How The USA Tricked Europe Into Total Strategic Defeat | E. Bistoletti & P. Lottaz

## Europe’s strategic blind spot: how an ally became the primary adversary What emerges from the conversation is a hard-edged thesis: Europe has not simply been outmaneuvered by Russia in the struggle over Ukraine — it has been systematically subordinated by its closest ally, the United States. The discussion frames recent diplomatic moves, including high-level U.S.–Russia talks held without European or Ukrainian participation, as the culmination of a long-running pattern. Far from being a sudden aberration tied to one administration, this pattern spans successive U.S. governments and reflects a deeper asymmetry in transatlantic relations. The consequence is stark: Europe is discovering its security is being decided outside its own locus of control, and it is ill-prepared to reclaim agency. ## From partnership to poodle: the anatomy of strategic subordination The conversation repeatedly returns to a metaphor: Europe as a poodle. That image is meant not as insult but as diagnosis. Over decades, European governments ceded policymaking space to Washington — on NATO enlargement, on energy interdependence with Russia, and on the framing of security threats. This deference produced two outcomes. First, the U.S. came to assume it could take sweeping actions affecting European interests — from promises of membership for third countries to blunt threats against energy projects — without sustained pushback. Second, European political elites internalized a posture of acquiescence, tolerating choices that eroded their independent capacity to shape outcomes on their continent. The practical effects have been visible. Strategic infrastructure projects and energy ties that once offered some insulation from geopolitical confrontation became vulnerable to external pressure. When those ties were severed or jeopardized, the European response was muted. The result: European leverage diminished while transatlantic asymmetry widened. The conversation stresses that this was not merely transactional capitulation in a single crisis; it was a cumulative weakening of Europe’s ability to secure its own interests. ## Riyadh and the sidelining of Europe: the new choreography of peace A focal point of the exchange is the recent U.S.–Russia engagement convened outside Europe and without Ukrainian presence. The video frames this as a watershed: major powers are moving to negotiate an end to hostilities through direct bilateral channels, bypassing the continental actors most affected by the conflict. Seen from this vantage, the move is both pragmatic and disconcerting. Pragmatic, because bilateral talks can be faster and less encumbered by multilateral veto dynamics. Disconcerting, because parties historically assumed to be indispensable — European states and the Ukrainian government — find themselves out of the room. The discussion highlights two linked risks. First, any agreement hammered out without Ukrainian buy-in will require immense pressure to be durable: the party that helped arm and support Kyiv may need to compel Ukrainian acceptance. Second, excluded actors can act as spoilers. Europe, feeling marginalized and humiliated, might seek to undermine a negotiated settlement by continuing military support or diplomatic obstruction. Paradoxically, the very marginalization that prompts European anger could become the avenue by which they reassert influence — by making peace harder to achieve unless their demands are addressed. ## Who polices the peace? Contested formats for stabilization A practical question follows: if a ceasefire or settlement is reached, what kind of force, if any, would monitor and guarantee it? The conversation contrasts two models that have immediate legal and political consequences. One option is a European-led force, perhaps under the EU’s security framework — politically acceptable to many in Europe but unlikely to win Russian trust. The other is a United Nations peacekeeping architecture, with blue helmets mandated by the Security Council, and composed of a geographically diverse roster of troop-contributing countries. From the exchange, three points stand out. First, Russia appears committed to international legitimacy: it would insist on UN authorization for any peacekeeping deployment it can accept. Second, the U.S. has signaled reluctance to act as a tripwire or to extend Article 5-style commitments to any on-the-ground European contingents — a position that further strains NATO’s coherence. Third, even highly capable European forces lack the political credibility in Moscow to serve as neutral guarantors. Ultimately, credible stabilization will likely require broad international participation and a clearly delineated, verifiable mandate — and that brings back the question of who sits at the negotiating table when such a mandate is crafted. ## Proxy to arbiter: Washington’s leverage and the fate of its protégés An arresting theme in the