The Collective West Is Collapsing | Jeff Rich

## A World Out of Model Something important is happening to the way we make sense of geopolitics: the interpretive frameworks that guided policy and popular expectation for decades are fraying. The conversation with historian Jeff Rich crystallizes a broader sense of disorientation. Realist accounts that reduce state action to rational calculations of national interest, liberal narratives that celebrate an expanding rules-based order rooted in Washington, and teleologies that imagine America always rescuing liberalism—each appears less reliable in explaining why allies behave the way they do, why crises escalate, and why elites across liberal democracies seem to clump around shared scripts that diverge from popular preferences. Rather than a single failing, this is a systemic rupture in the cognitive infrastructure of international relations. That rupture is itself a major geopolitical force. ## Elites, Cognitive Colonization, and the “Deputy” Role One striking theme in the exchange is how decision-making elites in countries like Australia, and across Europe, have come to live inside transnational networks that shape their tastes, loyalties, and policy horizons. Rich and his interlocutors point to scholarships, think-tank appointments, shared professional circuits, and informal grooming as mechanisms that produce a particular class of foreign-policy actors. These actors are often more oriented to Atlanticist institutions, American research hubs, and global corporate networks than to the domestic publics they nominally represent. The result is what some scholars have called “cognitive colonization”: mental worlds of the elite that differ markedly from the lived perspectives of ordinary citizens. This explains a pattern that is otherwise puzzling under simple realist assumptions: why certain governments repeatedly prioritize alignment with U.S. policy—sometimes vulnerably so—even when such choices create domestic friction or seem to contradict immediate national interests. Seen from this angle, Canberra’s repeated willingness to adopt Washington-led positions is less a failure of calculation than the outcome of long-term elite socialization into a shared geopolitical script. The script offers status, access, and the promise of a larger role in a global order—what Rich neatly calls a “deputy” role—where middle powers project influence by serving as reliable lieutenants of a dominant power. Understanding that process is essential to explaining why institutions and policies persist even when they look politically self-defeating. ## From Westphalia to “Rules-Based” Identity Politics The conversation also reframes the dominant story about the modern international system. Rather than a linear march from Westphalia’s territorial sovereignty to a robust nation-state order, Rich stresses discontinuities: empire persisted in new forms, decolonization reshaped the map, and the post-1945 architecture embedded competing logics from the start. The United Nations and the rhetoric of sovereign equality did not instantly erase imperial hierarchies or solve the problem of defining political community in newly independent states. In this unsettled context, the late twentieth-century rise of the “rules-based order” represented not an inevitable culmination of Westphalian statehood but a different attempt to build a community defined less by shared territory than by shared values and institutional practices. Membership in that community is signaled by rhetorical alignment—public declarations of commitment to human rights, liberal governance, and multilateral institutions—rather than simply by border control or national interest. The demarcation between “us” and “them” in this schema is performative and moralistic: countries that do not profess the right values are cast not merely as rivals, but as rule-breakers and, consequently, existentially suspect. This shift matters because it alters the grammar of legitimate behavior. Where Westphalian sovereignty put territory and domestic authority at the center, the new rules-based identity prioritizes transnational norms, alliances, and a hierarchy of approval. That hierarchy is anchored in institutions and networks that—again—map closely onto elite socialization channels, reinforcing the cognitive gap between leadership strata and their publics. ## Violence, Nuclear Risk, and the Fragility of Deterrence Against the background of shifting allegiances and elite alignment mechanisms sits a startling and under-acknowledged fact: the possibility of catastrophic violence has returned to the center of global politics. The participants in the conversation worry that the old taboo against nuclear war—hard-won after the Cold War—may not be as universal as many assume. The United States has no formal no-first-use policy; other nuclear powers have adjusted doctrines in ways that introduce ambiguity about thresholds and proportionality. Simultaneously, influential strategic thinkers in some policy circles have floated the idea of “limited” nuclear use in contingency scenarios, particularly around highly sensitive flashpoints such as Taiwan. Technological developments complicate this further. Reports of targeted strikes on nuclear-related infrastructure, cyber operations that compromise command-and-control systems, and new weapon classes like hypersonic missiles alter the calculus of stability. These developments make the picture less binary than Cold War-era mutually assured destruction: asymmetrical attacks that neutralize nuclear capabilities without immediate reciprocal strikes, or the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons intended to avoid strategic escalation, all destabilize established deterrence logics. The upshot is alarming. When strategic doctrine grows ambiguous, when elites are ideationally or institutionally committed to confrontation, and when new technologies fracture previous assumptions about second-strike survivability, the space for inadvertent escalation widens. The conversation captures the existential worry that one misstep—technological, operational, or political—could produce consequences on a scale human institutions are poorly prepared to manage. ## Implications for Neutrality, Nonalignment, and Small-State Strategy If the old maps of the international were wrong, the policy responses that follow must be reframed. For states that are neither great powers nor fully autonomous in their posture—Australia being the interlocutor’s example—the temptation to double down on deputy roles for status or security guarantees is understandable but increasingly