Moscow Meeting Shock: USA Abandons Europe & Ukraine | Ray MacGovern & Larry Johnson

## Introduction: US Delegation in Moscow The conversation makes the case that the recent U.S. delegation’s five‑hour meeting in Moscow marks a significant pivot in how Washington is approaching the war in Ukraine and European security. Far from a conventional diplomatic summit, the exchange reveals a hybrid of business negotiation, back‑channel choreography, and political theatre that has unsettled allies and energized opponents. What emerges from the discussion is not a sealed peace but the opening of a new, messier chapter in which transactional, personality‑driven diplomacy is testing the limits of institutional statecraft. The stakes are high: territorial questions have been placed on the table, NATO cohesion is strained, and the contours of any future settlement are beginning to reflect an altered balance of power on the ground. ## Unconventional Diplomacy & The Leaked Dmitriev Call A central theme in the exchange is how atypical the Moscow talks looked compared with established diplomatic practice. The conversation points out that the delegation’s composition and modus operandi resembled a private commercial negotiation as much as a state‑to‑state bargaining session. Business figures and informal advisers were reportedly central, and a leaked phone call between two senior Russian officials — discussed at length — exposed a preparatory paper circulated to the delegation as an initial negotiating framework. The leak itself is significant: it underscores the porousness of communications in the digital age and the strategic uses of selective disclosure to influence domestic and international perceptions. The panelists interpret this less as an accident and more as a window into a deliberate, expedited strategy for opening talks without committing institutional foreign policy apparatuses up front. The involvement of private sector interlocutors and the reliance on talking points distributed in advance suggest an approach designed to cajole the incumbent U.S. leadership — described in the discussion as highly personality‑centred — into a framework that can later be institutionalized. That said, the ad hoc nature of the exchanges raises immediate questions about legal authority and implementation: How will any verbal commitments made in that format be translated into enforceable state action? The conversation flags the obvious risk: informal agreements can collapse into useless promises unless domestic bureaucracies, allied capitals, and legal mechanisms are brought into the loop. Equally important is the strategic logic behind leaking the call. The discussion argues it functioned as both a warning shot and a test balloon. On one hand, it exposed a negotiating genesis that critics could present as improvised or illegitimate; on the other, it signalled credibility and preparation to the receiving side. This double‑edged transparency can both undermine and solidify nascent understandings — depending on how bureaucracies and publics react. ## Corruption, NATO, and Escalation in the Black Sea Another strand of the conversation connects the diplomatic detour to deeper currents roiling Europe: corruption, alliance strain, and military escalation. The narrative that unfolded in the exchange treats corruption allegations within the Ukrainian security and procurement apparatus not merely as a moral issue but as a practical lever being used to reduce U.S. support. If aid flows are curtailed or conditioned on anti‑corruption benchmarks, the political calculus inside Kyiv shifts dramatically. The conversation argues that revelations about misappropriated funds have already become a bargaining chip, one that can be wielded to justify a cooling of Western assistance and to push Kyiv toward compromise. This domestic politicization of assistance is intertwined with NATO dynamics. What emerges clearly in the discussion is a sense that Europe is being institutionally sidelined. The conspicuous absence of senior American foreign policy officials from key alliance meetings, paired with an ad hoc, business‑led U.S. delegation, has been read as a snub to European partners. Allies who expected to be co‑architects of any settlement feel frozen out, which generates two predictable reactions: panic and posturing. Panic drives rushed plans and unrealistic military demands; posturing hardens public positions that become difficult to reconcile at the negotiating table. The military dimension — especially in maritime theatres like the Black Sea — complicates any diplomatic détente. The conversation highlights that Russian advances on the ground, and parallel escalatory capabilities at sea, create bargaining leverage that feeds back into the political realm. As battlefield pressure mounts, calls for greater Western intervention grow louder, even as political fatigue and corruption narratives sap the will to sustain open‑ended support. The net result, the discussion