conversation is a reversal of roles: the external sponsor that once armed and directed a proxy can become the arbiter that forces its protégé to accept terms. The United States, perceived as the prime mover behind Western support for Ukraine, now holds the instruments — diplomatic pressure, conditional financial packages, withholding of military aid — that could coerce Kyiv into concessions demanded by a negotiated settlement. This dynamic amplifies the sense that Washington is not simply an ally but a principal with the ability to discipline its partners. That power to compel is politically fraught. For Europe, the idea that Washington might use its leverage to pull Kyiv toward a settlement negotiated over European objections revives deep resentments. It underlines the structural dependency: European influence over the course of the conflict was never solely a function of military or economic heft but of whether Washington chose to align its weight with European preferences. The conversation suggests the troubling precedent that strategic outcomes are now contingent on U.S. calculations rather than on allied consensus. ## The retreat of regime-change instruments and the emergent multipolarity A less anticipated development noted in the discussion is the apparent de-prioritization — or even dismantling — of U.S. institutions and programs associated with regime change abroad. Actions such as constraining democracy-promotion funds alter the texture of external influence around Europe and Eurasia. To observers in Moscow, such shifts may signal a recalibration of U.S. willingness to sponsor political transformations that threaten Russian interests. To European capitals, the change raises mixed emotions: relief if a source of regional destabilization wanes, but anxiety about being left without structural support if systemic change is the objective. Closely connected is the rhetorical and policy drift toward acknowledging a multipolar world. Where the language of a single “rules-based order” once dominated, the conversation identifies a new tolerance — even acceptance — in some U.S. quarters of a world where great powers negotiate spheres of influence. This recalibration does not mean the immediate collapse of Western normative frameworks. Rather, it points to a strategic recognition that durable security arrangements may require negotiated coexistence among major powers, even if that entails uncomfortable concessions for smaller states. ## Toward repair and strategic autonomy: what Europe must now contemplate If the central claim of the discussion is correct — that Europe has been led to a moment of strategic defeat by its own ally — the policy implication is urgent: repair, not maintenance, is needed. This is not a call for estrangement from the transatlantic partnership; the conversation stresses the practical benefits of continued cooperation. Rather, it is a demand for European political leadership that rebuilds capacity and credibility: developing independent diplomatic channels, investing in defen

How The USA Tricked Europe Into Total Strategic Defeat | E. Bistoletti & P. Lottaz The other day I was on Ezequiel Bistoletti’s show Demoliendo Mitos de la Politica (@demoliendomitosdelapolitica). He runs that channel in Spanish and published our conversation in that language, and here it is for you in English—or in your language if you watch this on one of our other channels. It’s mainly an interview with me about what’s going on with the new Trump administration and the War in Ukraine. One of my key arguments is that Europe got plaid so hard by its "ally" the USA that the Europeans still can't wrap their little NATO minds around it. And this is not just a "Trump phenomenon". No, the systematic undercutting of European interests by Washington has a very long tradition, the old continent just had no political leadership that could have prevented that.... And now "the weak suffer what they must". #M2 For as much as the Europeans thought that their mortal enemy was Russia, they are now finding out that they are losing to the United States. They're losing to their ally. And yes, at the moment, they can still pretend that this is all because of Donald Trump, and this is all just because an evil man, an evil orange man, took over Washington. But the fact of the matter is, Biden already did the same. And even before him, Obama started pushing the Europeans into a war in Ukraine, over Ukraine, that they didn't want. Angela Merkel didn't want it. Hollande didn't want it. They wanted to stop the session. They wanted to stop the Bush campaign, the George Bush Jr. administration in 2008, from promising NATO membership to Ukraine. They didn't want that. But then they gave up, and George Bush Jr. promised NATO membership for Ukraine. And, well, things spiraled to where they are now. So this is not just a Donald Trump phenomenon. This is just a succession of administrations that pushed the Europeans around, and they let it happen. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies. The other day, I was on Ezequiel Bistoletti's show, Demoliendo Mitos de la Política. He runs that channel in Spanish and published our conversation there. It's right here. On this channel, I'm now publishing that conversation where he interviews me on Trump and the new administration, the war in Ukraine, publishing this in English or in your language if you're watching this on one of our other channels. It's mainly an analysis of how I think currently the entire Trump administration is trying to run the show and what this means for world politics. Please enjoy. #M3 -- 1 of 14 -- Good morning, good afternoon, and good evening. Welcome back to Demolishing Political Myths. Today we have the honor and the pleasure of talking with our friend, Dr. Pascal Lottaz, who is a professor in Japan in his field, Neutrality Studies, and he also hosts the very, very interesting YouTube channel, Neutrality Studies. Dear Pascal, how are you there? #M2 Hello, Ezequiel. I'm very good. Life is nice here, but it is currently a little bit cold in Japan. #M3 Okay. It's cold here in Germany as well. The place that is not cold right now is Saudi Arabia, and that's the place where actually Marco Rubio, U.S. Secretary of State, and Lavrov, Russia's Foreign Minister, recently met in order to start discussing what appears to be the first step towards the final peace agreement in Ukraine. However, Ukraine was excluded from the negotiations, at least at this stage, and Europe as well, which made them criticize this meeting very much. They're really surprised and really angry about this. How do you interpret this first step towards what appears to be the negotiated peace at the end of the process? #M2 Well, to me, this is first and foremost very good news, because finally having real negotiations and a real peace summit is a wonderful thing. I mean, some of us might remember that we had this sham or scam peace summit back in the summer of 2024 in my country, Switzerland, which I still feel ashamed of. Because it was obviously not about getting to peace. It was obviously about creating clout for putting even more pressure on Russia, which is just not the same. But now we actually have a U.S. administration and a Russian administration who want to find a solution. We don't know what the solution will look like. We don't know what the terms of the deal are going to be. But we know that both of them are working toward that goal, which is hugely different from the summer of 2024, because then they were just working toward getting Russia to capitulate, right? Whereas now we are in a position where the idea is to find an end in one way or another, like in a way that the shooting can stop. This is a huge difference from before. Secondly, the United States choosing to directly reach out to Russia, over the head of Ukraine and over the head of Europe, is a very sensible thing to do. Because it is much, much faster and much easier to negotiate bilaterally than it is to do so in a multilateral forum of blah, blah, blah. So this is the most straightforward way to get to the point where you understand what the parameters can be. And then the United States, at some point, will need to include at least Ukraine in one way or another because they also need the Ukrainian armed forces to stop doing what they're currently doing. I mean, when the Russian armed forces stop shooting, you also need the Ukrainians to stop shooting. Otherwise, it won't work. In order to get to that, the United States has quite a vast -- 2 of 14 -- array of options, ranging from carrots all the way to sticks, in order to threaten the Ukrainians or just promising them that a lot of good things will come out of it. Preferably, it will be the carrots, but if necessary, it will definitely be the sticks. And then the only question is, who are the potential spoilers? The spoilers in this area could be the Europeans. Because if the UK and Brussels decide that they want to work against whatever kind of peace agreement might come out of this between the US and Moscow, then the obvious way to do that is by continuing to support the Ukrainians with their military means. And although the Europeans by now, obviously and to the naked eye, don't possess the means to win this war, they might possess enough means in order to spoil the peace. So the question to the US and to Russia will be how to bring the Europeans and the Ukrainians on board, maybe not to make them happy enough to say yes, but to keep them under the threshold of trying to spoil the peace process. This is a natural thing to happen because in any kind of peace process, you often have individual actors, left-out actors, that, if push comes to shove, will act as spoilers, even if it is for no other reason than to not be completely marginalized. The Europeans are currently being marginalized like they've never been marginalized before. I had a talk today with Arnaud Bertrand, and he pointed out very