Is Poland The Next Romania? EU Elites Thinking Of Stealing Another Election | Artur Ciechanowicz

## Assessment of the presidential election winner, Karol Nawrocki Poland’s recent presidential runoff did more than decide a single office; it registered a shift in mood. The conversation captured in the exchange with Artur Ciechanowicz portrays Karol Nawrocki’s victory as both narrow and symbolically significant: a win by a slim margin that nevertheless signals a reassertion of a certain idea of Polish identity. Nawrocki, a career civil servant and historian who rose from modest beginnings, stood in contrast to his cosmopolitan opponent. That contrast—between a candidate read as rooted in national memory and one cast as a representative of urban, Europeanized elites—was a decisive storyline that resonated with many voters. As the discussion details, Nawrocki’s biography and his role as head of the Institute of National Remembrance gave him credibility on questions of history, sovereignty, and national dignity. Those themes carried weight in a contest where voters were asked to choose, in part, who should symbolically embody the state. The first-round results were revealing: a splintering of the right, strong showings by civic liberal forces, and emergent left-patriotic currents that complicate simplistic two-party narratives. Nawrocki’s ability to consolidate enough of the right and parts of the patriotic left to win in the second round underscores how identity and practical grievances—rather than classic left-right economics alone—shaped the outcome. ## The role of the presidential elections in Poland Poland’s presidency is institutionally mixed: more than a ceremonial head of state but far from an executive powerhouse. The conversation reminds us that because the president is directly elected, the office carries unusual soft power and a democratic mandate that can influence national politics. Veto power, legislative initiative, and a formal say in defense policy mean the presidency can be a significant brake or ballast for parliamentary majorities. For a governing coalition without the supermajority needed to override vetoes, the president’s stance matters. The exchange places the election in three interlinked theaters—national, European, and transatlantic. Nationally, the result affects everyday policy disputes and, crucially, the political tone of representation. European-level stakes are ideological: debates over sovereignty versus deeper integration echo through the contest. Transatlantic dynamics add another layer; relations with Washington and how Poland positions itself on NATO and security cooperation were part of voters’ calculations. In short, while the office is not a governing engine, it functions as a critical pivot in Poland’s multi-vector politics. ## Foreign minister Sikorski's assessment of Nawrocki One striking thread of the conversation is the attention given to foreign reactions and endorsements. Artur Ciechanowicz parses comments from figures like Radosław Sikorski—whose perspective is treated as distinct and at times idiosyncratic within the civic-liberal camp. Sikorski’s suggestion that Nawrocki might be favored by U.S. conservatives and therefore useful for transatlantic ties is read with caution. The interlocutors emphasize that elites’ foreign policy preferences do not neatly map onto domestic alliances; personal histories, factional rivalries, and different conceptions of statecraft complicate easy translations. Ciechanowicz’s reading is attentive to nuance: Sikorski, by background and temperament, can appeal across some conservative constituencies, yet his standing within the Civic Platform and his rivalry with Donald Tusk matter for how his judgements are received. The conversation underscores the often-misleading temptation to treat endorsements as deterministic. Political cultures, especially in a country like Poland where history and memory weigh heavily, render foreign assessments only one input among many. Nawrocki’s perceived usefulness to Washington, therefore, is neither a seal of approval nor a carte blanche—it is an element that will be balanced against domestic priorities. ## Nawrocki's position regarding Ukraine-Russia Perhaps the most consequential policy territory discussed is the new president’s stance on the Ukraine war and relations with Russia. The exchange makes clear that Nawrocki’s posture is more guarded than his predecessor’s unquestioning pro-Ukraine alignment. He reportedly distanced himself from some previous government policies and signaled skepticism about automatic pathways to EU or NATO membership for Kyiv. That kind of recalibration matters because the president’s role in shaping defense policy and wielding a veto can materially affect ratification and alignment processes. Ciechanowicz brings lived complexity to this debate: broad public sympathy for Ukrainians fighting a war coexists with mounting frustration at how refugee flows and economic competition have played