Europe Is Doomed. Anti-Diplomacy Ruins EVERYTHING | Amb. S.Z. Kusai

## Europe’s Self‑Abdication and the Rise of Anti‑Diplomacy A striking theme emerges from the recorded exchange with Ambassador S. Z. Kusai: Europe has willingly narrowed its diplomatic imagination and, in doing so, surrendered strategic space to others. That abdication is not merely a matter of policy disagreement; it is a structural shift in how European states imagine their role in world politics. Kusai argues that a deepening ideological rigidity combined with deference to American geopolitical priorities has produced what he calls “anti‑diplomacy” — an approach that substitutes moral posturing and geopolitical alignment for the patient bargaining, mutual interest building, and pragmatic accommodation diplomacy is supposed to deliver. Framed bluntly, Europe’s foreign policy toward China today appears less like an exercise in statecraft and more like an ideological campaign aimed at reshaping another polity. The consequences of this posture are tangible: eroded trust with Beijing, lost opportunities for trade and investment, and a deepening strategic helplessness for smaller European states that lack alternative markets and levers of influence. ## Old Illusions, New Disillusions: How the ‘Change Through Trade’ Story Faltered Kusai traces Europe’s current predicament to two linked misperceptions that have evolved since the 1970s. The first is the long‑standing European faith in “change through trade,” the idea that economic integration and exposure to liberal markets would gradually remodel China’s political system. For three decades, Europeans indulged this hope; after 2011 it became clearer that it was an illusion. Trade bolstered Chinese prosperity and technological capacity, but did not produce the Western‑style political liberalization that many in Europe expected. The second illusion was reciprocal: Europe imagined it could become an independent pole in global affairs — an autonomous bloc capable of balancing great powers. Kusai points out that this belief in strategic autonomy, now frequently invoked in Western capitals, has little traction when confronted with the realities of global power politics and the structural capacities of the United States. As European optimism about both the transformative power of trade and strategic autonomy ebbed, mutual disillusionment set in, eroding the basis for constructive relations. ## Brussels, Bilateralism, and the Tightrope of National Diplomacy A practical fault line in Europe’s approach to China is the institutional tension between EU‑level policy and bilateral diplomacy. Kusai’s ambassadorial experience illustrates the diplomatic tightrope that EU member states, particularly the smaller ones, must walk. On paper, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) exists, but in practice national embassies continue to conduct the day‑to‑day business of trade promotion, cultural exchange, and investment attraction. That duality becomes a source of friction when Brussels adopts confrontational postures that contrast with the economic needs of member capitals. Hungary’s so‑called “China opening” is an instructive case. Facing the limits of the European market and the imperative of economic modernization, Hungary prioritized trade and inward investment from China to generate jobs, technology transfers, and industrial projects. Kusai recounts how, during the 2008 financial crisis, European engagement with China became markedly more cooperative out of necessity. Yet once the immediate crisis pressures eased, EU discourse shifted toward political conditionality and security concerns, complicating bilateral projects and placing national diplomats in the awkward position of defending investments that Brussels viewed with suspicion. Kusai’s narrative underlines an important diplomatic truth: when supranational rhetoric diverges from national economic imperatives, smaller states often suffer. Their capacity to balance external relationships is narrowed even while their economic dependence grows. ## Misreading China: Party Transformation and Western Stereotypes Underlying many policy mistakes, Kusai suggests, is a pervasive conceptual lag among European analysts and politicians. He asserts that much of the Western conversation about China remains stuck in the categories of the 1960s and 1970s — a picture of a monolithic, Maoist Communist Party that ignores the profound institutional and strategic transformations China has undergone since 1979. Kusai’s comparative perspective is revealing. He draws on Hungary’s own reformist moments and on his long service in China to argue that Beijing pursued a conscious strategy: preserve the core of one‑party rule while introducing market mechanisms and co‑opting new social and economic elites into the Party’s structures. The result, according to Kusai, is a political organism that is neither a relic of Maoism nor a Western liberal democracy. It is a hybrid that uses market tools instrumentally to pursue state objectives, while simultaneously reshaping its own internal governance to integrate diverse social interests. This model is not well captured by Western analogies that reduce China to “autocracy” or “communism” alone. When analysts insist on simple labels, policymakers are prone to treat Chinese actions as expressions of ideological hostility rather than as strategic choices made by a state intent on maintaining cohesion and developmental momentum. That misreading feeds reciprocal distrust and escalatory policies. ## The Politics of Economic Contestation and the Charge of Hypocrisy One of the more trenchant strands in the conversation concerns how Europe frames its economic grievances with China. European critiques often focus on state subsidies, industrial policy, and alleged unfair competition. Kusai’s response is to reframe those practices as foundational to the Chinese model: centralized coordination, strategic investment in key industries, and state‑led modernization have been deliberate tools of national development. Invoking them as aberrations without acknowledging their systemic role misunderstands the target and limits the plausibility of reformist demands. Equally damaging, Kusai notes, is the appearance of double standards. Human rights criticism of China — a persistent theme in European capitals — is legitimate in many respects, especially where credible evidence of abuses exists. Yet, Kusai points out, the selective intensity of Europe’s outrage exposes an uneven application of principles. He asks why human rights concerns are not raised with equal vigor when they involve geopolitically