The Great Betrayal: How the Democrats became the Party of War | James Carden
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James Carden discusses The Great Betrayal and his account of how interventionists displaced the Democratic Party’s tradition of restraint. He traces competing foreign policy schools from Roosevelt and Truman through Kennedy, Carter and Clinton, emphasizing personnel, donors, think tanks and media. The conversation examines Russiagate, progressive attitudes toward Russia, American exceptionalism and Carden’s concept of a pluralism gap. Carden also questions whether either major party can accommodate a multipolar world, arguing that advocates of restraint remain politically outnumbered in Washington.
James's Links:
The Realist Review: https://therealistreview.substack.com/
The Great Betrayal: https://orbooks.com/catalog/the-great-betrayal/
Neutrality Studies Links:
Neutrality Studies Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com
Support Neutrality Studies: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate
Neutrality Studies shop: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop
Time Stamps
00:00 The Great Betraya
Summary
James Carden argues that the Democratic Party’s contemporary hawkishness stems from a mid‑20th century realignment in which Truman‑Acheson–style Cold Warriors displaced Rooseveltian restraint. Tracing personnel, donors, think tanks and media from 1945 through Carter, Clinton and the post‑Cold War years, he shows how institutional nodes—alumni networks, funders and policy elites—entrenched an interventionist consensus increasingly indistinguishable from neoconservatism. Carden contends Carter’s siding with Brzezinski was a hinge moment, enabling Achesonian dominance and marginalizing dissenting “Rooseveltian” voices. He links persistent Russiagate hysteria and cultural‑value anxieties among progressives to familial and ideological memories of Eastern Europe, producing a pluralism gap: Washington’s self‑styled “realists” often endorse Cold War framing and support for Ukraine, undermining genuine multipolar accommodation. Ultimately Carden questions whether either major party can politically adjust to a multipolar world, concluding that advocates of genuine restraint remain outnumbered and institutionally sidelined in U.S. foreign‑policy circles.
Article
## The Great Betrayal: two Democratic traditions
The conversation centers on a striking historical reversal: the Democratic Party’s migration from a temperament of international restraint to one dominated by interventionist thinking. What emerges is not a sudden transformation but a slow institutional takeover in which ideas, personnel, and incentives converged to reshape what the party stands for in global affairs. James Carden frames this shift as a clash between two durable traditions: a Rooseveltian strain that favored multilateral cooperation and prudence, and an Achesonian current—named after Dean Acheson—that embraced a permanent national security apparatus and a more confrontational posture toward rivals.
Tracing this evolution from 1945 onward highlights a key point: foreign-policy trajectories are rarely decided by mass opinion alone. They are produced by elites who populate government, think tanks, media, and donor circles. The Rooseveltian ideal of cooperative great-power management, embodied in the immediate postwar project of international institutions, found itself squeezed by Truman-era choices and Cold War anxieties. Over decades, the institutional weight shifted; what had once been one pole of debate became the orthodoxy. That transformation, Carden suggests, explains why contemporary Democratic rhetoric often echoes Cold War certainties more than Rooseveltian pluralism.
## The neoconservative connection
A central analytic thread in the discussion is the overlap—and the distinction—between Achesonians and neoconservatives. Carden insists that the intellectual genealogy matters: many who later became prominent neoconservatives began their careers in the Democratic foreign-policy ecosystem under Achesonian tutelage. Figures who would be identified with muscular, unilateral strategies learned inside institutions shaped by Truman-era national-security thinking. Over time, some of these actors migrated to the Republican side, but the imprint they left on Democratic institutions persisted.
This shared genealogy helps explain why the policy choices of later Democrats sometimes look indistinguishable from neoconservative agendas. The differences, when they are invoked, are often stylistic—public commitments to multilateral institutions versus an avowed willingness to act unilaterally—rather than substantive on questions of force projection and regime opposition. In practical terms, whether policy originates in a Democratic or Republican setting, the same institutional incentives—desire for influence, access to defense contractors, career reward structures in think tanks and government—push toward interventionist options.
## Carter and the triumph of the hawks
The conversation isolates the Carter administration as an inflection point. Carden paints 1977–1981 as a hinge moment in which competing Democratic schools were forced to fight for institutional dominance. Jimmy Carter’s personnel choices—particularly the appointment of Zbigniew Brzezinski as national security adviser—tilted the balance toward Achesonian thinking. Where Cyrus Vance embodied a more cautious, Rooseveltian sensibility, Brzezinski pushed a hard-line containment strategy that ultimately set the tone for the next generation of Democratic foreign-policy elites.
