German Militarism Is Back | Fabian Scheidler

## Why the Left Abandoned Detente The conversation that unfolds around German militarism forces a difficult but necessary question: how did parties and movements historically committed to détente and common security become accomplices in a sweeping remilitarization? Fabian Scheidler’s analysis, as heard in the discussion, traces this reversal not to a single event but to a series of choices, opportunisms, and strategic misreadings that accumulated over decades. Where Social Democratic traditions once treated foreign policy as a domain for diplomacy and mutual security arrangements, large parts of the European left have increasingly embraced narratives that frame existential danger in stark moral terms—us versus them, democracy versus autocracy—thereby opening a political doorway for militarized responses. Scheidler points to key inflection points: the gradual erosion of détente after the 1999 intervention in Yugoslavia, the complex reactions to the 2003 Iraq War, and the tectonic rupture that the Russian invasion of Ukraine represented for many. But the shift is as much about domestic politics and elite strategy as it is about singular foreign policy crises. Parties that once prioritized social spending and cooperative security have found themselves captured by a rhetoric of emergency that legitimizes extraordinary budgets and exceptional measures. The result is a political realignment where defense spending and security posturing claim moral urgency usually reserved for welfare and social justice—turning a left that once prioritized peace into a coalition willing to underwrite vast militarization. ## Normalizing War: From Taboo to Policy What was once a deeply entrenched taboo in German public life—the idea of Germany as a major military power—has been transformed into a policy objective. The exchange makes clear how rhetoric and policy have marched in tandem: iconic phrases such as the German “Zeitenwende” (turning point) and the sudden willingness to unleash enormous defense budgets have reframed public imagination. Once, the memory of World War II and the Holocaust enforced a cultural restraint; now that restraint is unraveling under the weight of fear-based narratives and strategic recalibration. Scheidler draws attention to the mechanics of normalization. Political leaders declare emergencies, media frames emphasize binary moral narratives, and educational and civic institutions are enlisted into a pro-defense ecosystem. The Bundeswehr’s increased presence in schools exemplifies the cultural push. This is not just about procuring tanks and aircraft; it is about cultivating a social atmosphere where military solutions are common-sense answers to geopolitical dilemmas. The transition from taboo to policy has been accelerated by a potent combination of elite interest—defense contractors, geostrategic thinkers, political actors—and the willingness of parties across the spectrum to accept exceptional spending rules that exempt the military from usual fiscal constraints. ## The Sabotage of Peace Talks A recurring theme in Scheidler’s critique is the systematic undermining of diplomacy. Where states once saw negotiated settlements and balance-of-interest frameworks as the only sustainable path toward stability, contemporary policy-makers have often discredited or simply sidelined such options. Scheidler argues that the European Union’s and NATO’s approach has often been competition-driven, framed by a logic that assumes victory through attrition is possible or desirable. In practice this has meant blocking or weakening third-party mediation, and conflating a refusal to escalate with moral compromise. This sabotage takes many forms. It appears in the dismissal of diplomatic interlocutors as illegitimate, in the refusal to entertain security guarantees for perceived adversaries, and in the repeated framing of negotiations as capitulation. Scheidler’s insistence on the historical precedence of détente—recalling figures like Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky—serves as a reminder that negotiated security frameworks once underpinned European stability. When diplomacy is relegated to an afterthought, the policy default becomes continued armament and proxy escalation, which in turn makes meaningful peace talks almost impossible. ## The EU’s Irrational War Path The conversation erects a damning portrait of the European Union’s current posture: a union increasingly willing to decouple its economic stability from prudent legal and diplomatic norms in pursuit of a military agenda. Scheidler points to specific proposals—such as attempts to seize frozen foreign assets—as examples of policy choices that could retrench Europe into deep legal and economic hazards. The EU’s pursuit of militarization, according to this view, has become detached from practical considerations of national budgets, international law, and the long-term health of European