out domestically. Specific, tangible grievances—long waits for medical appointments, perceived labor market undercutting, and regulatory arbitrage by Ukrainian businesses—have eroded some of the unconditional support that characterized the early months of the conflict. Historical irritants also surface; unresolved memory issues and disputes over wartime grievances feed an element of distrust. Nawrocki’s background as a historian and his sensitivity to national memory make these themes central to his appeal and his likely policy choices. ## Prediction about what this election will do for Poland What will Nawrocki’s presidency mean for Poland’s trajectory? The conversation offers a cautious forecast: expect a period of recalibration rather than rupture. Because the president lacks the tools for sweeping legislative transformation, the immediate practical effect will be to inject a vetoing force and a moderating influence on some of the government’s commitments—especially those tied to EU directionality and Ukraine policy. The new administration in the Sejm and the cabinet will still drive day-to-day governance, but the president can complicate or slow certain initiatives, thereby reshaping the political bargaining space. The political landscape itself is also changing. One clear takeaway from the exchange is that Poland’s older duopoly—PiS versus Civic Platform—looks less stable. New formations on the right, strands of patriotic leftism, and libertarian currents mean future coalitions and contests will be messier. That fragmentation can make governance harder but also create openings for cross-cutting coalitions around concrete material interests. The likely practical effect is a Polish politics in which symbolic issues—identity, historical memory, national sovereignty—interact more directly with the nuts-and-bolts concerns of public services, labor markets, and security. ## Regarding claims that elections were "rigged" by Russia The exchange addresses a volatile claim being floated by some dissatisfied quarters: that foreign interference, particularly from Russia, had a hand in the electoral outcome. The conversation treats such accusations skeptically, noting that questioning results by losing camps is a familiar pattern in many democracies and that there is a political logic to delegitimizing an opponent’s victory. Ciechanowicz frames the immediate reaction of Tusk’s supporters—publicly questioning the legitimacy of the vote—as a predictable if dangerous post-electoral tactic rather than as conclusive evidence of foul play. Importantly, the discussion separates two distinct tendencies: on one hand, genuine vigilance about foreign interference is a necessary component of democratic integrity; on the other, reflexive attribution to Moscow flattens complex domestic dynamics and can serve partisan ends. The interlocutors caution against simplistic narratives that ascribe internal political setbacks to external manipulation. In Poland’s case, the argument that elites in Brussels or Washington somehow “stole” an

Is Poland The Next Romania? EU Elites Rigging Another Election Today I’m talking again to Artur Ciechanowicz, a journalist, international affairs expert, and a former reporter for the Polish newswire PAP in Berlin and Brussels. Artur covered the recent presidential elections in Poland and although that is already over a week ago this topic fell a bit by the wayside and I thought we should discuss it. Links: https://europeanconservative.com/articles/author/artur- ciechanowicz/ Neutrality Studies Goods Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00 Preview 00:28 Intro 00:58 Assessment of the presidential election winner, Karol Nawrocki 07:44 The role of the presidential elections in Poland 15:03 Foreign minister Sikorski's assessment of Nawrocki 21:40 Nawrocki's position regarding Ukraine-Russia 36:32 Prediction about what this election will do for Poland 42:49 Regarding claims that elections were "rigged" by Russia 49:49 Outro #M3 So what is happening now, at this moment, is that the supporters of Tusk, led by his close associates, are questioning the outcome of the elections. They're claiming that the election was rigged. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Literality Studies, and today I'm talking again to Artur Ciechanowicz, a journalist, international affairs expert, and a former reporter for the Polish news agency PAP in Berlin and Brussels. Artur covered the recent presidential elections in Poland, and although that was already over a week ago, this topic fell a bit by the wayside, and I thought we should still discuss it now. So, Artur, welcome back to the channel. #M3 Thanks very much for the invitation. Very glad to see you again, Pascal. #M2 Thanks for coming back. You also sent me your article that you wrote about this election. The person who won is not the one favored by the current ruling party; it's someone from the former government and somebody who, in general, is being described