The West is CLUELESS: The Unbreakable India-Russia Friendship Explained | Dr. Anuradha Chenoy

## India-China Rapprochement The conversation makes clear that the recent thaw between India and China is neither accidental nor merely performative; it is the product of deliberate, incremental diplomacy built on layers of conflict-management mechanisms. Dr. Anuradha Chenoy emphasizes that the visible rapprochement — state visits, joint communiqués, and public affirmations of peace — rests on a much longer arc of engagement. Corps-commanders' talks, repeated national security advisor meetings, and a series of bilateral accords dating back decades provide institutional scaffolding that allows both capitals to lower temperature without pretending that underlying problems have evaporated. That distinction matters. What has shifted is not so much the underlying territorial contest as the commitment to manage it below the boiling point. Decades of cross-border frictions, from low-level patrol clashes to the deadly Galwan incident, have produced an uneasy familiarity with crisis. The new momentum is an acknowledgement that perpetual escalation is unaffordable for both sides. In practical terms, India’s insistence on restoring pre-2020 positions in sensitive stretches of the Line of Actual Control and China’s signaling through diplomatic missions have been synchronized into a shared vocabulary of disengagement, de-escalation, discussion, and de-induction. The result is a calibrated de-freeze: greater diplomatic traffic, resumed talks across security and foreign-policy layers, and a renewed appetite to shield geoeconomic ties from strategic rupture. Yet this is a fragile equilibrium. National political narratives — the domestic audiences that prize sovereignty, honor, and historical memory — keep both governments constrained. Long borders drawn in eras of empire cannot be unmade by summitry alone; they require continuous micro-level management. The conversation underscores that the present thaw should be judged by compliance and follow-through rather than lip service. If both sides keep investing in their conflict-management architecture, the thaw can be durable. If one side feels the balance shifting too far, history suggests setbacks will follow. ## Managing Disputes and the Role of SCO and BRICS The discussion frames the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS less as revolutionary alternatives and more as pragmatic platforms for hedging, managing disputes, and normalizing multipolar diplomacy. These forums offer Global South states a venue to institutionalize strategic autonomy without embodying a fixed bloc against any single power. They create repeated interactions where disputes can be tabled, mediated informally, or quietly contained — turning interstate friction into a matter for ongoing negotiation rather than immediate confrontation. Dr. Chenoy points to a broader historical lesson: countries that have preserved neutrality and non-alignment-like postures — now often called strategic autonomy — have typically enjoyed more consistent development trajectories. For states fearful of being drawn into great-power competition, institutions like SCO and BRICS function as safety valves. They institutionalize a discourse of multipolarity, economic cooperation, and shared governance norms that, in practice, reduce the incentives for militarized escalation. The emphasis in recent meetings on “peace and tranquility” and on ensuring that differences do not metastasize into disputes is not mere rhetoric; it fits a deliberate, long-term strategy to rework international norms around sovereignty, equity, and non-interference. But BRICS and SCO are not cure-alls. Their capacity to force compliance or resolve deep-seated territorial claims is limited. Their power lies in shaping expectations, creating diplomatic pathways, and providing geopolitical cover for states like India to pursue diversified ties while resisting binary alignments. The conversation suggests that the value of these institutions is less in grand declarations and more in the day-to-day work of keeping conflicts manageable. ## India-Russia: An Unbreakable Partnership One of the most striking themes in the exchange is the solidity of India-Russia ties. The sentiment is presented as near-consensus across Indian political stripes: historical depth, mutual strategic interests, and a lack of substantive conflict give the relationship a resilience that few other partnerships enjoy. From defence cooperation and energy linkages to diplomatic coordination in multilateral fora, the partnership functions as a predictable pillar in India’s foreign policy architecture. Energy is a case in point. India’s refusal to cut off Russian oil amid mounting Western pressure — and its ongoing purchases — are not simply transactional; they are emblematic of a relationship built on reciprocity and strategic reliability. Discussions of projects like pipelines and broader Eurasian connectivity reflect