Tokyo's CRAZY New Policies: Power Grab & Economic Collapse | Aya Ikegame

## Introduction Japan’s veneer of seamless stability—carefully managed public messaging, steady institutions, and a restrained political culture—is beginning to flake. A wide-ranging exchange with Professor Aya Ikegame surfaces a set of converging crises: tangible disruptions in supply chains, surprising legislative choices by a newly empowered administration, and an opposition unable to convert discontent into effective political pressure. Far from isolated policy missteps, these developments signal a reconfiguration of power within Japan’s ruling coalition and an uneasy choreography between domestic symbolism and strategic necessity. The stakes are not merely economic or ceremonial; they cut to the heart of how Japan defines leadership, national identity, and its role in a volatile regional order. ## Oil supplies from Iran and Russia Japan’s oil vulnerability is structural. With roughly 97 percent of its oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz, disruptions in the Middle East land disproportionately on Japanese industry and households. The conversation makes clear that the government’s public assurances—citing large strategic reserves measured in months—paper over more granular and immediate scarcities. It is not only fuel at the pump: naphtha shortages, a downstream product of crude refining, are stalling construction projects and shuttering production lines for household fixtures and plastics. Facts that sound trivial—delayed delivery of bathtub units, unpainted walls, silver-wrapped potato chips on convenience store shelves—are symptoms of deeper supply-chain stress. Companies and local managers have been improvising. A handful of commercially arranged shipments from Iran have arrived, and there are indications some firms are engaging indirectly with Russian suppliers. But these are tactical drops in the ocean: two or three tankers that yield a day or two of consumption do not alter a national balance sheet. Crucially, the state response has been to prop domestic prices with subsidies and manage a narrative of continuity. Political and media passivity, combined with low public political literacy about international origins of price shocks, have so far muted visible public backlash. Yet the reality of shortages—felt in production halts, higher import bills, and a weakening yen—creates a slow-moving economic pressure that will be difficult to conceal indefinitely. ## Takaichi’s landslide and weak opposition The context for these policy choices is an extraordinary consolidation of power. The administration led by Sanae Takaichi won a decisive electoral mandate that produced a supermajority, dwarfing previous landslides. That victory came with expectations: a consolidated government should be able to translate electoral momentum into coherent policy. Instead, the conversation highlights an administration that has used its dominance to push through politically symbolic and controversial measures while leaving both routine governance and crisis mitigation to ad hoc private initiatives. Compounding the problem is the state of opposition politics. The main liberal opposition has been hollowed out of experienced MPs and lacks a coherent national narrative to capitalize on policy failures. Former moderates and center-left figures are scattered or sidelined; party structures that once offered checks are currently too enfeebled to form an effective parliamentary counterweight. The result is a paradox: political responsibility has increased for the governing party even as the incentives to moderate or negotiate have decreased. This is a dangerous mix when economic and security shocks require coordinated, technocratic responses rather than performative politics. ## The emperor, peace, and political power One of the most striking and divisive moves by the current government has been legislative meddling with imperial succession rules—a domain normally approached with extreme caution and deference. Rather than expanding succession to include women, the administration pushed through changes that favor reintegrating distant male-line relatives and enabling certain adoption mechanisms within branch families. The effect is to sideline Princess Aiko, the emperor’s only child, from any conceivable path to the throne despite the fact that public affection for her is high. This episode illuminates several things about contemporary Japanese politics. First, the imperial institution remains tightly controlled politically, with limited room for the emperor or even the imperial household to express preferences. Second, symbolic politics—questions of who may ascend the Chrysanthemum Throne—have been weaponized to consolidate factional interests within the ruling coalition. The move also reveals how formal constitutional constraints, informal bureaucratic prerogatives (notably the opaque Imperial Household