This personnel argument—“personnel is policy”—is crucial. Institutional memory and expertise are transmitted through careers and networks. When administrations recruit from a pool dominated by a certain worldview, that worldview gains institutional legitimacy. Carden’s historical anatomy shows how Carter’s tilt, combined with the tumult of the 1960s (including the assassinations of the Kennedys) and the ebb of Rooseveltian leadership, left the party with an alumni network steeped in Cold War vigilance. By the time Clinton arrived, the experienced choices available to him were largely Achesonian, and thus the party’s trajectory was reinforced.
## Who controls foreign policy
A recurring theme is the multilayered architecture of influence in Washington. The conversation moves beyond partisan labels to identify the nodes that actually shape foreign policy: donors, think tanks, congressional actors and staff, and media institutions. These nodes form an ecosystem that socializes and rewards particular kinds of thinking—strategic ambiguity, moral certainty about adversaries, and readiness to fund and militarize responses.
Understanding power this way reframes debates over “the base” versus elites. Electoral coalitions and grassroots movements matter, but they rarely dictate the decisions that shape intervention. Instead, foreign-policy choices are often the product of a compact between financial interests, institutional career paths, and a media culture that prizes alarm and moral clarity. That compact produces what Carden and the conversation describe as a kind of uniparty consensus on international security questions, within which dissenting views—especially those that counsel restraint—struggle to gain traction.
## Culture wars and American exceptionalism
The party’s shift is not purely organizational; it is also cultural. The conversation foregrounds how progressive cultural commitments—on rights, gender, and social liberalism—have been patriotically fused to an interventionist foreign policy. Many progressives, Carden contends, genuinely believe that American-led pressure for liberal social norms—on LGBTQ rights, civil liberties, and governance—legitimates intervention. These convictions are not cynical; they arise from a sincere, often moralistic belief in American exceptionalism and the universalizability of certain norms.
What this produces is a new kind of crusading language on the left: foreign governments that appear socially conservative are framed as backward regimes that must be nudged—or forced—toward liberal outcomes. That cultural lens makes restraint politically awkward: it can look like indifference to rights. The result is a coalition in which cultural solidarity and geopolitical hostility reinforce one another, hardening the party’s stance against countries seen as illiberal, and marginalizing voices that would prioritize geopolitical balance or pluralistic acceptance of different developmental paths.
## Russia, Russiagate and the limits of dissent
The Russiagate era crystallized these dynamics. According to Carden, the accusations and the fever around Russian interference functioned as a cultural and political litmus test: dissenting or restraint-oriented voices were quickly branded naive or worse. The scandal had the effect of narrowing the permissible range of debate within the party, especially on anything that could be read as sympathy toward Russia. That narrowing, Carden argues, discouraged nuanced considerations of Russian policy and fueled a bipartisan consensus on confrontation.
This climate also reveals how political theater and media narratives can discipline elite debate. Russiagate operated as both evidence and allegory: evidence of malign influence was used to justify broad strategic reorientation, and the rhetoric around it delegitimized alternative frameworks that might have been more conducive to negotiation or coexistence. Critics of intervention—whether progressive or conservative—found themselves marginalized by a discourse that equated restraint with complicity.
## The pluralism gap and a multipolar world
One of the sharper conceptual contributions is Carden’s idea of a “pluralism gap”: the inability of U.S. elites to accept a world in which multiple great powers legitimately pursue divergent internal paths and external interests. The dominant Democratic posture treats rival societies as moral puzzles to be solved, not political actors to be negotiated with. That intellectual unwillingness makes adapting to a genuinely multipolar world difficult.
If the international system is indeed trending toward multipolarity, then the prevailing domestic debate is poorly ad
Transcript
The Great Betrayal: How the Democrats
became the Party of War | James Carden
James Carden discusses The Great Betrayal and his account of how interventionists displaced the
Democratic Party’s tradition of restraint. He traces competing foreign policy schools from Roosevelt
and Truman through Kennedy, Carter and Clinton, emphasizing personnel, donors, think tanks and
media. The conversation examines Russiagate, progressive attitudes toward Russia, American
exceptionalism and Carden’s concept of a pluralism gap. Carden also questions whether either major
party can accommodate a multipolar world, arguing that advocates of restraint remain politically
outnumbered in Washington. James's Links: The Realist Review: https://therealistreview.substack.
com/ The Great Betrayal: https://orbooks.com/catalog/the-great-betrayal/ Neutrality Studies Links:
Neutrality Studies Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Support Neutrality Studies:
https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Neutrality Studies shop: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop
Time Stamps 00:00 The Great Betrayal: two Democratic traditions 04:04 The neoconservative
connection 06:13 Carter and the triumph of the hawks 12:20 Who controls foreign policy 19:03
Culture wars and American exceptionalism 27:21 Russia, Russiagate and the limits of dissent 42:25
The pluralism gap and a multipolar world 48:08 Why Republican restrainers remain outnumbered
#Pascal
Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today, we have an update with James Carden, the
author of the new book, The Great Betrayal, which is what we want to discuss today. So, James,
welcome back.
