🚨 Ex-President of German Spy Agency EXPOSES Sanctions Illegality | Dr. H.G. Maaßen

## Central stakes: sanctions as a tool that remakes law and politics The conversation lays bare a stark reality: sanctions have ceased to be a narrow instrument of interstate coercion and are fast becoming a form of administrative power that reaches into ordinary life. What began as targeted pressure against governments and institutions has been repurposed into a regime that can isolate, impoverish, and silence individuals—often without the ordinary safeguards of criminal or civil process. The panel’s exchange spotlights a double danger. First, the legal architecture that enables such measures can operate outside normal checks and balances, producing effects that resemble punishment while evading the protections associated with punitive processes. Second, the political logic animating these moves risks chilling dissent and shrinking the space for plural public debate. Together, these developments merit urgent scrutiny: they are not marginal legal quirks but a transformation in how democratic polities exercise extrajudicial power. ## How the EU’s individual listings actually work A clear thread through the discussion is the way the EU’s mechanism for listing individuals differs from traditional judicial processes. Decisions to designate people typically flow from the Council of the EU, where member-state ministers must agree—formally by unanimity—on additions to a sanctions list. National executives, the Commission, and diplomatic networks feed information into that decision-making space, and political considerations can override rigorous evidentiary standards. Unlike criminal indictments, listings are produced by administrative decision, not by an independent court. While the European Court of Justice (ECJ) remains a venue of appeal for those designated, the panel emphasized that judicial review is often deferential to the political bodies that make the listings. The result is a hybrid regime: one that combines administrative speed and opacity with the capacity to produce court-enforceable restrictions on property, movement, and contractual freedom. This hybrid nature explains several anomalies: designations sometimes target the wrong person, list the wrong nationality, or rely on narratives that fit a political line rather than a careful adjudication of facts. The mechanics also make it hard for the designated to obtain timely notice and effective redress. In many cases, affected individuals discover their status by accident, then face an uphill struggle to extract the evidentiary basis for the measure. In short, the instrument is fast and flexible in a way that favors the state actors deploying it—and punishes those who find themselves on the receiving end. ## Sanctions, human rights, and the specter of extralegal power Several panelists framed the current trend as more than poor procedure; it is a human-rights problem. Because sanctions operate outside the normal criminal law framework, they often bypass the due process protections we associate with state coercion. The measures can deprive people of bank accounts, livelihoods, and freedom of movement—restrictions that in other contexts would require judicial findings, indictment, or trial. The legal fiction sometimes proffered—that such measures are “non-punitive” or merely regulatory—collides with their lived effect. As the discussants stressed, when a sanction reduces an individual to subsistence (the example of having to obtain a court order for a modest food allowance was cited), it is functionally punitive. Moreover, the EU has treaty commitments—explicit and implicit—to respect fundamental rights. Case law such as Kadi has already established that human rights considerations cannot be sidelined in EU actions. The tension arises when administrative bodies seek to frame sanctions as security measures immune from ordinary scrutiny, thereby undercutting obligations that lie at the core of the Union’s legal order. The climate of fear that follows publicized listings also fosters self-censorship and deterrence: journalists, academics, and activists may recalibrate their speech not because a judge ordered them to, but because a sanction could follow. The conversation warned that such dynamics are eerily familiar from histories of authoritarian repression—where administrative fiat, not criminal law, enforces conformity. ## Parallels with U.S. practice and the globalization of sanctioning logic The panel connected recent EU developments to a longer U.S. trajectory. Over the past two decades the United States normalized wide-ranging sanctioning as a primary foreign-policy instrument—cheap, fast, and largely insulated from public and legislative scrutiny. That model provided both a template and a cautionary tale. U.S. practice—particularly the extraterritorial reach of certain sanctions and the use of financial tools to produce strategic outcomes—has influenced other actors’ thinking about