They NEVER Wanted To Build A Common European Home With Russia | Minister Evarist Bartolo

## A missed chance that shaped the map of Europe The core claim that emerges from the conversation is stark: the idea of a “common European home” that would have integrated Russia into a shared security and political order was not merely an unrealized dream — it was actively sidelined. Far from being an accident of history, the exclusion of Russia from a cooperative European security architecture was the result of deliberate policy choices, institutional rivalries, and strategic calculations, most prominently by Washington but with significant complicity among key European elites. That failure has had consequences that reverberate to the present day: a Europe reconfigured around exclusionary security alliances, deepened transatlantic dependency, and a political culture ill-equipped to cultivate genuinely equal partnerships beyond the West. ## How the post–Cold War opening was narrowed The late 1980s and early 1990s presented a unique political moment. Mikhail Gorbachev’s repeated overtures toward a pan-European security framework — a sphere that could have encompassed both East and West — created the possibility of rethinking the continent’s architecture. Yet documents since declassified and discussed in the conversation reveal a different trajectory than the one many Europeans imagined at the time. High-level U.S. policymakers treated cooperative frameworks like the Helsinki process and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) as useful rhetorical devices but not as strategic pillars. Henry Kissinger’s early dismissal of the Helsinki accords as “just a document” is emblematic of a broader approach: the United States preferred institutions and instruments that preserved its leverage. The result was an institutional mismatch. The OSCE, by design inclusive and political, competed with NATO, an explicitly military alliance that framed security in defensive and adversarial terms. Instead of allowing an inclusive CSCE to take primacy as the backbone of a collective European order, the dominant path favored NATO’s expansion and consolidation. The conversation stresses that this was not a slow drift but a choice: enlargement of an exclusive alliance effectively extinguished the political space for a genuinely pan-European security system. ## The American strategic interest in a divided Europe A throughline in the exchange is the long-term U.S. preference for a European order that preserved American primacy. From the early Cold War onward, Washington invested in European reconstruction and security — but on terms that reinforced dependence rather than European strategic autonomy. As Evarist Bartolo points out, NATO was consistently privileged as the U.S. tool of choice. More than defensive posturing, NATO served as a mechanism to bind European foreign and security policy to transatlantic priorities, limiting the emergence of a fully autonomous European voice. Several episodes underscore this dynamic. The handling of German reunification illustrates how U.S. and some Western European leaders prioritized NATO membership over neutrality as the organizing principle for a reunited Germany. Officials who advocated for an expanded, inclusive architecture were sidelined. Bartolo’s metaphor — a deal between a “drug dealer and a drug addict” — captures the asymmetry of the relationship: parts of the European elite became dependent on U.S. security guarantees to an extent that inhibited independent strategic thinking. That dependence made it politically costly for many European leaders to pursue a truly independent security policy or to entertain partnerships that might dilute U.S. influence. ## Internal debates: not all Americans or Europeans agreed The historical record is not monolithic. Within both the United States and Europe, competing visions existed. There were officials in Washington — diplomats and analysts who favored engagement and caution about enlargement — who lost influence to the political coalition that advocated expansion. Figures like Jack Matlock, who worked to manage the Soviet transition and prevent conflict, represent an alternative U.S. current that viewed enlargement skeptically and preferred integrating Russia into European political structures rather than driving it to the geopolitical margins. Similarly, European political currents were divided. Some conservatives, especially among Christian Democrats in postwar Western Europe, found the perceived security insurance of U.S. guarantees attractive and politically expedient. Other Europeans — not least in France and among more independent-minded leaders — sought a more autonomous European path, a capacity to balance relations with the United States, Russia, and other global powers. Over time, however, the cohort favoring tight alignment with Washington broadly prevailed. Enlargement after 1991, the so-called “new Europe” vs. “old Europe” split, and the institutional