🚨 Next Escalation: USA Out of Options, Iran's New Zero-Tolerance Strategy | Dr. Arta Moeini

## MOU violations and Hormuz blockade The conversation makes plain that the current spiral of violence did not spring from chance but from a pattern of broken understandings and unilateral moves. Central to the dispute is the memorandum of understanding (MOU) that sought to regulate maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. What one side treats as a narrow set of operational arrangements, the other reads as a definitive legal and political bargain. According to the exchange, Iran views specific clauses — notably the stipulation that only Iran would determine the modalities of Gulf transit during the 60-day window — as non-negotiable. The opening of an alternative “southern corridor,” the dispatch of American-aligned vessels via Oman, and the naval posture that accompanied these moves were taken in Tehran as explicit circumventions of the MOU’s spirit and letter. This matters because the Strait of Hormuz is not an abstract bargaining chip. It handles roughly one-fifth of global oil flows; any restriction or perceived risk reverberates immediately through global markets. From Iran’s perspective, a naval blockade or a hybrid economic campaign constitutes not incidental pressure but an act that undermines the MOU’s aims and Iran’s sovereignty. The exchange shows how such economic and maritime coercion was experienced by Iranian policymakers as a steady erosion of the negotiated status quo — one that could not be reconciled by words alone. The consequence has been predictable: tit-for-tat measures that escalate rather than defuse risk, and a renewed determination among hardline elements to assert control over the choke point by force if necessary. ## Iran’s leverage and escalation options A recurrent theme in the discussion is Iran’s asymmetric leverage: its ability to threaten the global economy through concentrated action in the Gulf. The participants underline that Tehran’s leverage is largely economic; it is not predicated on matching U.S. military capabilities but on exploiting vulnerabilities in the global energy system. That leverage is both a source of bargaining power and a strategic dilemma. Escalating attacks on commercial shipping or oil infrastructure raises the cost for the global economy — a lever intended to coerce U.S. political recalibration — yet it simultaneously alienates states whose trade and energy security depend on free passage, including China. Iran’s feasible options range along a spectrum: targeted, retaliatory strikes intended to restore reciprocity; interdiction and mine-laying aimed at directly raising transit costs; and broader, proactive campaigns designed to force the United States into an unfavorable political calculus. The conversation highlights that Iran’s political leaders are conscious of the different audiences affected by these options: domestic constituencies demanding firmness; regional states worried about spillover effects; and external partners like China who prefer stability. Tehran’s choice among escalation paths will thus be shaped by the interplay of domestic politics, operational constraints, and the international cost-benefit calculus — including the possibility of a U.S. “escape hatch” through alternative heavy crude supplies over the medium term. ## Competing Iranian strategic approaches One of the clearest insights offered is that Iran is not monolithic in doctrine or temperament. The transcript maps two competing approaches: a pragmatic, reciprocity-minded camp that seeks to calibrate responses and use retaliation to restore deterrence; and a security-first faction that advocates a more offensive, preemptive posture aimed at decisively altering U.S. behavior. The pragmatists — characterized as ready to punish violations but willing to preserve diplomatic breathing room — favor measured reciprocity. Their logic is defensive: demonstrate costs to compel a return to some negotiated equilibrium. By contrast, the security-first group, associated with figures like Rezaei and elements loyal to Supreme Leader calculations, argues that repeated American violations have demonstrated that deterrence through measured retaliation is insufficient. For them, only a more unpredictable, disproportionate posture — a deliberate raising of the stakes and taking the initiative — will change U.S. risk assessments. The conversation suggests this faction admires the “madman” unpredictability often attributed to Israeli doctrine: use the appearance of irrationality and the capacity for decisive escalation to shock an adversary into restraint. This intra-Iranian contest matters because it determines tempo and targets. A retaliatory model produces a series of constrained responses, each intended to be proportional and signal resolve. An offensive doctrine substitutes sequence for shock — larger, less predictable operations aimed at systemic reassessment by the United States and its partners. The