Ukrainian Academics Speak Out Against the Proxy War | Marta Havryshko & Ivan Katchanovski

## A proxy war that hollowed out democracy What emerges from the conversation is a stark and unsettling argument: external intervention framed as support for democracy has, in practice, contributed to the opposite outcome in Ukraine. The discussion traces a trajectory from 2014 onward in which outside actors shaped domestic institutions and wartime imperatives in ways that strengthened executive control, undermined checks and balances, and tolerated—sometimes even enabled—extremist actors. The result, as the conversation puts it, is a client-state dynamic in which sovereignty is diminished, public debate is constrained, and ordinary citizens bear the costs of a conflict increasingly seen at home as unwinnable. This is not a claim about a single misstep but about structural outcomes. The conversation links the dismantling of independent oversight bodies, coercive mobilization practices, and the expansion of far-right paramilitary influence to a pattern of policymaking that prioritizes strategic objectives over democratic resilience. That pattern raises uncomfortable questions for advocates of neutrality and nonalignment: when external powers treat another state as a theater for geopolitical competition, how can democracy survive within it? ## From anti-corruption instruments to instruments of control One of the clearest examples discussed is the recent legislative move to subordinate anti-corruption investigations to the Prosecutor General—an office now tied closely to presidential authority. The conversation frames this as a decisive blow to a key institution that had been established with international help to combat the very corruption that long plagued Ukrainian politics. Far from strengthening the rule of law, the reform is presented as a step toward consolidating executive power: dismantling an independent mechanism, neutralizing potential checks on the president, and narrowing the space for political challenge. Public reaction—nationwide protests—was notable precisely because under martial law, public assemblies are effectively criminalized. The fact that demonstrators nonetheless took to the streets signals not only frustration with the immediate legislative change but also a deeper disenchantment with the way wartime governance has been used to centralize authority. The discussion reads these events as evidence that the wartime narrative of national unity has been leveraged to erode pluralism and institutional autonomy, a dynamic that has implications beyond Ukraine’s borders for any state experiencing externalized security pressures. ## Silencing peace and reshaping public opinion The exchange emphasizes that public opinion polling on the war is difficult to interpret in a context where expressing support for peace can invite scrutiny or punishment. Accounts from the conversation describe bloggers and social-media figures who faced visits from security services, forced apologies, or exile after publicly calling for negotiations. That climate of fear and information control, combined with state-driven messaging, skews the surface readings of political attitudes. What the discussion suggests is a paradox: while many Ukrainians reportedly prefer a negotiated settlement, the public sphere has been effectively curated to leave those voices unheard. Researchers warn that polls likely undercount support for peace because respondents either cannot speak freely or consume a narrow stream of official information. For scholars of neutrality, this is a key point: genuine nonalignment or pursuit of a negotiated end to conflict requires not just diplomatic will but also domestic discursive space in which alternatives can be debated without coercion. ## Coercion at the front line: mobilization, desertion, and human cost Perhaps the most vivid and troubling theme in the conversation is the depiction of forced mobilization practices. Citing widespread footage and official data, the discussion portrays scenes of men allegedly seized in the streets, beaten, and rushed to front-line units with inadequate training and medical screening. Monthly desertion figures, presented as very high by official counts, are used to interpret the operational and moral failures of such a conscription regime. The conversation connects this coercion to external pressure: encouragement from allies to expand mobilization and reinforce lines of defense, sometimes in very specific ways. Those diplomatic nudges, it argues, have fed policies that treat the population as a reservoir of manpower rather than as citizens whose consent matters. The human toll is twofold: immediate casualties and trauma among conscripts, and longer-term eroding of the social contract between state and society. In such conditions, the legitimacy of wartime governance is fragile, and the rationale that the war is protecting democracy rings hollow to many inside the country. ## The far right’s expanded role