#James Carden
Thanks for having me. I appreciate it.
#Pascal
It's really great that you're back here and that you wrote this book. So it's obviously about the
parties in the United States. I mean, you're not just talking about the Republicans or Democrats, but
can you walk us through the arguments in your new book?
#James Carden
Sure. It basically is a history of the foreign policy debate within the Democratic Party, mainly from
1945 to the Joe Biden presidency. And I wrote the book because over the past decade or so,
especially during the Russiagate phenomenon, I was starting to ask myself: When did Democrats
-- 1 of 15 --
begin to speak like John Foster Dulles or the ghost of Joseph McCarthy? And I was tempted at first
to blame this on the Clintons. I thought that perhaps this was a phenomenon that began in the post-
Cold War era and was then picked up with great fervor by Hillary Rodham Clinton, who, like her
husband, ran to the right of her opponent on foreign policy.
People forget that Bill Clinton ran to the right of George H. W. Bush on foreign policy in 1992. Hillary
Clinton did the same thing in 2016. So I was wondering, when did this actually happen? And what I
found was that once Franklin Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, his vision of a postwar world where
great powers would act in concert, where there would be cooperation and reciprocity, you know,
through the UN mechanism, basically vanished under his successor, Harry S. Truman. And it was
Truman and Acheson who, because they were paranoiacs about the threat of Soviet communism,
basically began a Cold War that I don't believe Franklin Roosevelt had any intention of waging. And
so what I found was that from about 1945 to about 1992, within the Democratic Party, there were
basically two camps.
I call the camps the Rooseveltians, people who took a more realistic view, a non-paranoid view, with
regard to the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union, and the Achesonians, named after
Truman's Secretary of State, Dean Acheson. And they were really supporters and creators of the
national security state. And they were hawks, Cold Warriors. And ultimately, it was the Achesonian
camp that came to dominate the debate within the Democratic Party. And of course, today, with a
few exceptions, the Democratic establishment really are all Achesonians. They're hardline opponents
of the authoritarian axis of Russia and China. And they are diehard supporters of the national
security bureaucracy. And so I hope that the book is able to help explain that phenomenon.
#Pascal
How big is the overlap between what you call the Achesonians and what we usually refer to as the
neoconservative movement?
#James Carden
Quite a lot. Actually, the neoconservatives began as Democrats under the tutelage of Dean Acheson.
So among the earliest and most famous neoconservatives—names that you've heard before and all
your readers have read about—people like Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle were early protégés of
Dean Acheson. A lot of them, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, began to migrate from the
Democratic Party into the Republican Party, but they were originally Democrats. So there's really
quite a lot of overlap there, which explains why, during the debate, for instance, over the Bush-
Cheney Iraq War in 2003, there were so many supporters within the Democratic Party.
#Pascal
-- 2 of 15 --
Yeah, but would you say that there's actually a difference between neocons and Achesonians? What
are the main differences that would help us make sense of these camps?
#James Carden
Well, I think political party is one. I think the neoconservatives, from about the mid-’90s till the
Trump era, were mainly Republicans. I think hardline Democrats in the Achesonian mold today try to
differentiate themselves from the neoconservatives by claiming that they are good multilateralists.
And the neocons make no pretense about giving a damn about the United Nations. A lot of the
Democrats do, but it’s just talk. To me, the difference between a Hillary Clinton and a Paul Wolfowitz
is basically a distinction without a difference. And you see this very clearly in the policy positions that
they ultimately take.
#Pascal
Right. So did you then also trace in the book how the Achesonian camp managed to basically win
the debate inside the Democratic Party? Because, yeah, that was a huge change. If we also look at
the pre-war era, right, the fascinating thing to me is that the 1920s and 1930s actually were a time
when there was this huge debate around—what was it called?—the Nye Committee, when the US
population was shocked to find out that they had been duped into joining the First World War and
that there were these merchants of death, right? There was a huge debate, and this debate was
huge also inside the Democratic Party. And then that kind of got completely swept out and replaced
by what President Eisenhower later warned was the nascent military-industrial complex. Does this
discussion play into the victory of the Achesonians in the Democratic Party?