coercion short of armed force. The U.S. Treasury’s rhetoric about “economic statecraft” and public declarations of intent to effect political outcomes in other countries were cited as evidence that sanctions are often deployed with a political end in mind: to foment instability, to weaken regimes, or to coerce policy change. EU policy has absorbed some of these logics—though the Union’s institutional and judicial context differs. Where the U.S. historically leaned on the banking system and secondary sanctions, the EU’s turn toward individual listings demonstrates a parallel impulse: to weaponize regulatory levers domestically and extraterritorially. The comparison is telling because it reframes sanctions from a tool of international pressure to a technique of governance and social control. The consequence is a diffusion of coercive practices across liberal democracies: once the practice becomes normalized in one jurisdiction, it is easier for like-minded states to replicate it. ## Notable cases: when lists misfire and political purpose surfaces Discussion of specific cases crystallized the abstract concerns. Several names recurred as emblematic of the regime’s brittleness: analysts and journalists who describe alternative narratives about conflict zones; human-rights investigators whose reporting unsettles powerful constituencies; and ordinary residents misclassified on nationality or identity. These episodes illustrate two problems at once. First, the factual base for listings can be thin, mistake-prone, or politically selective. Mislabeling a citizen’s nationality or alleging ties that simply do not fit the record shows how administrative haste and information gaps produce grave material harms. Second, the pattern of targeting actors whose views disrupt the dominant geopolitical narrative suggests that sanctioning is not purely about combatting concrete illicit acts, but about signaling which voices are permissible. In that sense, sanctions can be a tool of narrative policing—a way to make dissent costly. The panel’s exchange also noted cases from outside the EU, where U.S. and other actors have used sanctions against UN officials or investigators. Those moves raise a troubling question: if sanction regimes can be turned against those documenting human-rights abuses, what does that mean for international accountability? Sanctioning investigators or reporters can amount to punishing the very possession and dissemination of inconvenient facts. ## Remedies, courts, and the limits of judicial review If the central worry is the circumvention of normal legal protections, then redress must be a core part of any corrective strategy. The panel underscored that judicial review exists—affected individuals may appeal to the ECJ and other courts—and that case law has pushed the EU to reckon with human-rights norms. But two limits were also clear. First, courts often show deference to political judgments in the security domain, accepting broad rationales for listings when national security or foreign-policy cons

Sanctions Against Individuals. What Can Be Done? An Expert Panel. Join a live-streamed webinar with the international lawyers, Alexandra Hofer and Roberto Zamora, who will be discussing the legal and political options to address the draconian EU Sanctions Regime that is unfolding over EU residents. #Pascal Hello, everybody, and welcome back to Neutrality Studies. My name is Pascal Lottaz from Kyoto University, and I’m joined today by my colleagues Dr. Alexandra Hofer and Roberto Zamora, both of them lawyers and legal professionals. Roberto is from Costa Rica, currently in the EU, and Alexandra is from the EU as well. Both have been working on human rights and international law, and Alexandra especially on sanctions law. So, today in this webinar, we want to discuss the recent developments in the EU sanctions policy and what can be done about this completely new regime we’ ve got. So, Alexandra and Roberto, welcome. #Alexandra Hofer Thank you. #Pascal Thank you so much for joining. Maybe just to introduce, we’ll probably be joined by Jeffrey Sachs in a moment, who will also speak a bit about the EU sanctions and ask some questions. But, you know, to start, I think most people have seen this: the EU has rolled out this new regime within its own framework—the EU sanctions against Russia—where they’ve started designating individuals on this list. One of my countrymen, Jacques Baud, has been caught up in this. The EU is accusing him and sanctioning him for, let me read this: Jacques Baud, a former Swiss Army colonel and strategic analyst, is a regular guest on pro-Russian television and radio programs. He acts as a mouthpiece for pro-Russian propaganda and spreads conspiracy theories—for example, accusing Ukraine of orchestrating its own invasion in order to join NATO. There's a second paragraph in the accusation, but that’s basically it. Once you’re listed on this sanctions list, normal life basically ceases to exist. You lose