correctly that never in the last 1,000 years was the security configuration of the European continent decided completely and utterly outside of it and by outside powers. This time, none of the European powers, literally none, sits at the negotiating table in Saudi Arabia. And I understand that the Europeans are very angry at that, that the Brits and the Germans and the French are furious. But if you make yourself a poodle, then you must not be surprised if others treat you like a poodle. And that's what the Europeans did over the last at least 25 years. And the closer you get to current times, the more poodle-ish they became. They became so much of a poodle that the German chancellor just stood next to the American president when Joe Biden announced, before the war broke out, that if Vladimir Putin attacks, then Nord Stream is over. He just stood there and took it as the American president threatened to sabotage, to destroy a German-Russian joint infrastructure project. And, well, the whole world watched. The whole world looked at it. And guess who looked at it and watched? It was the USA. The USA, first and foremost, learned a very important lesson, which is that by now the Europeans are so subordinated, so obedient, that you can blow up their infrastructure and they won't say anything. And they did. And they didn't say anything. The Europeans are still covering for the Americans, for the forces that blew this up. They're still covering for it. And we know that because the Swedish investigation has finished. The Danish investigation has finished. You cannot tell me, you cannot sell the idea to me, that nobody in Europe knows what happened. By now, it is clear that for as much as the Europeans thought their mortal enemy was Russia, they are now finding out that they are losing to the United States. They're losing to their ally. And yes, at the moment, they can still pretend that this is all because of Donald Trump, and this is all just because an evil man, an evil orange man, took over Washington. But the -- 3 of 14 -- fact of the matter is, Biden already did the same. Even before him, Obama started pushing the Europeans into a war in Ukraine, over Ukraine, that they didn't want. Angela Merkel didn't want it. Hollande didn't want it. They wanted to stop the Bush Jr., George Bush Jr. administration in 2008 from promising NATO membership to Ukraine. They didn't want that. But then they gave up, and George Bush Jr. promised NATO membership for Ukraine. And, well, things spiraled to where they are now. So this is not just the Donald Trump phenomenon. This is a succession of administrations that pushed the Europeans around, and they let it happen. And now you are at the endpoint of this entire charade, where the situation is becoming so evident that even the Europeans can't ignore it anymore. But it's now 20 years too late to do something constructive about it. And now you will need a lot of repair work instead of maintenance work done in order to get back to a situation in which Europe can again basically stand up for its own interests. #M3 Yeah, I completely agree with you. And I believe that the Europeans not only became a poodle, but a deceitful poodle in the sense that they probably don't even deserve to be at the negotiating table, because the last time they were there, they actually made these fake agreements in Minsk, which, as you remember, Hollande and Merkel conceded were just to buy time and send more weapons to Ukraine, when Europe was actually the guarantor of these agreements. So, not only can they probably not participate against the US's will, but do they really deserve to be there after losing confidence by doing this? Well, that's another question for sure. But Pascal, there have been some details about what the U.S. expects regarding the following steps, in the sense that Pete Hegseth explained in the Ramstein meeting when he said that, firstly, the U.S. would back down financially and militarily and leave all this burden on the back of Europe. And then they said, well, we would appreciate it if there were European troops as peacekeeping units there, but without the U.S. and outside of Article 5. How probable, how likely do you see a situation like this happening? Because this might be the U.S. plan, but Putin might think differently as well. So what do you think about this proposed project in order to go to peace under these terms? #M2 Well, we have more ideas in this direction. One of the people who also spoke about this was the Russian ambassador to the United Nations. He made the point that if any kind of peacekeepers were involved in settling the conflict, it could only happen under the only legal framework there is under international law, which is the United Nations framework. This means it would have to be sanctioned by the Security Council, with the mandate being of a limited term—one year, a couple of years at most—and then it would have to be reauthorized by the Security Council. -- 4 of 14 -- And i