Agency), and entrenched elite preferences can conspire to produce outcomes at odds with both public sentiment and pragmatic governance. What the conversation underlines is that the debate over the imperial family is not just about tradition. It is a proxy contest for power brokers within the party, for conservative narratives about lineage and national identity, and for the allocation of symbolic capital that flows from managing the nation’s most sacrosanct institution. In a broader sense, tinkering with such a sensitive topic while material pressures mount betrays a political calculation: shore up elite loyalties first, manage public disquiet later. ## Takaichi’s landslide and weak opposition (Chapter title repeated in the list; here the focus shifts to domestic policy choices and political image.) Takaichi’s electoral sweep afforded her the latitude to legislate aggressively, and she has used it to pursue measures that play well with a conservative base but alienate other constituencies. The laws passed—creating “sub-capitals,” criminalizing desecration of the national flag, and restructuring imperial succession—are less responses to urgent national needs than targeted efforts to consolidate support among right-leaning factions and regional kingmakers. The sub-capitals law, for instance, is a case study in symbolic rent-seeking. It offers no legal clarity about what constitutes a capital, leaves funding mechanisms unspecified, and institutionalizes a route for regional parties (notably revivalist factions in Osaka) to tap central funds. Far from solving administrative bottlenecks, it signals the revival of pork-barrel politics: infrastructure and status projects as tools of political consolidation. Criminalizing flag desecration functions chiefly as performative reassurance to nationalists—its vagueness about what qualifies as “harm” makes it a tool of political signaling rather than a precise legal reform. These kinds of laws erode the distance between statecraft and spectacle, favoring short-term political cohesion over policy sobriety. At the same time, surveys point to a declining personal popularity for the prime minister. The paradox here is stark: overwhelming parliamentary power has not insulated the administration from reputational costs. Yet institutional weaknesses in opposition and the media’s muted role mean that sliding popularity has not yet translated into political vulnerability. ## Taiwan, China, and Japan’s foreign policy On foreign policy, the conversation exposes a Japan attempting to balance regional security concerns with domestic constraints and alliances. The government’s posture toward China and Taiwan is cautious yet increasingly securitized. Concerns about cross-strait tensions and a more assertive Beijing have sharpened debate within Tokyo about deterrence, defense posture, and the limits of strategic autonomy. Takaichi’s administration has shown an inclination toward strengthening military capabilities and aligning more closely with like-minded regional partners, but there is apprehension about the consequences of overt

Tokyo's CRAZY New Policies: Power Grab & Economic Collapse | Aya Ikegame The cracks in Japan's "everything is fine" pretense policies are starting to show. The country can't import some very essential goods anymore and the trend is not looking good. On top of that, the Takaichi's LDP government chose some political fights at home that are alienating her voter base. Professor Aya Ikegame of Kyoto University discusses Japan’s oil shortages, the government’s response, and the political strength of Sanae Takaichi. They examine the debate over Japan’s imperial succession, the role of party power brokers, relations with China, military policy, and the weak state of the opposition. They also discuss social media campaigning, local elections, and the future of the LDP. Links: Aya Ikegame – Personal Website https://ayaikegame.com Aya Ikegame – University Profile https://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en/faculty/ayaikegame/ Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:01:31 Japan’s oil shortage and daily impact 00:04:55 Oil supplies from Iran and Russia 00:07:53 Support Neutrality Studies 00:08:16 Takaichi’s landslide and weak opposition 00:10:52 Three controversial new laws 00: 16:41 Imperial succession and female emperors 00:25:02 The emperor, peace, and political power 00:37:04 Takaichi’s leadership and public image 00:38:35 Taiwan, China, and Japan’s foreign policy 00:47:39 Japan’s military and North Korea fears 00:50:02 Nuclear policy and the LDP’s future 00:54: 10 The opposition and social media campaigning #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today, for the first time with a fellow academic at Kyoto University, I'm talking to Professor Aya Ikegame at the Graduate School of African and Asian Area Studies at my own university in Kyoto. Aya, welcome. #Aya Ikegame Hi, thank you for