This Is What Moscow Really Thinks About The Trump Plan | Prof. Nicolai Petro

## A strategic pause or a trap? Framing Moscow’s calculation on a ceasefire The conversation captures a central dilemma: for Moscow, a ceasefire is not simply a humanitarian pause but a bargaining move whose wisdom must be judged against hard military and political calculations. Russia’s forces are, by most accounts discussed in the exchange, advancing at a tempo that materially improves Moscow’s position on the ground. From that vantage point, a halt in fighting is costly because it would freeze gains short of the territorial outcomes Russia has declared non-negotiable. At the same time, declining a negotiated pause risks losing a diplomatic window that could yield the political recognition Russia seeks. The question, then, is whether the expected diplomatic dividends of a ceasefire outweigh the military and domestic costs of stopping short — and whether the U.S. offer changes that calculus enough for Russia to experiment with diplomacy. The discussion highlights that Moscow treats war and diplomacy as intertwined: battlefield advances are a means of strengthening negotiating power, and negotiations are a continuation of war by other means. A ceasefire is therefore attractive only if it credibly secures gains that would otherwise require more fighting, and if it does so at acceptable political price. That duality frames every Russian evaluation of current proposals. ## What “Istanbul Plus” tells us about realistic bargaining space A helpful conceptual anchor from the conversation is the idea of “Istanbul Plus”: a return to negotiated limits reminiscent of the Istanbul accords of April 2022 rather than some version of Minsk III or maximalist demands from either side. According to the views voiced, Moscow’s minimal public formula for stopping the shooting — neutrality for Ukraine enshrined constitutionally, no NATO membership or troops, and constitutional recognition of the four annexed oblasts plus Crimea as part of Russia — is narrow but consequential. These are not trivial points; they define Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation and the territorial settlement Russia insists upon. Yet the Istanbul framework suggests there is a path toward compromise on the ground: differentiated administrative arrangements, limitations on Ukrainian force structure, and verifiable restrictions on offensive weaponry. If package talks could bind rearmament and intelligence sharing to strict, verifiable limits, a version of “Istanbul Plus” might be framed as a transitional armistice leading into longer negotiations. The catch, as the exchange repeatedly emphasizes, is that these are only the contours of a ceasefire. They leave the far harder work for later: an armistice, treaty arrangements, security guarantees, and normalization — processes that can take years and are vulnerable to domestic politics on all sides. ## U.S. leverage and the art of selective assistance An underappreciated point raised in the discussion is how much control the United States retains over essential elements of Ukraine’s military capacity. Whether in the form of precision weapons, satellite-based targeting, Starlink and secure communications, or intelligence feeds guiding strikes inside and outside Ukrainian territory, the U.S. determines both quantity and quality. That gives Washington a bargaining chip in negotiations: it can condition the pace and scope of assistance on reciprocal steps toward a ceasefire or on verification mechanisms that limit offensive operations. But the conversation also stresses the practical limits of this leverage. The U.S. cannot bind Ukraine completely, nor can it guarantee Russian compliance. Moreover, not all aid is fungible or transparently observable—official statements that arms deliveries or intelligence sharing have resumed tell us little about composition, scale, or intent. Washington can credibly offer to cap offensive supplies, or to provide primarily defensive systems, and thereby attempt to shape a ceasefire’s military balance. Yet Russia will evaluate such offers against its own intelligence and verification capacity, asking whether promised limits will hold and whether those limits actually secure Russia’s declared aims. ## Verification, trust, and the bargaining problem Trust—or the lack of it—is a central theme. Historical experience, especially with Moscow’s long interaction with Washington and Western institutions, breeds deep skepticism in Russian decision-making. The conversation points out that this distrust is mutual but asymmetric in practice: Russia has independent satellite and technical means to verify the scale and nature of Western assistance, and therefore can test whether a Western promise is being honored. That asymmetric verification capability makes the idea of an experimental ceasefire more palatable to Moscow than it would be to Kyiv or some European partners, who depend heavily on external assistance without the same