transcript implies that recent U.S. actions have unintentionally strengthened the more militant consensus inside Iran by creating a shared existential narrative. ## Proportionality, deterrence and initiative Proportionality is not merely a legalistic rubric in this exchange; it is a strategic principle contested by each side. Iranian strategists, as reported, once relied on a doctrine of calibrated reciprocity: equal-cost responses that would demonstrate the credibility of deterrence while keeping conflict within manageable limits. That posture depends on the adversary’s respect for symmetric signals. But when one party interprets restraint as weakness and continues to press advantages, proportionality can become a self-defeating stance. The conversation suggests a shift from proportional retaliation to seizing initiative. Advocates of a harder line fear the liminal state that grows from tit-for-tat exchange; they worry that proportional responses merely normalize incremental coercion and give Washington the luxury of choosing timings, targets, and escalation slopes. Taking the initiative, even at the cost of greater short-term risk, is framed as a way to reset the psychological relationship between enemies: to impress that continued pressure will produce disproportionate consequences. This logic reframes deterrence as conditioning the opponent’s expectations of retaliation, not merely matching them. It is a risky recalibration: forceful, unpredictable action can deter, but it can also invite reprisals that are difficult to constrain. ## Can Iran sustain a long war? A crucial analytic thread runs through the discussion about endurance. Iran’s capacity to sustain high-intensity conflict is not infinite, but it is significant. The interlocutors estimate that Iran can maintain a high-intensity posture for around a year, owing to domestic mobilization, asymmetric weapon stocks, regional proxy networks, and the ability to inflict economic pain on global markets. But endurance is multidimensional: it requires political cohesion, economic resilience, logistic replenishment, and external support. The conversation suggests Iran can absorb shocks in the short-to-medium term but faces growing costs over prolonged conflict, particularly if its economy is further squeezed and civilian infrastructure suffers steady attrition. Sustaining a long war is therefore a bet on temporal asymmetry: Iran must impose unacceptable near-term costs to compel a pause before its capacity is eroded. That bet assumes the United States has political limits — domestic electoral concerns, munitions constraints, and prioritization of other theaters — which may indeed slow a decisive counteroffensive. Yet the window is finite. Waiting benefits the side with industrialized replenishment and deep logistic lines; it penalizes those who rely on strategic surprise or limited stockpiles. The logic of the conversation is stark: if Iran cannot translate leverage into decisive change within its endurance window, the balance may tilt back toward gradual attri

USA Out of Options, Iran's New Zero- Tolerance Strategy | Dr. Arta Moeini As operation "Economic Furry" or "Economic D-Day" is still born, the USA once again resorts to strikes on civilians to terrorize the nation of Iran. But Tehran already gave its answers by striking at US bases in Jordan, in "hot pursuit" of the fleeing US troop deployments. Dr. Arta Moeini, managing director of U.S. operations at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, assesses the Iran-US war, competing Iranian approaches to deterrence and escalation, the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran’s strategic resilience. He also introduces Reclaiming America First, an initiative examining a realist US foreign policy and a post-American regional order in the Middle East. Links: Arta Moeini: https://peacediplomacy.org Arta Moeini on X: https://x.com/ArtaMoeini Welcome to Fortress Iran: https://unherd.com/2026/08/welcome-to-fortress-iran/ Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction and Iran war update 00:01: 04 Fortress Iran and US strategy 00:05:58 MOU violations and Hormuz blockade 00:14:04 Iran’s leverage and escalation options 00:22:08 Competing Iranian strategic approaches 00:28:48 Proportionality, deterrence and initiative 00:37:21 Can Iran sustain a long war? 00:44:48 Strategic loneliness and external partners 00:56:48 Reclaiming America First #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Tonight, again, with an update by Arta Moeni, the Managing Director of U.S. Operations of the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy. Arta, welcome back. #Arta Moeini Thanks, Pascal. Great to be back with you, as always, and discuss all the crazy developments. #Pascal Yeah, I mean, crazy developments indeed, because the United States and Iran are fighting again. And you are the author of a recent piece that I've got here with me, "Welcome to Fortress Iran: Mojtaba Khamenei Is Building a Hardened Confrontational State," in which you actually are predicting quite a lot of things that are happening as we speak. Can you maybe walk us through what your analysis of the Iran-U.S. war, or the U.S.