Today I’m talking to Dr. Uroš Lipuscek, a Slovenian colleague and Professor at the Mediterranean University, the former director of AAB University, a correspondent and editor for Slovenia’s...
Article
## A Multipolar World at a Turning Point
The conversation makes plain that we are living through a geopolitical rearrangement whose stakes go far beyond trade balances or military deployments: it is about what order will shape the twenty-first century. The exchange centers on a simple, urgent proposition — the old U.S.-led unipolar moment is fracturing, and a multipolar architecture centered on China, India, Russia and an expanding BRICS coalition is asserting itself. That tectonic shift is playing out on multiple fronts at once: the Middle East is erupting into dangerous unpredictability; Europe is torn between Atlantic loyalty and economic self-interest; and the Global South is experiencing a surge of confidence that challenges Western primacy. These dynamics are mutually reinforcing, and the conversation underscores how choices made in Brussels, Washington, Beijing and Moscow will determine whether this transition proceeds peacefully or slides toward confrontation.
## The Middle East Flashpoint and Great Power Risk
The discussion opens with a sobering diagnosis of recent violence in the Middle East and the grave risk it poses for escalation. The attack on Iranian territory, and the prospective retaliations it may provoke, are not isolated regional incidents; they rip the seam that separates many of the world’s great powers from direct confrontation. The threat is structural: security ties, energy dependencies, and strategic postures link Iran, Israel, Russia, China and the United States in ways that can transform a localized exchange into a global crisis.
Participants noted that actors like Israel may calculate to provoke reactions that consolidate external backing. Whether intended or not, such acts invite a cascade of responses. Iran’s missile capacity and its relationships with Russia and China make any escalation fraught for major powers. The United States, constrained by domestic politics and broader strategic priorities, faces a dilemma: overt backing risks deepening involvement; restraint risks political backlash. Moscow, meanwhile, is hedging its posture, bound by treaties and regional interests; Beijing is closely watching energy flows and supply-chain vulnerabilities. The upshot described in the conversation is clear — the Middle East is a fuse that could set off larger geopolitical conflagration at a time when the core architects of the post-Cold War order no longer share a single script.
## Europe's Strategic Dilemma: Between Washington and Beijing
A recurring theme is Europe’s precarious position between longstanding security ties to the United States and growing economic interdependence with China. The European Parliament’s recent rhetoric casting China as a systemic challenger illustrates the tension. On the one hand, European political elites remain embedded in an Atlantic alliance that frames security policy and often dictates the contours of diplomatic posture. On the other, economic realities — supply chains, investment flows, and technology — increasingly point toward China as an indispensable partner.
Dr. Uroš Lipušček’s observations crystallize this tension: Europe has been “under the United States' command concerning China,” yet the material basis for that alignment is eroding. The conversation points to a paradox: political alignment driven by security narratives persists even as the commercial and technological foundations of European prosperity are shifting toward Asia. The result is a dissonance between what European governments rhetorically commit to and what their industries and publics increasingly prefer. That dissonance creates both political fractures and strategic risk — a Europe that leans militarily toward Washington while remaining economically dependent on Beijing is vulnerable to manipulation and strategic coercion by third parties.
## Economic Reality: China’s Technological Leap and European Vulnerability
One of the clearest empirical claims in the discussion is the scale and speed of China’s technological rise. Personal observations from extended stays in China were used to illustrate how rapidly the country has moved from imitator to innovator. Industrial fairs, urban infrastructure, and investments in research and development were cited as signs that China no longer lags in capability but often leads in practical deployment. The implication is stark: Europe faces a civilizational shock if it does not recalibrate its economic and innovation strategy.
