USA Pushes For WW3: Iran War REVEALS West‘s Real Intentions | Dr. Arthur Khachikian

## A turning point that signals strategic intent The midnight raids on Tehran and multiple Iranian cities do more than mark another violent chapter in the Middle East; they expose a deeper reality about how great powers are willing to use force, leverage allies, and bypass norms in pursuit of perceived security objectives. The recorded conversation with Dr. Arthur Khachikian — an Iran-neighboring scholar who holds a PhD in International Relations from Stanford and teaches in Yerevan — presses this point sharply: the recent strikes reveal not just a tactical choice against a regional adversary, but a larger posture by parts of the West that privileges unilateral power projection and preventive logic over restraint, negotiation, and the institutions designed to moderate interstate violence. This is consequential for Iran, for the fragile stability of the South Caucasus, and for the architecture of global order itself. ## Immediate regional consequences: anxiety on Armenia's border From Yerevan, the attack looks less like a contained exchange and more like a destabilizing shockwave. Dr. Khachikian explains that Iran had functioned as an informal mediator in the South Caucasus, tempering flare-ups between Armenia and Azerbaijan after the 2020 fighting. With Iran under direct military pressure, that calming influence falters. Populations in border regions, especially in Armenia, are visibly on edge because the northern provinces of Iran — including ethnic Azeri areas — are geographically and politically proximate. The risk is not hypothetical: local actors who have long-held grievances might interpret a moment of Iranian vulnerability as an opening for their own aims, producing a domino effect of localized clashes that could cascade across a region already marked by asymmetric alliances and unresolved territorial disputes. That immediate fear has strategic depth. When a neighboring mediator is struck, channels for back-channel diplomacy and de-escalation fray. What were once informal, bilateral mechanisms to cool incidents may dissolve if a key interlocutor is incapacitated or delegitimized. For small states like Armenia, the calculus becomes dreadfully simple: diminished buffers mean greater vulnerability. Smaller neighbors are left to confront not only the prospect of violence spilling across borders, but also the geopolitical arithmetic of choosing patrons or hedges in a more polarized environment. ## Double standards, preventive war, and legal pretexts A central theme of the conversation is the selective application of the preventive-attack doctrine. Dr. Khachikian underscores the glaring asymmetry: when Israel cites a future nuclear threat to justify preemptive action with U.S. backing, it is often tolerated, even supported; when Russia raised analogous security concerns about NATO at its doorstep, international reactions were condemnatory and punitive. That asymmetry, he argues, undermines the idea of consistent international norms and betrays a politics of exceptions. The legal question here centers on the Caroline doctrine and the narrow concept of imminence in international law. Preventive action is, by legal and historical standard, only defensible under an immediate and unavoidable threat. The attack on Iran came amid talks and amid a long history of fluctuating diplomatic arrangements — including the previous JCPOA constraints that had reduced enrichment levels and centrifuge counts. Thus, the justification of imminent danger appears thin; instead, the operation reads as preventive or preclusive. Dr. Khachikian’s point is not a denial of self-defense per se — Israel, like any state, has legitimate security concerns — but a critique of how those concerns are being operationalized selectively and how negotiation itself was apparently used as a smokescreen for military action. If diplomacy becomes a pretext for surprise strikes, trust in negotiation as a tool of conflict resolution erodes rapidly. ## Great power dynamics: escalation beyond the theater The exchange puts the current crisis in a wider frame: two major conflicts now embroil the international system. Russia’s war in Ukraine and the new conflagration involving Iran are not isolated anomalies; they generate systemic pressures that push great powers into closer alignment or more overt confrontation. Dr. Khachikian warns that such dynamics resemble the pre-World War era where regional clashes served as catalysts — the Balkans and North Africa provided the testing grounds for imperial rivalries before they widened. Beyond rhetoric, there are tangible signs of great-power involvement. Open-source reports suggest repositioning of British and American naval and air assets to the Persian Gulf, and reported intelligence-sharing that enabled the strikes. At the same time, phone diplomacy and offers of mediation — notably from Moscow — signal a desire among non-Western powers to prevent escalation, even as Beijing positions itself firmly in political solidarity with Tehran. The problem is structural: each demonstration of power or intelligence-enabled strike nudges other states toward countermoves, deeper technical cooperation, or explicit security commitments. That in turn hardens blocs and reduces the political space for nimble, multilateral diplomacy. Dr. Khachikian stresses an essential danger: when one side demonstrates a capacity to resolve disputes by force with apparent impunity, it incentivizes the formation of counterbalancing coalitions. Russia and China, observing what they see as a permissive environment for U.S.