access to your bank accounts and all payment methods. Nobody can give you anything. No EU citizen is allowed to enter into contracts with you. You’re not allowed to enter the EU, or if you’re already in the EU, to leave the state you’re currently in. Pretty -- 1 of 21 -- draconian measures. And Alexandra, we talked about this once already, but how do you currently understand these measures now, after half a year of seeing them being applied to people within the EU? #Alexandra Hofer Can you maybe clarify what you mean—how do I understand them? Like, what do I think their purpose is? #Pascal Maybe not the purpose, but how they work as a legal regime. One of my main points so far has been that they’re extralegal measures—not because they’re illegal, but because they circumvent the normal legal system. Do you see them that way too? #Alexandra Hofer Yeah, I think that's a fair qualification. I tend to see sanctions, let's say, as a security tool. The ones adopting them usually have some security purpose in mind, and very often I think these security measures are extralegal—they don’t follow what we’d assume to be the general channels where we’ d have the usual checks and balances on executive power. And of course, I think this creates huge problems for human rights because of the way these measures are qualified, which we’ll probably discuss today. But yeah, I think with these measures, what’s really being brought to the fore is how problematic sanctions are when they’re adopted against individuals, and the many absurdities they can raise. #Pascal Roberto, you’ve also been working in the human rights space. When you learned about these sanctions—being imposed by the EU on people within the EU rather than outside—what went through your mind, and how did you make sense of what was happening? #Roberto Zamora Well, maybe I’ll disagree a little bit with you here, because I do see these sanctions as illegal—in the sense that there’s a lack of foundation according to EU law. But from a strictly human rights point of view, it’s very concerning. In my view, these sanctions violate quite a number of provisions regarding human rights. They’re also based on a failure to fulfill several obligations that the EU has undertaken. For instance, Article 6 of the Treaty on the European Union states that the European Union must accede to the European Convention on Human Rights, something that has not been done. Nevertheless, there is case law from the Court of Justice of the European Union indicating and establishing that the application of human rights is mandatory and binding within the activities of the -- 2 of 21 -- EU. What I see is the rise of a regime that’s tending toward absolutism—totalitarianism—in very, very concerning ways when it comes to human rights. So, coming from Latin America and being a migrant here, now working in academia—and, you know, within academia there’s criticism and critical thinking, opposite points of view—well, I’m personally worried. I mean, how much can we, from academia, criticize what is going on? The arbitrariness the EU is using in applying these sanctions makes the situation very worrying. There’s a lot to be concerned about. #Pascal And I see that we’ve just been joined by Jeffrey Sachs. Jeffrey, welcome, and thank you very much for coming online. #Jeffrey Sachs Of course. Sorry I'm late. I apologize. #Pascal It's always great having you, so no worries at all. We just did an opening round on how everybody understands these sanctions, which is the topic of today's webinar. The European Union started about half a year ago—almost a year now—imposing sanctions on individuals inside the EU, and it’s had really dramatic repercussions for the people affected. Basically, they become prisoners with no legal rights and have to go to court just to get a basic 500 euros a month to pay for food. Now, the US has also imposed sanctions on individuals, including the UN Special Rapporteur for the Palestinian territories, Francesca Albanese. Jeffrey, can you make any connection between the US and European sanctions? #Jeffrey Sachs Well, I can’t in any informed way, because what Europe is doing is both shocking to me, and I’m online trying to understand better what the situation is. From the U.S. point of view, I think the main thing I’d say is that there’s become an absolute addiction to sanctions—on individuals, designated corporate entities, and governments—over the last 20 years, as if it were a newly discovered tool of statecraft. Especially after 9/11, the U.S. government found that sanctions were a very cheap, quick, flexible way—without any public scrutiny, congressional oversight, or need to explain—to launch economic warfare, and geopolitical warfare in general. So the personal sanctions should be seen in that U.S. context, at least. And I think that's probably true in the European context as part of a much broader use by the executive authorities of unconstrained power that doesn’t require any review. I focus much more