#James Carden
Absolutely. I'm a big believer in the maxim that personnel is policy. And as you know, probably from
talking with me over the years, I'm less theoretically inclined than some of our friends and
colleagues. I'm a big believer in the idea that it's the people who are appointed who call the shots.
And what happened was that, quite tragically, our last Rooseveltian president was John F. Kennedy.
And John F. Kennedy was murdered. And his brother was murdered. And then, after Robert Kennedy
was murdered, you had the Nixon years and then the brief Ford period. And then you had the Carter
years. Now, if the Carter years, beginning in January of 1977, had gone differently, we might not be
having this conversation.
#James Carden
But Jimmy Carter had a choice to make. And he was basically an inexperienced Southern governor,
governor of Georgia. He didn't have a big foreign policy portfolio there. And so Carter could have
gone with Kennedy's Rooseveltians, or he could have sided, as he eventually did, with the
-- 3 of 15 --
Achesonians in the debate. So at the beginning of the Carter administration, you had a secretary of
state, Cyrus Vance, who was firmly in the Rooseveltian mold. Yet his national security adviser,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, was firmly in the Achesonian mold. And so during the course of the Carter
presidency, you had this debate between the two camps play out in real time.
During his presidency, Carter consistently sided with Brzezinski and the Achesonians. There were
people urging President Carter to choose George Ball as secretary of state early on. George Ball was
the undersecretary of state under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. And George Ball was one of the
few in the upper levels of the government warning Kennedy and warning Johnson against getting
involved in Vietnam. Ball was the definition of a Washington wise man. But Carter ignored Ball's
advice. Carter brought Ball back into government in 1978 to get advice on what was going on in
Iran. Ball presented his findings. He said that the Shah wasn't going to make it.
It was time that we pulled the plug on our support for him. Carter ignored that advice at Brzezinski's
urging. The whole history of our involvement with Iran would have been different had Carter
listened to Ball. To me, the Carter administration is kind of the hinge of history. And with Carter
siding with Brzezinski, what you then had was a Democratic establishment during the Reagan years
that was dominated by the alumni of the Carter administration, because that's how it goes, right? If
you're out of power but you're an alumnus of the former administration, that's where the center of
power is. That's where the influence is going to be. And so that's what happened.
So Bill Clinton, of course, by the time he got into office—now, that's after 12 years of Republican
rule—basically all he had to choose from were Achesonians, because those were the last people to
have actual experience within government. And so, from Carter on, the Achesonians dominated the
Democratic foreign policy establishment. And that's where presidents pick their advisers. That's
where they get the people they name secretary of state, national security adviser, and ambassadors,
and so on and so forth. So the book takes a very close look at what happened during the late '70s.
And it's a period, as we just talked about, when the neoconservatives really began their rise to
power in Washington.
#Pascal
You know, it is a fascinating thing, because thinking of the decision-making bloc inside any of the
parties as just one monolith is totally wrong. So the way that the decision-making process works,
and where the centers of power are, is such an important question. And to me, we've seen how a
relatively small group of people can actually decide much, much more than they should be able to.
We saw that in 2024, when the Democratic Party had already made up its mind and chosen Mr.
Biden in the primaries to run again. Well, it turns out he's already basically a vegetable up there. And
then, just overnight, they were able to switch to Kamala Harris, right? So who are these power
centers that are able to steer the party's course? Because it doesn't happen on its own, but it's
definitely not just the base that makes the decision.
-- 4 of 15 --
#James Carden
No, I would argue that the base very rarely has anything to do with the decisions that the foreign
policy establishment makes. The foreign policy establishment is made up of a number of nodes. You
have the donor class. You have the think tanks. You have Congress and congressional staffers. And
then you have media figures. Those four nodes combine, in my opinion, to make up the Democratic
and Republican foreign policy establishments. Of course, they have their own think tanks and their
own donors and so on and so forth. But in the big picture, that's what makes up what we sometimes
refer to as the uniparty.
#Pascal
So are the nodes inside the Democratic Party today like that across the board, or do we still have a
pocket of resistance where you would say, no, they go back to the Roosevelt tradition?
#James Carden
I would say that there are vanishingly few Rooseveltians, if any, within the Democratic Party foreign
policy establishment. I would say that there are very, very few. S