capitalism. There is a peculiarly self-defeating logic at work: to shore up security by doing things that undermine the EU’s attractiveness as a safe jurisdiction for global capital, or that invite costly legal reprisals. The push for a wartime economy—raising defense budgets to levels seen only prior to World War I, embedding military spending deeply into public finance, and dismantling debt constraints—amounts to an erosion of the welfare state and a redirection of social investment into industries and contracts that profit from conflict. Scheidler warns that this path is not driven purely by rational threat assessments; it is also the product of political actors seeking tools of control during systemic stress and corporate actors eager for the spoils. ## Western Hegemony and Reality Denial A striking current in the discussion is the indictment of Western narratives that frame opposition as moral deficiency rather than as political actors with legitimate strategic concerns. Scheidler highlights the hypocrisy intrinsic to a “Western values” rhetoric that ignores centuries of imperialism, slavery, and violent expansion. Calling Russia—or any global south actor—a modern “barbarian” repeats older civilizational tropes that underwrite geopolitical coercion. The conversation suggests that the West’s response to declining hegemony has been a mixture of strategic overreach and ideological denial: insisting the global order is stable under Western leadership even as structural cracks widen. This reality denial has two dangerous manifestations. First, it justifies policies that assume a single narrative of victim and aggressor, amplifying hostilities rather than dampening them. Second, it blinds policy-makers to constraints and consequences: economic interdependence, legal norms, and the limits of proxy warfare. Scheidler underscores that denying the historical and geopolitical roots of conflicts—such as NATO expansion’s role in shaping Russian security anxieties—prevents any honest assessment of how to de-escalate. Without such honesty, the West continues to act as though military escalation can purchase long-term security rather than guaranteeing cycles of retaliation and instability. ## Public Dissent and the Youth One of the more hopeful notes in the conversation is the evidence of popular resistance—especially among younger generations—that rejects the militarized future being proposed by elites. Across Europe, there are still powerful anti-war movements: strikes against weapons deliveries, mass demonstrations, and political pushes that have constrained some governments from total capitulation to militarized agendas. Scheidler emphasizes that these signposts matter; they show that public opinion is not monolithic and that organized dissent can shape policy outcomes. Youth movements in particular are a crucial political resource. They bring energy, moral clarity, and a willingness to imagine alternatives to zero-sum geopolitics. The Spanish case, where public pressure helped resist extreme budgetary climbs to 5%

German Militarism Is Back War propaganda in Europe is running at full throttle. Whether in the mainstream or on social media, anyone calling for more war against Russia is being listened to. How can we possibly get out of this? That is the question my guest today is addressing: the German author and playwrite Fabian Scheidler, who recently published a book on this very topic titled “Capable of Peace: How We Can Stop Creating Our Own Enemies.” Links: X: https://x.com/ScheidlerFabian Facebook: https://www. facebook.com/counter.image Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/fabian_scheidler/ Bluesky: https://bsky.app/profile/scheidlerfabian.bsky.social Website: https://fabianscheidler.com/ "The End of the Megamachine. A Brief History of a Failing Civilisation“ book: [www.megamachine. org](http://www.megamachine.org/) Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00: 00:36 The State of War Propaganda in Europe 00:07:54 Why the Left Abandoned Detente 00:16:03 Normalizing War: From Taboo to Policy 00:23:58 The Sabotage of Peace Talks 00:31:16 The EU’s Irrational War Path 00:36:45 Western Hegemony and Reality Denial 00:43:07 Public Dissent and the Youth 00:50:39 Conclusion #Pascal War propaganda in Europe is running at full throttle. Whether in the mainstream or on social media, anyone calling for more war against Russia is being listened to. How can we possibly get out of this again? That is the question my guest today is addressing — the German author and playwright Fabian Scheidler, who recently published a German-language book titled, if I translate it, *Capable of Peace: How We Can Stop Creating Our Own Enemies.