having me. #Pascal Thank you very much for saying yes to this. We were introduced by a common colleague and friend, and it's wonderful to have, for the first time, somebody who's also at Kyoto University. So thanks very much. And let's maybe start with just a tiny little bit of your background. You are actually an expert on South Asia and Asia in general, right? #Aya Ikegame -- 1 of 25 -- Yes, and particularly on India and southern India. So I'm an India specialist, and I'm a social scientist. #Pascal And you also keep a close eye on what's happening in Japan politically, since we are all political beings, more or less, at the university. Can you give us a little bit of just an update of where Japan is now with the Iran war, you know, and the oil shock that actually also reached Japan? The last thing I know is Japan dipped into its strategic reserves. But what's currently going on, actually? #Aya Ikegame Okay, so 97% of our oil we need comes through the Strait of Hormuz. So compared to Europe and the United States, we were really, really hit by this war on Iran. But the government keeps on telling us that we have a huge reserve of petrol for 178 days, or however many days. Actually, nobody knows. So actually, we should be feeling that way, you know, the influence of this petrol shortage. But the government is trying to, you know, keep the surface: there's nothing wrong, there's nothing to worry about. So most people in Japan may not be feeling the effect of it, but actually it is affecting our lives. So it is a little bit odd situation because the government is pouring subsidies into the price of petrol. So the petrol price is artificially kept very low and should be probably 20–30% more than what it is now. But shortages, for example, naphtha, a byproduct of petrol, have a lot of consequences. So, for example, a lot of construction sites are being stopped because they can't get important, for example, paint thinner. They can't get paint thinner. #Pascal Paint thinner. Okay. #Aya Ikegame Thinner, yes. So they can't really paint inside the house or outside the house. And, for example, what we call unit baths. So, you know, all these bathrooms and bathtubs and showers and et cetera, it's all made out of plastic. And they can't make any more. So, for example, Toto, it is the number one company who makes this kind of baths, bath stops, and kitchenettes and et cetera, et cetera. They can't supply. So supply has been stopped. But still, government is denying, no, no, no, no, no. We have enough naphtha. We can make enough, you know, petrol-related products. But actually, people working in construction companies, construction sites, they were complaining. #Pascal -- 2 of 25 -- Yeah. Last weekend, for the first time in a convenience store, I saw silver-packaged potato chips. And I was like, "Oh, what is that?" And it's like, yeah, they cannot make the color anymore. So it's just like the bare silver and grayscale in which they are now selling potato chips. So this is like one of the first cracks in this story, isn't it? Yes. #Aya Ikegame Yeah, but then the government says this was Calbee. This is the largest company which makes these crisps and potato chips. But the government says, no, no, no, that's their publicity stunt, which is just shocking. So the government is completely in denial of petrol shortages. Yeah. #Pascal There were a couple of attempts by Japan to find new ways to supply themselves. I think, on the one hand, they tried with Iran to actually have a couple of ships go through. And on the other hand, they've also tried to buy again a bit of oil from Russia. Can you tell us anything of how much, do you think, or how much do we know about oil that actually managed to reach Japan? #Aya Ikegame Yeah, we don't know exactly because this is not necessarily the government doing. Individual oil companies try to do their best. And interestingly, Japan always had a good relationship with Iran, which not many people know of. And somehow the United States allows us to do that. And we have some historical reason to be in a good relation with Iran. And so the Iranian government keeps on saying that, you know, if you ask, Japanese ships can go through. But the Takaiji government never asked. So individual companies seem to be negotiating with the Iranian government. And so a couple of ships went through, but not everybody. #Pascal Ah, so Takaichi is maybe at the point where she tries to be as friendly to Mr. Trump as possible. And on the other hand, on the lower level, they're going like crazy and trying to do whatever they can in order to somehow manage the situation anyhow. #Aya Ikegame Yes, but that's really like a drop in the ocean. So two or three ships managed to come through, but the amount of petrol they were carrying was just like one day and a half in total or something. #Pascal -- 3 of 25 -- So, isn't that causing any kind of, you know, bad feelings toward the United