This reality plays out in multiple arenas. On high-end semiconductor lithography some supply-chain chokepoints remain concentrated, but in many sectors — electric vehicles, renewable energy technology, rail infrastructure, telecommunications — China has moved decisively into leadership positions. The conversation warns that European firms, weakened by underinvestment in R&D and fractured industrial policy, risk becoming the targets of acquisition and displacement. Where once Western companies guarded technology against transfer to China, the dynamic is reversing: Chinese capital and know-how are entering Europe, sometimes buying assets at fire-sale prices and retooling production with domestic technology. For European policy-makers, the hard choice is whether to double down on protectionist reflexes and militarized responses, or to pursue pragmatic economic engagement that secures markets for European goods while safeguarding strategic assets.
## The Emerging BRICS Alternative and the Global South
A striking dimension explored in the exchange is the reconfiguration of the Global South’s alignments. The BRICS grouping — long a rhetorical counterweight to Western economic orthodoxy — is becoming a substantive pole of cooperation, investment and political influence. The discussion emphasizes that future architecture cannot be reduced to a China-U.S. duel: India, Brazil, South Africa and other rising economies are important nodes that can knit a genuinely multipolar order together.
This matters for Europe because it offers an alternative route to growth and influence. Rather than anchoring European strategy solely to transatlantic military partnerships, expanding ties to BRICS and the Global South could diversify markets, technology partnerships and diplomatic leverage. The conversation suggests that joining broader multilateral frameworks would be less about capitulating to any single power and more about rebalancing dependencies. For smaller European states and for regions with deep historical ties to the Global South, that rebalancing could yield economic opportunities and greater foreign policy autonomy.
## Fragmentation Within Europe and the Politics of Militarization
The narrative of European unity is increasingly overstated. The exchange repeatedly notes fault lines: Hungary and Italy diverge from the Brussels consensus; public opinion in several European states demonstrates growing skepticism about uncritical support for overseas military engagements; and domestic party alignments fracture the political landscape. These fissures undermine a coherent European security policy and make the continent susceptible to external pressure.
Equally important is the political tilt toward militarization in many capitals. The conversation warns of a cadre of leaders who equate security with armament, channeling resources into defense at the cost of investment in education, research and industrial renewal. That pattern—if unchecked—risks normalizing a perpetual security posture that serves strategic competition rather than the public interest. The participants argue that such a course would not only be economically ruinous but would also cement Europe’s role as a subordinate in great-power rivalry instead of an autonomous actor that can chart its own course.
## What Europe Must Do: A Pragmatic Roadmap
The conversation closes with a clear-eyed set of strategic imperatives for Europe. First, Europe must prioritize economic renewal: raise public and priv
Transcript
USA Uses Europe Against China
Today I’m talking to Dr. Uroš Lipuscek, a Slovenian colleague and Professor at the Mediterranean
University, the former director of AAB University, a correspondent and editor for Slovenia’s RTV and
a consultant of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. Dr. Lipuscek has been working all over the world and is
intimately connected to the Global South. The rise of BRICS and the new multipolar order is what we
want to discuss today. Links: Lipušček's Facebook profile: https://www.facebook.com/Uros.Lipuscek
Neutrality Studies Goods Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com
#M3
We are still under the United States' command concerning China. One example is that in late March,
the European Parliament adopted a resolution concerning the rearmament of Europe, with articles
dedicated to China. They said that China is endangering the security situation of Europe.
#M2
Hello, everybody. This is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to Dr. Uroš
Lipušček, a Slovenian colleague and professor at the Mediterranean University. He's the former
director of AAB University, a correspondent and editor for Slovenia's RTV, and he also used to work
as a consultant for the OSCE mission in Kosovo. Dr. Lipušček has been working all over the world
and is intimately connected to the Global South. So, the rise of BRICS and the new multipolar order
is what we want to discuss today. Dr. Lipušček, welcome.
#M3
Welcome. Thank you for inviting me.
#M2
Thank you very much for accepting. You’ve been recently in China, and we will talk about this in just
a second. But, you know, today we’re recording this video on Friday, June 13th, and we just learned
about the horrible attack by Israel against Iran—targeting Tehran, targeting private housing
complexes, and also the nuclear facility in Natanz. I think we have to start with this, because you
also have some experience working with Iran. What is your assessment of the situation?