blending of EU and NATO policies reflected that victory. What might have been a multipolar European diplomacy hardened instead into a transatlantic consensus that excluded Moscow. ## NATO expansion, German reunification, and broken assurances The conversation carefully revisits critical junctures — notably the discussions around Germany’s future — to show how diplomatic practices and assurances shaped outcomes. When German reunification became possible, options existed that could have produced a neutral Germany embedded in a broader security architecture. Instead, agreements were steered toward maintaining Germany inside NATO. Accounts of meetings in which ministers who favored a different course were deliberately excluded are telling: the pattern was not only one of strategic preference but of active management to prevent rival ideas from prevailing. Bartolo and others highlight a deeper problem of credibility in Western diplomacy at the time. Russian leaders, including Gorbachev, were told different things by different Western interlocutors. Public reassurance and private planning diverged: while some Western officials spoke publicly of partnership and inclusion, internal plans in parts of Washington’s defense bureaucracy plotted substantial enlargement. That disconnect — the simultaneous offering of diplomatic sugar and hard strategic planning — sowed mistrust as post-Soviet Russia watched institutions it had hoped would evolve into inclusive frameworks consolidate instead as mechanisms of exclusion. ## The European predicament: dependency, weakness, and self-blame A central analytical claim is that the European Union’s current posture is in large part self-inflicted. Europe presents itself rhetorically as a global actor, but in practice its strategic choices reflect limited capacity and an ingrained habit of external reliance. The blending of EU policy with NATO priorities, the conversion of economic and political instruments into extensions of military alignment, and the political tendency to externalize responsibility — blaming Moscow, or even Washington, rather than grappling with internal economic and technological weaknesses — all point to a polity that has not learned the craft of strategic sovereignty. This has consequences beyond abstract debates. It shapes how Europe negotiates with rising powers like China, grapples with energy security, and modernizes its industrial base. The conversation suggests that Europe’s inability to conceive of non-Western partners as equals — an intellectual and cultural reluctance to treat “non-Europeans” as full partners — undermines efforts to build durable economic and diplomatic ties outside the transatlantic orbit. That mindset makes it easier politically to accept adversarial framing than to pursue complicated but potentially stabilizing engagement. ## Reflections and what a different path might have looked like If the conversation offers a critique, it also implicitly sketches alternatives. A genuinely inclusive European security order woul

They NEVER Wanted To Build A Common European Home With Russia Today I’m talking to Evarist Bartolo, a labor politician of the beautiful island state of Malta. Mr. Bartolo was a member of Malta’s parliament for 30 years, and he served as Minister of European and Foreign Affairs, between 2020 and 2022. Links: Article mentioned in the video (Mirage of a Common Home): https://timesofmalta.com/article/mirage-common-home.1113920 Minister Bartolo's Homepage: https://evaristbartolo.mt Our Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00 Preview 00:42 Introduction 01:44 How Did We Lose the Post-Cold War Opportunity? 12:28 The American Strategic Interest in a Divided Europe 19:05 The Internal US Debate on NATO Expansion 25:27 Europe's Difficulty Accepting Non-Western Partners 29:05 The Transatlantic Elite Network Controlling Europe 49:07 Why Did the US Initially Want to Keep the Soviet Union Together? 53:23 Is the Goal to Turn Europe into a 'Mega-Ukraine'? #M3 The deal is a deal between a drug dealer and a drug addict. And a substantial part of the European elite have been addicted to the security drug of the United States. They cannot get away from that addiction. And they feel as if their only purpose is to work for that kind of transatlantic subservience, because it's not an alliance. An alliance presupposes some kind of dignity and equality. