China Fools US with Genius Iran Strategy | Sheng Zhang

## China's Calculated Restraint at the UN What looked like indecision from Beijing during the Security Council votes was not confusion so much as calculation. Rather than reflexively vetoing a resolution that condemned Iran’s attacks on Gulf facilities, China abstained — a move that puzzled many Western observers expecting a blunt bloc with Russia. The abstention was, in effect, a diplomatic performance of balance. It avoided signaling unconditional support for Tehran while also leaving room for Beijing to condemn U.S. and Israeli actions elsewhere. The choice illustrates a broader pattern: China treats veto power as a calibrated instrument, used sparingly and symbolically, rather than as an automatic shield for partners. This approach should be read against Beijing’s desire to preserve maneuvering space. Abstention allowed China to avoid alienating Gulf monarchies that had been attacked while still framing the conflict’s origins — in Chinese diplomatic language — as rooted in U.S. and Israeli escalation. The subsequent vote on a Russian-drafted resolution condemning attacks on civilians, which China supported and the United States vetoed, further signals Beijing’s intent to maintain rhetorical parity. In short, China’s UN behavior during the early weeks of the war was stagecraft: signal sympathy for Iran, avoid appearing to bless Iranian strikes on Gulf neighbors, and keep diplomatic channels open across the region. ## Dual-track Diplomacy: Balancing Iran and the Gulf China’s foreign policy calculus in the Middle East is driven by a dual-track need to sustain ties with Iran while keeping favorable relations with Gulf Arab states. The Gulf monarchies — suppliers of energy and partners in trade and investment — were the ones who pressed the Security Council to act after suffering direct attacks. Beijing’s abstention can thus be read as an attempt to acknowledge their grievances without sacrificing verbal support for Iran’s broader position. This balancing act is not merely transactional. It reflects a strategic logic: China does not want to be perceived as the unconditional backer of any actor likely to end up on the losing side. Memories of the Assad episode in Syria, where rapid shifts left Beijing embarrassed and exposed, seem to weigh heavily. Avoiding a hard-line commitment to one side preserves China’s hedging strategy: it keeps trade flowing, maintains political influence, and retains the option to deepen ties with whoever emerges resilient after the fighting subsides. ## Public Sympathies and Their Political Weight One striking revelation of the conversation is the depth of public sympathy for Iran in China. Ordinary Chinese citizens reportedly flooded the Iranian embassy with offers to donate — a volume of empathy that the embassy felt obliged to decline publicly. The same pattern emerged earlier with Palestine: mass offers of support and unsolicited solidarity circulated widely on Chinese social platforms. These grassroots sentiments shape the domestic environment within which China crafts foreign policy, even if they do not dictate it. Public opinion constrains and empowers Beijing at the same time. On the one hand, visible sympathy for Iranian and Palestinian causes helps justify a softer rhetorical posture toward Western actions in the region; on the other, it does not compel full-throated diplomatic confrontation with the United States. The Chinese leadership appears to be weighing domestic sentiment alongside strategic interests: signaling solidarity with popular feeling without risking the disruption of critical economic ties or provoking direct confrontation with Washington. ## From Pessimism to Surprise: Beijing's Read of Iranian Resilience Before the war escalated, a mix of pessimism and doubt colored Chinese assessments of Iran’s ability to sustain a large-scale conflict. Past events — assassinations of Iranian figures that suggested deep infiltration by adversaries, the relatively short “12 Days” clash, and domestic unrest in Iran — convinced many in China that Tehran might quickly crumble if targeted. That expectation helps explain Beijing’s early low-key reaction. But the course of the recent fighting introduced a recalibration. The rapid mobilization, effective retaliation against U.S. assets, and visible public demonstrations of support following the reported assassination of Iran’s supreme leader surprised many observers in China. As conveyed by Sheng Zhang, those developments altered Beijing’s costing of the crisis: Iran displayed resilience, organizational competence, and popular backing that were not fully anticipated. This shift in perception matters because China’s willingness to increase support — diplomatic, economic, or covert — will likely be conditional on Tehran’s perceived staying power. If Iran continues to demonstrate that it is not on the brink of collapse, Chinese support is expected to strengthen incrementally. ## Economic Lifelines