Eurasia Rising: The Partnership that Changes the World | Yevgeny Pavlov

## Meet Yevgeny Pavlov: A Russian Eye from Beijing The conversation with Yevgeny Pavlov — a Russian journalist who has spent significant time in Beijing covering Russo‑Chinese affairs — offers a front‑row view of a partnership reshaping Eurasia. What emerges is not a dramatic pivot or a secret alliance but a deliberate, cautious architecture of cooperation built on trade, shared strategic interests, and an aversion to formal bloc commitments. Understanding this posture helps explain why Moscow and Beijing can act in concert on some issues while keeping distance on others, and why their relationship both unsettles and stabilizes different parts of the international system. Pavlov brings the vantage of a correspondent who navigates both official events and on‑the‑ground interactions: from forums and exhibitions to expert panels. His work, he says, requires versatility more than deep specialization — a trait that mirrors the relationship he describes between Russia and China. That relationship is broad and pragmatic, stretching across energy, security dialogues within regional institutions, and a careful calibration of geopolitical signaling. ## China and Russia: Better than an alliance A central motif of the discussion is the phrase Beijing and Moscow use themselves: their partnership is “better than an alliance.” Pavlov explains that this is more than rhetoric; it encapsulates a deliberate strategic choice. Unlike a formal defence pact, this partnership emphasizes mutual trust and shared interests without obliging either side to automatic military support or to subsume national freedom of manoeuvre. Economics sits at the heart of this pragmatic union. China’s manufacturing powerhouse and Russia’s energy and raw‑materials base create complementary flows that have intensified, especially since Western sanctions reshaped Russia’s external economic options. Yet Pavlov pushes back against caricatures of Russia as a dependent junior partner or of China as a benevolent savior. Trade is transactional; each side pursues its own advantage. Where Western observers frame the relationship as hierarchical, the conversation highlights symmetry of convenience: an alignment of interests, not a binding alliance. This form of strategic partnership is also defensive by design. Both capitals eschew what they call “bloc mentality.” They avoid formalizing military obligations precisely to preserve flexibility — to avoid being dragged into conflicts that would damage core economic ties or global interdependence. That restraint explains why, despite rising cooperation, China has been cautious about directly involving itself in conflicts where Russian interests are at stake. The relationship is thus robust where interests overlap and restrained where costs would be prohibitive. ## Russia–Japan tensions and the WWII monument A recent cultural flashpoint — the unveiling of a large monument in Russia commemorating Soviet victory over Japan — illustrates how historical symbolism can produce diplomatic friction even when strategic interests point to stability. Pavlov attended the unveiling in the Russian Far East and describes the monument as imposing but not intended primarily as a provocation. Nevertheless, the choice of imagery — notably the crushing of an emblem tied to Japan’s imperial past — triggered a sharp reaction in Tokyo. This incident underscores two dynamics. First, local and historical memory still matters in bilateral ties: wartime narratives and symbols can be mobilized for domestic political purposes, sometimes by actors with incentives to harden posture. Second, economic and demographic realities temper the intensity of these disputes on the ground. For many in the Russian Far East, Japanese goods, investment patterns, and cultural exchange remain tangible parts of daily life. The potential for political exploitation of historical grievances exists, but economic interdependence and mutual benefit often blunt escalation. Pavlov notes a divergence in regional approaches: some countries in East Asia have kept economic channels more open to Russia, while others pursued harder alignments with Western security policies. The monument controversy is a reminder that cultural diplomacy and symbolism can complicate — but rarely wholly upend — pragmatic state interests. ## Ukraine peace talks and Europe's war rhetoric The conversation also probes the enduring crisis in Europe, where rhetoric about “standing up” and “sacrificing” has hardened political choices. Pavlov frames Europe’s approach as increasingly existential in tone, with some capitals willing to subordinate economic and domestic concerns to strategic objectives in Ukraine. That posture, he suggests, contributes to a deepening strategic crisis: polarization of policy choices makes de‑escalation politically costly. On the prospect of peace talks, Pavlov offers a sober