States? Because this is an absolutely, utterly unnecessary war that was clearly started by them, and now it's hitting Japan pretty hard. On the one hand, I understand that Takaichi cannot say a bad word. On the other hand, it would only be natural that people get very grumpy. Do you have any information about that? #Aya Ikegame First of all, Japanese people are not politically so aware of what's going on. So actually, you will be very surprised. Most Japanese, they don't know what's going on in Iran. They don't even know what's going on in Russia either, or Ukraine either. So that's the situation. They are very naive, politically very naive. And the government is really hiding this news. And the media is not reporting in a big way. So they don't really connect what's going on in Iran and what's happening in Japan. For example, the falling value of the yen and rising food prices. They don't really connect these two together. So that's actually saving the Takaichi government. #Pascal Hey, just a very quick note. The best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on neutralitystudies.com. Links below. See you there. So she won this huge landslide victory in December last year, right? I mean, it was a surprise, but just how large it was. She dissolved Parliament and got her vote, and she got a confirmation that was stronger than what Mr. Abe got in 2015, I believe, when he won his landslide victory. Yes. And now it has been eight months. She's in power. She has a two-thirds majority. Isn't this now the moment when the opposition party could start using a couple of these things in order to undermine this confidence? What's happening on the parliamentary stage? #Aya Ikegame The problem is the opposition parties are very weak and pretty much destroyed, especially in the lower house. So most of the veteran politicians from the Constitutional Democratic Party, which is a liberal, you know, center-left party, they aren't there anymore, practically. Right. And so some Komeito, former Komeito, which is basically Soka Gakkai, which is one of the largest religious sects in Japan. And their parliamentarians were kind of liberal, but still right of the center. So they don't necessarily raise their strong voice against the Takaichi government. So the opposition is very weak. That's why the anti-Takaichi feeling hasn't been translated into a proper political opposition. #Pascal Yeah, she's not in trouble at all over here, right? I mean, eight months, I thought the chances for a scandal to break out or something similar, you know, trouble with the economy, would be quite -- 4 of 25 -- high. And because she owns everything, right? She has a two-thirds majority, a huge victory. So anything that happens is on her shoulders. But so far, it's been pretty smooth sailing for her, hasn't it? #Aya Ikegame Although many newspapers and other companies who do these popularity data surveys, they say her popularity is going down, and actually dropping quite rapidly. That's partly because what she did when she passed recent regulations through parliament was just so unnecessary and so silly. #Pascal Tell us about this. That legislation is fascinating because it's so quirky. Can you tell us about it? #Aya Ikegame Okay, so the three regulations, very controversial, which were so unnecessary and not at all urgent, but somehow she pushed through. One is the sub-capitals regulation. So, to make other cities a sub- capital apart from Tokyo. But we don't have any legal definition of the capital city. The emperor just moved to Tokyo at the time of the Meiji Restoration, but there's no regulation to make Tokyo the capital of Japan, despite the fact that now we have a law saying that we can have sub-capitals. #Pascal So Japan has no official capital by law, but has official sub-capitals. #Aya Ikegame Okay, great. We can have, but then we don't know how many sub-capitals we have. No, there's no discussion. And where the money comes from, no discussion. #Pascal What does she want to do with sub-capitals? Does she want to send a couple of government agencies to work there? Like, I don't know, Ministry of Foreign Affairs now goes to Osaka. What's the idea? #Aya Ikegame We don't know. There's no concrete discussion. But the main thing is that Takaichi wanted to say thank you to Ishin. This is a Restoration Party from Osaka. It's a regional party. They're very aggressive. They're a far-right political party. They wanted Osaka to have capital status. -- 5 of 25 -- #Pascal Okay. #Aya Ikegame So that they can tap into not just regional tax income, but central government money. #Pascal Is it also a little bit about pride? You know, in Japanese language, Tokyo is the only to, actually, of the prefectures, and Osaka always was kind of angry because Osaka is a fu, right? And they would love to be a to. Is it about that? Is it this kind of, like, give them a little something in order to bribe them to keep them on board?