independent monitoring aperture. Yet verification is only part of the equation. The debate explores how much political assurance can be bought with mutually observable mechanisms—new onboard inspectors, agreed monitoring regimes, third-party verification or demilitarized zones. The deeper problem is whether verification solves the political incentives that drive noncompliance. If one side perceives that concessions will create existential vulnerabilities or open the way to future coercion, technical verification cannot substitute for strategic trust. That is why the conversation stresses that any ceasefire must be embedded in a sequence: a short-term pause, a longer armistice with sharper verification, and then protracted negotiations that address underlying security architecture. ## Sanctions as the ultimate bargaining chip Perhaps the single most consequential piece of leverage the United States can offer — and the conversation repeatedly returns to this theme — is the prospect of dismantling or substantially rolling back the sanctions regime. Unlike arms caps or short-term intelligence-sharing commitments, relief from sanctions is an economic and diplomatic inducement with immediate, visible benefits. The interlocutors argue that if Washington signals a credible reversal on sanctions, other major trade partners and European countries would likely follow, creating a cascade effect that transforms the incentives for Moscow. This is the “Trump card” in the negotiating hand: unlike promises to influence Kyiv’s behavior, which Washington cannot fully guarantee, the U.S. president can materially alter Russia’s external economic environment. That matters because the sanctions regime is not just punitive but also isolating; easing it would restore markets, investment, and logistical channels that have been restricted. Even if the Russian economy has shown surprising resilience and even growth under current restrictions, relief would still matter. The conversation captures a nuanced Russian domestic debate: one strain is philosophical resistance to returning to former dependencies, while another is pragmatic interest in the flexibility and efficiencies that reengagement would bring. ## Domestic political costs in Moscow’s calculus Any Russian decision to accept a ceasefire must pass not only international tests but also domestic political filters. The conversation underlines that there would be internal backlash if Moscow stopped short of declared objectives, especially after public pronouncements that shifted expectations about annexation and final borders. For a leadership that has tied territorial gains to national prestige and security narratives, the political cost of a compromised outcome can be severe. At the same time, domestic economic actors — oligarchs, industrial managers, and regional elites — will have different preferences. Those who suffer most from sanctions might welcome normalization; hardline political voices will resist perceived concessions. The leadership therefore performs a diffic

This Is What Moscow Really Thinks About The Trump Plan | Prof. Nicolai Petro Russia's position on the battlefield is getting better and better, but the US still insists on Moscow forfeiting its advantage to negotiate an end to the entire conflict. Why does Trump think this approach could work and what are the Russian calculations to not flatly reject this idea? To discuss these points, I’m talking again to Dr. Nicolai Petro, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Rhode Island and the author of the magnificent book „The Tragedy of Ukraine: What Classical Greek Tragedy can teach us about conflict resolution“. #M3 Not just the last few years, all of the Putin presidency has been an effort to slowly, with fits and starts, wean itself off of dependency on the West. And one of the reasons that the Russian economy did so well under the current sanctions regime was that those past policies had largely prepared the groundwork for it. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking again to Dr. Nicolai Petro, who's a professor of political science at the University of Rhode Island and the author of the magnificent book, The Tragedy of Ukraine: What Classical Greek Tragedy Can Teach Us About Conflict Resolution. Nicolai studies and writes much about the internal political processes of Russia and Ukraine, but it has been a while since he was last on this channel. Therefore, I'm very happy he agreed to give us all an update. Nikolai, welcome back. Nice to talk to you again, Pascal. Nikolai, I really wanted to get your insights. Maybe in the second part, we'll talk a bit about what happened recently in Russia and Ukraine, you know, and how these political parties are moving, but we have to start with what happened just less than 48 hours ago, which is these negotiations in Riyadh and the outcome of it that the United States and Ukraine agreed on pushing for a ceasefire. And the agreement says that the Ukrainian side accepts going for a 