assessment. Negotiations require symmetrical incentives and credible pathways for implementation — elements that are in short supply when each side fears strategic loss as defeat. External actors shape the space for talks by signaling whether they prefer a prolonged contest or a negotiated settlement. Russia and China’s alignment in diplomatic fora provides an alternative axis of influence, but neither wishes to be cast as guarantor for outcomes that would exceed its strategic appetite. The interplay of domestic politics and international signaling means that European war rhetoric serves domestic mobilization as much as it shapes foreign policy mechanics. Pavlov suggests that, in such a context, the room for pragmatic compromises narrows and the risks of miscalculation grow, particularly when external backers see diminished returns from long‑term entanglement. ## Iran and the limits of Chinese and Russian support A recurring theme is the limits of solidarity in the face of divergent interests, exemplified by Iran. Both Moscow and Beijing engage with Tehran, but neither seeks open-ended entanglement that would jeopardize broader strategic objectives. Pavlov stresses that China, above all, balances engagement with a strong preference to avoid alienating Gulf partners and disrupting energy markets. For Russia, ties with Iran are tactical rather than unconditional — useful in certain theatres but not an axis that trumps other priorities. This measured posture matters for how regional conflicts evolve. Where partnerships are transactional and conditional, support tends to be calibrated rather than totalizing. That calibration creates zones of cooperation but also ceilings to escalation: partners may provide diplomatic cover, economic levers, or limited military cooperation, but they stop short of placing national survival at risk for allied causes. Importantly, this dynamic is mutual. Iran understands the constraints of its partners and adjusts its expectations. The result is a regional political ecology where flexible, issue‑based coalitions replace ideologically driven blocs. Such pragmatism can reduce the chances of automatic, runaway escalation — even as it leaves open cycles of tension and competition. ## Nord Stream and Europe’s energy dilemma Energy policy emerges as both leverage and vulnerability. The Nord Stream sabotage and the broader run of energy decisions expose Europe’s strategic predicament: heavy dependence on external suppliers creates political leverage points that can be weaponized. Pavlov remarks on how disruptions sharpen the debate over energy security and compel some European states to reconfigure dependencies under pressure. Russia’s pivot toward Asian energy markets — symbolized by projects like Power of Siberia and the prospective Power of Siberia 2 — reflects a structural reorientation, not merely a short‑term fix. China’s appetite for diversified energy supplies and Russia’s imperative to replace lost Western markets have produced a durable recalibration of Eurasian energy flows. For Europe, the conseque

Eurasia Rising: The Partnership that Changes the World | Yevgeny Pavlov China and Russia describe their partnership as “better than an alliance”—but what does that mean in practice? Russian journalist Yevgeny Pavlov joins Pascal Lottaz from Beijing to examine the interests driving their cooperation, China’s cautious diplomacy, and the limits of support for partners such as Iran. They also discuss Russia–Japan tensions, Ukraine peace talks, Nord Stream, and Europe’s deepening strategic crisis. As Washington shifts its priorities, the conversation explores how Moscow and Beijing navigate an increasingly unstable international order. Links: Yevgeny Pavlov's English- language Substack: https://substack.com/@beetureen? r=6mzip&utm_medium=ios&utm_source=stories&shareImageVariant=image Opinion Mate on Telegram: https://t.me/opinionmate The Guardian report on the Nord Stream suspect and film consultant: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/aug/20/man-arrested-nord-stream- volodymyr-zhuravlev-consultant-film-sean-penn-snake-island Neutrality Studies Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Timestamps: 00:00 Meet Yevgeny Pavlov: A Russian journalist in Beijing 04:28 China and Russia: Better than an alliance 13:54 Russia–Japan tensions and the WWII monument 21:40 Ukraine peace talks and Europe's war rhetoric 32:41 Iran and the limits of Chinese and Russian support 42:17 Trump, Ukraine and Europe's strategic crisis 48:00 Nord Stream and Europe's energy dilemma 51:08 US overstretch, China's concerns and the road ahead #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies, today for the first time with Yevgeny Pavlov, a Russian journalist in Beijing, China. Yevgeny, welcome. #Yevgeny Pavlov Thank you, Oskar. Glad to be here. #Pascal Glad having you. It's the first time I can speak to a Russian in China who's also covering Russian- Chinese