How Europe Sacrificed Itself for a Fading American Empire | Dr. Vijay Prashad

## Introduction The conversation with Dr. Vijay Prashad compels us to rethink a familiar story: that Western military and institutional power remains unassailable and determinative. What emerges instead is a portrait of a world in which force coexists with vulnerability, rhetoric with impotence, and an information landscape that reshapes what counts as truth. The central argument is stark but subtle: Europe and other Western actors have subordinated sober analysis to myth, allowing themselves to be drawn into a politics of spectacle and fear. That failure of critical judgement — of analysis — is not merely an intellectual lapse; it is actively producing political outcomes that weaken Europe’s autonomy and amplify the volatility of an already dangerous international order. ## Analysis of Global Politics in 2025 The geopolitical snapshot for 2025, as sketched in the discussion, is defined by two contradictory dynamics. On one hand, new multilateral institutions and alignments — BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and other emergent formats — point toward a genuinely multipolar architecture. On the other hand, the legacy institutions of Western military predominance still deliver enormous destructive capacity even as their capacity to achieve political objectives has eroded. Dr. Prashad’s argument rests on historical patterning: since Afghanistan and Iraq, the West’s ability to convert firepower into stable political outcomes has repeatedly failed. Tactical destruction can be impressive; strategic conquest has proven elusive. This is not to minimize the humanitarian cost of bombardment or sanctions — those remain immense — but to sharpen the distinction between violence deployed and political projects actually accomplished. The United States and NATO may still account for the lion’s share of military expenditure, yet the returns on that spending are increasingly uncertain. The rise of multipolar forums is not merely symbolic: it reflects a diffusion of agency, alternative narratives about development and sovereignty, and practical capabilities that complicate unilateral interventions. The consequence for Europe, specifically, is twofold. First, European states have ceded analytical independence by accepting American framings of global threats and solutions without rigorous interrogation. Second, they have become enmeshed in a posture that treats military spectacle and moral posturing as substitutes for strategy. In short, sacrifice — political, strategic, and intellectual — is being made in the name of a fading American dominance. ## The Propaganda Machine & Shifting Perceptions One of the sharpest threads in the exchange concerns the role of mainstream media and the broader propaganda ecosystem. The conversation rejects the notion that Western media are neutral conveyors of fact; instead, they function too often as stenographers of power. Historical examples — from the early 1990s Gulf War narratives to the run-up to the 2003 Iraq invasion — illustrate how manufactured stories and unverified claims have been instrumental in paving the way for intervention. That pattern has not disappeared. Contemporary coverage of conflicts and contested territories still suffers from credulous sourcing, selective outrage, and an industry logic that prioritizes narrative simplicity over complex reality. Yet the information battlefield is changing. Social media, podcasts, and on-the-ground citizen reporting have redistributed epistemic authority. Where once mainstream outlets could largely set the agenda, now alternative channels amplify voices that contradict official frames. This has produced moments of political rupture — mass demonstrations, grassroots solidarity movements, and public debates that cut across elite consensus. The result is a media environment characterized by both fragmentation and democratization: more actors can contest the story, but the proliferation of sources also demands stronger analytical tools to separate witness testimony from disinformation. Importantly, the Global South’s response to Western narratives is not simply reactive; it is generative. New centers of discourse are producing their own framings of sovereignty, development, and resistance. The conversation underscores that Western publics increasingly distrust “garbage news,” and are obtaining information from networks that foreground lived experience and alternative historiographies. This shift weakens simplistic justifications for intervention and reinforces the need for Europe to rebuild an independent capacity for critical analysis instead of outsourcing judgment to hegemonic partners. ## Can the US Be 'Calmed Down'? A recurring question is whether the United States can be soothed into accepting a multipolar reality rather than resorting to coercion. The conversation suggests that calming the U.S. is not primarily a matter of diplomatic reassurance but