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies. And today I've got with me again Evarist Bartolo. Evarist was the former foreign minister of the wonderful island nation of Malta, and he was a parliament member there for many, many years as well. By now, he's also a regular guest on my show because he always writes brilliant articles and provides great analysis. His latest piece, which he published in the Times of Malta, is called "A Mirage of the Common Home: The United States Has Always Opposed the Pan-European Security Structure," in which he discusses why we don't have a common European security that includes Russia and Belarus as well. This is what we want to discuss today, so Evarist, welcome. #M3 Welcome, and thank you for giving me this opportunity to explain actually more than 50 years of history. Because unless we go back, unless we try to understand history, we will not understand where we are. #M2 -- 1 of 17 -- Precisely. And this is such a crucial point. In that article—which I will also link in the description and is free for everybody to read—there's this picture of Gorbachev waving. Of course, the "common home" is remembered as this idea that Gorbachev pitched very strongly: that in the 1990s, we were going to create a common security framework, actually including the Americans as well, and actually work together, not against each other. How did we lose that chance? Why are we now at a worse moment than at the height of the Cold War again? #M3 I think if we study carefully the documents that have been made available online in the National Security Archive—these are now official documents of what was discussed in the U.S. Cabinet and in bilateral meetings between European and American leaders—it becomes very clear. And it was quite a discovery for me because I was under the illusion—and I must say that sometimes illusions help us cope with harsh reality—I was under the illusion that things were much better 50 years ago, when the Helsinki Accord was signed, to talk about and try to bring about cooperative security in Europe: security which brings together economics, environment, human rights, and political rights. And then I thought that somehow things went wrong after the fall of Berlin and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Reading those documents and analyzing them actually shows that no, right from the beginning, in 1975, the United States did not believe in the Helsinki Accord. We can see in one case—I think it was just a week after the signatures were put in Helsinki—that Kissinger is telling the cabinet, "Don't worry, this means nothing. It's not a treaty. It's just a document. And we did it sort of to please the Europeans, especially as a kind of nod to the left, who wanted to build this cooperative security, trying to build détente at that time." Obviously, at that time, it was détente. And it's interesting who the people were who were pushing for détente, you know, to have a working relationship between Western Europe and Eastern Europe. And what is interesting is that even the Soviet Union at that time acknowledged that the United States could play an important part in cooperative security in Europe. And that's why it accepted the United States as a signatory to that accord. But I repeat, from the very beginning—way back, I would say, since the foundation of NATO—the United States has always privileged NATO as its main policy tool in Europe. And so it never gave... CSCE and even OSCE a chance, because you have a big collision there between NATO and OSCE. OSCE is inclusive—you include everybody. NATO is exclusive; NATO wants to be against others. So the decision to enlarge NATO meant that you squash, you kill OSCE. And there was no doubt at any moment in these last 50 years what the United States was going to do. Presidents come and go, secretaries of state come and go, but there was one particular priority that they gave: it should be NATO. And I think, Pascal, what is interesting is that particular episode when Helmut Kohl is invited by Bush to go to Camp David to discuss the security arrangements. -- 2 of 17 -- And he told him, now listen, there is no way that a united Germany will leave NATO. Because Russia was saying, yes, let's unite Germany, but it would be good to have a neutral Germany instead of Germany as a NATO member. And the Americans said, there's no way we will accept that. So Kohl is invited to Camp David, and Bush tells him, come alone. Don't bring your foreign minister, because your foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, was one of the few voices still saying, let's have a common European security architecture, and that it should be larger than NATO. Because if NATO is larger than the CSCE, what kind of—if it's a military alliance against someone else, it's not inclusive at all. So Genscher is actually excluded from that meeting, and they are angry at him. What is interesting is that both Bush and Kohl are angry at him. So in this story, the Europeans are as complicit—part of the European elites, I would say mostly at the beginning, the center-right, especially the Christian Democrats. I think especially the German Christian Democrats are complicit in this story. The French tried to keep a kind of autonomy for Europe, tried to take a different position. But even—I would say, and it might be strong language, what I'm going to say now—even in the latest so-called deal between President Trump and European Commission President von der Leyen... The deal is like that between a drug dealer and a drug addict. And a substantial part of