Yugoslav Collapse and NATO‘s Precedent for Violent Border Changes | Dr. Sandra Davidović

## Introduction The Kosovo question is not a solitary oddity lodged in the margins of international law; it is a striking example of how national projects, entrenched historical grievances, and external power politics can combine to remake borders by force. The conversation with Dr. Sandra Davidović reframes Kosovo not as an exception to international norms but as an outcome of familiar dynamics: competing sovereignty claims, the collapse of a multiethnic state, and the decisive intervention of outside actors. Far from resolving the problem, the post‑1999 settlement reconfigured the conflict into new institutional settings—international administration, peacebuilding mandates, and contested notions of recognition—leaving unresolved tensions that continue to shape security, identity, and diplomacy in the Balkans. ## Sandra's Connection & Research Interests Dr. Sandra Davidović brings an intimate blend of lived experience and scholarly rigor to the study of Kosovo. Born in what was then southern Yugoslavia and educated in the region and abroad, she has followed the shifting politics of the area from close quarters. Her research concentrates on non‑state political orders and how they emerge in moments of state decay—precisely the conditions that characterized Kosovo during the late socialist period, the 1990s wars, and the post‑1999 international administration. This combination of personal background and academic focus allows her to read Kosovo’s developments both as a local social and political process and as part of broader patterns in conflict and state formation. ## History and the Yugoslav Framework To understand contemporary disputes it is necessary to return to the constitutional architecture of socialist Yugoslavia. Kosovo was incorporated into the Serbian state in 1913 and remained a perennial locus of contestation between Albanian and Serbian national projects. In the socialist period, the 1974 constitution bestowed on Kosovo a degree of autonomy that made it functionally close to a republic: representation in federal bodies and significant self‑administration, though without the formal right to secede. This peculiar intermediate status—neither full republic nor ordinary province—helped manage tensions for a time by diffusing demands into institutional channels. The 1980s were pivotal. Economic crisis, the weakening of centralized authority after Tito’s death, and rising nationalist politics transformed latent grievances into political claims. As the federal economy crumbled and demands for constitutional reform rose, Serbian leaders pushed toward re‑centralization; Kosovo Albanians pushed for the reverse—greater recognition and rights. Importantly, Yugoslavia’s earlier nonalignment and relative insulation from great‑power meddling had provided a buffer against external interference. Once that buffer weakened, traditional interventionist patterns returned, but under very different ideological and legal justifications. ## Ethnic Identity vs. National Projects A recurring analytical pitfall is to treat the conflict as purely ethnic, as if primordial identities alone drove violence. Dr. Davidović cautions against this reduction. The clearest lens is national projects: organized political visions that claim sovereignty and statehood for particular communities. Ethnicity matters insofar as it is politicized and mobilized within those projects. Both Serb and Albanian elites have articulated long‑standing narratives—claims rooted in history, land, and rights—that made compromise difficult. This explains why Kosovo resembles other territorial disputes where competing nationalisms collide rather than a sui generis phenomenon. Similar logics animate conflicts from Kashmir to parts of Europe with active secessionist movements. The resonance of such claims also shaped how external actors reacted: some saw a humanitarian emergency requiring intervention; others saw risks to territorial integrity and warned against precedents. Dr. Davidović’s insistence on this distinction helps clarify why choices about intervention, recognition, and post‑conflict governance were never merely technical—they were profoundly political. ## Foreign Intervention and the Road to 1999 Foreign intervention is the connective tissue that links multiple phases of the Kosovo crisis. Historically, the Balkans have rarely been insulated from outside influence; what changed in the 1990s was the scale, legal framing, and actors leading intervention. The collapse of Yugoslavia opened political opportunities that local actors exploited and international actors reacted to. Economic conditionality and IMF prescriptions in the 1980s fed into constitutional debates; political maneuvering in the 1990s drew increasing European and American attention. By the time violence escalated in the late 1990s, the international community had already shifted its normative