#M3
It could be a much bigger war—the beginning of a much bigger war in the Middle East. But I was
not surprised by that news, because I think that Netanyahu was trying to prevent United States
-- 1 of 14 --
President Trump from making an agreement with Iran concerning this problem. Trump yesterday
said that they are good partners and that they will make a good agreement. I think that Israel is
trying to prevent this at all costs. We are risking a severe war because Russia has a security
agreement with Iran. What will be their reaction? We don't know. Then there is a third partner,
which is China. China is importing around one-third of its oil from Iran, and it could be very hard for
them to be without this oil. And there is the United States, on the other hand, supporting Israel. And
I think the aim of Netanyahu is to involve the United States in that battle. It could be a severe crisis
involving all the biggest world powers.
#M2
Do you think that the Europeans will react to this act of war? This is an act of war—it's an act of
aggression by Israel against Iran. Do you think the Europeans will react the way they did when
Russia invaded Ukraine and impose any kind of sanctions on Israel?
#M3
I hope not. But I think that Great Britain will support the United States, whatever they decide in
Washington. But the other European states—I think they will hesitate to join. You know why? I am
encouraged by the fact that all the European powers supported the resolution in the Security Council
a week ago, which asked Israel to stop its intervention and allow humanitarian aid. Because this was
vetoed by the United States, the General Assembly then adopted a resolution. Only one country from
Europe—Hungary—opposed it. I think that the pressure of public opinion on governments is
increasing also in Europe. I think that they cannot support Israel anymore. I think that this is a
changing situation.
#M2
My interpretation is that Israel is actively trying to provoke a counter-reaction from Iran and wants
to invite, of course, military strikes against itself in order to regain narrative control, also in Europe.
Do you also think that Israel's desperation is part of what caused this attack?
#M3
Yes, I think that with this attack, they're trying to provoke Iran because Iran has, I don't know,
1,000 or 2,000 missiles. They could literally destroy Tel Aviv or something like that. This could be a
reason why Israel will try to regain solidarity from European countries and the United States as well,
because in the European theater, the public mood is changing. Now, for the first time, European
governments are hesitating to support Israel's aggression. Also, our country, a small country—
Slovenia—which is a member of the UN Security Council, was encouraged to be a coordinator of the
latest resolution. Even the smallest European countries are starting to be more principled against
those horrible things that Israel is doing, especially in Gaza and the genocide.
-- 2 of 14 --
#M2
You've also been working in Kosovo and with a lot of Global South countries. What is your view on
how, let's say, even places like Serbia, of the former Yugoslavia, are currently looking at what is
happening in Gaza and also in the war between Russia and Ukraine? Are the former Yugoslav
republics, in the European context, in a kind of in-between space with different interpretations of
what is happening—as we see with Serbia being staunchly neutral, but Croatia and Slovenia having
different policies? Can you give us a little bit of insight there?
#M3
Yes, I think they are divided. On one hand, Slovenia and Croatia are pro-European. They are doing
whatever they have to do and what they are told to do in Brussels. That's unfortunately the
situation. But on the other hand, you have Serbia, which is a special case. President Vučić is trying to
sit on both seats, to be pro-Russian and to be pro-European. He would like Serbia to be admitted to
the European Union. Therefore, he attended the 80th anniversary of the Second World War in
Moscow. But yesterday he paid a visit to Kyiv—he was in Ukraine. And then, on the other hand, he is
also selling weapons and ammunition to Ukraine. And he is also exporting weapons to Israel. You
know, that's a kind of different situation in the Balkans. But I think, as far as the present aggression
of Israel is concerned, all of the Balkan countries will be against it.
Much depends on the European Union's reaction, but I think that the mood of the public is changing.
I think that Israel cannot get any kind of support anymore. Here, even in Germany, the mood is
changing, which is very important because Germany is the most important country, especially with
the new chancellor. He was forced by the opposition parties to react against the aggression. What
we should see is what will be the reaction to this from the president of the General Assembly of the
United Nations. She is the German foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock. She was perhaps the most
pro-Israeli politician in Europe. And I don't know how she will react now, but I don't think that she
could have any kind of influence on public opinion in Europe and also in Germany.