and Military-adjacent Trade Beyond rhetoric, Beijing’s posture toward Tehran is anchored in longstanding and pragmatic commercial relations. China has been a major buyer of Iranian oil, and trade persisted through the initial weeks of hostilities. More consequentially, Chinese exports to Iran include dual-use technologies and industrial equipment that can bolster Iran’s domestic production capacities — some of which have potential military applications. Examples range from components used in manufacturing to decoy technologies and drones. Sheng Zhang points to a wider pattern: Beijing emphasizes economic empowerment over overt military entanglement. Supplying technology and materials that can be used to sustain defense industries provides plausible deniability while materially strengthening Iran’s capacity to resist external pressure. The mention of inflatable decoys and drone technology serves as a reminder that contemporary warfare increasingly depends on commercially available technologies. China appears comfortable operating below the threshold of open arms transfers, opting instead for trade that nourishes Iran’s industrial base and complicates attempts to isolate Tehran. ## The Strait of Hormuz and Strategic Risk Management The closure or partial disruption of the Strait of Hormuz is the kind of flashpoint that forces great-power calculations. China’s energy imports and global trade networks depend on the free flow of Persian Gulf oil, so any sustained disruption would have direct consequences for Beijing’s economic security. That said, China’s rhetoric about maritime safety and its realpolitik measures are not always aligned. Beijing’s priority is to ensure continued oil flows while signaling its opposition to external aggression. The reported Iranian offer to allow passage for ships from “friendly” nations or those engaged in yuan-denominated trade reveals Tehran’s use of maritime control as both leverage and a testing ground for alternative economic arrangements. For China, such a scenario introduces opportunities and risks: control over transit could be used to deepen energy ties and shift settlement practices toward non-dollar transactions, but it also risks military entanglement or the need to secure shipping routes — commitments Beijing would prefer to avoid. Therefore, China is likely to pursue policies that minimize disruption: continued purchases of Iranian oil where feasible, discreet logistical and diplomatic support, and pressure on Iran against broad closures that would backfire economically. The aim is to preserve trade continuity while avoiding entanglement that would force China into a kinetic role. ## What Comes Next: Conditional Support and Strategic Hedging China’s strategy in the Iran war is best understood as conditional backing wrapped in strategic hedging. Beijing has demonstrated sympathy for Iran and a readiness to adjust its posture as Tehran proves resilient. But that backing is calibrated: abstentions at the UN, continued co

Breaking: China's Iran Strategy REVEALED | Sheng Zhang China's silence in the first weeks on Iran was not a mistake. Beijing is highly strategic in its approach to the latest US war of aggression, and it's quite surprising what's behind the reasoning. Today I'm talking again to Mr. Sheng Zhang, a Chinese West-Asia expert who explains the driving rationale behind China's approach to the Iran War. Support us on substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Goods & Donations: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com #Pascal Welcome back, everybody. My name is Pascal Lottaz. I'm an associate professor at Kyoto University, and today I'm joined again by a good colleague, Mr. Sheng Zhang, a non-resident visiting researcher at Turkey's Koç University. Sheng, welcome back. #Sheng Zhang Thank you. #Pascal Thanks for taking the time, because we want to talk about China's approach toward the Iran war. You’re one of the analysts who always keeps a very close eye on Chinese foreign policy. Last time we talked, you explained to me the various approaches in China toward the genocide in Gaza. So, three weeks ago—well, two weeks ago—we’re now in the third week of the U.S.–Israel–Iran war, the all-out war, the bombing campaigns on both sides, and of course the unprovoked attack on Iran. Yet, when there was a Security Council resolution last week proposed by the United States, it got a significant number of supporting states and condemned not the United States and Israel, but Iran’s attacks on neighboring Gulf countries. That resolution passed. I never thought it could, because I always assumed China and Russia would clearly veto it. Yet neither of them did. I’m not going to ask you about Russia, but about China—why did China not veto that? #Sheng Zhang Yeah, actually, I was a little bit surprised by that vote as well. I mean, I personally have a lot of criticism of it, but I’m just trying to explain what the rationale might have been for the Chinese diplomats—what