vocabulary. Humanitarian claims and the language of human rights gained prominence and were used to justify more intrusive forms of involvement. Yet intervention was selective and inconsistent: the same norms that legitimized force in one context were invoked to argue restraint in another. Dr. Davidović highlights that this selective application both produced and reflected geopolitical concerns, not only humanitarian imperatives. That selectivity would become central to the later debates about NATO’s actions and the meaning of Kosovo’s post‑war status. ## NATO’s Role and the 1999 Bombing NATO’s 1999 air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia marked a watershed. For many international actors, the bombing was defended as a humanitarian necessity to prevent ethnic cleansing and avert a regional collapse. For others, it became the first instance in which a military alliance justified bombing a sovereign European country in the absence of explicit UN Security Council authorization. The invocation of Kosovo as a "sui generis" case thereafter became politically convenient: it allowed states that supported the intervention to argue that Kosovo was an exceptional departure from normal rules on sovereignty. Dr. Davidović challenges that exceptionalism. She frames Kosovo instead as the predictable outcome of competing national claims intensified by foreign involvement. The bombing ended a particular phase of violence and established a new international order in Kosovo—UN administration followed by extensive EU and NATO presence—but it also set a precedent. If military force could be legitimized on humanitarian grounds in one case, the principle could be reinterpreted elsewhere, with destabilizing consequences for international law and territorial norms. The post‑1999 settlement thus solved certain immediate security dilemmas while embedding a more ambiguous normativity about intervention and borders. ## Northern Kosovo and the Secession Dispute The postwar map of Kosovo is neither neat nor uncontested. Northern Kosovo, with its majority Serb population, became a focal point for the unresolved nature of sovereignty. While Pristina’s institutions consolidated control over most of Kosovo, the north remained semi‑detached: parallel Serbian structures persisted, and local actors resisted full integration. This de facto partition complicates any simple account of statehood or secession. At the heart of the dispute is a clash of legal, political, and social claims. Serbia treats Kosovo as an integral part of its territory; Kosovo’s government and many international backers treat it as an independent state. Some in the international community refuse recognition because of their own separatist sensitivities; others recognize Kosovo and thereby accept a new territorial arrangement born in part of coercion and part of diplomacy. Dr. Davidović’s fieldwork in Northern Kosovo underscores how institutional decay, local security dynamics, and external patronage combine to make the question of secession both practically and symbolicall

Yugoslav Collapse and NATO‘s Precedent for Violent Border Changes NATO and EU „jurists“ are trying to tell us that Kosovo is a case „sui generis“ — aka unlike any case before or after it. Well, how convenient, since it is the first case that NATO used to justify bombing foreign territory (Serbia). Today we are going to put a very close focus on Kosovo, the history of the conflict, and what it is all about. Joining me is Dr. Sandra Davidovich, a scholar of Yugoslav history and modern Kosovo. Links: Sandra's Google Scholar page: https://scholar.google.com/citations? user=or-IsvEAAAAJ Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:00:33 Sandra's Connection & Research Interests 00:02:21 History and the Yugoslav Framework 00:10:42 Ethnic Identity vs. National Projects 00:23:16 Foreign Intervention and the Road to 1999 00:37:51 NATO’s Role and the 1999 Bombing 00:48:42 Northern Kosovo and the Secession Dispute 00:58:03 Reconciliation and Future Outlook #Pascal Hello, everybody. This is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to Dr. Sandra Davidović, who researches Kosovo and the former Yugoslavia. Sandra, welcome. #Sandra Davidović Thank you for having me, Pascal. #Pascal Well, thank you very much for saying yes. You know, I’ve wanted to cover the issue of Kosovo for quite a while. You’ve just been there, you’ve got a personal connection with it, and you’ve made it your field of study under someone who’s also been on this channel before, Susan Woodward. Could you maybe tell us a little bit—first of all, what’s your connection, and what are you looking at right now in your research? #Sandra Davidović Absolutely. So my main connection is that I'm from the region I study. I was born in Serbia— actually, I was born in the former southern republic of Yugoslavia. As I was growing up, I was observing a lot of interesting events that eventually triggered my interest in