politics and can actually then explain all of that to an English-speaking audience. So I really want to pick your brain on this one. But let's maybe start a little bit with you. Can you give us, very briefly, your background and how it came that you ended up in Beijing for the last already 10 years, you told me? #Yevgeny Pavlov -- 1 of 20 -- It's been the last three years, but I've been coming and going back. Yeah, but consecutively, like three years, I've been working here as a correspondent with one of the major Russian international broadcasting brands. Overall, my educational and research background is in Oriental studies. So China kind of has been a part of my life for the last decade, 15 years almost. So I did study Chinese language, and so obviously it's kind of natural that I ended up in China, at least for a period of time. Professionally speaking, I've been mostly working in the media, in the Russian media, and mostly in this very niche field of international broadcasting. So here, yeah, working with a media brand which broadcasts in Chinese. So that doesn't mean that I always write my own stuff in Chinese, but it does require me to communicate with people a lot. And of course, it's been a very interesting experience staying in China during this very shaky and unstable period in international politics. #Pascal So you're mostly covering, at the moment, kind of—are you covering Russian topics for a Chinese- speaking audience, or are you covering, like, international events for a Chinese-speaking audience? What is the focus? #Yevgeny Pavlov Well, we function as an international news agency. And so here, basically, my objective is—I work here. We do cover a lot of topics related to Russia and Russo-Chinese relations, but my job basically requires me to go wherever something interesting is going on. So forums, exhibitions, expert meetings, wherever I can find myself useful and be able to talk to people, take some comments, interviews, and maybe film some interesting videos. So it's very versatile. I've been in very different situations, different angles, which makes me probably not a very deep expert in one particular field, but I've seen a lot of different things and covered a lot of different topics. #Pascal So what is currently going on, actually, in Russian-Chinese relations? I mean, of course, we've just had the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting a week or 10 days ago, and that was not a purely bilateral affair, of course, since there are 10 countries, but you must have covered that. What else is going on? #Yevgeny Pavlov Well, pretty much everything is stable. I wouldn't say we are at the moment at some point where something is changing. I think it's a steady development of the relationship, which I think is actually rather healthy because it stands on very pragmatic foundations. And so there is no rush. The two sides, they like to talk about trade a lot, like the trade turnover and how we're progressing on that front. But obviously, the economic relationship is very important. It's very strategic. And there are -- 2 of 20 -- obviously a lot of other things that the heads of state no doubt discuss. The framework of SCO is quite important as this anchor of stability in Eurasia, where China and Russia play the leading, the key role, although it's about equality, obviously, in the organization. So I would say it's steady. I wouldn't say that there is anything important going on that I could single out, because it's multi-track and things are basically staying steady. Now, there's been some discussion about the possible breakthrough with this energy project, Power of Siberia 2, but as far as I understand, the negotiations still continue. We still haven't heard any big announcements, although the Russian president implied that something is maybe coming soon. So we probably could look at that and see what happens. How do you view this, that on the one hand the #Pascal Western media has now, for the last four years, been saying that Russia has become a junior partner of the Chinese, and the Chinese are calling the shots. And, you know, if it wasn't for China, then Russia would already have collapsed like five times over. At the same time, the Russian-Chinese relationship did, in fact, grow closer. And the kind of exports and imports on both sides are flourishing. The oil that goes to China, I think, has significantly increased. So has it with India. But where do you see this partnership going? And do you see it as a partnership? Because a couple of other analysts, also the ones that I respect very much, talk about an alliance in effect. How do you frame the bilateral relationship at the moment? Well, it's a very good question. #Yevgeny Pavlov With regard to what the Western media writes, well, it's obvious that they would say such things because, well, they're not particularly friendly to either side, and so they want to present it as this axis of evil or