Finland: The Next Neocon War To Entrap Russia And The USA | Tuomas Malinen

## Preview & Intro Finland’s dramatic pivot from a posture of careful neutrality to full NATO membership has become one of the more consequential and underexamined developments in Europe’s post-2022 security landscape. The conversation recorded with Tuomas Malinen—an economist based in Helsinki who has been observing Finnish politics and policy first-hand—draws out a series of disturbing threads: rapid militarization at home, an unusually bellicose presidential tone toward Russia, and a wider Western strategy that risks turning Finland from a buffer into a battleground. What emerges is not only an account of national policy shifts but a warning about how alliances, domestic elites, and strategic narratives can combine to create new theaters of great-power confrontation. ## What is Finland's role in the Ukraine war? 00: 05:31 Why was Finland's President invited to Washington? Finland’s role in the Ukraine war is ambiguous and paradoxical. Officially, Helsinki has moved into the Western camp—joining NATO in April 2023 and concluding defense agreements that would have been unthinkable a few years earlier. Unofficially, this has produced mixed signals: aggressive rhetoric from the new president, increased logistical preparations, and high-profile diplomatic appearances that raise questions about Finland’s actual mission. Tuomas Malinen highlights how one of the president’s first acts—a defense treaty with Ukraine—breaks with a long Finnish tradition of steering a tight line of neutrality and balance in the neighborhood of Russia. Historically, Finland’s "Finlandization" was about survival and pragmatism; the new posture looks more like alignment and provocation. Malinen believes the president’s invitation to Washington served multiple symbolic and operational purposes. On the surface, such invitations showcase unity and bolster the perception of a consolidated Western front. But the optics also signal to multiple audiences: to domestic constituencies that Finland has fully allied; to NATO partners that Finland can be relied upon; and crucially, to Moscow that the Cold War-era buffer has been transformed into a NATO frontline. The presence of Finland’s president among the European heavyweights in Washington was a physical manifestation of that shift, and it also fed speculation about whether Finland is being groomed for a particular role in a widening conflict—either as a model of how to resist Russia or as a potential next theater. ## Strategy behind militarizing Finland: being set up as a threat to Russia? The militarization evident across Finland—expanded airfields, infrastructure upgrades for heavier aircraft, and a startling plan to expand reserves from roughly 325,000 to one million by the early 2030s—cannot be explained away by traditional deterrence rhetoric alone. Malinen reads these measures as preparatory rather than purely defensive. In the logic of deterrence, quantity does matter, but the scale proposed suggests a posture calibrated for sustained combat readiness, not merely for signaling. Two strategic readings are possible. The benign interpretation is that Finland is fortifying itself for credible self-defense in a more dangerous neighborhood. The darker interpretation, which Malinen finds persuasive, is that such militarization could be part of a broader strategy to cultivate a new front against Russia. In that scenario, Finland becomes not just a shield for its own territory but an instrument to entangle the United States and NATO in a conflict that might otherwise be limited to Ukraine. Positioning forces and infrastructure in a country with the EU’s longest border with Russia increases friction and the odds of accidental escalation. Whether intentional or emergent, this creates a situation in which Finland’s defensive preparations double as a provocation-risk multiplier. ## Is the 'Break Up Russia' faction still powerful? The interview surfaced an old fear given new life: that a coalition of neoconservatives, intelligence operatives, and sections of the deep state remain committed to a long-term goal of fragmenting Russia. Malinen recounts conversations with insiders—one former agency operative explicitly saying “we need to break up Russia”—which suggest this idea is not merely fringe fantasy but an actively discussed policy objective among some Western actors. However, Malinen doubts the capacity of such a faction to realize its ambitions today. The global strategic balance has shifted since the end of the Cold War: Russia has refurbished its military capabilities, China has become a central player, and new economic architectures like BRICS complicate bloc-building aimed at Russia’s fragmentation. Yet the ideology persists, embedded in think tanks, certain Congressional networks, and in the rhetoric that still pervades parts of Western policymaking circles. The danger, therefore, is less that a single coherent plan exists and more that the