* Mr. Scheidler, welcome. Thanks for having me. Let's talk a little about this. For people who are not directly present, as you are, in Germany or in Europe, how would you describe the current state of affairs — the public discourse around war and peace with Russia? #Fabian Scheidler We are seeing in Europe, and in Germany especially, a militarization we haven’t seen since World War II. The German government has pledged to triple its defense budget from 42 billion euros per year to 142 billion—or 153, I think that’s the right number. So we have a discourse that knows only “us and them.” It’s black and white, good versus evil. It’s like a Harry Potter version of geopolitics. And anyone who questions the narrative that Russia will soon invade NATO countries is considered a Putin sympathizer. And that’s despite the fact that even the American intelligence services, in their annual report, say that Russia has no interest in attacking NATO. I mean, it would be utterly suicidal, of course. -- 1 of 14 -- But still, our leading politicians—whether it’s the Greens, the Conservatives, or the Social Democrats—have set in motion a propaganda machine that tells people, “Well, we have no other option than to rearm in a way unheard of since World War II, because the Russians are coming.” And this is utter nonsense, of course, although the Russian invasion of Ukraine was a serious crime. But still, there is no realistic view of our situation. And of course, this is being used to prop up the military‑industrial complex at a time when Germany has a lot of problems—economically, a two‑year‑long recession, the longest in German history. We also see militarization in all parts of society. The German army is going into schools to propagate its war narrative, even into kindergartens. They’re everywhere, in public space, while the peace movement is in quite a weak position in this situation. #Pascal How prevalent do you think this is across Europe? Because in Germany, this is certainly the case. Do you know about the situation, let’s say, in France or Italy? My impression is that Germany is particularly belligerent at the moment, but there are similar tendencies in other European countries. #Fabian Scheidler Yes, I think that's true. In Italy, for example, the situation is quite different. If we talk about the war in Gaza—the genocidal campaign of Israel in Gaza—Italian workers have gone on strike against weapons deliveries to Israel. So that’s a different situation. In France, for example, there is quite a lot of resistance to militarization. The former government under Prime Minister Bayrou had to be dismissed because it wasn’t able to push through parliament a social‑cuts bill that would reduce social spending by about 40 billion euros, and it had no majority in parliament. And in Spain, in particular, anti‑war movements are quite strong. And I think they pushed the government of Sánchez, the Social Democrat, to be the only government in the European Union that refused to abide by Donald Trump’s demand to raise the military budget to 5% of GDP. Spain said, “Well, 2% is enough for us.” And I think that’s because there’s a lot of opposition—both to the genocidal campaign of Israel in Gaza and to militarization. So the situation is not as desperate as in Germany and other countries, but still, leading politicians, especially in the European Parliament, are extremely belligerent. They’re even willing to go down an economically suicidal path. We now have a situation where Ukraine is clearly losing the war. And that has been clear for years now. I mean, even General Milley, former chief of staff of the American army, said two or three years ago that the West cannot win, that Ukraine cannot win that war. And the chief of the Ukrainian army, Zaluzhny, said the same thing. So for years we’ve known that Ukraine cannot regain the territories it lost to Russia. But still, the European Union keeps -- 2 of 14 -- pushing this narrative that we can win the war if we just put more money into it. Now the Americans have pulled out of giving any money to Ukraine, and the Europeans are supposed to step in— especially Germany—to pay the bill. And I mean, now they’re trying to get hold of the Russian assets in Belgium—about 180 billion. But that would be suicidal for Belgium, because there would be legal cases against Belgium and the European Union to repay that money. Under international law, you can’t seize those funds. Still, they’ re trying to do it, and that would utterly ruin Europe as a place for international investment, because international investors, especially from the Global South, wouldn’t consider putting their money in European banks if European governments could seize it whenever they wanted to. So I think they’re really, in the European Parliament and in the European Commission, on a warpath for several reasons. And in a recent article in the *New Left Review*, in Spring 2024, I argued that the idea is, as the *Financial Times* once put it, to turn the European welfare state into a warfare state. I think that's the program we are facing. I mean, they’ve been trying to destroy the welfare state for decades within the neoliberal framework of the Washington Consensus. They’ve managed to do so in part, but