on -- 3 of 21 -- the economic sanctions than on the individual sanctions in my own work. I’ll just say one thing that I think is, uh, interesting about the economic side, and that is that a couple of weeks ago, the Treasury Secretary of the United States, in Davos, boasted about how the U.S. had used this sanctions regime to crush the Iranian economy and to bring people out on the streets—and that this was moving in a very good direction, he said. So it was an unusually explicit, even vulgar, description of the economic warfare that the U.S. wages with these sanctions. Also, Bessent was interesting—he said this is “economic statecraft,” as he called it, which is quite a term in this context. But when we see the mass unrest in Iran, our mass media attributes it to the corruption and mismanagement of the Iranian regime. But Bessent said very clearly that this was our policy—to cause this to happen. And it did happen, and it’s moving in a very good direction. The only final point I’ll make is that even after Bessent said this, The New York Times would not report it. The mainstream media in the U.S. would not report the most basic facts of all. So we’re in a surreal bubble on all of this, where sanctions are unconstrained tools of power—unchecked by law, unchecked by any kind of legislative oversight, unchecked by public debate. And that’s why they’re so effective, because we’re in a world of executive abuse. And these are good tools for that purpose. #Pascal Thank you for that, Alexandra. I mean, you're a sanctions lawyer—you’ve worked with European sanctions for a long time. Can you maybe give us a short rundown of where they’re actually coming from? And, in your view, has the European Union learned something from the United States in applying them, or are they kind of sui generis? #Alexandra Hofer Yeah. Well, I would just say, I think—yeah, I agree a lot with what Professor Sacks said. And indeed, the comments made by Bessent, if I could just jump in on that a bit, were really interesting, because we tend to frame sanctions as a non-coercive tool—they don’t involve the use of force. They’re great because they’re a peacetime remedy. But I think when you see the case of Iran, or you talk about the sanctions against Venezuela, or against Syria, or any other country, these economic sanctions— and you see the level of destruction they bring on these populations—it resembles, or it amounts to, structural violence. You’re basically completely degrading the standards of living in many countries. Inasmuch as they are a violent form of what we call a state crash, to me they essentially amount to hybrid warfare. We can see how sanctions were used as a form of warfare against Syria and eventually led to the downfall of Assad, and apparently they’re hoping for the same thing in Iran. I think sanctions were used in a very similar way in Venezuela. Now, in the U.S., sanctions are well known for not having any scrutiny from the courts. In the EU it’s slightly different, because if you’ve been targeted by the EU, you can appeal to the European Court of Justice. A few years ago, Venezuela was given access to the European Court of Justice to contest the restrictive measures the EU had imposed on it. So there is some form of judicial review. -- 4 of 21 -- And I think that’s why, in Europe, because we have this judicial review, we tend to think that sanctions are fairer or more legitimate—because there’s a court process there. But I think, as I’ve discussed with you previously, Pascal, there’s a lot of room for improvement in this judicial procedure. As we discussed, the court tends to be quite deferential, giving a lot of room to maneuver to the Council of the EU in its listings and in imposing restrictions on human rights. Now, whether or not the EU has learned from the U.S. is kind of hard to say, but in some instances it does seem as if the EU is picking up on the more, let’s say, controversial practices of the U.S., particularly when the U.S. adopts extraterritorial sanctions. So it would seek to ensure that actors outside U.S. jurisdiction abide by U.S. sanctions. This has been quite controversial, and the EU typically condemns these types of measures. But in its sanctions regime against Russia, the EU has seemed increasingly willing to extend the jurisdictional reach of its restrictions—tipping into behavior we usually see from the United States. I think the parallel you made at the beginning to the measures against Francesca Albanese is interesting, because she was essentially sanctioned for her reports, especially after the one on the economic actors participating in the genocide against the Palestinians. So it was hitting the U.S.’s economic interests, let’s say. And in the EU, with the measures that have led to this discussion—like the ones we’ve seen against Jacques Bourg—we see individuals being listed because they’re presenting a narrative, or an alternative narrative, to the one the Council of the European Union would like to s