they were thinking when they made that decision, without necessarily defending it myself. So, the first thing is that, as we talked about last time regarding China’s actions on the UN Security Council resolution about Palestine, China is often very cautious—sometimes you could even -- 1 of 17 -- say overcautious—about using its veto power. Normally, when they do use it, it means they’re trying to send a message: even if you’re going to keep pushing this, we’re going to sabotage the plan. That’s normally what they’ve been doing. And specifically about this resolution, there are some particular circumstances around it. The first thing is that it was basically proposed and backed mainly by the Gulf countries—the Gulf Arab countries that were physically attacked by Iran’s weapons when the war started. Of course, Iran did that as retaliation for the U.S. and Israeli invasion of Iran. But the background of this particular resolution is that the Gulf monarchies felt they were attacked and wanted to push forward something condemning that attack. And for the Chinese, they felt that China could definitely support something condemning the U.S. and Israeli attack on Iran. But at the same time, if they veto this resolution, they feel like that would mean they’re supporting the Iranian attack on the Gulf monarchies, which is a little bit different from their official stance. Their official stance right now is basically that all sides should stop the war. And then, of course, they blame the Israelis and Americans more. If you look at the video of the UN discussion during this vote, you can see that the Chinese representative was very straightforward in explaining why they abstained instead of voting in favor of the resolution. The argument was that this all started with the U.S. and Israeli bombing and the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader, and the killing of civilians. So the Chinese are definitely not, in any way, supporting the U.S.-Israeli stance over Iran. But at the same time, they feel that if they veto this particular resolution, it would make the Gulf Arab countries feel like China is supporting the Iranian attack on their facilities. And right now, China still values its friendship with the Gulf monarchies. We can talk about that later—whether China should feel that way or if there’s any critique of it—but for today, what the Chinese government is thinking is that they still want to maintain a close and friendly relationship with the Arab monarchies in the Gulf. And that’s one important piece of background. Another thing is that the Chinese didn’t expect that to be the only resolution. Because, you know, after that, on March 11th, I think the Russians proposed another resolution condemning all attacks against civilians—which, of course, would include what the Israelis and Americans did at the beginning of the war. And China voted in favor of that. That resolution was more about criticizing all attacks on civilians and demanding that all sides stop the war. And if you look at how the Russians framed it, it was very clearly a resolution targeting the United States. And the Chinese voted in favor of it. But of course, that resolution was vetoed by the United States. And alongside, I think Latvia was the only other country that sided with the United States in that vote. So it was a very disappointing moment when that resolution was vetoed. But I think what the Chinese were thinking was that, in order to maintain some sort of self-claimed balanced stance on this issue, they would not block the Bahrain-proposed condemnation of the Iranian attack. At the same time, if Russia or Iran proposed something condemning U.S. and Israeli attacks on civilians, the Chinese would vote in favor of that as well. So I think that was the rationale behind their move. -- 2 of 17 -- #Pascal Hey, very brief intermission because I was recently banned from YouTube. And although I'm back, this could happen again anytime. So please consider subscribing not only here, but also to my mailing list on Substack—that’s pascallottaz.substack.com. The link’s in the description below. And now, back to the video. Now, that makes very good sense. So we should not understand the non- vetoing of this resolution as support for the United States, but rather as a form of support—or at least non-opposition—to the Gulf monarchies, because China is interested not only in its relationship with Iran, but also in its relationship with the Gulf monarchies. And they are, after all, the ones who asked the Security Council to do something on their behalf. Then that resolution was tabled. Okay, so that’s again very much in line with what you told me last time—that while the United States treats the veto like a royal prerogative that it wields anytime it’s not 100% behind a resolution, China uses it in a much more nuanced way. But this time, that meant the resolution condemning Iran passed. How was it perceived inside China? Or how is the war—the start of the war, its