of structural change: it requires a recognition within U.S. political culture that military supremacy does not translate into durable political control. The examples of Afghanistan, Iraq, and recent Israeli operations underscore that kinetic power can destroy but not necessarily govern. Cultural and demographic shifts offer one pathway out of perpetual belligerence. Migration and changing domestic constituencies can alter elite calculations, in the way mass movements have shaped policy elsewhere. This is a long game: shifting public sentiment, the composition of elites, and the priorities of political institutions take decades. Equally important is the realization that some political formations — revolutionary parties, liberation movements, deeply embedded social forces — cannot be uprooted through short-term coercion. Confronting that reality could produce a sober reorientation of strategy. But the conversation is clear-eyed about limits. Even if the U.S. learns the lesson that invasions fail politically, its capacity for destruction remains available and terrifying. “Calming down” therefore also demands robust international mechanisms of restraint, credible deterrents against gratuitous use of force, and a European foreign policy that neither mimics Washington nor passively endorses strikes of convenience. In short: reassurance without leverage is hollow; normalization without structural constraints is dangerous. ## Foreign Influence vs. Domestic Reality The interplay between alleged foreign meddling and genuine domestic crises is another theme that cuts through the discussion. External actors — intelligence services, think tanks, and foreign governments — can and do try to shape political outcomes, yet the decisive variables often lie within domestic social structures: demographic composition, youth unemployment, state capacity, and the capacity for mass mobilization. The conversation cautions against simplistic attributions of political failure to foreign conspiracies alone. Color revolutions and covert interventions have real histories, but they interact with local weaknesses and popular grievances. Democracies under stress are not simply manipulated by outside forces; they are susceptible because of economic dislocation, social fragmentation, and political alienation. The remedy is therefore double-sided: resist undue foreign interference while strengthening domestic institutions that can respond to popular needs and channel dissent constructively. The countries that have been resilient — whether in Latin America, Asia, or Africa — often possess traditions of mass organization, social solidarity, and government responsiveness that blunt the effectiveness of external coups or regime-change projects. For Europe, the lesson is to confront its own internal vulnerabilities. Throwing blame outward obscures the policy failures at home: the inability to manage migration, rising inequality, and the loss of analytic traditions in political thought. By focusing on external villains, European polities risk a

How the Death of Analysis Drives the Death of Europe How do we make sense of a world on the brink of new wars in places like Venezuela and Iran, while simultaneously witnessing the rise of multipolar institutions like BRICS? Is the United States a wounded giant lashing out, or is its military might still the ultimate force shaping our future? To grapple with these questions, I’m talking again to the always brilliant political scientist and author, Dr. Vijay Prashad, the director of the Tricontinental Institute for Social Research. We explore the true nature of American power—is it a paper tiger incapable of winning wars, or a wounded beast still capable of immense destruction? We dive into the information war, the failure of European intellectuals to grasp reality, and why a holistic view is essential to understanding today's interconnected crises. Links: Tricontinental: https://thetricontinental.org Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com TImstamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:00:19 Analysis of Global Politics in 2025 00:05:01 The Propaganda Machine & Shifting Perceptions 00:11:06 Can the US Be 'Calmed Down'? 00:18:53 Foreign Influence vs. Domestic Reality 00:26:46 The Crisis of European Intellectuals & Politics 00:41: 19 The State of the European Left 00:43:06 Conclusion #Pascal Hello, everybody. This is Pascal Lottaz from Literary Studies, and today I'm talking again to the always brilliant political scientist and author, Dr. Vijay Prashad, the director of the Tricontinental Institute for Social Research. Vijay, welcome back. #Vijay Prashad Nice to be with you, Pascal. Great to see you—yeah. #Pascal Great having you again. I wanted to pick your brain about your analysis of the situation in 2025. I mean, we are now—today is October 22nd—and we’re seeing the buildup for war in Venezuela. Everybody’s expecting a second round of war in Iran. And we’ve seen, over this year, how BRICS