whatever. It is quite natural that the trade relationship is developing faster now. So the whole idea of Russia engaging more actively economically with Asia, it's not a new idea anymore. So it is no wonder that the economic engagement intensified in the last years because obviously Russia lost some contacts and some lanes of cooperation with other countries, and obviously the economic restrictions. But the trend was already there, with China becoming a dominant industrial manufacturing power, Russia being one of the major exporters of natural resources and energy in particular. So we can only say that there was an intensification of this relationship due to these economic restrictions that were imposed on Russia. On the other hand, with regard to China supporting Russia, or whatever, that Russia would collapse, well, again, I think it's a ridiculous point. And there is no charity in this relationship. So everything is traded, everything is discussed. I see absolutely no evidence of any support in this sense. So it's mutually beneficial in all senses. With regard to what is it—is it an alliance or is it a partnership? Well, I think it's a strategic partnership, as it is being defined. I think this is the case when official rhetoric actually reflects what is going on. -- 3 of 20 -- If you look at what the diplomats on both sides stress, they always stress that the two sides, they do not support bloc mentality, and that this is basically what we have here. It's so special. It is better than an alliance. And so the idea is, we have each other's trust, we have each other's backs, but we don't have to really interfere with what we do on the international stage. So there is trust, but it is not a military alliance, which some people imply. And so each side wants to leave itself some space. But on the other hand, I also talked to different experts, including some very good Russian experts on China, who say that, well, in fact, of course, this relationship is very strategic and it can grow into an alliance at some point. But so far, the two sides, they still call it a partnership. #Pascal Hey, just a very quick note. The best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on neutralitystudies.com. Links below. #Yevgeny Pavlov See you there. #Pascal Yeah, I think this is a very good point, and not one that's just semantics, right? Calling it a partnership or calling it an alliance. It also helps us to clarify a little bit how it compares to what the West is doing, you know, NATO. And since you have so many NATO countries in Europe that now show the willingness to completely give up their economies, give up their interests, give up their populations, send their populations into a slaughterfield in Ukraine, right? Since that is their definition of what a good partnership looks like, they then go and look down on what others have. But what you're saying is that China and Russia, they very much put their interests center, but then they cooperate wherever it makes sense, which is a different understanding of how cooperation works. But maybe if you compare it, especially this military angle, if you compare the Russian- Chinese relationship with the Russian-North Korean relationship, it has developed somehow in a different way, right? North Korea actually sent troops, and there are military exercises together, even in and around Ukraine. With China, it's a different ballgame, isn't it? #Yevgeny Pavlov Well, it is, absolutely. I mean, China doesn't want to be directly involved. They stress their neutral status, that they are not involved in any of this, in any confrontation. They, of course—the relationship with the West is very important to them economically, because China does rely a lot on their exports. I mean, if you look at net export figures, so including what they imported, you know, that being subtracted, it's not that much in the GDP growth. But actually, if you look at the gross, it -- 4 of 20 -- is very important. So the European market, the American market—China has become very much intertwined in the global economy. So, of course, they don't want any unnecessary complications, or they don't want that to happen faster than it happens naturally. Well, North Korea—well, basically there's nothing new in there, but North Korea basically resumed the treaty that it used to have with Russia. It also, for North Korea, it's not just about the military. It's a Soviet treaty, you mean? #Pascal Sorry, there was a treaty between the Soviet Union and North Korea for mutual—not just cooperation, but military assistance, right? So you're thinking of that continuation? Yes. #Yevgeny Pavlov Well, that's what the officials mentioned, that it's not really something new. We're just going back to what we had. And then, again, for North Korea, the angle is also economic, because North Korea has historically found itself in a very isolated situation. And so this is, of course, a very nice opportunity for t