long-term thinking about securing energy routes and diversifying partners. For New Delhi, Russia occupies a singular place: a strategic partner with whom there is historical trust and no underlying zero-sum antagonism. This creates room for New Delhi to exercise autonomy, balancing ties with Moscow while engaging with other powers whose interests sometimes diverge from Russia’s. Importantly, the conversation also shows how India views its Russia ties as complementary rather than substitutive of other relationships. The partnership with Moscow is an anchor, not a tether; it affords India policy space to collaborate with Western powers on selective issues while resisting pressures that would force it into exclusive alignments. ## Decline of US Structural Power and Western Strategy A central analytical thread is the suggestion that U.S. structural power in the Global South is under strain and that this decline is reshaping how the West — particularly Washington — approaches rising powers like India. Dr. Chenoy and the interlocutors argue that U.S. policy toward India is increasingly transactional and punitive rather than purely cooperative, reflecting both domestic politics and a strategic calculus aimed at containing emergent blocs such as BRICS. This interpretation reframes recent U.S. moves — tariff threats, trade frictions, and a less accommodating tone — as symptoms of a broader anxiety. The U.S. appears intent on protecting perceived advantages in trade and technology while signaling to partners that certain developmental models should not be replicated. Such signals risk alienating countries whose leaders equate strategic autonomy with national development. For India, the message is clear: partnerships that come with strings undermining domestic priorities (like agricultural protections or industrial policy) are politically costly. The conversation argues that this dynamic explains much of India’s hedging. New Delhi is unwilling to accept a foreign policy that privileges external strategic preferences over internal socio-economic imperatives. The result is a more nuanced, sometimes prickly relationship with the U.S. — cooperative where interests align, resistant where they do not — and a deeper willingness to engage with alternative multilateral architectures that promise policy space. ## Continental versus Maritime Geopolitics Another insightful strand is the contrast between continental and maritime visions of geopolitics. The Indo-Pacific discourse, championed prominently by Western strategists, focuses on maritime interoperability, alliances, and the projection of power across sea lanes. Yet the recent resurgence of continental corridors — Eurasian land linkages, Russia-India-China dialogues, and renewed overland connectivity initiatives — suggests a rebalancing in strategic imagination. The conversation highlights that the Eurasian landmass still matters. Russia’s Pacific capacities, China’s continental initiatives, and India’s own interest in diversified corridors point toward a complementary, i

The West is CLUELESS: The Unbreakable India-Russia Friendship Explained Is the era of US structural power in the Global South coming to an end? As the US strategically downgrades India, how is India reshaping its foreign policy, strengthening ties with China and Russia while asserting its strategic autonomy? What does the emerging continental bloc of BRICS and SCO mean for the future of geopolitics and the push for a multipolar world order? To discuss this and more, today I’m talking again to Dr. Anuradha Chenoy, a former professor and dean at the School of International Studies at India’s prestigious (JaVa Halal) Jawaharlal Nehru University. Links: Anuradha's articles in "Economic and Political Weekly": https://www.epw.in/author/anuradha-chenoy Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies- shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 0:00:00 Introduction 0:01:04 India-China Rapprochement 0:08:17 Western Narrative on China's Success & Border Disputes 0:15:12 Managing Disputes & Role of SCO /BRICS 0:17:38 India's Stance on the Quad Alliance 0:19:56 Continental vs. Maritime Geopolitics 0: 21:45 China-Taiwan & India-Russia Relations 0:27:01 Decline of US Structural Power 0:29:39 Indian Perception of Trump's European Humiliation 0:31:48 India-EU Relations & Sanctions 0:36:10 India's Security Concerns in the Neighborhood 0:41:13 India-Pakistan Dialogue within SCO 0:43:05 Where to find Anu Chenoy's work #F1 Well, look, internationally, the India-Russia relationship is the most solid—historical, with no conflict of interest, and complete support from both sides. And there's complete consensus in these countries. Now, in India, which is very divided—there's a right, there's a left, there's a center, there's the ordinary people—but you ask anyone on the political spectrum and they say Russia is a part. There's no dispute on that, and it has to continue. So they can talk about India-Pakistan, India- China, but on India-Russia, there is this consensus. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies. And today I'm talking again to Dr. Anuradha Chenoy, a former professor and dean at the School of International Studies at India's prestigious Jawaharlal Nehru University. Anu, welcome back. #F1 Thank you. Thank you for having me. #M2 -- 1 of 14 -- Great having you back, because we really need to talk about India's foreign policy now that everything is changing. We've just seen the meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. We've just seen this rapprochement—or we're seeing the rapprochement—between India and China. What is your take on this new relationship with your big neighbor to the northeast? #F1 Well, look, of course, you know, the optics have shown that there is a defreeze, which there is. There has been a thaw because Modi has visited China after seven years. So naturally, it is a major event in international politics, given the fact that international politics is in transition. But there is a lot behind it—a lot behind the timing, a lot behind the process between India and China. There are legacy issues in which, you know, there was a lack of trust because India and China have not been able to really demarcate this very long border that they have. There are differences in perception. These borders were created, of course, by the colonialists, the British. So the Indians see it differently. The Chinese see it differently. And along this border, there have been skirmishes in the past. Sometimes they're low, sometimes they increase. So China uses a kind of politics of pressure, compromise, and pressure with India. But India is quite keen to improve relations, though there has been a breakdown of trust. Now, given this major transition, India and China actually started moves to improve their relations in 2024. So it's not an immediate thing where Trump has sanctions or Modi rushes to China. These meetings have been very carefully prepared. And the other thing is, India and China, despite their differences, have set up several levels of conflict management. One is a corps commanders' level meeting on the border, a working mechanism which was set up in 2012. And though Galwan happened, where Indian soldiers were killed and a few Chinese soldiers as well, even then, in 2023, these corps commanders were on the ground there facing each other. They had 23 meetings. So while there was a freeze, this still goes on. But the most important meeting is at a higher level, that of the national security advisors—that is, in India, the NSA, Ajit Doval, and in China, Wang Yi. And there, before, and I think Mr. Modi was very clear that if he was going to meet President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of Kazan, there had to be some give. And so there was the 22nd round only in 2019, and suddenly there was a 23rd round between them in December 2024. In this, of course, in the press, Modi told Newsweek, for example, that India- China relations are very significant and that we need to permanently address the issue. The Chinese reacted. But an important date was October 2024, when the foreign secretary announced that the Border Patrol had actually restored the pre-2020 rights in sensitive areas on the border, and he referred to the four Ds, which have been mentioned again and again, including in the meetings in 2025: disengagement, de-escalation, discussion, and de-induction. So overall, if you look at international relations and border issues, I think this is a good model as well. -- 2 of 14 -- #M2 And this model was in place even before the current situation with all of these sanctions. So the thaw in relations has a longer history than just the United States now putting pressure on India. #F1 You're right. It has a longer history, but the difference is that it has been sped up greatly. It's been accelerated because it's clear that the U.S. has strategically downgraded India. It's not just Trump's idiosyncrasies—saying one thing one day and another the next. There's an entire structural shift, in my opinion, which is happening now, and there are four or five points if we look at why the U.S. has strategically downgraded India. One, of course, is that it's both personal, political, and economic. It's holistic. It's not just personal, like Modi refusing to endorse the Nobel Prize for Trump or refusing to acknowledge Trump's mediation efforts in the India-Pakistan conflict. It's more than that. For example, Trump, in his cabinet meeting, has said, "Well, India does more trade with us than we do with them." And that's true. India has a major advantage in what it exports to the US and what it receives. And India does have tariffs; it does protect its agricultural sector because 70% of India's poorest farmers depend on dairy and agriculture. So if they open it to the highly subsidized U.S. dairy and agriculture, it would be a big blow, and there would be a movement against the prime minister. So that's one. Second, it's a