development—how is it perceived inside China, from what you can tell from the local media? #Sheng Zhang Yeah, I think overall it’s pretty clear that China somehow expected this war to happen. What the Chinese were feeling—and we can talk about this in more depth later—is that in the last few years, they thought Iran might be acting a bit naively in many situations, especially in its relations with the United States and Israel. The Chinese felt that one day, and probably quite soon, the United States would attack Iran. And especially after the October 7th incidents in 2023, when Israel and Iran were already firing missiles at each other, that feeling grew stronger. During that time, the Chinese already felt that the United States would one day come in against Iran and launch some sort of larger attack. So it wasn’t really a surprise for China to see this war happen. The overall feeling among Chinese civilians is that they are very, very sympathetic toward Iran—and I’d say the same about the government as well. At the beginning of the war, actually, the Chinese were a bit pessimistic. You could see it in the atmosphere, in the media, and in people’s comments. I think that also explains why the Chinese government was very low-key at the start of the war. Part of the atmosphere was that this was the underlying mood they were voting in favor of—like abstaining, not doing more diplomatically to help Iran in the UN Security Council. I think China in general was a little pessimistic about how Iran would react to this war. Because, you know, especially since last year, when Israel was bombing Iran, the Chinese felt it was so easy for the Israelis to assassinate important figures in Iran—either someone like Haniyeh, the Politburo member of Hamas, or very important leaders and commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. -- 3 of 17 -- Those people were assassinated very easily last year during the 12 Days War, and Haniyeh was assassinated before the 12 Days War. But during that war, the Chinese were a little disappointed with Iran’s performance, wondering, why is it so infiltrated by Mossad? Why is it so easy for top military commanders to be assassinated? Shortly after that, at the beginning of this year, we saw protests—or riots, however you want to describe them—happening in the streets of Iranian cities. All of those events gave the Chinese a feeling, actually quite a strong feeling, that they’re not very optimistic about Iran’s ability to defend itself if the war breaks out again. And especially if we talk about the 12 Days War, the Chinese were thinking, oh, maybe the Iranians would keep fighting a little longer. But it didn’t happen—it ended after 12 days. That’s why it’s called the 12 Days War. So at the beginning of this war, the Chinese government, and then the public as well, didn’t have very high expectations for Iran. And it’s not because the Chinese don’t like Iran; I’d say it’s because they really want Iran to perform well. They put some expectations—and sometimes imagination—on Iran, which may not align with the actual situation there. But still, they felt maybe Iran should be doing much better. And when the war started, they were very afraid that a regime change could easily happen in Iran or something like that. Because at the beginning of the day, Ayatollah Khamenei was assassinated. So the Chinese were freaking out about that. They were like, oh, last year so many people got assassinated, and this year again the supreme leader gets assassinated. Does this mean that Iran is so infiltrated that the regime might fall? Are they able to continue fighting? So that’s where the sentiment was—a kind of freaking-out stage. But as we see now, after two weeks, actually even in the first several days, especially after the Iranians announced that Ayatollah Khamenei was assassinated, the Chinese were noticing that Iran was actually doing much better than they had thought. When Ali Khamenei was assassinated, that didn’t stop Iran’s retaliation against the U.S. and Israeli invasion. So far, the Iranians are actually self-organizing very well. You can see their military, their Revolutionary Guard, working very efficiently in their retaliation against U.S. assets in the region. And we don’t see any, I’d say, fifth column in the streets of Tehran trying to cooperate with U.S. or Israeli airstrikes. Actually, both Trump and Netanyahu were calling for that, but it didn’t happen. So overall, we saw the video of the Iranian assembly and the people protesting in the streets against the U.S. after Khamenei’s assassination. It was going very viral on Chinese social media, and people were happily surprised by that because they had expected Khamenei’s death might cause people to lose faith in the resistance and things like that. But actually, what we’re seeing is that the Iranian people are coming to the streets, showing their support for the resistance. And we see that the Iranian leadership was also joining them in the streets—yo