants, and seven elected seats for broader inclusion. The logic is simple: expand the winners so that more states see a tangible stake in the UN’s legitimacy and future. That proposal is not merely technocratic; it carries an implicit political pedagogy. Reform that generates a coalition of beneficiaries is more likely to pass than zero-sum designs that leave many outside. Nonetheless, the conversation also acknowledges real political resistance from declining powers that hold vetoes and symbolic seats. The dilemma is acute: maintain old privileges and risk institutional irrelevance, or relinquish clout to preserve credibility. The 7-7-7 formulation is pitched as a compromise to square that circle. The same segment of the exchange turns to ASEAN as a living laboratory for pluralistic governance. Southeast Asia’s experience — a patchwork of religions, political systems, and historical memories that nevertheless sustains peace and economic growth — is presented as a model for a “3M world”: multi-civilizational, multipolar, and multilateral. ASEAN’s consensual, inclusive approach is contrasted with Western alliances that prize ideological alignment. The take‑away is that global institutions might learn from ASEAN’s tolerance of political diversity and its insistence on coexistence without ideological conformity. ## Asian Inclusivity vs. Western Alliances A vital distinction emerges between inclusivity and exclusivity in security and diplomatic practices. Western security architecture often institutionalizes like-mindedness: democracy, shared values, and formal alliances create cohesive blocs. The conversation highlights how Asia, by contrast, tends toward inclusivity. Major Asian powers—China, India, Indonesia—do not cultivate rigid alliance systems in the Western sense. Instead they maintain multiple vectors of engagement; even U.S. allies in East Asia simultaneously pursue economic and diplomatic ties with Beijing. This difference is not merely strategic; it reflects different civilizational logics. Asian states frequently prioritize coexistence with civilizational neighbors over clubby alliances that exclude “others.” The continental and maritime proximities of Asia demand a diplomacy of balance. For smaller states, this translates into hedging strategies—diversifying security and economic ties so as not to be forced into exclusive alignments. The result is a security environment that, while not devoid of tension, is less predisposed to binary blocs and more open to flexible coalitions tailored to specific issues. ## The Global South Refuses to Pick Sides A recurrent motif is the refusal of the Global South to be drafted into a binary contest between old and new great powers. The conversation stresses that many non‑Western states prefer to keep both old institutions and new platforms, provided that the terms of engagement are fairer. Asian states, for example, are said to largely favor retaining the UN system because it provides rules and predictability—but they insist that the system update to reflect contemporary realities. Where they do build alternative architectures—BRICS initiatives, regional development banks—the aim is not simply to replace Western institutions but to expand global governance space so it better matches current distributions of power. This posture has important implications for geopolitical competition. If the Global South is determinedly non-aligned or multi-aligned, great power efforts to force a choice risk alienating potential partners. Economic incentives, diplomatic recognition, and security guarantees—long the currency of great power politics—lose some of their potency when states can credibly claim an independent path. The pragmatic lesson is that courting the Global South today requires accommodation and respect for plural modalities of order, not binary ultimata. ## Europe's Strategic Incompetence & Diverging Interests Europe is subject to a particularly sharp critique in the conversation: strategic incompetence. The argument is that European missteps—whether in mismanaging relations with Russia, failing to adapt institutions like the IMF to new realities, or continuing to treat Asia condescendingly—have tangible consequences. Strategic misreadings can catalyze crises, as with Ukraine, and erode Europe’s standing. Moreover, Europe’s view of itself as a global norm

The Transatlantic Empire Is Already DEAD Asia transformed massively in just one century — from a region carved up by colonial empires to the powerhouse of today’s emerging multipolar world. BRICS, the SCO, ASEAN… so many of the key pillars of the new global order are now anchored right here in Asia. To discuss the continent’s stunning success and its future, I‘m joined today by the prolific Singaporean diplomat and academic, Dr. Kishore Mahbubani, the author of „Has China Won?