the European elite have been addicted to the security "drug" of the United States. They cannot get away from that addiction. And they feel as if their only purpose is to work for that kind of transatlantic subservience, because it's not an alliance. An alliance presupposes some kind of dignity and equality. But I think, right from after the Second World War, the United States made clear that it would rebuild Western Europe—rebuild it on its terms, rebuild it to have also very important markets for its industry and for its exports. But it wouldn't want Western Europe to grow beyond a certain stage. Yes, don't be dependent on us. Don't ask us for pocket money all the time. But don't become an independent individual who leaves our relationship to do what you want to do, even if it's in your interest to do that. So, time and time again, NATO has actually been used to keep the members in line. Because although over the years there is talk of the Soviet threat and of invasion, if one studies the history of NATO, it's to keep the members in check rather than to keep someone away. Because when they, for example, say, "We don't want missiles on our territory," the response is, "No, remember, you are members of NATO," and especially the Germans are being told, "If you don't accept missiles on your territory, who else in Europe is going to accept them?" So please, not only must you be members of NATO, but you must also accept what we impose on you, because France is not always compliant. But then, if you look at the Italian Christian Democrats, for example, they still tried to build a kind of independent foreign policy where they would have some room for maneuver to build a good relationship with North Africa, with the Arab countries, with the Middle East, with the Gulf countries. The United States was not happy. And I -- 3 of 17 -- found it quite an interesting remark—recently, I was reading the autobiography of Willy Brandt, where he says that Kissinger actually said, you know, we prefer to have the Europeans as individual dwarves rather than becoming a giant. So as much as possible, we want them to be dwarves so that we can play Berlin against Paris, Paris against London. So we want a united Europe. But again, a united Europe—a united Western Europe—where it's not truly united, because the United States was never happy when the Europeans spoke with one voice, when they managed to speak with one voice. So it was always very important for them to have a disunited Europe, which became even more disunited with enlargement to the Baltic countries and to the Eastern European countries, and then the talk of "new Europe" and "old Europe." New Europe, which does more of what we say, and old Europe, which sometimes tries to have its strategic autonomy and its strategic sovereignty, which today have become almost ridiculous. One shouldn't even talk about it. #M2 And it needs to be pointed out—God forbid, from an American perspective—that a united Europe includes Russia, because then everything is over. So even just something like a beneficial trading relationship with Russia and an energy security relationship is something that literally needs to be blown up—and was blown up. So, you know, the Ukraine war in this sense fulfills several checkmarks, right? It is, on several levels, something that is in the strategic interest of certain groups in America. And I would never, ever ascribe this to all parts. We know that most of our American colleagues are very well-meaning humanists, but we also have these neoconservatives and the neo... Kissinger's. I wouldn't say Kissinger is a neoconservative, but I would say Kissinger is one of these very cold-hearted geostrategists who think in these nationalistic lines. But the one thing I would like to explore further with you is this point that never occurred to me: that actually, in the Cold War, we had two chances at having a unified, neutral Germany, and both times it was blown up by the CDU. I mean, the first one was Adenauer. Had it not been for Adenauer, actually the Americans would have said yes, because Eisenhower was in favor—he was not against the idea pitched by Stalin of a reunified, neutral Germany. And then a second time, it was Kohl, together with Bush, against the idea, saying, "Instead of that, let's sell the idea that a unified Germany inside NATO is good for the Soviet Union." And Gorbachev took it. Gorbachev took that one and swallowed it and said, "OK, if it's not neutral, it's at least inside NATO and it is well defined and not an inch to the east." #M3 It is so sad. It is so sad. I had a friend, an ambassador friend who was based in Moscow, and he became a friend to Gorbachev when, obviously, he was not in public life anymore. Also, we have an emotional relationship with Gorbachev—and with Bush to a certain extent—because way back, it was in the rough seas of Malta that the first discussion of a common European security home was held. -- 4 of 17 -- But it was discussed from the point