risky. Rich’s analysis suggests that smaller powers need a recalibrated strategy that takes into account elite socialization dynamics, the fragility of deterrence, and the limits of value-based coalition-building. Neutrality and nonalignment regain strategic plausibility in this light. Historically, nonaligned postures have not merely been ideological; they were pragmatic hedges against being dragged into great-power conflicts or used as instruments of larger blocs. Today’s complex mix of diffuse norms-based communities and precarious nuclear stakes means that a more sophisticated, interest-driven neutrality might provide meaningful security dividends. This would involve diversifying economic ties, enhancing local and regional defense capacities without automatic entanglement clauses, and cultivating foreign-policy narratives that reflect domestic priorities rather than international status-seeking. At the same time, neutrality must be more than declamation. It requires robust domestic institutions that can resist elite groupthink: diversified education and foreign-exchange programs, transparent channels for public consultation on security policy, and measures to insulate strategic choices from capture by foreign-oriented patronage networks. For countries socialized into deputy roles, reversing cognitive colonization is less a discrete policy switch t

The Collective West Is Collapsing Today I’m talking again to the Australian historian and writer, Jeff Rich. Jeff publishes on his substack and on YouTube. Today we want to discuss the general development of world politics and the forces that are shaping the 8 billion people planet. Links: Jeff's Substact: https://substack.com /@jeffrich Jeff's YouTube channel: @theburningarchive Neutrality Studies Goods Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com #M3 I feel there's a tendency to sort of treat the World Wars as this kind of, you know, box office package—there's World War I, and, you know, America saved Europe, and then there's World War II, and America saved the world. Yeah, there might be a World War III, but America will save the world again, that sort of thing. And so I feel that kind of thinking lulls people into believing it's going to be the same kind of war. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies. And today I'm talking again to Jeff Rich, a historian and writer publishing under his pseudonym, or his channel name, The Burning Archive, on both YouTube and Substack. Jeff, great having you back. Great to be back, Pascal. Well, you are based in Australia, and I thought we should have an update on your assessment of world politics—what we have both learned through our channels and social media journeys—because they are just as much about broadcasting as they are about learning ourselves, right? And maybe let me start with this: Since you began publishing regularly and interviewing people regularly, what's one of the most important things that you've taken away from all the conversations? #M3 It's interesting. I think one of the most important things is just how... I feel, especially over the last six months or so, with Donald Trump and the sort of new incarnation of America, people's models of international relations—their models of history—are starting to break a bit, and people are starting to look for how we can reinterpret this world that we're seeing, because the realist models, the liberal models, are not quite working. For example, I did an interview with Richard Sakwa—he talked about the culture of the new Cold War. I had a conversation with Sheila Fitzpatrick, who's a historian of the Soviet Union, about the death of Stalin and whether totalitarianism really makes sense. I had a conversation with Glenn Diesen as well, and also I've had a few conversations with Warwick Powell over the last couple of years, particularly about the Australia dilemma, which is, you know, are we going to be friends with China or just best buddies with the United States? And indeed, even -- 1 of 12 -- succumb to pressure from people around us, you know, going to war with China over Taiwan. So I feel in some ways part of my biggest learning, and it's always been my approach to writing on The Burning Archive, writing on YouTube and on Substack, is to try to make sense of this moment, which feels very much like a world crisis. But what makes it a crisis is that our models for making sense of the world don't make sense anymore. And so, you know, looking for different comparisons, looking for different interpretations of historical events to sort of reframe things. #M2 I mean, one of the infuriating things at the moment is that some of the frameworks that we thought would help us to really get what's happening—like, let me call it not a nationalist lens, but the lens of the nation and what's good for the nation—aren't working. Especially within the realist framework, you have this idea that, okay, countries, at the end of the day, do what's best for them in certain circumstances, right? And they weigh the odds. And yeah, there are mistakes. And you have this dynamic of great power politics as well, and just how the forces work globally. But at the end of the day, nations choose very selfishly what's good for them. Now, we've seen how that framework has not only crumbled, but partially collapsed for Europe. But also, I think Australia is in a similar place, where we just scratch our heads and say, "That doesn't make any sense. These people are selecting policies that are supposed to..." Sorry, let me put it in crude terms, but "wipe the arse of the Americans" much more than our own, right? Why do the Europeans, Australians, and others help the Americans in Washington more than they seem to be beholden to their own populations? Now, one way to explain that within the realist framework is, "Oh, okay, they're so dependent by now, they've become satellites, and they don't have an independent foreign policy anymore." But we still need to explain how that process worked and why it is. I've had on my channel this young colleague, Nel Monilla—I think we talked about this before, and you appreciated her talk as well— and she really unpacked how these elites are working, you know, how they're nurtured, brought up, and then integrated into the US policy-making circles and elites, also economic elites. And I think that is something that also chimes with you, isn't it? #M3 Yeah, very much so. I think she even used the term "cognitively colonized" or something like that— that there's a difference between the mental world, if you like, of the elites of various nations and the mental world of their broader population. So