suggests, is a creeping normalization of conflict management over conflict resolution: agreements that freeze or contain rather than decisively settle. ## Can Trump Deliver? The "Deep State" & Territorial Compromise A recurrent concern in the exchange is whether the current U.S. administration can translate informal understandings into durable policy, especially given domestic political fractures and institutional resistance. The conversation paints a picture of a presidency driven by personal calculus, where dealmaking is mediated through trusted confidants and family ties rather than through career diplomats and formal channels. This means that any potential compromise — particularly on territorial questions — would need to navigate not only foreign interlocutors but also a labyrinth of domestic actors who may be skeptical or hostile. The discussion places particular emphasis on the “deep state” trope as shorthand for bureaucratic and political pushback. Whatever one’s view of that label, the practical reality is familiar: long‑standing security institutions, intelligence agencies, and allied capitals rarely accept sudden strategic reversals without scrutiny. Consequently, a president who pursues a rapid, personality‑driven deal risks having that arrangement undermined by leak campaigns, congressional interventions, or administrative foot‑dragging. The leaked call discussed earlier is a vivid example of how covert or semi‑covert channels can be exposed and weaponized, potentially derailing fragile momentum. Territorial compromise sits at the heart of this tension. The conversation notes that placing borders and troop dispositions on the table marks a decisive shift from prior public U.S. positions. For Kyiv, ceding territory — or accepting arrangements that institutionalize Russian control over certain regions — is politically explosive. For Moscow, territorial security is framed as non‑negotiable in ways that demand guarantees beyond verbal assurances. For Washington, the calculus is therefore existentially political: Is a peace based on territorial accommodation worth the domestic political cost of alienating core constituencies and betraying declared principles? The discussion suggests that the answer depends on whether the White House can align short‑term transactional gain (a headline peace) with long‑term institutional buy‑in — a heavy lift in the current polarized environment. ## The Geopolitical Shift: Russia Looks East, US Looks Inward Perhaps the most consequential theme is the larger geopolitics the conversation implies: a gradual eastward pivot by Russia and a retrenchment or inward turn by the United States. The panelists argue that, whether or not a formal deal emerges, Moscow is increasingly courting economic and strategic partnerships beyond Europe. This move eastward — toward Asia, the Middle East, and sympathetic regional partners — reflects a long‑term hedging strategy that reduces Russia’s dependency on Western recognition and markets. For Russia, the diplomatic opening presented by

Moscow Meeting Shock: USA Abandons Europe & Ukraine The US delegation just met with Vladimir Putin and his staff in Moscow and although there is no peace agreement yet, we seem to be one step closer to some form of “compromise” as the Russian TASS news agency puts it. Here to help explaining the developments are Ray McGovern and Larry Johnson. Links: Ray's website: https://raymcgovern.com/ Ray's X (Twitter): https://x.com /raymcgovern Judge Nepolitano's podcast: https://art19.com/shows/judging-freedom Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop. fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction: US Delegation in Moscow 00:04:52 "The End of the Beginning": Analyzing the Negotiation Process 00:10:00 Unconventional Diplomacy & The Leaked Dmitriev Call 00:17:58 Kabuki Theater? Parallels to Minsk & Western Desperation 00:23:06 Corruption, NATO, and Escalation in the Black Sea 00:29:21 The Foreign Ministry Takes Over: Lessons from Broken Promises 00:36:31 Can Trump Deliver? The "Deep State" & Territorial Compromise 00:47:19 The New START Treaty as a Litmus Test 00:49:37 The Geopolitical Shift: Russia Looks East, US Looks Inward #Pascal The U.S. delegation just met with Vladimir Putin and his staff in Moscow. And although there’s no peace agreement yet, we seem to be one step closer to some form of compromise, as the Russian TASS news agency puts it. Here to help explain the developments are Ray MacGovern and Larry Johnson. Ray, Larry, welcome. Thanks, Pascal. Thank you. Let’s maybe begin with what you think of this five-hour marathon meeting that apparently the U.S. and Russian sides had in Moscow. Also, regarding the participants—how do you interpret the fact that it was mainly led by Mr. Vitkov and Jared Kushner on the U.S. side? Maybe let’s start with Ray. #Ray MacGovern Well, it's very interesting that Marco Rubio is not there. He's been shunted aside, and so have the Europeans, who have been very much opposed to this kind of rapprochement—or at least U.S.