punishment for BRICS. It's clear now the U. S. sees BRICS and multipolarity as a threat. And they're seeking to counter it in multiple ways. Third, they believe that they can damage BRICS with this and pressure both Russia and China—maybe give something to China, because they're actually only negotiating with these two countries; the others are sideshows. And also, they don't want India to become another China. After all, the U.S. was responsible for making China a market economy, bringing it into the WTO, opening up, and transferring manufacturing, which led to this huge scaling up. So they don't want India to do the same. So there are various reasons, and these have come out in various statements. #M2 Although I must say, the idea that the United States made China successful is a very Western narrative, isn't it? It completely disregards Chinese agency. It's like, "Oh, all of the mistakes we made, and therefore they became rich. Oh, too bad." But if we think that this is actually the thinking over there—which I see in several publications—then it makes sense that they would try to have a different strategy toward India. Now, this, however, creates a huge pressure, of course, for India and China to resolve these petty little disputes. Maybe one more question about the petty disputes, because both countries are huge, humongous, and the border areas we're talking about are long, -- 3 of 14 -- yes, but the disputed area itself is just a couple of tens—20, 30 kilometers on each side. It's like, why is it that these border disputes are so difficult to overcome for countries this large? Is it partially also out of the control of the central government what happens in these areas? #F1 No, I think, number one, it's the two nationalisms—you know, the Indian nationalism, which helps governments take power, and the Chinese nationalism, which also has an ecosystem and trolls, etc., who don't trust India and don't want to see China transferring technology and FDI, but India does. And there's a difference in perception, even on multipolarity. For example, China is pushing for a multipolar economy and world order, which is anti-U.S. hegemony. It's against unilateralism; it's for strategic autonomy. Now, India also gains from a multipolar world order, but it continuously repeats that they also want multipolarity in Asia. And here the relations are very asymmetric. China is five times more advanced in every sector than India. But at the same time, if you look now—and this is something interesting which I haven't seen come up in other analyses—if you look at Xi Jinping's thought, just like Mao's thought and Deng Xiaoping's thought, he has these four global initiatives. One is the Global Development Initiative, which came out in 2021 and is closely linked to the UN SDGs. The second is the Global Security Initiative in 2022, which talks about common and indivisible security, and that you cannot have security for one state if you do not have security for the other. It's something that you say, something which the Russians say, and a hundred countries have endorsed and supported this—the Africans and many others. And the third was the Global Civilization Initiative, that these great civilizations must be allowed to progress. And the fourth, which just came out at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting from Xi, was the Global Governance Initiative, which talked about sovereign equality, abiding by international law, practicing multilateralism, a people-centered approach, and focusing on taking real actions. So they have these huge four global initiatives, which they are touting at every meeting. And the overarching conceptualization is, of course, multipolarity and globalization with free trade— not the American kind of globalization, but anti-U.S. hegemony under the U.N. arch. So not a rule- based order, but a U.N.-based order. If you have this rhetoric and you're not getting along with your biggest neighbor, people are going to question that. It's not that the Chinese are not keen to mend ties. But again, there's an issue about mending ties because China has repeatedly said, "Let's forget about the border and go in for economic development." Geoeconomics is very important. The reason is that China has a huge, huge trade relationship with India—$128 billion, of which India has a deficit of almost $100 billion. So they're gaining. But a lot of products India makes— electronics, etc.—which it exports again to the US and to the West, the base materials, the downstream components, come from the Chinese, including rare earths. So India also wants that. They want FDI. But at the same time, there are constraints for both sides to at least repair the -- 4 of 14 -- relations. But India has held firm, and they've said, "We can give up on that if the border issue is not resolved. That is central to us." And that is why, before the SCO meeting, when Wang Yi suddenly came—and mind you, the international events are very interesting in this period. O