“, „The Asian 21st Century“ and „Living the Asian Century“. Links: Kishore's Homepage: https://mahbubani.net/ Kishore's Books: https://mahbubani.net/books/ Substack: https://kishoremahbubani.substack.com Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/kishoremahbubanipage X (Twitter): https://x.com/mahbubani_k Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies- shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 The End of Western Domination 00:04:20 Why the Global Transition is Violent 00:09:12 Reforming the UN Security Council (The 7-7-7 Formula) 00:17: 34 The ASEAN Model for a Multi-Civilizational World 00:20:23 Asian Inclusivity vs. Western Alliances 00:22:39 The Global South Refuses to Pick Sides 00:27:59 Europe's Strategic Incompetence & Diverging Interests 00:34:55 Conclusion #Pascal Asia transformed massively in just one century—from a region carved up by colonial empires to the powerhouse of today's emerging multipolar world. Between the SCO, ASEAN, and so many other key pillars of the new global order, much of it is now anchored right here in Asia. To discuss the continent's stunning success and its future, I'm joined today by the prolific Singaporean diplomat and academic Dr. Kishore Mahbubani, author of *Has China Won?*, *The Asian 21st Century*, and *Living the Asian Century.* Dr. Mahbubani, welcome. My pleasure. #Kishore Mahbubani By the way, you can call me Ambassador or Professor, but I'm not a doctor. #Pascal I'm sorry, I'm sorry. I saw that—I read it. #Kishore Mahbubani It's okay. It's all right, actually. #Pascal -- 1 of 12 -- Ambassador Mahbubani, which is very nice, because you actually served twice as Singapore’s ambassador to the United Nations. Yes. So, can you tell me—do you share my assessment that Asia is really going to be one of the new centers of this multipolar world? #Kishore Mahbubani No, Asia is not just going to become one center. It's going to become *the* center. And of course, within Asia, there will be multiple poles, by the way. Asia itself will be multipolar, not just part of a multipolar world. And certainly, you know, the key point I emphasize in my writings is that the 200 years of Western domination of world history have been an aberration. Because from the year one to the year 1820, the two largest economies in the world were always China and India. So it's only in the last 200 years that Europe took off and North America took off. But this Western domination was always an aberration. It has come to an end, and it's ending very fast. And I always give one statistic to illustrate this. If you compare the combined economy of the European Union with China, in the year 2000 the EU’s economy was eight times bigger than China’s. Right. Today, they’re about the same size. Yeah. And by 2050, Europe will be half the size of China. And, you know, for the Europeans, they’ve got to understand that when you go from being eight times bigger than China to becoming half the size of China in 50 years, you have to learn to treat China with more respect, instead of making these condescending comments that European leaders still make about China—which is just crazy. #Pascal It is. Somehow it just doesn’t leave the European mindset—they still believe everything revolves around them. But now reality is catching up very fast. One of our colleagues, Glenn Diesen, made this argument in a book: that Europe needs to get back to the idea that it’s really just the western peninsula of Eurasia. Do you think this kind of reintegration of Europe into Asia will have to come sooner or later? #Kishore Mahbubani Certainly. I think it's important for Europeans to understand that if you look objectively at the world today, Europe represents the past. I mean, it does, by the way, represent a beautiful past. And so I actually believe that Europe is going to become, in some ways, a very nice museum for the world. The United States of America represents the present, but Asia represents the future. That’s where all the future growth is going to come from. It’s better for Europeans to adapt to this change in advance rather than resist it. And certainly, acceptance means you’ve got to make real concessions— for example, in places like the IMF and the World Bank—and not insist that the European voting share must still remain disproportionately high. #Pascal -- 2 of 12 -- What do you think stands in the way of this order changing peacefully? Because right now we’re seeing a lot of violence. We see a genocide in Gaza, the war in Ukraine, and the United States preparing to go to war with Venezuela. In your view, what makes this moment so violent? #Kishore Mahbubani Well, I think I would say, overall, certainly the war in Ukraine is a tragedy, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine is illegal. It should be condemned. But at the same time, it’s a war that could have been prevented if the Europeans had shown some degree of geopolitical competence. European geopolitical incompetence is also responsible for this war, because they completely ignored some real and legitimate security concerns of Russia in the build-up to it. And certainly, the Gaza war is a tragedy, and a war in Venezuela would also be a tragedy. But if you look at Asia, by and large, what’ s stunning is that China has managed to grow its economy dramatically—as I’ve just mentioned— becoming the same size as the European Union, despite being only one-eighth its size in the year 2000. China has achieved this rise peacefully. And normally, when great powers emerge, they never do so peacefully. I mean, Graham Allison, in his book *Destined for War*, said that Americans should not wish for China to be like America, because when America emerged as a great power in the 1890s, it was very violent. It declared war on Spain, conquered the Philippines, and conquered some of its neighbors. So clearly, China’s peaceful emergence has been a gift to the world. That’s why the West should appreciate this and accept the fact that China’s rise has been peaceful, instead of trying