sensitive partners or when other states pursue assimilationist or repressive policies closer to home. That inconsistency nourishes the perception in Beijing that European criticism is less about universal values and more about geopolitical encirclement. Furthermore, the insistence that China must abandon its core developmental tools to conform to Western norms risks being interpreted not as principled advocacy but as an attempt at regime change by other means. Kusai warns that such rhetoric further erodes trust and moves the relationship away from constructive management toward confrontation. ## Small States in a Great Power Game: Hungary’s Dilemma Throughout the exchange, the special vulnerability of smaller European states is a recurring concern. Countries like Hungary find themselves squeezed between EU policy frameworks, American strategic preferences, and their own pressing need for external investment and market access. Kusai emphasizes that peripheral economies cannot achieve rapid modernization by doubling down on stagnant intra‑EU trade; they require external partners to bring capital, technology, and markets. This structural asymmetry means that European anti‑diplomacy, applied uniformly, produces unequal harm. Measures designed to curb Beijing’s strategic reach — sanctions, investment screening, export controls — often have disproportionate costs

Europe Is Doomed. Anti-Diplomacy Ruins EVERYTHING Today I’m talking to a former Hungarian Diplomat, His excellency, Ambassador Sandor Zoltan Kusai. Ambassador Kusai served his country in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Office in various capacities, most importantly he spent a total of 18 years in China, including in the top position as Ambassador between 2008-2014. He is now working as a scholar in research and education back home in Hungary and it’s a pleasure having him here today. https://neutralitystudies- shop.fourthwall.com #M3 One more important thing: the absolutization of serving American interests. Europe serves American geopolitical interests because Europe fears that it has become too soft or has lost the power to control the world. So Europe gave itself up to the United States. The US is capable of controlling the world, so we will serve the US to control the world and get, from the big feast of the Americans, some scraps from the table. From the big American feasting table, Europe will get some small drops or some small pieces of food. That's the general approach. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to a former Hungarian diplomat, His Excellency Ambassador Sándor Zoltán Kusai. Ambassador Kusai served his country in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister's Office in various capacities. Most importantly, he spent a total of 18 years in China, including in the top position as ambassador between 2008 and 2014. He is now working as a scholar in research and education back home in Hungary, and it's a pleasure having him here today. Ambassador, welcome. #M3 Thank you very much for the invitation. #M2 I'm glad you said yes, because we discussed a little bit via email that we want—or should—look at the role of China and Europe's diplomacy, or non-diplomacy, toward it—anti-diplomacy, depending on how you want to see it. You've had so much experience with that country, and you represented a European state there. Can you tell us a little bit about your experience and your general assessment of where European diplomacy with China is headed? -- 1 of 14 -- #M3 It is heading in the wrong direction. Europe is misunderstanding China, but I am convinced that Europe is deliberately misunderstanding China. It's not just by mistake; it's a deliberate act. And the Chinese are getting more and more impatient, I would say, with Europe. They hope that Europe can turn in a better direction, but I see in the latest developments that the Chinese are gradually losing their patience. They are full of distress and dislike. What they see from Europe is all the attempts at misleading China or taking advantage of certain economic and political factors. So it's very clear, I would say, that Europe does not want to have good relations with China. Europe now openly wants a regime change in China, whether by diplomacy, political pressure, or economic pressure. That's the fact, and it's so understandable and clear that it simply undermines the basic trust which could underlie cooperation. That's my assessment of the present situation. #M2 Can you give us examples of that? I mean, in what way does the European Union, or does Europe, signal to China that they want regime change? And when did that start? #M3 Oh, the second part of your question is easier. I think it started in the mid-70s when official diplomatic relations were established. But it was more covered up and not such a simple and pressuring attitude, because Europe had fundamental economic interests. In trading with China, the "change through trade" policy of Germany was very important, so they wanted to change China all the time. But for the first three decades, it was simply a hope, an illusion—that by trading, by influencing the economic development of China, by helping the Chinese middle class to grow and develop, it would change China by itself. It was an illusion. We saw it in the early 2000s, and after 2011 we saw very clearly that it was an illusion. But on the other hand, the Chinese always had another illusion. The Chinese had the illusion that Europe could become a simple or single, separate, individual pole in the global economy and in global politics. The Europeans had the illusion that the strategic autonomy of Europe—which was later formulated by President Macron—was a reality or at least a possibility. I think nowadays it's very clear that it is impossible. So what we see now is a mutual disillusionment, both from Europe and from China. And the consequences are really very bad, first and foremost for the smaller European countries, like Hungary. #M2 How does that work, though? We have the European Union, and yes, the EU is a bloc, but on a diplomatic level, it's still each member state that has direct diplomatic contact with other countries. -- 2 of 14 -- Yes, you have a common foreign and security policy, but the EU member states are in this in- between zone, and diplomacy still, at least on paper, happens on a national level. So when you were ambassador there, I mean, what were your competencies? What did Hungary do directly with China? And where were you undercut by, let's say, forces from Brussels? #M3 You know, we could have bilateral cultural and investment activities. You could