Deterrence Psychopathy Highjacks Europe—It's Getting Worse | Cdre. Steve Jermy

## Support Neutrality Studies The conversation foregrounds a pressing intellectual and political need: reclaiming the language and institutions of neutrality as tools for de-escalation, not as capitulation. What emerges from the exchange is a practical program of civic and scholarly support—backing research, building informed public debate, and creating channels for Track II diplomacy—that treats neutrality as an active security strategy. Neutrality Studies, as discussed, is not merely an academic boutique; it is positioned as a repository of ideas and a convening platform to rescue cooperative security from rhetorical marginalization and policy neglect. This strand of argument insists that public opinion matters. The conversation points out that, despite noisy militarist advocacy, many Europeans do not appetite open-ended confrontation with Russia. Mobilizing that latent public preference requires credible intellectual infrastructure: analyses that explain how mutual security arrangements work, policy blueprints for conditional neutrality, and mechanisms to test confidence-building steps. Support for such work is also strategic—if European governments are to be nudged back toward diplomacy, they will be pushed by constituencies that understand the stakes and the viable alternatives. Funding, pedagogy, and translation of ideas into digestible messaging are practical priorities. The conversation suggests a two-track approach: scholarly rigor to win over elites and clear public-facing narratives to shift mass opinion. That dual investment can break the informational lock that currently privileges deterrence dogma over cooperative options. ## Why Europe abandoned cooperative security A common thread running through the exchange is a diagnosis of how cooperative security—embodied in Helsinki and the OSCE-era architecture—eroded into a reflex for deterrence. Several dynamics converged. First, a long, incremental political sleepwalk: NATO’s eastward movement happened against a backdrop of competing crises and public distractions, from interventions abroad to domestic policy battles, allowing a major geopolitical shift to harden without sustained scrutiny. Second, media and political elites increasingly framed the Russian challenge in existential, moralized terms that shut down nuance. The result was a feedback loop: elite framing hardened public perceptions, which in turn empowered more confrontational policy choices. A further factor is institutional inertia and failure. When the invasion arrived, the collective body politic pivoted almost exclusively to defense and confrontation rather than re-examining causes and alternatives. The conversation highlights how this reflex bypassed the kind of diagnostics required for thoughtful policy—most notably the obvious fact that NATO’s expansion had been a central antecedent to the crisis. Without that diagnostic humility, the only default policy left was escalating deterrence, which by the speakers’ lights has proven both morally costly and strategically brittle. Finally, technological change and the changing character of warfare have hardened militarized responses. The visible inability to shield populations from missile and drone strikes has paradoxically reinforced calls for greater military commitments instead of pushing leaders toward diplomatic settlement. That militarization of politics and discourse has crowded out the old cooperative logic that underpinned major European détente moments. ## Air defense, drones, and missile warfare The conversation starkly reframes modern air power: air supremacy is no longer a given, and missile volumes—conventional, cruise, and hypersonic—coupled with swarming drones, can overwhelm current air-defense architectures. This is not only technical analysis but strategic caution: systems built in a past era assumed lower engagement density and more forgiving detection windows. Today's threats arrive in saturations reminiscent of a different class of warfare; the old playbook for achieving air dominance is strained or obsolete. A naval career perspective in the discussion drives home the operational consequences. Effective area air defense requires not just interceptors but integrated sensors, allocation algorithms, and industrial depth to replenish losses. In contesting skies, even rear areas and critical infrastructure become vulnerable. The experience recounted suggests Europe, and NATO members in particular, are exposed. That vulnerability undermines the strategic logic of sending Western combat aircraft or forces into high-intensity confrontations, because a limited local gain can cascade into a wider, uncontrollable exchange. The broader implication: deterrence premised on the ability to punish without intolerable reciprocal damage becomes unstable where second-strike conventional capabilities are pervasive. Recognizing