China, Russia and the Battle for Eurasia | Ryan Perkins

## The Contest for the Caucasus: TRIPP and the Eurasia Canal The geopolitical map of Eurasia is being redrawn not only by tanks and sanctions but by transport lines and waterways. The conversation with Ryan Perkins frames the Caucasus as the next theatre where great-power competition will be materially contested: a corridor through Armenia and Azerbaijan, backed by the United States and the European Union, and a revival of Soviet-era Russian proposals to link the Sea of Azov to the Caspian. What may look like infrastructure planning on paper is, in practice, a contest over influence, security buffers, and the ability to shape trade flows across the continent. Perkins describes TRIPP — the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity — as a multimodal corridor carrying road, rail and digital infrastructure, intended to connect Europe to the Caspian and beyond. For proponents, it is an economic artery linking the EU to Central Asia that can bypass traditional Russian routes. For skeptics around the region and in Tehran, it appears designed to institutionalize a Western footprint between Russia and Iran. Russia’s countermove — to resurrect a maritime passage across its own territory — is more than nostalgia for Soviet engineering. It is a strategic riposte intended to consolidate Moscow’s control over Caspian access and to deny the emergence of an alternative overland route that might reorient the Caucasian states away from its sphere. The conversation makes clear that these projects cannot be divorced from wider conflicts. The political feasibility of TRIPP depends on fragile peace agreements, constitutional concessions and the will of capitals such as Armenia and Azerbaijan. Likewise, the Russian canal proposals feed off revived Kremlin interest in boosting regional connectivity to offset Western policy moves. In short, the battle for the Caucasus is at once technical, economic and geopolitical — infrastructure is the instrument by which influence is being contested. ## Building the Eurasia Canal: engineering and trade When geopolitics meets hydraulics, practical constraints rapidly become decisive. Perkins sketches the engineering contours of the Eurasia Canal proposal: roughly 700 kilometres across the Kuma-Manych depression, with locks and water-management works required to negotiate the Caspian Sea’s lower level versus the Sea of Azov. Proposals range in ambition — shorter, smaller-draft channels for 10,000-ton vessels versus more ambitious schemes for 26,000-ton ships — but even the scaled-down option would change the economics of north-south maritime transit across Eurasia. Beyond sheer engineering, the question is what kinds of trade such a canal would unlock. Sea transport is far cheaper than overland trucking, and a navigable channel would give Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and other Caspian states more direct and cost-efficient routes to Mediterranean markets via the Bosporus. For Russia, a canal on domestic territory would both capture transit revenues and strengthen Moscow’s maritime leverage in the Caspian basin. Yet technical feasibility is only one side of the ledger: financing and politics are the other. Perkins notes that some of the needed infrastructure has antecedents in Soviet-era projects, which lowers the technical novelty but does not eliminate the need for large, patient capital and capable contractors. Finally, strategic costs arise from creating new, possibly isolating, artificial waterways inside a country. The conversation raises a salient point: large canals can act as internal borders and occasionally become flashpoints where governance, ethnic tensions, or regional separatism exist. Whether Russia views such risks as manageable is an open question, but for Moscow the calculus appears to favour expanded connectivity and control over the Caspian littoral. ## China’s Belt and Road and reserve strategy China’s approach to transcontinental infrastructure has shifted since the Belt and Road Initiative’s (BRI) ambitious launch. Perkins traces that evolution from an early phase of large-scale lending motivated partly by the need to deploy dollar reserves, to a period of retrenchment and then to a more strategic accumulation of minerals and onshore assets after 2022. The initial Belt and Road push was as much about providing outlets for China’s dollar holdings as about building global ties. As projects exposed Beijing to debt-restructuring headaches and Western criticism of “debt-trap diplomacy,” the PRC adjusted both the scale and the terms of engagement. Perkins argues that the BRI has not so much collapsed as reoriented: loans are now more targeted, often focused on renewable energy and projects that better align with Chinese industrial needs. Crucially, the shift toward stockpiling metals and raw materials signals a new phase of reserve management — one driven by concerns about financial exclusion and the vulnerability of dollar