belief in perpetual pressure and strategic weakening of Russia has become normalized—making escalation more likely even without clear operational oversight. ## Does Trump have enough power to bypass the deep state? A recurrent theme in the recorded exchange is whether a strong executive—specifically, a return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency—could overturn or bypass entrenched bureaucratic and geopolitical currents. The question is less about personal will than about institutional momentum. Malinen and the participants note that while an American president has significant levers, there are limits when broad coalitions in allied capitals, permanent military basing agreements, and long-term force postures are already set. To reroute strategy would require not just presidential directive but the cooperation—or at least the acquiescence—of allies and of entrenched elements within the American security bureaucracy. There is also the political reality that much of the NATO posture in Europe is shaped by consensus among member states. Finland’s new basing agreements and its integration into NATO frameworks complicate any unilateral moves. If a U.S. president wanted to de-escalate or open talks with Russia, he could certainly attempt it; but doing so against the push of allied governments and components of the security establishment would be extremely fraught and could produce political blowback. In short, while presidential authority is formidable, it is not omnipotent—especially when operating in a now more militarized and interdependent European security environment. ## What is the general mood in Finland right now? On the streets and in the political discourse, Malinen describes a country caught between anxiety and mobilization. The eastern regions, in particular, exhibit visible signs of preparation: military exercises, infrastructure upgrades, and a public mood that oscillates between patriotic readiness and quiet dread. The president’s aggressive rhetoric is a departure from decades of caution—raising alarm among those who remember how Finland historically navigated between larger powers to preserve independence. There is also a domestic political dimension: parties that once prioritized strict neutrality have shifted toward integrationist positions, while older guard figures and public intellectuals warn about the risks of entanglement. Within this mix are personal relationships, networks, and ideological affiliations that have altered the balance of influence. For many Finns, the rapidity of the change—moving from a referendum conversation to full NATO accession in a matter of months—has felt sudden and disorienting. The result is a simmering unease about whether the country is being led into a role it did not fully choose. ## Are Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries effective? The recorded exchange closes with a practical, tactical question: do Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure have strategic effect? From the perspective offered, such attacks have

Finland: The Next Neocon War To Entrap Russia And The USA Tuomas Malinen, Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Helsinki and CEO of GNS Economics, discusses Finland's dramatic shift from neutrality to NATO membership. One of President Alexander Stubb's first acts was signing a defense treaty with Ukraine, marking Finland's first military treaty with a nation at war with Russia since 1944. This represents a stark departure from Finland's historical policy of neutrality ("Finlandization"). Finland is showing signs of military preparation, with airfields being expanded, military reserves planned to increase from 325,000 to 1 million by 2032, and aggressive rhetoric toward Russia unprecedented in Finland's 100 years of independence. Finland formally joined NATO on April 9, 2023 - symbolically the same calendar date as NATO's founding in 1949. Links: Tuomas’ Substack: https://mtmalinen.substack.com Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall. com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Preview & Intro 00:02:01 What is Finland's role in the Ukraine war? 00: 05:31 Why was Finland's President invited to Washington? 00:16:05 Strategy behind militarizing Finland: being set up as a threat to Russia? 00:22:02 Is the 'Break Up Russia' faction still powerful? 00:33:38 Does Trump have enough power to bypass the deep state? 