and Western complicity A recurrent and contentious theme in the conversation is the growth in influence of far-right and neo-Nazi formations within Ukrainian military and social space. The discussion does not deny that Russia has exploited and exaggerated this issue for propaganda purposes; rather, it argues that Western actors have tended to downplay or dismiss legitimate concerns about extremist elements even as they have provided material support for the broader war effort. The transformation—described as the evolution of a battalion into brigade and corps structures—demonstrates how paramilitary groups have consolidated power through violence and battlefield prominence rather than through electoral politics. The interlocutors claim that such groups, while not necessarily central in parliamentary politics, wield tangible influence over security decisions and public symbolism. Specific incidents—public exhibitions and overt comparisons between contemporary units and wartime collaborators—are cited as evidence of a social normalization of problematic historical narratives. The conversation interprets Western tolerance, and in some cases direct arming, as a strategic calculation: the immediate military value of experienced and ideologically driven units was prioritized over the long-term danger of empowering extremist ideologies. For scholars of nonalignment, this raises an acute dilemma: when external patrons ignore or enable illiberal forces inside a partner state for short-term strategic gains, they degrade the very democratic norms they claim to defend. It also demonstrates how proxy dynamics can distort local political settlements and recalibrate the balance of power among domestic actors in dangerous ways. ## Academic repression and the shrinking of dissent The conversation also foregrounds the personal costs borne by academics and public intellectuals who challenge the dominant narratives. Accounts of self-censorship in the immediate aftermath of the 2022 invasion give way to descriptions of targeted threats, institutional abandonment, and campaigns of intimidation once critical perspectives returned to the public sphere. One anecdote—the reaction to an exhibition that valorized a wartime collaborationist formation—illustrates how cultural and historical politics can become flashpoints for broader repression. This pattern—where scholars who raise uncomfortable facts are sidelined or silenced—has consequences beyond individual careers. It impoverishes public debate, limits the evidence available to policymakers and the international community, and discourages rigorous appraisal of strategic choices. The conversation frames the protection of academic freedom not as an abstract norm but as instrumental to making sustainable, ethical decisions in wartime: governments that stifle critique are more likely to perpetuate policies that are unsustainable and unjust. ## Lessons for neutrality, nonalignment, and democratic resilience Taken together, the conversation offers a set of sobering l

Ukrainian Academics Speak Out Against the Proxy War The US interfered in Ukrainian domestic politics in 2014 and funded the Ukraine proxy war ostensibly to save Ukrainian democracy from tyranny. Yet under US tutelage and to service proxy war aims, Ukraine has rapidly descended into a more authoritarian state. Ukrainian scholars Marta Havryshko & Ivan Katchanovski explain how. Full Interview here:https://youtu.be/3d6wuQf3t7g? si=ZyFXnxx3fYNwoRs2 Support Marta Havryshko: https://www.newglobalpolitics.org/an-open-letter Support Ivan Katchanovski: https://www.gofundme.com/f/openaccess-book-russiaukraine-war-its- origin Follow Harrison Berger: https://bergerposts.substack.com #M2 My colleague Harrison Berger just uploaded a video with two very important Ukrainian academics. You will find the entire video on his channel; the link will be in the description. Here are the first 35 minutes. It's very much worth watching. #M3 Just like Trump's campaign pledge to end the genocide in Gaza, Trump's promise to end our involvement in the Ukraine proxy war hasn't come true either. Though the United States continues to support that proxy war, Ukrainians increasingly do not. Recent protests in Ukraine that took place across the country prove that. I speak to two Ukrainian scholars, Ivan Katchanovski and Marta Havryshko. Thank you so much for doing this. I really appreciate it. Yeah, you're welcome. A protest broke out across Ukraine on Tuesday after President Zelensky signed a bill to eliminate the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, also known as NABU, and its Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office. Now, this is a country that was considered, before its war, to be one of the most corrupt countries in Europe. That's what The Guardian said. And Ukraine will now administer all of its anti-corruption investigations under the direct control of the Prosecutor General. This is someone who was appointed by, and is loyal to, President