to thwart it and thereby create a lot of problems for the world. #Pascal From your experience as a diplomat who’s had to interact a lot with Europeans and Americans—the West in general—do you think they can do that? Do you think they’re able to jump over their own shadow and actually say, “Okay, fine, this time we’re going to try to approach others on an equal footing”? #Kishore Mahbubani Yeah, sorry—could you repeat that? #Pascal Do you think the West is finally able to realize that it has to approach others on an equal footing, instead of constantly berating them for all sorts of alleged things? #Kishore Mahbubani -- 3 of 12 -- Well, I mean, I would say the more thoughtful people in the West understand that the world has changed, and the West has got to stop talking down to Asians, for example, right? But many of the leaders can’t admit it, you know? You remember President Joe Biden famously said that the Chinese have the goal of becoming the number one power in the world, but he said, “It ain’t going to happen on my watch.” No American president wants to be president of the United States when it becomes the number two power in the world. So that shows a certain lack of realism, because at some point— I don’t know when—the Chinese economy will become the largest in the world. And it’s better to prepare for it in advance and accept it, rather than keep denying it. Earlier, for example, I mentioned the voting shares in the IMF. Even though both the EU and China are about the same size—they each have around 17–18% of the world’s GNP—the EU’s share of IMF voting rights is 27%, and China’s share is 6%. Now, in theory, the voting shares in the IMF are supposed to represent your share of global GNP. So the EU has to cut its voting share from 27% to 17%, and China has to increase its share from 6% to 17%. Then you’d have voting shares that reflect the world of today, not the world of yesterday. That’s a concrete example of how the Europeans are refusing to accept the fact that Asia has risen and that they could adapt and change. #Pascal Do you think it’s more realistic to try to nudge the West to actually adapt these institutions, or does it make more sense to just build new ones? Because it seems to me that, especially within BRICS, the idea at the moment is, “Let’s build the new infrastructure, and if the West ever wants to join— maybe in the future—they can. But let’s go ahead.” #Kishore Mahbubani Well, I think most Asian states, surprisingly, are actually happy to live with the current global order that was created by the West in 1945, at the end of World War II. If you look at all the major global institutions—the United Nations, the UN family of institutions like the World Health Organization, the World Trade Organization, the IMF, the World Bank, you name it—they were all created by the West at the peak of its power at the end of World War II. Now, in theory, with Asia rising, Asia could say, “Hey, we don’t want these Western institutions; we want to create our own.” But actually, the Asians want to keep these institutions. Of course, though, these institutions have to adapt and accept Asia’s return. So, for example, within the UN, you have the UN Security Council. In theory, it has 15 members, but in practice—as Singapore discovered when we were on the Council in 2001 and 2002—there are really five members who control it, the P5: the United States, Russia, China, the UK, and France. The ten elected members are basically observers. The Council is controlled by the five. But, you know, it’ s not necessarily a bad thing to have five permanent members with a veto. The point is, you’ve got to represent the great powers of today, not the great powers of yesterday. That’s what the Security Council was designed to do. -- 4 of 12 -- So, for example, take the UK, right? I mean, I’ll compare the UK with India, okay? The reason I compare them is that a hundred years ago, the British could rule India effortlessly. It’s shocking that about a hundred thousand Englishmen could rule over three hundred million Indians—amazing, right? Now, that world, of course, won’t happen again. But even as recently as the year 2000, the British economy was three and a half times bigger than the Indian economy. Today, of course, the Indian economy is larger. And by 2050, the Indian economy will be about four times bigger than the British economy. When that day comes, it’ll be absurd to have the UK as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and India not as a member. So if the British want to be gracious about it, they should say, “Okay, India is now a much more powerful country than we are.” The British should graciously give up their permanent seat on the UN Security Council to India. You know, when I wrote this article for the Financial Times, I thought they wouldn’t print it. To my surprise, they did. So I think the more thoughtful British realize that the time has come for them to give up their seat on the UN Security Council to India. But that’s the sort of thing—these are the kinds of changes you need to make so you keep the institution of the UN, but change its composition. #Pascal But in order to do that, the Brits would have to do it voluntarily, and the other four Security Council members would have to accept it too, because the United States could veto it. France could veto it if they said, “No, you’re not leaving the club.” Is it realistic to believe that these dec