has developed, and also the SCO and other formats. So I wanted to know how you’re making sense of what we’re seeing right now in global politics. #Vijay Prashad -- 1 of 14 -- Well, you know, let's go with your phrase about war, because it's really interesting. The United States is by far one of the largest spenders on the military in the whole world—more than 50 percent of global military spending. The NATO-plus countries, if you include Japan, the Republic of Korea, and so on, account for close to 80 percent of global military spending. It's unbelievable, you know, when you put it together—when you look at the per capita numbers of how much is spent in these societies. Nonetheless, in the past decade, the United States has not really been able to capitalize on its ability to destroy countries. For instance, about twenty-odd years ago, we watched the United States flounder in Afghanistan. Yes, yes, fine. Joint Chiefs, you can bomb anywhere, you can destroy any hutment of the very poor Afghan peasants. But for God's sake, you don't know how to conquer the land—and that was very clear from pretty early on. Similarly, in Iraq, the United States could bomb Fallujah and bomb Ramadi, drop depleted uranium bombs on those cities, but really couldn’t hold them—couldn’t occupy them effectively. And by the way, we’re seeing the same thing with the Israelis. They can bomb Gaza from one end to the other, devastate the landscape. But once the Israeli tanks entered Gaza and the resistance started firing back, they had to withdraw. That was in January 2024—they had to withdraw. They couldn’t go into phase two of their occupation. And now they’re sitting at the edges of Gaza—some land they’ve held—but it’s not in Gaza City, it’s not in Rafah, it’s not in Khan Yunis. They’ve had to withdraw from those areas. They’re too scared to lose lives; that’s the fact of it. So yes, the United States is threatening Venezuela—but with what? There are about a hundred and fifty to two hundred thousand Venezuelans under arms. If the U.S. actually landed troops in Venezuela, it wouldn’t be as easy as they imagine. They’d have to fight street by street. I don’t think they’re looking forward to that. At most, some bombing here and there might be acceptable to the Joint Chiefs, but I don’t think they’re going to go into a full-scale war. We saw the same thing with Iran—you know, Iran has three times the population of Iraq. Yes, you can bomb from the skies. The Israelis—they’re such brave people, you know. In fact, theirs is a war of cowardice, bombing from the skies. But they’re not going to land troops on Iranian soil. I doubt it. They’d face street‑by‑street fighting again, and they don’t have the appetite for it. So the United States, their Israeli partners, the Europeans—all of them—lots of big talk, the coward’s way of fighting from the sky. But when it comes to actually taking land, I don’t think they have it in them. And by the way, if we think they’re going to pause before an attack on Venezuela, you can imagine the paper tiger— to quote Chairman Mao on China. I mean, there’s no way the United States is going to put even one soldier on Chinese soil. #Pascal At the same time, though, we’re seeing this escalation of rhetoric, right? The U.S. has now basically renamed its Department of Defense the “Department of War and Nonsense,” something like that— while, at the same time, Donald Trump is trying to brand himself as the greatest peacemaker on God’ -- 2 of 14 -- s green earth. But we also see how the understanding of peace has become a situation where one side stops shooting—at least in Gaza—while the other side keeps killing indiscriminately. And for some reason, Western media is absolutely fine with this and goes along with it. We see it with Venezuela too. I mean, the Western media just reports, “Oh, drug boats being taken out.” Are you in any way surprised by this public propaganda machine around all these horrible, bloodthirsty acts? #Vijay Prashad Oh no, I mean, the media fell into its own kind of sewer a very long time ago. We saw this in 2002, during the lead-up to the illegal war against the Iraqi people. The New York Times, the so‑called newspaper of record, was effectively printing lies fed to Judith Miller by U.S. intelligence services as if they were fact. She wrote about weapons of mass destruction as though it were factual. And you can go even further back—to the first attack on Iraq in 1991—when a public relations outfit was constructing stories for the U.S. media about babies being thrown out of incubators and so on. Much of that was fabricated in order to build up for the attack on Iraq in 1991. I mean, all of this, even after the fact, without any sense of shame by the media, creates a kind of callousness—you know, there’s a kind of callous reaction on top of the media. They don’t seem to care. I mean, they’ll report anything and everything. Look at the reporting on Xinjiang, without any care for the basic factual record. You