Zelensky. And NABU, which was originally set up with help from the United States, says that the anti-corruption infrastructure in Ukraine has basically been destroyed. What's the context for this move that just handicaps anti-corruption investigations in Ukraine, and what really explains the mass protests that we're seeing in response? Why is it happening now? #M1 -- 1 of 11 -- I think this is just the latest move by Zelensky to try to consolidate his undemocratic rule in Ukraine and to eliminate any vestiges of potential challenge to him in the form of the National Anti- Corruption Bureau, which was organized by and is still influenced by the United States. He removed, basically, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. He blocked and banned Ukrainian journalists and bloggers—very popular Ukrainian bloggers—who were critical of him. He has now banned 12 opposition parties. He launched investigations for state treason against potential presidential challengers to him. So he is basically trying to consolidate his undemocratic rule and to create a full- fledged dictatorship in Ukraine. And now he went against a U.S.-influenced, U.S.-backed agency, which is also just an example of a situation where Ukraine is not truly an independent state—there is no sovereignty. It's basically, as I mentioned before, Ukraine is a client state of the United States. And this agency, which is quite unique in the world, was basically created by the U.S. administration to have control and influence over Ukrainian politicians and the Ukrainian government, using corruption as an issue because Ukrainian politics is very corrupt and the Ukrainian government is very corrupt. I always say that the best business in Ukraine is to be in politics or in the government. So for this reason, there is such a strong backlash in the West, which happened for the first time during the Russia-Ukraine war, to have such open opposition and criticism of Zelensky by top EU officials, but also by U.S. Senator Graham, who is an ally of Donald Trump, and also by leading Western mainstream media like The Economist, The Wall Street Journal, the BBC, The Guardian, and many, many other media outlets who were promoting the narrative of Zelensky as a hero of Ukraine, as a new Churchill, as a great democrat. Now they basically accuse him of doing the opposite. So this is quite revealing, what happened in Ukraine. And the mass protests which took place in Ukraine are not, I think, very large ones. So this is not on a scale which can have any real possibility of removing Zelensky. But I think this is very significant in terms of the fact that this happened at all, because previously there was no possibility for people to express any opposition in the form of a mass protest, since now they are considered to be illegal. Any protest can be considered illegal during martial law, and this is another way for Zelensky to limit and eliminate any possible challenges to him. So in this case, just the fact of such demonstrations is very significant—it's a sign that he's not as popular and embraced by Ukrainians as the media, and he himself, have tried to present in order to show him as supported by Ukrainians, and so on. So this is, I think, a very important moment right now. #M3 So the last time we spoke, polling had just been released which showed that more than 50% of Ukrainians wanted an end to the war. That was in November 2024. More recent estimates show that the number of Ukrainians who want a negotiated end to the conflict is even higher. We're now more than three years into the proxy war. What do you assess is the view of most Ukrainians at this point toward ending this conflict? -- 2 of 11 -- #M1 Again, since I also research public opinion polls professionally and have done so for a very long time—I have commissioned such polls in Ukraine—I think it's very difficult now to take public opinion poll results at face value, especially on such important and politically charged issues as peace and war in Ukraine. I believe a lot of public opinion polls actually underestimate support for a peaceful end to this war, a peaceful resolution of this armed conflict in Ukraine, because even recently it was not possible to speak publicly in Ukraine in support of peace. It was regarded as a state it isn't, and just last year, Ukrainian bloggers who were very popular— bloggers who were not involved in any politics, who were doing fashion blogs or some kind of social media, just non-political blogs—started to support a peaceful end to this conflict. And they were visited by the Security Service of Ukraine. One of these bloggers had to issue a public apology for calling for peace in Ukraine and said that she now supports war in Ukraine until victory. Another blogger had to flee Ukraine and go to Spain. So this is just one example that a lot of people who actually support peace in Ukraine are not able to do so openly because they are afraid of persecution. But I think a lot of other people also cannot