this should push policy conversations from counting weapons systems to reducing the incentives for their use—i.e., diplomacy, de-escalatory frameworks, and cooperative risk-reduction measures. ## Energy security and the need for diplomacy Energy emerges in the dialogue as a symbiotic force linking military escalation and civilian suffering. Missile strikes against energy infrastructure, the knock-on effect on markets, and the political pressure to secure supplies create an economic logic for escalation. Energy insecurity can therefore both precipitate and deepen conflict, making diplomacy a fiscal as well as humanitarian imperative. The speakers underscore that energy resilience is not purely technical—stockpiles and backup terminals can mitigate shocks—but political: sustained dialogue with regional actors and potential adversaries is required to reduce the likelihood that energy chokepoints become targets or bargaining chips. A policy that couples investment in hardening infrastructure with active diplomacy can lower the incentives for strikes and provide off-ramps for crises. This logic reorients the debate: energy security needs to be part of any de-escalation strategy rather than an afterthought that simply hardens defensive postures. At a higher level, the conversation implies that the cost of sustained military confrontation—economic, demographic, and political—will eventually force reconsideration of adversarial strategies. The trajectory of energy markets and the fiscal burden of continuous defense may be what makes previously unpalatable diplomatic compromises feasible. ## How peace talks could begin The speakers map a plausible, staged route toward talks rooted in realism about political constraints and recent initiatives. Track II engagements—already occurring between European E3 actors and Moscow—provide preliminary templates. Such backchannel conversations can clarify non-negotiables and test confidence-building measures without the immediate pressure of media theater or electoral politics. The suggestion is not that grand bargains will appear overnight, but that iterative, low-profile exchanges can create the momentum for formal negotiations. A functional peace process, as outlined, would start with diagnostics: mutual recognition of causes and red lines, shared assessments of the costs of continued conflict, and identification of reversible, verifiable steps. Practical elements could include phased ceasefires tied to humanitarian access, reciprocal withdrawals from key zones, and third-party monitoring mechanisms to reduce fears of cheating. Importantly, the dialogue argues for European leadership in initiating these sequences—freedom from reliance on a single external power’s priorities is seen as both politically realistic and normatively necessary. Crucially, the conversation highlights sequencing and incentives. Rather than demanding unrealistic immediate concessions, a credible process must deliver politically meaningful gains to each side incrementally. These could be framed as security guarantees, economic measur

Deterrence Psychopathy Highjacks Europe— It's Getting Worse | Cdre. Steve Jermy The people who lead Ukraine straight into the bayonets of Russia are working over-time to do the same to the rest of the European continent. Retired Royal Navy Commodore Steve Jermy joins me today to discuss what we need to work toward stopping this: A new “Spirit of Westphalia” for ending the NATO-Russia war. We examine the loss of cooperative security in Europe, weak air defenses, the energy costs of escalation, the human cost of a wider war, and possible paths toward diplomacy, neutrality, OSCE-led confidence-building measures, and Track II talks. Links: Steve Jermy’s Substack: https://stevejermy.substack.com Steve’s Article: https://stevejermy.substack.com/p/the- spirt-of-westphalia Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00: 00:00 Introduction and the Spirit of Westphalia 00:09:03 Support Neutrality Studies 00:09:20 Why Europe abandoned cooperative security 00:14:41 Air defense, drones, and missile warfare 00:18:14 Energy security and the need for diplomacy 00:22:37 How peace talks could begin 00:29:25 Neutrality, the OSCE, and ending sanctions 00:35:19 Who could launch a new peace process? 