-backed coercion, may find a closer strategic alignment rational. If these alignments harden, the world approaches a condition where conflicts are no longer regional disturbances but layers of interconnected theaters — a condition that historically precedes larger conflagrations. ## Historical analogies and the risk of a spiral The conversation repeatedly draws historical analogies — from the Italian invasion of Libya to the Spanish Civil War and the Balkan crises — to illustrate how episodic acts of aggression set precedents that normalize force. Those precedents erode the credibility of institutions meant to restrain unilateral action: when the United Nations, treaties, or collective security mechanisms are bypassed, states learn that coercive innovation works. The worries voiced by Dr. Khachikian are not abstract. He cites the erosion of post-war norms since the 1990s, which saw unilateral interventions and bypassing of the UN framework in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. Each episode contributed to a cumulative norm erosion, making the current strikes plausible within the contemporary strategic imagination. The parallel to early 20th-century dynamics is sobering: the drift from balance-of-power equilibria to polarized blocs was not inevitable, but it was facilitated by a sequence of local wars and diplomatic misjudgments. The present conflation of high-tech covert operations (drone infiltration, precision strikes on strategic assets) with overt naval posturing and public partisan narratives could generate the same miscalculations that once turned limited wars into global wars. ## The crisis of legitimacy and the collapse of mediation Perhaps the most insidious consequence of the recent strikes is the delegitimization of mediation and arms-control architecture. Iran’s willingness to negotiate before the attack suggested an opening for diplomacy; the apparent use of the talks as tactical cover makes future negotiations far harder. After such an operation, mutual trust — the raw material of diplomacy — is depleted. If negotiation can be weaponized by one side to conceal an impending attack, why would the other side ever come to the table? For small and medium states caught in the middle, the message is clear and unnerving: norms and diplomatic guarantees may not hold when a powerful patron or coalition sees decisive advantage in coercion. This produces

Iran War REVEALS West���s Real Intentions Today we once more need to discuss the fresh war that Israel and the US plunged Iran into after the sneaky surprise attack on Tehran and other Iranian cities last Friday. To discuss the situation from one of Iran’s northern neighbours I’m joined by Dr. Arthur Khachikian. Arthur holds a PhD in International Relations from Stanford University, and currently teaches at the Armenian University in Yerevan, the capital. #M3 Look at the double standards. Look at the double standards. Israel has a legitimate concern related to Iran's nuclear program. Yeah, OK, we can understand it. Israel can take preventive action because it sees a threat from Iran. But Russia cannot do that in Ukraine. Russia cannot say, "We see danger from NATO. Please consider our interests, too." No, no, no, no, no. You can't do that because you're Russia. You have to shut up and suck it up. But when Israel sees a threat from Iran's nuclear program, it is entitled to a preventive attack with the help of the United States and the entire West. France said that they're backing them up. Again, where are international norms? Where are international norms? So one state can think about its future and see future threats and take action, which we kind of can understand in certain conditions. But another state, for 25 years, 30 years, has been telling you that it's very concerned with this: "Please don't do this. This is threatening us." No, no, no, it doesn't matter. #M2 Hello everybody, this is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today we once more need to discuss the fresh war that Israel and the US have plunged Iran into after the sneaky surprise attack on Tehran and other Iranian cities last Friday. To discuss the situation from the perspective of one of Iran's northern neighbors, I'm joined today by Dr. Arthur Khachikian. Arthur holds a PhD in international relations from Stanford University and currently teaches at the Armenian