00:40:36 What is the general mood in Finland right now? 00:46:43 Are Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries effective? #M3 I was at a small conference about a month ago in Cambridge, and there was a former CIA operative there. She told me, even at the introductory dinner before the conference started, that we need to break up Russia. That's the plan of the neocons, the CIA, the deep state, and all those groups. #M2 In 2025, they still want to break up Russia. #M3 Yeah. Yeah, they want it. There were two other neocons there. And one of the main points, one of the main ideas of the conference, was to learn what they are aiming at. And what we learned was that there is no end point to this war. They really want a perpetual war, and they want to break up Russia. #M2 -- 1 of 16 -- Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies. Today, I'm talking again to Tuomas Malinen, an associate professor of economics at the University of Helsinki and the CEO and chief economist of GNS Economics, a macroeconomic consultancy firm. Tuomas, welcome back. #M3 Thank you. Nice to be here again. #M2 Glad to have you, because you are in one of the centers of the craziness at the moment, in Helsinki, in Finland. And I do think that we are now going to see much more coming from the Nordic states, especially from Finland, as this war in and about Ukraine seems to be taking new routes. We have seen the Alaska, the Anchorage summit. We've seen how the Europeans all rushed to Washington and were summarily humiliated, without our media even taking notice of it. And we've seen Mr. Stubb—Alexander Stubb, your president—also being part of that meeting. Sorry, your president also being part of that meeting. Yeah, right, because the president has a foreign policy function in Finland. Can you maybe make sense of what we are seeing with the Ukraine war and with Finland, how you interpret it? #M3 Well, yeah, it's an interesting thing. I think I mentioned this before, about a year ago or something, when we spoke, that one of the first acts of President Stubb was to sign a defense treaty with Ukraine. And this was the first time we made a military treaty with a nation at war with Russia since 1944, when there was the Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement, which basically—at the very last stages of our war with the Soviet Union—gave us food and armaments and helped us to get by and repel the major attack by the Soviet Union in the summer of 1944. But it was the craziest thing. A newly elected president signs a military treaty with an enemy of Russia—our next-door neighbor. And so that kind of set us on a particular direction of travel, so to speak. After that, it's been the rhetoric. If you focus on President Stubb, his rhetoric has been very aggressive towards Russia— something we have not heard, maybe ever, during our over 100 years of independence. Maybe during the war—well, I don't know—even in those days, it was more, let's say, not so aggressive. But now it's getting really strange here. And what I'm seeing—what you see on the ground when you drive around Finland, and especially in the east—you see hints of preparation for something. On a military scale, you see planes, you see buildings being built up, airfields being expanded so heavier planes can land on them. And there are -- 2 of 16 -- more things. So it's difficult to say what Finland's position toward Ukraine is at this moment. But I'm thinking that there is something really bad going on in the Nordics. In the worst case, this could be preparation for the opening of another front against Russia. That's the absolute worst case. #M2 I mean, the fact that your president was one of the Europeans who ran to Washington on Monday two weeks ago—that was just bizarre, because it was all of the big guys, right? Including the NATO Secretary General, including Ursula von der Leyen of the EU, and then the Germans, the French, the Italians, and Zelensky, of course. And then there was Stubb. And he even felt the urge to explain that, right? When he was given the floor by the director—like Mr. Trump, by the real president of Europe—he said, when he was given the word to speak, he actually said, "Maybe people are wondering why someone from small Finland, like me, is here." And he said, "Look, we have our own experience with cutting a deal with the Russians back in '44, when basically the Continuation War was also lost and the Finns had to accept a dictated peace, as the Europeans call it." Yeah. That, to me, is a weird thing to say, first and foremost, because it would hint at him assuming that Ukraine is now in the position where Finland was in 1944, having to accept an end to the war in a way they didn't want to. But secondly, it also seems like a pretext for maybe handing over a staff or something, like discussing between the current and the future battlefield. I hope that's not the case because it seems insane. But then again, the Europeans are doing so many insane things that I wouldn't be surprised if they were preparing—if there were preparations going on—for various insane futures as well. #M3 Yeah, there's a great clip from the meeting with Trump. Well, they were not actually negotiations, but President Trump starts to explain, "Okay, here's President Stubb." Then he looks around—he's sitting directly in front of him. He didn't recognize him at first. Then, "Oh, no, no, no. Oh, yeah, yeah, there you are." #M2 Obviously, he didn't know who he was. He didn't know the guy—"Who are you?"