00:45: 25 Where to follow Steve Jermy #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies today with an update by Steve Jeremy, the retired Commodore of the British Navy. Steve, welcome back. #Steve Jermy Good to be back with you, Pascal. It's been too long. We've been sort of busy doing other things. #Pascal It has been too long, but I saw you in Tbilisi two months ago, then saw you on Tucker Carlson a few weeks ago. Well done on that one. And then you published this new piece here on the spirit of Westphalia with New Thinking: Britain, France, and Germany could help end the NATO-Russia war. So you're one of the people making a proactive argument, actually, about what could be done about this entire tragedy, where still thousands of Ukrainians and Russians die a month. Steve, can you walk us through this? #Steve Jermy -- 1 of 15 -- Yeah, I thought the article was important, Pascal, because a lot of people have been talking about the problems that we're facing. And indeed, I had done an article on the coming war with Russia and what could happen. And the coming war with Russia would be very scary if it happened. So it seemed to me that we need to at least start to think about what alternative pathways could be. So think about it as an alternative pathway for peace. And the reason that I chose the title "The Spirit of Westphalia" was that, as you will know well, Westphalia was one of those events in history which was dramatic inasmuch as it brought to a close the Eighty Years' War and the Thirty Years' War. And it was a complicated event. But the message to me was that Europeans could do this. So that rather than having to sit back and wait for the Americans to go and talk to the Russians, we in Europe could take a role in this. And not only could we take a role in this, should we take a role in this. So the idea was to actually really start and think initially about what the antecedents of the war were. I won't sort of take too long about that because I think there's a general consensus amongst those of us in the independent media, and indeed most anybody who's got any sense of strategic history whatsoever, that the antecedents started all the way back when NATO started to expand, and that there was that expansion which was ultimately the cause of the war. And I still hold by that view. I mean, I think anybody who's got any strategic history or mind whatsoever knows it's unavoidable to avoid that conclusion. That's important as well, because when you're thinking about how to solve wars, diagnostics is important. So what we were doing there was diagnosing the causes of the war, which then allows us to apply the right treatment, if you like. But the next thing really was to actually look at the changed context. I mean, it seemed to me that the change of the context has been significant. So since 2022, we've seen the issue of a NATO national security strategy by the Americans, you know, in which Europe is at best about fifth on the priority list. And as we know, the Americans have got much higher priorities, not least of all Iran and that unfortunate entanglement. We're also in the situation where it's difficult to say whether there is real change yet in European leadership, but certainly we can see that amongst the E3, Britain has just had a change of prime minister, not in the normal way. Merz looks under pressure in Germany, not least of all because he's got the AfD breathing down his neck, and the AfD have an explicit policy of re-engagement with Russia. And, of course, Macron has for some time maintained contact with Putin, we believe. We don't know for sure. You've also got a couple of other things as well, Pascal. I think the next thing really was that I think we're now starting to see that the fortress belt, which was really the last part of the sort of the main defence against Putin, Russian military movements west, the fortress belt is falling. And when that goes, there's not much left behind it. So, you know, the Russians at that stage will have open fields, -- 2 of 15 -- if you like, all the way to the Dnipro and, of course, all the way across Odessa, with the possibility of taking Odessa. And I think probably the last bit of it really, in terms of the context, was that—or the last two bits of it. First is that we now know that the West cannot defend ourselves against air attack. I mean, if anybody thought that it wasn't true and anybody ignored what was happening in Ukraine, then just look at what's happened in Iran, where essentially the United States have been driven out of the Gulf and have retreated. And it is a retreat, have retreated as far back as Jordan. In Jordan, they weren't safe, and as far back as Israel. And of course, the carriers have drawn further back. So we know we can't defend ourselves against air attacks, which in turn plays into the issue about Western air defence. You know, the fact is, if we can't defend Ukraine's skies against air attack, then neither can we defend Europe's skies. So surely this is the time to start talking to Russia. I also had a good look at NATO. The fact is that NATO, as I've said before, when I was operating in a NATO formation, we used to joke that NATO stood for no ability to organise. Sorry, tell me again. We joked that NATO stood for no ability to organise. And, of course, that's not true, but it was how we thought about it, light-heartedly. But NATO is not this great coalition that people talk about. Its sort of overseas operations—Kosovo was done under very dubious legitimacy. It certainly wasn't a legal operation. I have now, looking back on it, great doubts