holdings if global politics leads to asset seizures. For the Eurasia infrastructure competition, this reorientation matters. A Russian canal or an overland corridor that can be financed in renminbi, and built largely with Chinese technology and labour, becomes a realistic proposition in ways it might not have been a decade ago. Perkins further suggests that China’s appetite for a Russian-led canal or for backing connectivity projects in Central Asia will be calibrated by pragmatism: Chinese firms are experienced at delivering large civil works; Beijing can afford patient finance; and a route that diversifies China’s transport links into Central Asia and the Middle East is functionally aligned with its strategic objectives. Thus, if Moscow can present a deal that reduces dollar exposure and secures Chinese strategic access, collaboration is plausible even without a formal military alliance. ## China and Russia: partnership without alliance A recurrent theme in the discussion is the character of the Sino-Russian relationship: deepening strategic partnership, but not a formal alliance. Perkins frames the Beijing-Moscow link as transactional and interest-driven rather than bound by an automatic security guarantee. The two states cooperate where their goals align — trade, energy, and coordinated diplomatic positions — and are cautious where strategic entanglements would cost them autonomy. This dynamic helps explain why Russia would expect Chinese financing or technical assistance for large projects while remaining wary of over-dependence. It also clarifies China’s posture: Beijing prefers flexible partnerships that allow it to hedge its bets, secure resources, and avoid being drawn into conflicts that would jeopardize its domestic priorities. The Eurasian infrastructure competition exemplifies this: China is willing to finance and build where there are clear economic returns and where the project strengthens its strategic resilience, but it is not stepping into any arrangement that would require Moscow to act as Beijing’s proxy in a military sense. Perkins’s reading highlights how the relationship is stabilised by mutual interest rather than ideological alignment. This has implications for third parties: states in Central Asia or the Caucasus can exploit Sino-Russian competition by courting both partners, while Washington or Brussels must recognize that neither Moscow nor Beijing will sacrifice hard strategic interests lightly. ## Financialization and the loss of industrial capacity One of the deeper undercurrents discussed is the role of global financial structures in shaping great-power options. Perkins points to the constraints that Western financialization imposes on long-term infrastructure projects: short-termism, risk-averse capital markets, and regulatory entanglements that complicate patient investment. Western actors, according to this account, are increasingly ill-equipped to bankroll or organize megaprojects in challenging environments. China, by contrast, retains state-direct

China, Russia and the Battle for Eurasia | Ryan Perkins The great powers are leaving Europe behind. The USA, China and Russia are all focusing on the new heartland of the 21st century: Central Asia. Ryan Perkins joins Pascal to examine competing transport corridors across Eurasia, from the US-backed TRIPP route to Russia’s proposed Eurasia Canal. They discuss Chinese infrastructure financing, the evolution of the Belt and Road Initiative, and the strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing. The conversation explores financialization, industrial capacity, digital sovereignty, and China’s approach to international relations. Perkins also presents his interpretation of the Iran conflict and argues that disruption around Hormuz can serve as economic pressure on China’s development. Ryan's Links: Substack: https://ceinewsletter.substack.com X: https://x.com/ChinaIndicator Global Economic Indicator: https://globaleconomicindicator.com The Contest for the Caucasus: TRIPP and the Eurasia Canal: https://ceinewsletter.substack.com/p/the-contest-for-the-caucasus-tripp The ECB Maps the Trap, Cracks Form and Bessent Slips Up: https://globaleconomicindicator.com/the-ecb-maps-the-trap- cracks-form-and-bessent-slips-up/ Neutrality Studies Links: Neutrality Studies Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Support Neutrality Studies: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Neutrality Studies shop: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Time Stamps 00:00 Ryan Perkins and the contest for the Caucasus 07:06 Building the Eurasia Canal: engineering and trade 17:04 China’s Belt and Road and reserve strategy 24:35 China and Russia: partnership without alliance 33:05 Financialization and the loss of industrial capacity 40:46 Digital sovereignty and China’s global approach 46:46 China, the Philippines and regional tensions 50:13 Iran, Hormuz and economic pressure on China #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today, for the