Iran Anti-Blockade Strategy & Military Reality Defeats US Empire | Prof. S. M. Marandi

## Introduction and Islamabad talks The recent Islamabad talks crystallize a deeper clash over sovereignty, narrative control, and military reality. What began as a diplomatic effort to freeze the flames of a devastating regional conflagration instead exposed the limits of U.S. leverage, the coherence of Iran’s political posture, and the fragility of mediated ceasefires when one party’s core strategic aims remain unaltered. The exchange — captured in a recorded conversation with Professor S. M. Marandi and other participants — reveals a negotiation that was less about compromise than about signaling: a stage on which both sides sought to convince domestic and international audiences they held the stronger hand. Yet the most consequential signals were not merely words at the table; they were threats, near-misses in transit, and a public relations war that paralleled, and sometimes overshadowed, substantive bargaining. At the heart of the Islamabad trip was a delegation that carried Tehran’s explicit mandate. The contrast between the Iranian team’s consolidated instructions and the apparent lack of authority on the other side emerged repeatedly during the discussions. Calls to external actors, repeated consultations, and last-minute withdrawals betrayed an American negotiating posture constrained by internal divisions and external pressure groups. The Iranian side, by contrast, arrived with a mix of resolve and calculation: to demonstrate willingness to negotiate, to stave off accusations of intransigence at home, and to show the global audience that Tehran had tried every avenue to end the violence short of capitulation. But the setting was charged in more ways than one. Delegation members reported credible threats, including public calls for assassination and personal bounties surfaced online. These security threats were not peripheral background noise; they shaped the political context in which conversations occurred and influenced Iranian calculations about what diplomacy could realistically achieve under duress. Islamabad was thus both a test of diplomatic creativity and a litmus test of whether signaling — through talks and televised statements — could outweigh coercive force and clandestine intimidation. ## US demands and failed talks 00: 12:13 Ceasefire pressure and US aims The negotiated contours discussed in Islamabad exposed a substantive gap: Washington’s demands reflected battlefield objectives it had failed to secure militarily. What had been attempted by strikes and attrition was now being sought at the table — demands for limits on Iran’s nuclear program and control over maritime access that Tehran found existentially unacceptable. These are not mere negotiating ploys; they betray a strategic objective to subordinate Iranian sovereignty to external oversight. The U.S. posture evolved over time — from demands for unconditional surrender to a 15-point plan, and then to acceptance, at least rhetorically, of Tehran’s 10-point framework. But the apparent acquiescence was shallow. Delegates reported that progress was intermittent and fragile, with breakthroughs undone by unilateral demands and dishonest public statements. An abrupt overnight statement and withdrawal from talks illustrated a negotiating tactic more geared toward domestic performance than mutual resolution. The accusation that Iran maintained a weapons program — repeated in public fora despite contrary evidence from the International Atomic Energy Agency and whistleblower accounts — underlined how accusations were deployed as bargaining chips and as pretexts for continued pressure. From Iran’s vantage, the logic was straightforward: it had not initiated the escalation and had used restraint to forestall wider conflagration. For Tehran, continuing to negotiate was both a domestic necessity — to show citizens that every diplomatic avenue had been pursued — and an international one — to deny U.S. efforts the moral high ground. The failure of the talks, then, was not merely a missed opportunity for de-escalation; it was indicative of a broader American strategy to seek by diplomacy what could not be seized on the battlefield. ## Hormuz blockade and military reality Claims of an impending U.S.-led blockade of the Strait of Hormuz must be measured against the stark military realities on the ground. Control of maritime chokepoints depends less on pronouncements than on the willingness and capacity to enforce them. The conversation laid bare the practical limits of a blockade: for such a strategy to be credible, the U.S. would need to project significant naval power into a region where it is vulnerable to Iran’s increasingly capable missiles, drones, and coastal defenses. Iran’s demonstrated reach means any attempt to assert exclusive control would impose substantial risk and cost on U.S. naval assets. Strategically, Tehran has used a calibrated approach: targeting hostile shipping entities while allowing passage for neutral or friendly actors, thereby signaling restraint and denying full closure that would inflict global economic pain. Iran’s relative willingness to keep some routes open — even while asserting control over its territorial approaches — reveals a political logic designed to maximize pressure on adversaries while minimizing self-inflicted damage. For Washington, the calculus is complicated by allies who rely on uninterrupted energy flows and by a public that is sensitive to the prospect of direct military losses. The conversation emphasized that the U.S. posture, centered on theatrical threats and inconsistent policy statements, risks strangling global trade and forcing third-party states to choose between practical commerce and declarative alliances. ## Media claims and mine story One of the most illuminating strands of the discussion was the treatment of media narratives — especially the persistent claim that Iran had mined the Strait of Hormuz. This claim, narrated repeatedly by Western outlets, functioned less as