about the operation. NATO was defeated in Afghanistan against a ragtag bunch of people armed with Kalashnikovs and IEDs over a nearly 20-year campaign. And the great moment of NATO surely was when the Russians invaded Ukraine, because NATO's purpose from the outset was to avoid war in Europe. And yet at that moment, NATO had done something which caused the war in Europe and yet had not been prepared for the war that its actions must have been able to cause. So to me, that was a huge failure in strategic thinking. And it shows to me that NATO is not strategically competent. Last but by no means least, NATO's support to the war in Ukraine has not worked. So to me, it's time to have a very, very good look at NATO. So I began to really think, what might the structure of peace talks look like? It's difficult to start this, but necessary, I think. I think the interesting thing is that from a Bloomberg article, I think it was about a month ago—it was in July, Pascal—it became clear that there have been Track Two talks organized by the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue between the E3 nations—that's Britain, France and Germany—and Russia. I think, from the sound of it, the E3 nations got a fairly stark message from the Russians. And it does not entirely surprise me. I think the Russians have just about given up on negotiation. But anyway, at least that conversation started. But what might a peace plan look like? I mean, there are a number of elements that it might look like. I think the first thing is that we need to move from a sort of philosophy in NATO and in Europe that actually we deter the Russians. Now, what deterrence really means is confrontation. It means we confront the Russians, and we confront the Russians. The deterrence is achieved through the effect of marching all the way up to -- 3 of 15 -- Russia's borders. And we should not be surprised that Russia found that threatening. Indeed, that's the cause of the war. So the first thing is, let's go philosophically for an approach which is to do with cooperation as opposed to deterrence. Let's look at the way in which we work with the Russians, or could work with the Russians. Let's think about those measures. But shall I just stop then, before we sort of run into what that peace process might look like, Pascal? #Pascal Yeah. Hey, just a very quick note. The best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on neutralitystudies.com. Links below. See you there. I do have a couple of follow-up questions that I would like to clarify first. One of them being, where do you think it's coming from? Because I realize that I'm currently in Switzerland, and we're going to have a public referendum at the end of next month, and the whole political debate is really heating up right now about Swiss neutrality. And the people who are against what we are proposing and would like to have affirmed next month, they are arguing that, you know, even in Switzerland, Russia can only be deterred. You cannot have any kind of constructive dialogue with them because they're evil and whatnot and blah, blah, blah. But the whole point is that even in Switzerland, the idea is that deterrence is the only path to security. Even over here, a good number of the population swallowed the pill that, you know, a state needs to have the capacity to obliterate the other one, otherwise it will never be safe. And that's, of course, the root cause of the security dilemma and how then the other one will perceive you and whatnot. So the entire idea of building cooperative frameworks, and that the security of the other will add to your security, and that friendship is better than deterrence, is completely—I mean, is gone out of those circles of society. Not everywhere. There's still a good number of people understanding that. But we don't talk about this. The newspapers don't talk about it. Everything is about the importance of being strong against Russia. In your analysis, what do you think is the reason for basically Europe having completely, utterly lost the idea of cooperative security? I mean, we had it. Helsinki was built on that. The Final Act in 1975 was built around that concept. If you're secure, then I'm secure. And it's completely, utterly gone. What do you think led to this? #Steve Jermy I think there's probably two things, Pascal. I mean, there are a number of things. And like you, I've really struggled with this. I think, like all of us in the independent media, I've really struggled with this. I think that there has been a sort of sleepwalk. We didn't really notice much as NATO was marched up to the borders. People were interested in other things. There were events going on in Afghanistan. There were events going on elsewhere. People worried about climate change and so on and so forth. And I think that we've sleepwalked—at least the press sleepwalked up to it. And I think, indeed, most of the government sleepwalked up to it a