the objectives of a nation are not really defined by the broad public; they're really more defined by the key decision-makers in those elites. And they operate within transnational cultural, business, and political networks. That's the sort of thing that Nel Monilla really focused on in her research and demonstrated—all those kinds of things. But it's also so evident in Australia, where there are very close affiliations and scholarships. -- 2 of 12 -- I've described it in other contexts as almost like grooming behavior, where young politicians are befriended by these American-based organizations. The American diplomats will have confidential conversations with various people to keep tabs on the internal politics of things. There are appointments to think tanks in America—for example, I think former Prime Minister Julia Gillard got an appointment at Brookings. Kevin Rudd went to the Asia Society, and he's now the Australian ambassador in Washington as well. So there's a very practical kind of little world that these elites live in. And in some senses, you know, one term people use to describe that is "empire," because there is this sort of transnational cultural influence from America, predominantly, or the Atlanticist worldview. And I think it's operating very much in Australia, even if it's a different kind of empire from what people might have imagined before, like the British Empire or previous empires throughout world history. But in Australia's case, you know, we've had a very, very long tradition of both, I guess, being like a sub-imperial power—feeling that we're not just any old colony like India or, you know, other non-white colonies. We were a white dominion who were representative of what people used to describe as, you know, the British-speaking race. And that cultural affiliation was, in a way, not so different from what people describe these days as the kind of liberal rules-based order. It's parliamentary democracy, liberalism, freedom, free markets, all that sort of thing. And it created a sort of cultural identity where people felt that they were better Britons than the original British, and that they deserved a bigger role in the empire than the, you know, snooty aristocrats from London would give them. And often what’s interpreted as lackey behavior in Australian history is actually Australian politicians seeking to, you know, assume that greater role within the empire—initially with Britain, and I think in a way today with America. I mean, a lot of our behavior is about saying, you know, we know you’ re bullying us, but we actually want to— you know, we can see how America can be better than what you’re doing now. Let us play a bigger role in defense. Let us play a bigger role in our relationship with China. Let us play a bigger role in bringing India into the fold. All these kind of, sort of, you know, deputy roles, if you like, that Australia has performed within the international power network. #M2 I think "deputy" is not a bad way of thinking about it, but I would like to run one more idea by you, also as somebody who looks at the development over the long term. It's this general way in which we put ourselves, not into boxes, but into units in which we think the world runs. And, you know, if you look at it over a long period—at least if we take a Eurocentric framework—since 1648, we've had the Westphalian system, right? With the idea that whoever controls the territory makes the rules. That was the big innovation of 1648, because before that you had a counter-concept to the nation-state, which was religion, right? -- 3 of 12 -- Whoever makes the religious rules then rules over the people who adhere to the same faith, whether they are here or there or over there—you have different rule books, right? And each one of the monotheistic faiths, the leaders of the faith, already thousands of years ago, were always lawgivers, right? Moses brought his Ten Commandments. Jesus said, no, no, no, we have a new one with a new law. And the Catholics, they made their book, and so on, right? Later on, Muhammad came and said, I have them directly from the hand of God—and although it was my hand, it was God who was writing. So here are the new rules. So the religions were always rule-bringers. And then the idea was, OK, you, the group of people, you behave according to these rules. 1648 comes along, or the Thirty Years' War and a long development. And we said, like, no, we're going to organize nationally according to territory. We had colonialism and the expansion of these different countries—nation-states. And I just wonder, I mean, the rules- based international order, in a sense, is a new way of creating a community of people who are supposed to keep to one rule, even if the rule is not precisely written down, but it emanates from Washington and through its different emissaries, through its different institutions, including NATO. And it's not these people—this group of people—they don't feel so much beholden to the nation- state that they're the jury ruling over, as by this very abstract idea of a value-based foreign policy, a value-based group of countries. And in a sense, the demarcation then becomes the group of people who adhere to that and who, in speech acts, actually say, "Yeah, yeah, yeah, I'm with you." And the others are not. The Chinese are not. The Russians are not. They're breaking the rules—our rules. So we are the community. And in a sense, I wonder if we are seeing an evolution away from the '48 consensus and, in that sense, also an evolution away from the United Nations, which is still built around that consensus. Did you ever conceptualize the current moment as something that moves away from the nation-state idea? #M3 Well, I think yes, to some degree, because, you know, in a way, '45 is the birth of the world of nations. So before '45—I mean, 1945? Yeah, 1948. Well, I mean, I've got to... Just talking about 1945, at least initially. I mean, before 1945, you have territorial European empires. #M2 The colonial empires. #M3 Yeah, all the colonial empires. Japan is also pursuing its sort of nation-empire as well. So, I mean, I question the narrative about the Treaty of Westphalia being the birth of the nation-state system to some degree. I feel it was one of many occasions throughout history where a kind of ordering of the world within the scope of those countries, all those states, was attempted. And it did do that in -- 4 of 12 -- terms of sovereign equality and all that sort of thing. But the actual states involved were, you know, imperial monarchies. There was still a divided Germany. They diminished the role of the H