there’s a lot of resistance. And now they have an argument. They say, well, the Russians are coming, we have to put all our money into the military, and we can’t afford social welfare anymore. So that’s, I mean, the agenda of both the political elites and capital. #Pascal Why is the left going along with it? And I’m not speaking necessarily about the Left Party, but rather the SPD—this seems to be the consensus. And also, you know, even in Switzerland, the Social Democratic Party, of which I’m actually a paying member, one of the things I dislike is that they’re so willing to go along with this narrative of, like, “Well, the evil Russians need to be resisted.” Especially now, in the European context, you can see how this 5% target is hollowing out all the capabilities. I mean, Mr. Merz even said we have no more money for social welfare, which is always what the liberal right says whenever it’s about social welfare. There’s always money for tax cuts, there’s always money for military spending—and now they seem to have zeroed in on massive spending for the military. That, of course, means the military is going to be the only one—or rather, the whole military environment. It’s not just the institution, but the entire environment that will be able to spend money if it serves defense purposes, right? This would lead to massive militarization of all aspects of civil society, wouldn’t it? #Fabian Scheidler Yes, absolutely. I mean, 5% of GDP, I have to remind everybody, is 50% of the national budget in OECD countries. Typically, the national budget of the central government is about 10% of GDP. So -- 3 of 14 -- spending 5% of GDP is 50% of the national budget. That’s almost the amount we had under the Kaiser, under the German emperor, before World War I. So it’s really unheard of. #Pascal It must be added, you know, that in modern European states—and in general, in welfare states—a large part of the national budget is a transfer budget that’s pre-allocated. It goes into pensions, it goes into healthcare, it goes into all sorts of things that are already kind of set in stone. So that makes it even worse. #Fabian Scheidler Yeah, yeah, absolutely. I mean, it's an outright attack on the welfare state and on workers and the middle classes, of course. It's a strategy for times of chaos. You know, the capitalist world system is in dire straits, and the West in particular—Western hegemony—is declining. Western capitalism itself is deeply in decline. So they’re desperate to find ways to keep the system running and to preserve their privileges, their power, and their wealth. And one way to do that is to create a permanent state of exception. We’ve seen that in several forms—we had it with the war on terror, of course. I write about that extensively in my book *Friedenstüchtig*. The war on terror was the model, if you will. And we saw the same thing during the pandemic—a kind of power grab by the elites to channel huge amounts of money into the pockets of shareholders of big companies like Pfizer and so on. And now it’s Rheinmetall. So, in times when capitalism is in dire straits, it looks for ways to discredit dissent, to justify repression, and to funnel huge sums into the pockets of the shareholders of big corporations. That’s what it’s all about. Now, the question is, why have the Social Democrats gone along with that agenda? I mean, the German Social Democrats, like the Austrian ones, have a very important tradition of détente policies. Under Willy Brandt in Germany, Bruno Kreisky in Austria, and Olof Palme in Sweden, they developed the concept of common security in the 1970s, which was crucial for ending the Cold War peacefully and for achieving German reunification. The concept of common security was created at the height of the Cold War, after the Soviet Union invaded Prague to end the Prague Spring movement, and while the Americans were bombing Vietnam, with four million dead. So these were not nice times either. But they understood that in the nuclear age, as the former American Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, once said, common security in the nuclear age can only be common security. You can’t achieve security against a nuclear power, because in the end we’d all be dead. So they developed this concept, and common security means that the legitimate security interests of all countries must be considered equally. That means, of course, Western Europe has legitimate security interests too. -- 4 of 14 -- Israel, for example, has legitimate security interests, as do the US and others. But in the same way, the Russians—or the Soviet Union at the time—also have legitimate security interests. The Palestinians, for example, have legitimate security interests, and the people of Venezuela have legitimate security interests. You have to consider all these security interests at the same time. That was a way to forge nuclear disarmament deals, as they were reached at the time, and to have some sort of d