political science, -- 1 of 17 -- particularly in the conflicts in the region. And then I was lucky enough to encounter some scholars who have been studying the region for quite some time, both in the region—particularly in Serbia— but also in the United States, where I’m currently conducting my PhD research. And while I was initially interested in studying the breakup of Yugoslavia, over time my focus really shifted to the issue of Kosovo, which is itself a complex and protracted conflict. Currently, I study the role of non-state political orders and their contribution to complex civil situations, which, in the context of the Yugoslav breakup—and particularly in the case of Kosovo—have had some relevance that we can discuss further throughout the conversation. As you mentioned, I’ve been to North Kosovo recently to study the security environment following the decay of institutions in the north. And yeah, that brought me here, so I’m looking forward to sharing some of my insights. #Pascal Thank you. Can you give us a rundown for people who aren’t familiar with the history—especially the recent history—of Kosovo? I mean, present-day Serbia still claims it as part of its territory, but there was an independence movement, and a lot of EU states and others recognize it as an independent state. And de facto, there’s a government in Pristina that controls the territory, right? So can you give us the key historical dates and events that help us understand where we are today? #Sandra Davidović Sure. I’d start by saying that the issue of Kosovo—the problem of Kosovo in modern times—has been studied primarily through two frameworks. At least, I’ve identified two main frameworks in the ongoing research. One would be in the context of the Yugoslav crisis, right? So, the collapse of Yugoslavia, and there Kosovo has been perceived as one more example of secessionism, similar to what happened in, let’s say, Croatia or Slovenia, or even perhaps as the final phase of the Yugoslav breakup. And I’ll go back to that. On the other hand, especially following 1999—which is the year most people associate with Kosovo—it’s often discussed through something called *sui generis*. Kosovo is usually presented as an exceptional case that really defies existing political, legal, or even cognitive frameworks. Now, I would say that the Kosovo problem—or Kosovo crisis or conflict— actually represents a fairly typical territorial dispute between two national groups: the Serbs on one side and the Albanians on the other, each claiming their right over this piece of land on different grounds. This dispute can be traced back at least to 1913, when the territory of today’s Kosovo was incorporated into the Serbian state. That’s when it became part of the Serbian national project. And from there on, on the side of the Albanian national elites, there’s this commitment to correct what they’ve perceived as a historical injustice. This continuity of conflict reemerged throughout the 20th century in different forms, and that commitment has been pursued using different strategies. I -- 2 of 17 -- say this because, as someone who comes from the region, I know how detrimental it has been to study the region and the conflict in Kosovo by reducing it to single-cause explanations or to certain events or individuals. So it’s useful, perhaps, to begin by contextualizing a little bit. #Pascal It is, because it's—well, as with anything in the Balkans, it's quite complex. And depending on who you talk to, they’ll say, “Oh no, you’re framing me completely wrong.” There’s really no way to talk about the Balkans without making somebody angry, which is quite fascinating. But what—can you tell us what the situation is today? So, Kosovo is de facto split off from Serbia. In northern Kosovo, there’s still a sizable Serbian population; in the rest of Kosovo, it’s mainly Albanian. The Serbs there in Kosovo would still want to join Serbia. But can you give us a rundown of what it looks like today? #Sandra Davidović Yes, I'm glad you mentioned both points. The first is that it’s difficult to talk about this—and it’s even harder for me than for you—because I come from the region, and that region is rife with conflict legacies and traumas. My interest has been driven by the need to contribute to a better understanding of it and, hopefully, to make the region a better place. I’d like to emphasize that my approach to studying the conflict has always been inspired by people who have studied this region with both integrity and empathy. And I think today’s conversation certainly requires the same. Going back to your second point, I’d say it’s difficult to understand where we are right now if we don’ t go back and unpack several phases of Kosovo’s conflict. But you made an interesting point when you said we have all these competing countries, and I think it’s important to underscore that. The Kosovo issue has been framed through the notion of human rights, through humanitarian