University in Yerevan, which is the capital city of Armenia. Arthur, welcome back. #M3 Thank you. Thank you very much for having me back, Pascal. And I promise to never mention Margaret Thatcher again. #M2 -- 1 of 19 -- Don't mention Thatcher. Don't mention the war. Let's start with what's going on. I mean, Yerevan— you are 200 kilometers away from the border with Iran, right? What's the situation right now? Is there any impact on you guys over there? #M3 Well, people are very worried. It may have a very destabilizing effect on the whole South Caucasus region. Iran was playing the role of a mediator between us and Azerbaijan, the republic next door with which we have a very complicated relationship. A few military incidents have happened in the last few years. There was a war in 2020, and Iran was one of the countries that stabilized the situation in the region, together with Russia and, to a certain extent, Turkey—although Turkey was a little bit partial. But now, with the destabilizing consequences of the attack on Iran, people are really worried that Armenia may be the next target. Unfortunately, we do not have a very friendly relationship with our neighbors to the east and to the west, and people are worried that this may be an opportunity for them to also resort to military action, that the war will have a domino effect in our region. #M2 So with Azerbaijan especially, right? And Turkey secondarily. But so far, is it fair to say that people are just watching and on edge about what is being hit? Because I hear that the northern, Azeri part of Iran was also hit, and that is quite close to Armenia as well, isn't it? #M3 Well, it's on our border, yes. People are—they are on edge. That's the right way to put it. They're very worried. They're on edge. What this means, Pascal, is we're taking another step towards the law of the jungle. It's the law of the powerful. You know, we are back to Thucydides: the strong do what they want and the weak have to accept, you know, have to do what they must. That was his formula. So we're going back to the world of the jungle. We're casting aside any semblance of international norms. And basically, we resolve everything by power—peace through strength. This is not peace through strength. This is world chaos, instability, and potentially moving towards World War III through strength. This is very strange. I'm very surprised that the U.S. administration is following this course. #M2 Let's go there, because the fear is that this conflict could develop very differently from the Russo- Ukrainian war, which for three years has been contained to those two places. And although the war was carried into Russia several times, and has been fought also inside Russia, it has been mostly fought inside Ukraine. Now, what we are seeing with Iran could immediately turn different, right? For now, the official narrative is that it's Israel and Iran exchanging blows. But we know that this -- 2 of 19 -- was made possible through U.S. assistance. And we are seeing right now preparations, apparently by the U.S., to join with its military forces. Can you maybe speak a little bit about what you know regarding where the U.S. forces are at the moment? #M3 Well, yes, my information is coming from open sources. From what I understand, there's been a movement now of British and American air force and naval units towards the region of the conflict. Apparently, some refueling planes have left the United States for Britain, and then probably they're going to head for the Middle East. And two aircraft carriers were moved closer to the Persian Gulf, from what I understand. I mean, we all knew that this attack could not have been possible without U. S. military involvement. They armed the weapons that were provided. The financing, of course, came from the United States, as well as reconnaissance. And you saw the article in ABC. Well, ABC media said that, and then the New York Times quoted them: "We provided exquisite intelligence to Israel." We all knew that, of course. And also, the style of this attack—remember how it started with the drones? The drones that were smuggled into Iranian territory and then activated suddenly. This is the same style as that pretty disturbing attack on the Russian nuclear triad that happened, I think, what, two weeks earlier? It's the same style. It's the same handwriting. Regarding the war in Ukraine, this attack is pretty unprecedented. Never during the Cold War could we have imagined an attack on the nuclear triad of one of the superpowers. This was just unthinkable. This is a lot more dangerous than the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. I mean, we would all be in shelters right now. But we can talk about that whenever you want. As for this, you saw that they smuggled these drones. That is a pretty well-organized covert operation. The drones were smuggled into Iranian territory and then they struck at the Iranian air defense systems and at the ballistic missiles, and that gave Israel the