in Europe as a populist and nationalist. So I would like to hear your assessment of what we've seen happening in Poland. -- 1 of 11 -- #M3 Yes, that's absolutely correct. The opposition candidate won the second round of the elections, defeating the liberal candidate, the mayor of Warsaw, and the candidate of the ruling party and the ruling coalition, Rafał Trzaskowski. Just a small caveat: when we are talking about the political divisions in Poland, obviously we are using terms like liberal, left, conservative, right, and these terms more or less describe these divisions, but they do not explain their depth and their origins. So, oversimplifying, these elections were about who is ashamed of Poland and Polishness, and who accepts Polish identity and Poland as a sovereign country. As I said, it is an oversimplification, but it's not a big stretch, and these two attitudes are the substructure and the superstructure where these two candidates stood. Rafał Trzaskowski, the liberal candidate, was presenting himself as a sophisticated, cosmopolitan person, immersed in French civilization and French culture. Karol Nawrocki, on the other hand, is the chair of the Institute of National Remembrance. His biography is of a kind that many ordinary Poles can relate to. He was born into a rather poor family and did not benefit from any advantages connected to his parents, unlike Trzaskowski. He started boxing as a teenager, then worked physically as a security officer in one of the hotels. Later, he went to university, earned a PhD, and became a civil servant. As I said, many people could relate to this biography—maybe not 100%, but it symbolizes the path, the way that Poland and the Poles have taken in the past 30 years. And he won the elections by a small margin. It was about 55% to 48%, more or less. So it's a really slim margin. But we had two rounds of the elections, and the first round was actually more revealing than the second one because it reflected other divisions within Polish society. For example, it turns out we have three right-wing parties, one of them being PiS, obviously—P-I-S, yes, center-right. Then there's Confederation, which is further to the right but also has a very strong libertarian side. And then there's Grzegorz Braun's party. He's a politician who started with Confederation, but then their paths parted. His core voters are traditional Catholics, but also people dissatisfied with the way the PiS government handled the pandemic. On the other hand, we have the Civic Platform, so the Tusk party, which also performed respectably. And then we have the left-wing party Razem, which means "together." It's a patriotic left, which is also something new on the Polish political scene. This party grew out of urban populist movements, so it's not a post-communist left—it's more of a patriotic left. And it shows, or it might show, in which direction the Polish political scene will develop: that this duopoly between PiS and the Civic Platform is actually obsolete, that people want a real discussion, so to speak, beneath the divisions— beneath these big, abstract ideological divisions—about the actual, the particular, the concrete interests that concern ordinary citizens. #M2 -- 2 of 11 -- And the presidential election is important for this because, on the one hand, the president in the Polish system is more of a ceremonial role, right? He's the head of state who represents the country. But in terms of actual decision-making powers, there are some. I think he can veto certain decisions coming from parliament, if I'm not wrong. But it's nowhere comparable with the powers of the U.S. president, right? The decision-making power rests in the hands of the prime minister, more or less. But in this sense, this is a figure that... Poles ask themselves, who do we want to represent us, or who is closest to our hearts, right? And can you maybe talk a little bit about the way that this election was also fought? And also, what were the results of the first round? Because in the second round, you have a runoff, right? So, 50-50 chance, right? One of them must win. But the first round is probably more revealing of how the distribution then falls off. #M3 Absolutely. Yes, you are absolutely right. The Polish president plays more of a ceremonial role, and he has much less power than the French president or the American president, but he also has much more power than the German president. The Polish president, first of all, is elected directly, so he has a very strong democratic mandate. And subsequently, he has very strong soft power because he can relate to the voters who voted for him. Constitutionally, the president has veto power, which can be overturned by two-thirds of the parliament, which the current ruling coalition doesn't have. He also has legislative initiative, so he can build cross-party alliances to support some initiatives. Well, these elections were really important on three interconnected levels: the national level, the European