30-day ceasefire in return for resuming military aid and intelligence sharing. And now, with this information, apparently at the moment as we speak, the Americans are approaching Russia to tell them that they want a 30-day ceasefire. All while Russia, so far, at least as of the recording of this discussion, hasn't said whether they would accept or reject it. They are so far waiting for direct information coming from the Americans. And I think Marco Rubio wants to talk to Moscow. Apparently, for either Friday or the weekend, it seems that a phone call between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump is scheduled. What are your thoughts on this? -- 1 of 8 -- #M3 Well, I think everyone would agree that the devil is in the details here. And from Russia's perspective, there's no need to rush. Events are going as anticipated militarily. Russia is, by all accounts, likely to retake all the territory that Ukraine invaded in Russia last year, perhaps even as soon as next week. That, of course, deprives President Zelensky of one of his major negotiating points, one that he's reiterated several times. But Russia has always argued that the negotiations for peace must proceed from the situation on the ground, and that is no doubt exactly the way that they will go forward. I was struck by the sequence with which these negotiations began. In other words, the United States, now the Trump administration, believes that Russia has the upper hand, both in the short and the long term in this conflict. Therefore, their first initiative was to reach out to Russia, to Moscow, to see what the conditions were for a ceasefire that Putin would accept, and then secondarily to go and see what the Ukrainians would accept, having put them under a certain pressure to reveal to especially Zelensky and his closest supporters exactly how dependent Ukraine was on U.S. intelligence, military, and other financial assistance. Having, I suspect, made that point, the U.S. negotiators have done their best to explain to the Ukrainians what the limits of their options are and will now go back to Russia to see if Russia is willing to budge a little bit on its terms. But again, that's the trick in the negotiations. Nothing, of course, will be sealed or done until the Ukrainian and Russian sides actually sit across from each other and negotiate face-to-face. The United States, the Europeans, the Chinese, the Brazilians— everyone can only sit in the middle and be either an intermediary bringing the sides together or, as I fear in the case of Europe, stand in the way, pushing the sides further apart. So we shall see in the long run whether the United States has the ability to promote at least the first step in this process. And I would remind people that the ceasefire is only the first step. You go from a ceasefire to, secondarily, a longer-term armistice, and then perhaps, if you're lucky, into prolonged negotiations that will establish a new settlement between Ukraine and Russia. But I expect Russia will insist, and Ukraine should insist, that it should include all of their neighbors as well, all of Europe as well. And that final negotiation may be years in the making. #M2 The issue, of course, is that at the moment, Russia is on the advance, right? I mean, Russia is winning the war, as in the battlefield war in Kursk, I mean, within its own borders, but also in the four oblasts, of which, to my knowledge so far, Russia doesn't control any one of the four yet completely, right? The Ukrainians still have strongholds there. But the idea now of proposing a ceasefire is to basically freeze these front lines, right? And if Russia agrees to this, it will basically agree not to move anymore. Because if you don't shoot, you freeze the conflict where it is. So do you... Because the Russians, Mr. Lavrov and others, and Mr. Putin have said repeatedly, we are -- 2 of 8 -- willing to do diplomacy, but we are not willing to have a ceasefire. I mean, we will continue shooting while we negotiate. Do you think there is a realistic chance that they might reconsider this stance? #M3 I think the likelihood of Russia reconsidering its minimal proposal for a ceasefire, which was made, I will remind listeners, last June, June 2023, by President Putin, is low. He stated only three requirements. I don't mean to suggest that they're simple, but these are the three requirements after which Russia would immediately declare a ceasefire. They are neutrality on the part of Ukraine, introduced into the Constitution; secondarily, no NATO membership, of course, and no NATO troops within Ukraine; and lastly, the acknowledgment of these four territories, four oblasts plus Crimea, as legitimate parts of the Russian Federation, as they currently are in the Russian Constitution. So that's a technical procedure, removing them from Ukraine and acknowledging that they are now part of Russia in their current administrative borders. I must say that the issue of the administrative borders of the region has not historically