first time, with a good colleague who I met for the first time in Pskov, Russia, when we were together at the same conference. It's Mr. Ryan Perkins, a geopolitical analyst based in Beijing, China. Ryan, welcome. #Ryan Perkins Thank you very much. Thanks very much for having me. #Pascal Thank you for coming online. You've already talked to Alexander Mercouris, and we all enjoyed very much your observations about China and Russia at the forum, and that was quite insightful. So I wanted to have you back. And you actually just wrote an article on your own Substack. Everybody, -- 1 of 20 -- you can subscribe to Orion on Substack. And the article is actually called "The Contest for the Caucasus Trip and the Eurasian Canal." Let's start with this one, and then we go into Chinese- Russian relations a little bit later. What exactly are the observations in here? #Ryan Perkins So I was recently at the Far Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, and this story came out of a number of rumors and proposals that were floating around there. And it's actually very interesting to see. You can view, I think, this contest for the Caucasus very much as an extension of the other wars that are currently waging across the Eurasian continent. So you have the conflict in Ukraine and the conflict in West Asia with Iran, U.S.-Iran conflict. And in many ways, you can view this contest that's emerging in the Caucasus as an extension of that. So the TRIP proposal, which is the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, grew out of the peace summit between Armenia and Azerbaijan last year, in September of last year in Washington. And this was a proposal to build a multimodal transport corridor. So it's a rail and road link with digital infrastructure connecting the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea, running primarily through Armenia and Azerbaijan. And essentially, that will create a corridor that will run from the European Union through Turkey and then on through the Caucasus. And obviously, this is clearly aimed at trying to reorient the Caucasus region away from the kind of traditional sphere of influence of Russia and Iran. And you can view it very much as a way of putting a U.S. presence directly in between Russia and Iran. When I was at the Far Eastern Economic Forum, there was clearly quite a lot of concern about this from certainly the Russians. And what we saw was the revival of really a Soviet-era proposal, which is to build a maritime route from the Sea of Azov to the Caspian Sea that would run directly through Russian territory. And you can view that really, I think, as a direct countermove to this U.S.-backed proposal. #Pascal Yeah, maybe just very briefly, for the geography of the place, right? I mean, we've got Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia here that are the three Southern Caucasus states. But then the Northern Caucasus is, of course, entirely Russian. And so the TRIPP corridor, what people in Georgia sometimes refer to as the Zangezur corridor, would connect Azerbaijan via Armenia, and actually TRIPP would connect it down here right at the border to Iran. Right, right at that border. #Ryan Perkins It's literally putting U.S. infrastructure directly north of the Iranian border. And the Iranians have been very, very vocal about this. And they've said, you know, this essentially is a form of geopolitical strangulation. And interestingly, they said that even before the war started in February. So they're -- 2 of 20 -- very, very concerned about it. And they've actually said that they will close it down, even if the Russians don't. They've said whether or not the Russians back us in this, we will do whatever's in their power to try and stop this from happening. #Pascal It would really only be this stretch over here, right? Because these are two parts of Armenia, two parts of Azerbaijan. But the whole proposal is to make that land basically one long stretch of a U.S. military base, right? #Ryan Perkins Basically, yes. #Pascal And then the remaining proposal goes up here through the north, right? Yes. #Ryan Perkins That's right, yeah. It goes entirely through Russian territory. #Pascal And you said this is a proposal of an earlier idea, right? I mean, that came out of the Soviet era, you said? #Ryan Perkins Yes, there was a Soviet proposal in the 1950s. So some of the infrastructure is already there, but it needs to be greatly developed. And I think at the moment, one of the big stumbling blocks for the Russians is funding. And I think in those terms, they're very much looking at trying to get Chinese funding, because obviously the Chinese have been spending a huge amount of money on programs similar to this. And they also have a huge amount of expertise in, you know, massive infrastructure projects. So it's a relatively new revival. But then, of course, the TRIPP proposal is quite new as well. That only came out in September of last year. But, yeah, they're trying to move ahead with it. Interestingly, the