level, and the transatlantic level. The national level is very simple. If the government or the governing coalition doesn't have enough votes in parliament to overturn the presidential veto, it is rather difficult to govern efficiently. Although, out of about 200 laws that were passed by this coalition, the current president—the current right-wing conservative president—vetoed only five. So, there is no actual legislative war between the current prime minister, Donald Tusk, and the current president, Andrzej Duda. That's for one. The European level, of course, also reflects the divisions in Polish society, including different opinions towards European politics. Simplifying again, the left-liberal camp is in favor of creating a European superstate, while the right-wing and centrist camps want to retain sovereignty. As I said, this is a simplification, but basically, that is what it is about. That's why Rafał Trzaskowski was supported by the Brussels oligarchy, and Karol Nawrocki was supported by the current US administration. And now we come to the third point: transatlantic relations. PiS is an ally of the Republicans—a great ally— and members of the Trump administration said openly that if Poland wants security guarantees, it has to elect a president who would be respected and have a good working relationship with the current administration. On the other hand, the Civic Platform, although their declarations vary, are more in favor of the so- called strategic autonomy. It's a concept of the French president, Emmanuel Macron, which entails -- 3 of 11 -- building a European army, armed forces. And many analysts argue that it's a sort of competition with NATO. So these are the main stakes of the election. You asked about the results of the first round. The first round was won by Rafał Trzaskowski. I cannot recall the exact numbers now, but it was about 35% of the vote. If memory serves, Nawrocki got around 29%. Then Confederacja, the right-wing libertarian party, got about 15%. Grzegorz Braun, the traditionalist, got over 6% of the vote. The rest were below the 5% margin. Right. #M2 Right. OK, so in a sense, what we are seeing is that the winner, Mr. Nawrocki, managed to capture a good number of votes from people who didn't vote for him in the first round. Right. Absolutely. With his messaging, he was able to galvanize probably also parts of the patriotic left, as you said before, because he presents himself as patriotic, right, and as a pro-Polish, as opposed to pro-EU, candidate. The interesting thing is the role of the United States. And, you know, I just read a very short article before we talked in Politico where your foreign minister, Mr. Sikorski—the transatlanticist husband of Anne Applebaum—actually says he's optimistic about the role of Mr. Nawrocki because he is the favorite candidate of the Republicans. He's the favorite candidate of the Americans. And he will apparently, in the interpretation of Mr. Sikorski, help to build or continue a positive relationship with the US, which they then also take as a, well, pro-war in Ukraine position, which Mr. Sikorski and Applebaum heavily favor for their neoconservative agenda. Do you think that this assessment of Mr. Sikorski is correct? #M3 It's complicated because, first of all, Sikorski has a very special position within the Civic Platform. He's actually not a typical member, not a typical politician of the Civic Platform, and he has always competed with Donald Tusk. That's for one. Second, he always presents himself as a kind of conservative in the British sense. He studied at Oxford or Cambridge University—I can't remember now. And he's obviously well-mannered and cultured, which also constitutes a difference with many of the Civic Platform politicians. Basically, he could be accepted by parts of the conservative electorate in Poland. Third, he is one of the few members of the current government and of the Civic Coalition who understand the state and the importance of sovereignty, at least on the declarative level. He really understands the mechanisms of the state and of foreign policy. He has an instinct for this. What I mean, to put it bluntly, is that actually, from his background and from his convictions, he doesn't really belong to the Civic Coalition. But for various personal reasons, we've ended up with the situation we have now. And to answer your question: yes, Nawrocki as president will help to maintain this partnership with the U.S. But Donald Tusk's government has a very difficult relationship with the U.S. and with the Donald Trump administration, because Donald Tusk was suggesting that Donald Trump is a Russian agent—well, I mean, before Donald Trump was elected. So it's actually impossible for Tusk to have even a reasonable relationship with the American -- 4 of 11 -- administration. But as far as Ukraine is concerned, again, it's complicated, because it was one of the subjects of the election campaign. And Nawrocki distanced himself from the previous