– Russian dealing on this key issue of Ukraine. Who else is there? Well, I talked about Witkoff and the son—well, not his son, of course, but the son-in-law, right? Trump’s son-in-law. So Witkoff—who is he? He’s a real estate, kind of financial guy, and he gets along really well with Dmitriev, who is the Russians’ financial guy. They talked a bit about the potential for a vast expansion of economic relations. Now, that may happen, but not for several years. Still, it’s on the table, and they know that Trump is interested in it. -- 1 of 15 -- Those who expected a settlement or really substantive talks have been disappointed because, as both sides agreed, these were just talking points going in—points for discussion. Well, far from anything that could be agreed upon, what was actually agreed upon was to talk about these things at a later date. The most important thing is that territorial issues were addressed. Now, that surprised me—that’s one of the details. But as Rubio himself has said, that’s the real fly in the ointment: territorial issues. Of course they are. So what else? Well, I’ll just broaden it out before I finish here. You know, I like to talk about the backdrop to all this. And the backdrop is that we have a delusional—what’s the word?—narcissist as president. Now, if I’m giving President Putin the President’s Daily Brief, and he asks me, “What about Trump?” What do you think he’s going to do? I’d have to say, “Beats the hell out of me,” in Russian. He’s so mercurial—we can’t figure out what he’s going to do from one day to the next. So, Putin, what does that mean? It means, Mr. Putin, that he’s got his fingers on those codes, okay? You’ve got to treat a delusional narcissist like Trump the way you’d treat anyone of that kind. You have to be really gentle. You can’t provoke them. You have to play along. You have to flatter them. You have to say, “Oh, that was a great thing you did, and you should have gotten a Nobel Peace Prize.” So you play along, because the other extreme is you get him rattled—and God knows we can’t really depend on anything he’s going to do, okay? He’s got the nuclear codes. Besides all that, the Russians have made it very clear since Trump took over that Trump is not Biden, okay? They're talking to Trump. There's some evidence that Trump really is interested in a final deal on Ukraine—I believe he really is. So, three more years of this guy. How are we going to deal with him? It's sort of like—what’s the—yeah, like porcupines mating in the jungle. You know how they mate very, very carefully, okay? That’s how Trump needs to be handled. And I think that since the Russians are winning in Ukraine and Putin’s in a rush, what really needs explaining is why Trump is so much in a rush. We could talk about that later. I have a couple of theories on that, one of which is a little out of the ordinary. I’ll stop here. I hope that helps. #Pascal Yeah. So, Larry, how do you interpret this? I mean, it seems to me that we’re kind of circling in on something workable, isn’t that right? #Larry Johnson I'll quote Churchill when he said, “This is not the beginning of the end. This is the end of the beginning,” or something to that effect. There were a lot of—I think I agree with what Ray was saying—that the Russians harbor no illusions about Trump and his stability. I don't think he's viewed as a reliable negotiating partner. The term “mercurial” is more apt. I think the real purpose of this meeting was, as the Russians have said and Ushakov reiterated, they had heard about all these different proposals, but nothing had ever been officially submitted to them. So they wanted to get it -- 2 of 15 -- officially submitted. I think part of the reason Kushner went along as well was that Trump trusts Witkoff as a friend, but also because of Kushner’s family, right? And so he was going to get another read from a family member about what was going on. And Putin, as he does, is very meticulous, very lawyerly, and will explain in detail what the Russian position is and how it has evolved. I would imagine there may even have been a minor history lesson from Putin—you know, he loves to do the history thing. So this was, you know, the start of negotiating over things like how many troops Ukraine could have, whether Russia was really interested in getting back into the G7, going to the G8. I mean, if you listened to Putin’s press conference at the Kremlin last week, out in Kazakhstan, when he was asked about the G7, he basically said, “You’ve got to be kidding me.” No, we're not going to do that. “Why join a loser’s club?” was basically his message. But I think Ray is correct that, in the back of the Russians’ minds, they want to avoid this escalating into a nuclear conflict. So they’ve now gone back. Trump did a couple of things prior to this meeting—he suspended, I was told, all military aid to Ukraine. He really cut it off. Stuff that was in