been a sticking point in the negotiations that were taking place under the Minsk II Accords. Even within that framework, the governments of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics had, within the framework of the Minsk II Accords, acknowledged that there would be different administrative rights and civic rights also, essentially, for the regions within those territories that were under their control as opposed to under the control of Kiev. So, the Minsk II Accords did not apply to the entire Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts, but only to the territories that were then under the control of the rebel forces. So, maybe one could envision something similar eventually being agreed to in the case of the present situation. I think the neutrality and non-NATO membership are probably the greatest sticking points. Another key point, which was discussed in the Istanbul Accords, was limitations on the size of the Ukrainian armed forces and some limitation on the armaments that they could get. I think those probably, if one side were willing to, if Russia were willing to not push its military advantage to the administrative borders within Ukraine, which it could probably reach eventually, of the four oblasts that it doesn't currently fully occupy, then perhaps Ukraine, for its part, could return to the limitations that it had agreed to and was willing in principle to negotiate with Russia about, which it had reached in the Istanbul Accords in April of '22. #M2 So basically, like what other commentators also on YouTube call "Istanbul Plus." #M3 Not Minsk 3, but a reiteration of Istanbul. And when you think about it in those terms, you know, the sides are maybe not so far apart. But again, we're only talking about how far apart they are in terms of a ceasefire, not even the next stage of a real armistice, much less a full peace settlement. -- 3 of 8 -- #M2 And this is, of course, very critical, because if these are the conditions for just a ceasefire, we are far away from where the Trump administration currently thinks it is reasonable to try to push the Russians into agreeing to stop using weapons. Because to them, to the Trump administration, it seems reasonable to say that if the Ukrainians stop firing, then you should stop firing too. All while we actually officially say that we are going to resume arming Ukraine, which at this point seems like a very, very bad deal for Russia. However... #M3 Yeah. So, as you've put it, yes, it would be a bad deal. But let's imagine the deal embellished in the context of Istanbul Plus, which is that this rearmament of Ukraine must not exceed the limits established in the armistice agreement that would have to be negotiated. If there were limits established on the kind of offensive weaponry that Ukraine could use, then I think Russia would probably be willing to live with that as long as those limits could be effectively verified and maintained. #M2 And it's, of course, important here that the United States actually controls these limits because all of the critical information that Ukraine needs—getting the weapons, the Starlink, and the intelligence sharing needed in order to use these weapons—are actually in the control of the United States. So you could imagine a scenario in which Mr. Rubio would negotiate with Russia, saying, like, look, we are hereby agreeing to only supply so and so much, but not more for the period of the agreement. Therefore, why don't you agree, and we try to get to the next stage? #M3 Which probably is a bridging tactic in negotiations, because, again, the ceasefire doesn't need to be extended, right? In other words, if the ceasefire broke down or either side considered that it was being violated, then the armistice negotiations would simply never take place. One thing I'd like to draw our listeners' attention to is that when the press reports that arms deliveries have resumed, or that intelligence sharing has resumed, that doesn't tell us what and how much. For example, on intelligence sharing, there are two key components that have been mentioned by a number of Ukrainian bloggers as essential to Ukraine. One is intelligence on incoming missiles and drone attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. And the second is the information that is being shared by the United States and the Europeans on sites that the Ukrainians would like to attack inside Russia, and they are providing the guidance for. So it's entirely possible—I have no idea whether this is true or not—but on the intelligence sharing, the United States might be, in fact, sharing the defensive part of that, say, sharing the information -- 4 of 8 -- that would allow the Ukrainians to more effectively shoot down Russian missiles. They might still not be sharing the offensive capability and might use that as a playing card, to use a Trumpian expression, in the negotiations to encourage Russia to persist in the negotiations. #M2 The question then for the Russian side is, of course,