—and he forgot him a second time later. #M3 Yeah, yeah. So I can think of only two reasons why Alexander Stubb was there. First is what you proposed—that he's the next Zelensky, basically, or in the worst case, that the war would be coming here. Or the second one is that I have been getting really, really conspiratorial of late. I just think there are very dark forces on the move in Europe, like there were in the 1930s and 1940s, which are -- 3 of 16 -- pushing for this. I actually published a piece about it just a few days ago. But the other explanation is that in this group—I call them the European Coalition for War, which I think is a conspiracy—there is something behind it. So the second option is that—and this is interlinked—but the second option is that Stubb has become something of a leading figure in this conspiracy, by agreement with I don't know who. But that's the other explanation. There are a lot of rumors, for example, that King Charles is part of this or some kind of leader in this global conspiracy. I cannot say anything about that. But if you speculate, there are only a few reasons why Alexander Stubb was in the White House and President Trump didn't even know who he was. So I think we have just these two. The first is yours, like you said—that it's a preparation, a passing of the torch. Or then he's some kind of leading figure in this European coalition for war, which wants another European war. #M2 Because his explanation that he gave during that meeting—that Finland has experience in dealing with the Russians and coming to a peace agreement—makes no sense in the context of what the Europeans want. The Europeans, it's utterly clear, want to continue. They were there in Washington to convince Trump not to give in to any kind of, maybe, behind-the-scenes talks with Vladimir Putin in Anchorage, right? So what he said while he was there is the opposite of what the Europeans are trying to achieve. On the other hand, Finland, of course, has—I think of all the EU states—the longest land border with Russia. It is a very militarily challenging terrain. And it is also fortified now that you have these 15 US military bases. You have a base agreement with the US. So, in a sense, if you want to entrap the United States in Europe, doing it in a place that already has US troops and is part of NATO would be easier to do than in a place like Ukraine that doesn't. #M3 It's a very good point. That's an excellent point. I hadn't really thought of it that way, but that's very good. If you want to set a trap—for the Americans—yeah, for the Americans, you do it here. And something about the example President Stubb gave was that we capitulated. In 1944, it was effectively a surrender to the Soviet Union. We even allowed an Allied monitoring force, which was basically a Soviet monitoring force, to come to Finland and dismantle our military and make sure that we did everything they wanted. And this is actually what I think should be done in Ukraine. Ukraine is in the same position as we were, in the sense that if we had continued the war in 1944, our country would have been annihilated, completely destroyed. And Ukraine is at the same point. And they have no leverage. We had no leverage. So, yeah, but the Europeans are trying to make it so that they would have some leverage. But in essence, what Stubb said there is the complete opposite of what actually happened in 1944. So it doesn't make any sense. -- 4 of 16 -- #M2 Yeah, and if you wanted to give advice about how to capitulate successfully—like Finland, in the sense that it capitulated successfully—it wasn't integrated into the Soviet Union. It maintained its statehood, and so on and so forth. It was very successful. #M3 We lost 11% of our landmass. #M2 True, true. But that's, again, where Ukraine stands now—about to lose 20%. But if you wanted to actually understand the transition, you would invite historians, wouldn't you? You wouldn't invite a bellicose president of Finland. The problem is that Mr. Stubb is not known for actually maintaining a balance of power in Europe through Finland. It's the opposite of your previous prime ministers, who all maintained Finnish neutrality as a security policy that recognized the necessity of securing Russia. #M3 I think you mentioned previous presidents, but something happened in '22–'23 in this country. Our president then was Sauli Niinistö, and he served for 12 years—a long period of time. Our presidential terms are six years, so he served for 12, and his message constantly was that if we're going to go into NATO, there has to be a referendum. We need to ask the people. Just on the 4th of February, 2022, he said that if there is going to be an accession to full NATO membership, the people need to be heard. And three months after, he said that these polls are enough. Something happened right after the war started in Ukraine that changed the status of Finland. And Finland acceded to full membership on the 4th of April, 2023. The 4th of April, 1949, is the date of the signing of the first North Atlantic Treaty