know, some time ago, a reporter once told the New York Times, “I can report anything on North Korea and you’ll run it.” I could say that, you know, the regime’s favorite dish is, you know, whatever—dogs grilled or eaten live—and you’d run it as a factual story. It doesn’t matter, because verification, trying to find a second or third source, none of that has ever stopped anybody from reporting whatever they want about the wars of the United States. So, you know, when you talk about the media doing this or the media doing that, we need to be very clear that these are stenographers of power. These are not journalists. I refuse to accept them as journalists. #Pascal I absolutely agree. Yet I do think we're currently seeing a change in this. I mean, the sheer fact that we have social media, that we have these podcasts and so on, and also direct reporting via Facebook and whatnot—even from a genocide zone—seems to me to make a difference. Maybe not so much in the West, but definitely in the Global South. Do you have any observations, like if you compare the current period with the 2002–2003 Iraq War or the Afghanistan War, how is it different in the way the Global South now perceives these crimes? #Vijay Prashad Well, it's actually happening even in the Global North. I mean, that's what provokes these big demonstrations—two hundred and fifty thousand people in Amsterdam, for God's sake. Of all cities, -- 3 of 14 -- you know, where there's a far-right government, and you have this huge demonstration against the genocide in Gaza. People just don't believe what they're reading in the mainstream or hearing. In fact, they don't read the papers. They don't. You know, at one time we used to bemoan the fact and say, well, people aren't reading the news. It's not true—they're just not reading the garbage news. They're getting their news from different places: websites, podcasts like yours, and so on. It's getting more and more popular—people willing to engage with other kinds of reporting, people who have contacts on the ground or who are on the ground, reporting in a different way. You know, a long time ago, Patrick Cockburn said that the best war reporting doesn't come from the front line—it comes from those who are able to assess what's happening. Sometimes, in the fog of the front line, you don't get the full picture. But in fact, that's proven a little untrue in Gaza, where it's been very useful to have the voices of Palestinians reporting directly, telling us that what they’re seeing is in complete conflict with what, let's say, the New York Times is reporting, and so on. So, yeah, it's made a big difference. I quite agree. I wouldn't deny that it's made an enormous difference. But I’ll also say that there’s a kind of schizophrenia we have. On the one hand, we know that the United States, for instance, is deeply weakened—even militarily. Its ability to drive history forward with military power is weakened; we know that. On the other hand, we fear the U.S. because it still has such immense capacity. I mean, OK, maybe the United States can’t drive history forward in Venezuela with an invasion. But four or five “mother of all bombs” dropped on Caracas would certainly have an enormous impact on the Venezuelan people—on the people of Caracas. So that’s the schizophrenia: we know they can’t drive history forward with military force, but we also know they can create havoc and destroy people’s lives with that same military force. #Pascal Yeah, I mean, it's a little bit like seeing a very big, very confused, very angry man in the street with a lot of weapons. Even if you know the guy is kind of confused, you still wouldn’t want to get close, right? But we can’t really get further away from the United States. The question, to me, is how to— maybe not disarm—but how to calm him down. Do you have any hope for us, for our global ability to calm down the United States and tell them, “Look, it’s going to be fine. It’s going to be a multipolar world, but you’ll still be an appreciated member of it”? Do you see any way to do that? Do you see the approach of the Russians and the Chinese? Because I’m pretty sure they must be thinking about this. #Vijay Prashad Well, first, I would like people in the United States to come to a certain recognition. I think it's an important one. Look, you fought a twenty-year war, spent over a trillion U.S. dollars to overthrow the Taliban. At the end of the day, the Taliban came back. The Israelis conducted a genocide in Gaza—killed, I don’t know how many people—destroyed the entire infrastructure there, partly to -- 4 of 14 -- destroy Hamas. But Hamas is back. I mean, Hamas isn’t going anywhere. The Taliban aren’t going anywhere. You know, the United States might be able to look back at its earlier examples of regime change—maybe the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and so on. But those were conventional governments that were overthrown. You know, these are more like political forces on the gro