-Iran war, is, and where we stand today as we speak on the 2nd of September? #Arta Moeini -- 1 of 17 -- Yeah, we have officially entered the seventh month of the war. And this war, I'm afraid, doesn't look like it's going to slow down. The Iranian changes in leadership, which is what my article at UnHerd was about, was a bold signal to the United States. It was a way to let the other side know that we are serious about protecting Iran's sovereignty, and we're not going to back down on the threat and force question. The Trump administration seems to have had this realization that an intense conflict is something that it cannot afford or it cannot continue on. And therefore, it wants to sort of go back and restore the status quo where Iran was in January of '26, where there were no kinetic strikes, but Iran was squeezed politically, financially, and economically. That was the intention behind the D-Day, the naval blockade, which is basically the hybrid or economic warfare of the Trump administration against Iran. And Iran was already then signaling that it cannot abide by this. It cannot allow this to keep on going. And it was also signaling to the Trump administration that it will punish Donald Trump's presidency if Donald Trump does not come back to the MOU. Obviously, in Washington, people did not take any of this seriously. And we are back into this tit-for-tat escalation, it seems. But from an Iranian perspective, it's very clear that what the United States was doing, which was both the sort of financial assertions, if we can call it that, as well as the push towards this other southern corridor through Oman, which was supposed to challenge Iran's control over the Strait of Hormuz. And they did get some ships out through that corridor. And, you know, they hit Iranian radar systems in the south. And, you know, by turning off their transponders, they were able to do a few million barrels through that route. The question with the Iranian side was whether or not that is something that they can negotiate with the United States. This was basically the Volubov stance, the more moderate, pragmatist, conservative stance, that the United States can only understand the language of force. And once Donald Trump came out and said, "We have now cleared all the mines," which is not true from the Iranian perspective, it was clear that Iran can no longer stand by and allow for Donald Trump to make his narratives, to basically stabilize the global economy with the narrative tropes. Iran's leverage ultimately is economic. It holds the world's economy in a stranglehold through the choke point of the Strait of Hormuz, from which 20% of oil flows. And so it's not going to let this, you know, let this go. And I think it's very clear that we are going to be in for a much wider escalation because Iran just cannot, you know, let Donald Trump get what he wants, which is a low-intensity conflict of, you know, just getting American or American-aligned ships through the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabian, Emirati, and otherwise, while punishing Iran with what they call defensive strikes in the south, as well as squeezing Iran's economy financially through the naval blockade. So the combination of this plus what's happening with Israel and Lebanon is considered a total and utter violation of the MOU that Trump himself signed. And so it's very hard for even the sort of diplomatic elements in Iran, the Araqchis, the Qalibafs, to argue that we need to just go back and, you know, have any kind of a peace deal with the United States when America is acting effectively as a belligerent power here. -- 2 of 17 -- #Pascal Yeah, but, I mean, isn't this the problem from the beginning, that the United States keeps pretending that diplomacy is on the way while it actually then starts attacking and destroying and backstabbing Iran? And actually, I mean, even right now, I mean, the whole idea of defensive strikes is basically offensive strikes, right? It's like attacking Iran with the pretense that you are just doing it to prevent attacks that haven't happened yet, and just grinding down Iran bit by bit because apparently the United States, again, mistakes Iranian restraint for weakness. And Iran is constantly actually asked to put its foot down, which it's trying to do. But again, like, the United States, anytime Iran then strikes back, interprets that as—or not interprets that, but at least touts that as—Iranian aggression. Yeah. How do you think that Iran is going to go through that now? #Arta Moeini Yeah, grinding down is absolutely 100% the key term. Again, the U.S. strategy, the original objectives of this war obviously failed. The decapitation strikes did not produce the intended results. As I had written for another piece that I