the pipeline, he didn’t send anymore. So, you know, they’re right now, I think, laying the foundation for the actual negotiations. Because, as Putin said last week in Bishkek, when they negotiate, Lavrov is going to be in the lead, and Ushakov will be there as well. And, you know, the Russians, as Ray knows, they weigh heavily on protocol. So they're not going to have Lavrov sit down with some number two or number three flunky. You know, it should be Rubio there. Now, will Rubio try to sabotage the process? Because I think Ray’s correct in raising that—I’m not sure Trump’s got a lot of confidence in him. But he’s also sitting there doing what no one else has done since Henry Kissinger: wearing the two hats of Secretary of State and National Security Advisor. So, in this process, everybody’s hoping they can come to a deal and sign it by Christmas. Hey, don’t hold your breath. This could take anywhere from six months to a year. And in the meantime, the Russian offensive is picking up steam and may make the negotiations no longer relevant. #Pascal And isn’t the— I mean, how this is unfolding is quite surprising to me, because usually, if you do diplomatic negotiations, you know, ambassadors are involved, the foreign ministers are pivotal, right? And you try to create a structured process—first, second, third round, whatnot—with working groups and levels and so on. But here, it’s like a business approach, right? It’s my business clan, and somehow the Americans seem to have convinced the Russians to go along with this and send their business people, because a lot of it was also done through a businessman—what was his name? Kirill Dmitriev. Dmitriev. It's quite... I wonder what they’re making of it. I mean, especially the Russian side, because in a sense, what you want are guarantees that whatever you negotiate will actually be implemented. -- 3 of 15 -- Right. So you need institutional buy-in. Ray, what do you think? How are the Russians trying—or what is the Russian strategy in this situation? How do they get buy-in, let’s say, from the security side, the intelligence agencies, like the CIA? We know the CIA is on the ground in Ukraine, right? So how would the Russians deal with the institutional side of whatever’s being discussed there? #Ray MacGovern Well, with respect to the process, I’d hate to be the CEO of this company. #Pascal Which company? #Ray MacGovern Of the U.S. company here. It’s not even consistent with normal business practices. And the British have their way of saying, “This is not proper.” “It’s not proper?” “It’s improper, as a matter of fact.” Well, of course it is. But it’s Trump—he’s mercurial. But that doesn’t matter. The Russians—would they prefer a more orderly, straightforward approach? Of course they would, and they’ve said they would. But they deal with Trump the way he is, and they see some flexibility in him. And, you know, it seemed to be mid‑October when people like Kellogg and other hawks were telling Trump, “Look, Ukraine can still win this thing, and the Russians are falling apart. Their economy is just—oh, they’re losing.” And they’re losing three million troops every week. Yeah, it wasn’t quite that bad. But then, all of a sudden, he found out they were lying to him—mid‑October, okay? And that’s when this whole thing started. That’s when he called Putin and said, “Well, let’s meet in Budapest.” Then the next day, he met Zelensky and told him, “Forget about those Tomahawks. We’re not going to give you those Tomahawks for X, Y, and Z reasons.” So, those were two days in a row. After that, Trump ran into a lot of flak, right? It took him about a week to recover, and then you have Rubio and Lavrov talking— but that doesn’t matter—and they cancel the Budapest summit. But then, all of a sudden, somebody says, “Now, Donald, how about putting in really tough sanctions against Lukoil, against Rosneft?” “Yeah, that’ll do it.” So he says, “Yeah, all right.” Now, there are communications sub rosa, right? My notion is that somebody level‑headed—perhaps even Trump himself—communicated to the Russians, “Look, I’ve got to do this. It’s not going to hurt you very much.” The sanctions—even, what’s his name, Mnuchin, the Treasury Secretary—says they don’t matter anymore. “We’re going to do this. But the next day, I, Vladimir Putin, am going to send Dmitriev to Miami to talk with Witkoff and Jared Kushner.” And maybe we’ll—yeah—if Umerov from Ukraine wants to, well, we’ll work that all out. Now, what happens? We have a really interesting intercepted conversation between Dmitriev and Ushakov, two -- 4 of 15 -- very senior Russian diplomats. My God, who leaked that? That’s a major crime, whoever leaked it. Who collected it? Well, the usual suspects—the National Security Agency or GCHQ in Britain. But, you know, Dmitriev was in Saudi Arabia. It could be as simple as a phone tap. The Saudis might have done it. But whatever it was, it was meant to show how this whole thing started. Okay, and what did it sho