advantage of a surprise attack. From what I understand, there was some tentative agreement to continue the negotiations on Sunday, so three days after the attack was launched. So Iran was caught by surprise. It doesn't strike me as a very good way to conduct negotiations. And again, this could lead to a major escalation. I mean, #M2 Yeah, no, it's a horrible thing. And especially, it drives home the point that apparently the United States and Israel were counting on the fact that Iran wouldn't expect a blow while negotiations were still ongoing, and then used these negotiations as a camouflaging tactic, which then, of course, invalidates any kind of hope in a diplomatic process. Now, at the same time, we now know that Vladimir Putin was talking to Donald Trump yesterday, on Sunday, right, on his birthday. And apparently, Vladimir Putin and the Russians are offering to help mediate or to help bring this conflict—to calm it down. Did you hear anything, or have you heard anything, about what the Russian position is at the moment? -- 3 of 19 -- #M3 Well, again, from what I understand from open sources, there have been some phone calls from Putin. There was a conversation with the leader of Iran and Donald Trump, and Russia offered its mediation services. Clearly, this is not in Russia's interest. I mean, Russia and Iran have a strategic cooperation agreement. It does not provide for a Russian military intervention, but certainly the Russians were helping and will probably continue to help Iran. Iran provided invaluable assistance to Russia during the conflict in Ukraine, and certainly Russia does not want to be dragged into this war and confront Israel and the United States—not in the condition it is in now with the war in Ukraine. So they have all the right reasons not to want this conflict to escalate. But of course, Russia is in a tricky position because of the conflict in Ukraine. It's not seen in the West as an objective mediator, but at least something is better than nothing. #M2 We are also seeing that the Chinese have officially declared that they condemn the attack on Iran and that they are basically taking Iran's side. How do you think these two great powers, Russia and China, together are going to influence whatever comes out of this, however this conflict develops? #M3 Well, to speak to your question, from what I understand, there have been some airplanes heading for Iran from China. It's possible that it's just an allegation; it's possible that it's just a rumor. But apparently, China was providing some military assistance to Iran, some technical assistance to Iran. Of course, China was not going to get involved militarily, but some assistance was possible. They have a pretty good relationship with Iran. Now, what we need to understand is that this conflict... We now have two major conflicts in the world with great powers getting involved to various degrees. This is like the 1910s or 1930s. I mean, a lot of people have been saying "World War III, World War III." It's become commonplace to say that. But really, if you look at what's happening, we're moving closer and closer to a major international conflict. The only thing missing now is China—if China got involved in a major conflict, let's say over Taiwan, or moved closer to Russia and forged a closer military alliance with Russia, then we would have a classic world war situation, where we have two alliances of great powers and several conflicts in which they are involved, with rigid alliances formed between them. So the Middle East could play the same role that the Balkans played in the 1910s. And you remember the road to World War I was paved by the Italian invasion of Libya in 1911 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, because they basically demonstrated to the world that it's possible to solve problems by brute force. And then, of course, that escalated to the Balkan War, and then the Reinsurance Treaty was canceled with Russia, and Russia drifted towards France, and we had two -- 4 of 19 -- alliances. The same thing happened during World War II. The Spanish Civil War was an interesting event preceding World War II. Again, the great powers were showing their muscles and kind of trying and checking each other out. But this could be another instance. We now have two major conflicts. We have a huge conflict in Ukraine. This is not Vietnam. This is not Korea. This is not Afghanistan. This is forty times—if you look at the number of casualties, these are World War I figures. I mean, some sources are saying over a million people have been killed, which is more than the British casualties and close to the French casualties in World War I. This is a major thing, and there's no sign of it abating. The negotiations failed, as predicted. And now we have a different region—the Middle East—with another major conflict. So by definition, this is getting very, very close to a world war. What does it take to have a world war? You need to have most of the great powers involved, which