think we discussed earlier, it strengthened the Iranian political system. It brought everyone together. It created a consensus about defense, and it was an existential crisis. The argument now is that, has that existential moment gone away? And I think it's very clear, if you're an Iranian observer, that that's not the case. You know, the country is under even more economic hardship than it was. It's blockaded. And the counterpart that you're trying to negotiate with reneges on almost any promise that it gives you, right? So there's a ceasefire after the 12-day war. Then Trump violates it by full-on decapitation strikes against the Iranian government and the political system. Then there is the question of, you know, let's have a truce in April. That truce is violated immediately after the Islamabad talks. Then there is the MOU itself, which Donald Trump signs in a ceremony in Europe, and I think at Versailles, of all places. And that also is immediately violated. The terms of the MOU were immediately violated in 48 hours, with Rubio's team going to negotiate with the Lebanese, the pan-Lebanese government, effectively, which works with the United States and Saudi Arabia. And basically squeeze out Hezbollah's positions. And that is interpreted as a violation immediately, as well as this southern corridor path. Again, if you look at the MOU, it's very clear in paragraph five. It talks about how it's Iran that will decide. Basically, there was a 60-day window, and within that 60- day window, then Iran will also work with the other states, which is a stakeholder of the state of Oman, to create a new mechanism. And it doesn't say that there will not be any kind of a fee. It doesn't say that America will create its own mechanism, own version of sort of either a toll system or a security system. So it has no mention of the United States in that paragraph. That is by design. It's not up to interpretation. It says what it does for a reason. The negotiators spent hours deciding the terminology, and the terminology was to exactly prevent this kind of escalation from returning, which was, again, Iran -- 3 of 17 -- accepted basically an opening of the Strait of Hormuz to commercial vessels, and it was committed to doing so. It was the American interference through the southern corridor and other kinds of machinations that made Iran then have to try to close the Strait of Hormuz again. And keep in mind that the naval blockade by itself is a violation of the MOU. So today, Iran is very clear in terms of how its leverage and its limited options cannot stand more compromises, let's say, with the United States. That it needs to push its leverage on the Strait of Hormuz, and that the other side only understands power and force. And so the shift that we saw with Rezaei, with the new spokesperson and head of Iran's National Security Supreme Council, that shift was to show that the realists in Iran, the ones who say, what I call security firsters, the ones who say that this can only have a military solution, that military resistance to American forces is the only way to get the United States to back down, because Donald Trump and Pete Hegseth do not understand any other language other than force. And so this would mean that Iran would, you know, actually preemptively strike United States bases, the tankers that are being pushed, as well as regionally and horizontally escalate the conflict. #Pascal Yeah, but this is a pretty bleak picture, actually. But I think it's an accurate one. If I was Iran and I had this memory of having negotiated over many, many years the JCPOA that was ceremonially signed in 2016 and then very unceremoniously sabotaged in 2018 and exited in '19 or '20, and then, like, the whole escalation and the deterioration under Trump one and then Biden and Trump two, and the constant, the constant breaching of all kinds of agreements or understandings that were created, what other conclusion can there be? But the problem that Iran has, of course, is that its economic leverage with the Strait of Hormuz hurts not only the United States, it also hurts its allies like China. China has an interest in having, like, proper relations, proper relations not only with Iran, but also with the Gulf states. And the complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz is something that is kind of a problem also for Iran. But the United States knows that, and it plays with it. Plus, it has given us the indication of how it intends to get out of that, which is by stealing all of Venezuela's heavy crude, the heavy oil that Venezuela has, which is what the United States is lacking. It will still take two or three years until it can refine all of that oil, yes, for sure. But that's the U.S. kind of the Joker card to get out of prison, out of the Hormuz prison. So how do you think that Iran is now trying to, or will Iran try to increase its leverage that it has for the time being until the United States is able to refine all of that heavy crude oi