Eurasia Canal project is one of two projects that they were actually looking at. And the other is another canal project, which would be extending the Volga-Don project. So at the moment, there's actually a canal that connects the Volga and the Don, but it's very, very—it's very small, and it's not in very good state. So there's two proposals on the table. But at the moment, I think the Eurasia Canal is the one that really has the most momentum. And that's the one that was being discussed at the Far East Economic Forum. -- 3 of 20 -- #Pascal And how were the discussions about that? Like, what's the feasibility of it? I have no idea about the terrain. I mean, what do you need to do in order to build such a long canal? I mean, even the—you know, this canal would probably be longer than the one connecting the Pacific and the Atlantic in the Americas. I mean, this would be a major project. #Ryan Perkins So it's about 700 kilometers that the canal needs to... 700 kilometers of Russian territory that the canal needs to pass through. And it's the Kuma-Manych Basin that it would be passing through. It's not an enormous canal project. I mean, it's not an enormous canal project in terms of some of the bigger canals, because at the moment they're looking at two different proposals. One would be to allow ships of up to 10,000 tonnes to pass. There is a more ambitious proposal on the table where they're looking at 26,000 tonnes. Most likely, I think it would be the 10,000-ton proposal. But the biggest problem is that the Caspian Sea is quite a few meters lower than the Sea of Azov because the Caspian Sea has been shrinking for quite a few years. So... the major engineering project would be putting in locks that would allow the ships to pass up and down. But one of the points they're using to promote it is that it would actually divert water into the Caspian Sea and raise the sea level. #Pascal Really replenishing the Caspian Sea is a nice side benefit. Yeah. Hey, just a very quick note: the best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on NeutralityStudies.com. Links below. See you there. What kind of new trade would that allow for if it happened? I mean, that's not already possible at the moment, because, like, oil and so on is being transported through pipelines. There is road traffic, of course. What would be the big advantage of such a canal? #Ryan Perkins One of the keys to this is opening up some of the Caspian trade. A maritime canal, if it ran through Russian territory, would essentially help consolidate Russian control over maritime traffic in the Caspian Sea. But really, one of the factors pushing for the TITR route is the European Union. So the European Union have already promised to mobilize 200 billion euros in funding for the TITR route as a way of opening up a route from the EU into the Caspian, primarily looking at Kazakhstan. And Kazakhstan has kind of been hedging its bets a little bit because it doesn't want to commit entirely to the TITR. So it's also been tentatively showing a lot of interest in the Russian route as well. #Pascal -- 4 of 20 -- I mean, for Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, this should make evident sense, right? It would mean that both Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan would then, by way of the Bosporus, also have a direct route into the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, right? I mean, that would, for both, be huge. So, on Russia, I mean, Russia already has the Baltic access, of course, but so basically another huge trade route for all three of them, huh? #Ryan Perkins The first time that this project was really revived was actually by Kazakhstan in 2007. And they were pushing quite hard for it in 2007. But then it kind of disappeared for a while. And it wasn't until after September of last year, when the Trump administration began talking about the TITR route, that Russia began to revive interest in this route. #Pascal But in this sense, you know, the TITR route would be just the overland corridor. That would just be like, okay, at best, you would have trucks on the highway, right? #Ryan Perkins No, it's multimodal. It's multimodal, so that means that you have this rail route and a road route, but it's also a digital infrastructure highway as well, which essentially means just putting U.S. military monitoring stations across the northern Iranian border, right? Yeah, and then on each end of that, we also have port facilities as well. #Pascal Yep, yep, port facilities. Sure, port facilities, but it would still mean loading and unloading ships, right? Whereas a canal would mean that ships can directly pass through. I mean, in terms of economic viability, let's say, just how cheaply you then can transport goods. I mean, a canal would allow for goods to be transported much, much more cheaply, wouldn't it? #Ryan Perkins It would. Obviously, moving everything by sea is much, much cheaper. But then the problem is the size of the vessels. So a multimodal