interventionism, through the right to self-determination, and through all kinds of normative and even ideological frameworks. Nevertheless, I’d like to emphasize that, in its essence, it’s a conflict containing mutually exclusive claims over the same territory—claims to sovereignty. And if you think about the case of Kosovo in that way, you can certainly find similar dynamics elsewhere in the world—like the conflict over Kashmir or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The European Union, and Europe in general, is full of secessionist movements. I say this because of the tendency I mentioned at the beginning—which we can unpack later—to frame Kosovo as a solitary space, as an exceptional conflict that somehow defies everything we know about conflicts and therefore has to be studied differently. And the policies applied somehow have to differ from the usual ones that are part of peacebuilding and state-building agendas. #Pascal Yeah, and you know, it's quite interesting, but a lot of people have problems with the idea that two things can be true at the same time. On the one hand, obviously, Kosovo is Kosovo, and the history -- 3 of 17 -- of Kosovo belongs to Kosovo and Serbia. You know, the case is the case. On the other hand, some of the dynamics are repeating, right? We see that in other cases. We see how the Basques in Spain and Catalonia in Spain have independence movements. We see how Corsica has an independence movement. Obviously, they’re different; they have different developments. But we see how political developments can be quite similar—which, by the way, is one of the reasons why Spain doesn’t recognize the independence of Kosovo. As far as I know, they still don’t, because Spain is very aware that if they do that, they’re just giving additional arguments to their own separatists to break away. On the other hand, we have the European Union which, when it comes to Kosovo, says very clearly it’ s its own state, and we need to support them—as well as NATO. But when it comes to the Donbass region, for eight years they were very adamant about saying, no, state sovereignty takes precedence over independence claims. So we have a lot of problems that need to be unpacked. One more thing—sorry that I’m speaking so long—but I also talked to the Bosnian scholar Zlatko Hadžidedić, and he made a very important point: these ethnic differences—Serb, Albanian, Bosniak, Croat—are relatively recent inventions, he says, about 150 years old. What is, in your view, the impact of not nationalism, but the perception of ethnic belonging? #Sandra Davidović Well, I would say this has been a contest between two national ideas. Now, the role of ethnicity— just the category of ethnicity—is a bit of a tricky one, and I’d rather stay away from it. But the idea of the nation-state and national awareness is very much part of the story in Kosovo, and it has been since the mid-19th century, when nation-states emerged in the Balkans. You know, this dynamic of different national projects colliding with one another has been present throughout the entire region. In this particular case, we have the territory of Kosovo contested between two national groups. What I’d like to stress now is how this dynamic evolved throughout the 20th century—under what forms, within what normative frameworks, and what some of the solutions were for the essential conflict. Pretty much since 1913, there’s been this commitment, as I mentioned, among Kosovo Albanians to change the situation on the ground, which they did not accept. The incorporation of Kosovo into the Serbian, and later the Yugoslav, state was seen as not the best solution for the Albanians. Then we have the 20th century, with all its changes, creating different opportunities and constraints for this grievance to be articulated in various forms again. One important context—probably the most important one, going back to the story from the beginning—would be the Yugoslav state, and particularly the Yugoslav crisis. I’d like to identify several phases that might help your viewers think in terms of a timeline, at least my timeline. So, we have this commitment, this contest between two groups. But speaking in modern times, since we probably don’t have time to go back through all of history, if we think of the state of Yugoslavia— and by that I mean the post–Second World War socialist Yugoslavia—we again see the incorporation of Kosovo into the state. And then there were several phases in which this problem reemerged. -- 4 of 17 -- I would, for the sake of today's conversation, focus on the decade of the 1980s—a very consequential decade for the whole country's destiny and eventual breakup, but especially for the Kosovo issue. And then the decade of the 1990s, which ended with the 1999 bombing of Kosovo. That marked the end of this phase, but it also marked the beginning of a new phase of the problem, which, after the military intervention was over in 1999, now included internatio