express their support for a peaceful resolution of this war because they only have information based on government propaganda and state television, which is controlled by Zelensky. They do not allow any opposition to him or to his policies, including his decision to continue this war without any prospect of winning. He has even blocked YouTube channels in the West run by bloggers who moved there because they were critical of him. So, in this case, I think a lot of people just do not have enough information to express their views, and many of them are afraid to do so. So I think there is much greater support for a peaceful resolution to this conflict and for ending the war right now, even compared to what it was before. Because it's now very clear that Ukraine is not able to defeat Russia. And I said this from the start: the best way for Ukraine to end this war was to have a peaceful resolution—a peace deal—which would end this conflict and would be a much better option for Ukraine than to continue this war. But for Zelensky, war is a way for him to stay in power. And for this reason, he tries to continue this war by getting support from Trump now and trying to get new weapons, and so on. Even so, this would not change the outcome of the war, but would only extend it, with more casualties, more devastation, and actually more loss of territory for Ukraine. #M3 Because there are just so few people left in Ukraine who actually want to fight this war, the Zelensky government has employed some really brutal and violent tactics to coerce Ukrainians into military service. They've sent teams of what The New York Times called in December 2023 "people snatchers"—people who abduct Ukrainians off the streets and then send them to the front lines. And we're told that this war has been about defending Ukrainian democracy, but in many ways, we've -- 3 of 11 -- actually helped to destroy Ukrainian democracy by encouraging the Zelensky government to adopt all these authoritarian tactics in service of NATO war aims like mobilization. U.S. officials actually told Zelensky to lower the conscription age from 25 to 18, while people like Jake Sullivan demanded that Ukraine, quote, "firm up their front lines." So how has that tyrannical conscription regime escalated in Ukraine, and what role have the U.S. and NATO played in that escalation? #M1 Yes, I think this is quite unprecedented—to see such a forced mobilization taking place in Ukraine. There are thousands of videos of this mobilization, where men are caught on the street, basically by force; they're often beaten, put into buses, and then sent to the front line without any regard for their medical condition, without any adequate training. A lot of them are either killed, wounded, or actually desert. There is now a very large number of desertions by Ukrainian forces from the front line after they were recruited by force. According to official data from the Ukrainian government, about 20,000 members of the Ukrainian armed forces desert—that is, basically abandon their units—each month, which is very significant. This has a very negative effect on the front line and on the fighting with Russia. This was quite predictable, because you cannot just force people to fight against their will, especially in a war where there is no real possibility for Ukraine to win. For this reason, Zelensky and his government rely on such illegal, brutal, unconstitutional, and basically criminal tactics to force Ukrainians into the military and to fight Russia. Even this is done against their will. And this is, I think, for me, very difficult to watch because there is also an abundance of such videos, which I also analyze in my book that will be published very soon about the Russian-Ukrainian war and its origins. I also post some of these videos on Facebook and on Twitter, or X. Such videos appear daily. This is just a tactic of Zelensky to continue this war by using Ukrainians and trying to force them into fighting this unwinnable war, because actually, ordinary Ukrainians—Ukrainian men—most of them now don't want to fight this war. And Zelensky just did this with impunity. There was no criticism of him. Even Western media published only a few articles about this tactic, and there was no criticism from Western governments or policymakers. In fact, they actually encouraged him, as you mentioned, to extend and expand the mobilization age to the youngest generation—to 18 years old, from 18 to 25 years old. Zelensky resisted this because it would be very unpopular, so he tried to resist it. Instead, he suggested a new voluntary mobilization, a voluntary draft. He offered a lot of money for people from this age group to join the Ukrainian forces in exchange for a very significant monetary reward. But only about 500 young men from this age group joined the Ukrainian military forces, which is just another indication that this war is not popular even among Ukrainians—Ukrainian men in particular, and especially Ukrainians in the we