represent your country, your government. I did it for six years, starting with a socialist government and ending with the present center-right government. So I was a professional diplomat. I worked with any government that the people might have elected in Hungary for more than 30 years. So I know how it works. My basic task—which is, by the way, the basic task of diplomacy in principle, according to the Vienna Convention—was to help develop bilateral trade and bilateral relations, to realize your country's national interest via cooperation. That's basically why the whole Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was originally established. But at present, it is very difficult to continue that. I was ambassador when Hungary had already joined the European Union for four years, so I participated in the cooperation between EU member states, which meant monthly meetings of the ambassadors and discussions on issues mainly at the level of EU-China relations, but it always included details about bilateral relations as well. It was an exchange of information, an exchange of our approaches, and so on. This happened once every month at the ambassadorial level, but all the embassies continued this at every diplomatic level— press attachés, trade attachés, and so on—in every aspect of diplomacy. And I had a very interesting experience when I began my ambassadorial work there. It was in 2008, and that was the year of the crisis—the Great Recession, if you want to call it that. At that time, in the beginning, in the first two or two and a half years, our European approach to China was much, much more cooperative because we needed China economically and financially. Europe couldn't overcome that crisis, that financial crisis, without active cooperation with China—not only in economic relations, but also in financial matters. So we were very cooperative at that time. And as for the crisis, I would say—because I am convinced as an economist—that we never overcame it. We have never overcome that crisis. Still, the crisis is lingering around us. But anyhow, as we felt better economically, financially, and so on, the Union began to pressure China to push for more political—I would say, more ideological—aspects or matters, and it began to sour the relationship. And it was very difficult for an ambassador. Of course, the Hungarian governments, all of them led by different parties, were always for cooperation, for expanding investment, trade, and humanitarian cooperation, education, and so on. We were interested in that because Hungary is a peripheral country of the European Union. We are on the periphery— economically, socially, culturally, in every aspect. -- 3 of 14 -- We needed extra, I would say, impetus from the world for economic development, for social development. The European Union has troubles. There is no chance of selling twice as many Hungarian products in Europe as we sold last year. It's simply impossible because the European market is not expanding, especially now, but it didn't expand even in the best years. I remember that growth was 3-4% at most. We needed extra cooperation outside the European Union. If you think back to those years of global economic globalization, which was the single most important growing economy in the world? Which was the strongest market, the source of upcoming new technologies, upcoming new partnerships, upcoming new investments? It was China. So that's why the Hungarian "China opening" policy, as it was called at that time, began in 2003, and it became very, very impressive after 2010, with the present government formation for the first time, because it was simply a very clear and understandable economic interest. And that motivated us. So I had to balance the European pressures and the national interests. It involved investments like Huawei, like the battery factories. Now it's about the electric car factories, and so on. On the other hand, I had to manage things with the European Union in the background, convincing my colleagues that it is not dangerous when any Chinese company invests in Hungary. It was not easy sometimes. #M2 I believe that. But where is this fear and distrust also coming from? On the one hand, I do understand that there is deep-seated European distrust toward socialist China. But then again, I mean, in the 2000s and 2010s, communism wasn't a topic anymore, right? Communism is what Europe overcame. And of course, you are Hungary. I mean, you were a communist Hungary, socialist Hungary, right? And that was left behind, at least rhetorically, ideologically. So where did it come from that the Europeans still thought that the Chinese were out to somehow come and get them? Switzerland is the country that had the first free trade agreement with China. That was very much also a model case for the EU. These free trade relations actually helped both. They helped Switzerland and the Chinese. The Chinese liked the Swiss market and also saw it as an example case. Can you maybe speak to that a bit? #M3 I think the distrust on the European side is a deep-rooted ideological stubbornness, I would say. The European politicians in most countries, and the European scholars studying China, simply stayed in the 60s and 70s in their minds. They simply don't understand that, as the Chinese call it, "socialism with Chinese characteristics." In that formula, the "Chinese characteristics" put the limitation on socialism. It's a mixed economy, a mixed social structure, and a mixed political structure. Regarding the economy, the European scholars and even the European politicians could understand much more easily the capitalist elements, the private ownership, the private entrepreneurship in China. They very often overestimated the importance of it. -- 4 of 14 -- But in social policies, and especially in the political sphere, they could not understand the restructuring of the Chinese Communist Party, which originally was a classical Communist Party based on Leninism and so on—organizational structure, policies, and everything. But nowadays, it's a different party. That does not mean that it is a liberal party—no. It's still, I would say, an atheist party with a very strong purpose of moving forward the rebirth of the Chinese state technologically, economically, and so on, and it is ready to use every possible means, including capitalism, to reach that purpose, to reach that target. And they are doing that. So it's a much more structured entity, the Chinese Communist Party, than most of the European analysts think. And as you know, this is common in every foreign policy issue. The analysts are much better than the politicians. T