#M2
What surprised me today, when it comes to the attacks on Iran, is that the United States—Mr.
Rubio, the foreign secretary—actually said that the United States had no hand in these attacks. He
said that he warned Israel not to target U.S. forces or U.S. interests. He actually didn't say that Iran
must not strike against Israel. He didn't say that. He said, "Don't strike against the United States." Is
this also a change in the way that the U.S. is signaling its support right now? Or is this, you know,
just smoke and mirrors at the moment?
#M3
-- 3 of 14 --
It's a small change, but my impression is that if President Trump, in his last telephone conversation
with Netanyahu, had insisted that Israel not attack, Israel would not have attacked. Because, you
know, President Trump has all the weapons and cards in his hands. If he stopped supplying Israel
with weapons, Israel couldn't do anything, you know. Therefore, I think that Americans are playing
on both sides. And, you know, unfortunately, they are under heavy influence of the Israeli lobby.
And I think that's the reason that they are there. And you know what is also important? They didn't
say that they will defend Israel. No, they didn't say that. You know, this could be pressure on
Netanyahu not to go on with the war, because he said that this is just the first attack and that there
will be several attacks. And maybe this could be pressure on Netanyahu not to go on with these
attacks.
#M2
Yes, and it might also be a way for the United States to avoid having to immediately use military
power against Iran should Iran choose to retaliate, depending on how it retaliates. But we also know
that Russia plays an important part in this. Russia, just a couple of days ago, officially said and
agreed that they will try to help the United States mediate some form of nuclear agreement with
Iran. And you already said Iran and Russia, of course, have security agreements. How do you think
the Ukrainian and Russian war, and the fact that the US would like to bring that to a close as well,
will play into the conflagration in the Middle East now?
#M3
I think that this war, what has happened now in the Middle East or in Iran, is not in the interest of
the Trump administration and the United States. First, he has a lot of internal problems. And second,
it could become a much wider war. And this is also not in his interest. Why? You know, this is a
problem also because Iran said that if it is attacked by Israel, they will destroy oil fields in several
surrounding countries, including Saudi Arabia. If this happens, then this could be the beginning of a
recession or even, I don't know, a depression of the world economy. The United States is not in a
situation now where it can afford not to react.
I think that the United States will try to force Israel not to go on, because it could be too severe a
crisis, not only in the Middle East, but all over the world. Also, it could complicate the situation with
the other big powers, because now the Americans will try to get some kind of conciliation with the
Chinese. This will also have an effect on the war in Ukraine. We don't know. I'm sure, you know, the
Russians, in my opinion, will not react or they will not send the army to help the Iranians. I hope so.
If this happens, the Americans will be forced in, and that could be a war between the United States
and Russia—and a world war.
#M2
-- 4 of 14 --
I also don't think that it will go to that level, but Russian military hardware is certainly being
transferred, has already been transferred, and will be further transferred, right? And the question is,
will the crisis be contained as it is, or will it become an all-out war that actually includes United
States personnel or not? But... Maybe let's shift a little bit to a discussion about China, because you
recently visited China and you were there for several—not only weeks, but months—because you
were teaching there. And you told me that what you experienced makes you actually quite hopeful.
Could you tell us a little bit about that?
#M3
You know, I was a correspondent in China for almost nine years, and I left China on one of the last
planes before the COVID epidemic started. I went on a three-week vacation, and I ended up staying
here for five years. After five years, I was back in China. I must tell you, it is a completely changed
country. They have a will—the country is developing so fast. It's becoming a technological power of
the first rate, much more developed, in some cases, than even European states. I visited, for
example, a fair in Ningbo, which was dedicated to Central and Eastern European countries. I was
thinking about what the European countries can export to China. Nothing. You know what they're
exporting? Wine, food, cheese, and that kind of stuff.
Because C