verified intelligence and more as a rhetorical pretext. In the exchange, Marandi and others emphasized a lack of credible evidence that Iran placed sea mines and pointed out the broader pattern: media outlets often serve as amplifiers for state objectives and geopolitical myths. The mine story worked on multiple levels. It justified calls for demining operations and pre-positioning of U.S. vessels, created an aura of American technical savviness and moral authority, and delegitimized Iran by depicting it as reckless and obstructionist. But when a single narrative serves the strategic needs of a coalition, independent verification becomes secondary. The conversation cautioned against uncritical acceptance of such claims, noting that the pattern of demonizing targeted states — from Cuba to Venezuela to Iran — follows a familiar playbook: accuse, isolate, and then act under the guise of remedial intervention. Domestic audiences in Western countries are particularly susceptible to simplified narratives that cast one side as the villain and the other as a reluctant, benevolent actor. The mine accusation fits that mold: it is an easily digestible explanation for a complex maritime problem, and it offers political cover for any kinetic or economic measures taken subsequently. The conversation urged listeners to ask not just whether a claim is true, but who benefits from its circulation. ## PR strategy and US power play Beyond battlefield tactics, the conversation underscored how public relations is an integral component of modern coercion. Washington’s approach has been as much about shaping perceptions as it has been about altering facts on the ground. Producing visuals and headlines that convey inevitability — of U.S. supremacy, of sanctions’ efficacy, of the target’s culpability — is part of the strategic toolkit. This is a power play in which narrative dominance can precede, accompany, and sometimes substitute for kinetic dominance. The Islam

Iran Anti-Blockade Strategy & Military Defeats US Empire | Marandi Pascal is joined again by Professor Seyed M. Marandi of the University of Tehran to discuss the Islamabad talks, threats against the Iranian delegation, US demands over Iran’s nuclear program and the Strait of Hormuz, the ceasefire with Lebanon, Western media claims, and the risk of more war, economic shock, and a wider regional crisis. Links: Professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi on X: https://x.com/s_m_marandi Professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi on Telegram: https://t.me /s_m_marandi Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com (Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: https://pascallottaz.substack.com/s/academic) Merch: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction and Islamabad talks 00:06:02 US demands and failed talks 00: 12:13 Ceasefire pressure and US aims 00:16:45 Hormuz blockade and military reality 00:19:37 Media claims and mine story 00:22:15 PR strategy and US power play 00:24:06 Ceasefire motives and next moves 00:29:04 Bounty claims and flight security #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. My name is Pascal Lottaz, and I’m joined today once again by Professor Saeed Marandi from the University of Tehran. Professor Marandi, welcome. #Marandi Thank you very much for inviting me, Pascal. It’s always a great pleasure. #Pascal It's great having you here. You were actually in the eye of the storm — in Islamabad over the weekend, together with the delegation that negotiated with the Americans. We're now speaking on this Monday, the 13th of April, when Donald Trump is threatening to start a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, supposedly to end what they’re calling Iran’s blockade of the same strait. Can you tell us where things stand this afternoon, and what happened in Islamabad? #Marandi Yeah, sure. Well, we've been threatened with assassination. The Washington Post was calling for the assassination of Iran's negotiators. We're living in amazing times. A while back on X, a bounty was put on my head personally, and now the entire delegation is being threatened with murder. On the way back from Islamabad, we were truly expecting to be hit by a missile on the plane. Instead of -- 1 of 10 -- coming to Tehran, they landed in Mashhad, near the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan border. They landed very swiftly because they wanted it to look as if they were heading toward Tehran. Then we took the train to Tehran, back to where we came from originally. So, you know, under those circumstances, the delegation went to Islamabad. But the Speaker of Parliament was very courageous, because he’s one of the people this regime wants to murder—and, of course, by extension, the Trump regime. But in Islamabad, it was very interesting, Pascal. The Iranians had a full mandate from Ayatollah Saeed Mujtaba al-Khamenei, but Banz didn’t. Even though he was surrounded—excuse me, my phone, go away—even though he was surrounded by Witkoff and Kushner, two Israeli-firsters whose interests are with the Israeli regime, not the United States, he had to constantly make calls to Washington, and apparently even to the Israeli regime, from what I’ve heard. But he made all these calls simply because he had no authority. The Iranians didn’t make a single call to Tehran. Throughout the day, they were negotiating. Sometimes progress was made, and sometimes there were disagreements—important disagreements—but overall, progress wasn’t really happening. They were supposed to continue into the second day, but suddenly, at night, things went very bad from the American side. It turned very negative, and then, in the middle of the night, they just issued a statement and left. Of course, the statement was completely dishonest, because Vance claimed that Iran wanted to stick to—or was implying that Iran wanted to stick to—a nuclear weapons program, which was a lie. Iran never had a nuclear weapons program. And in fact, fortunately, Joe Kent, in his resignation letter, exposed this for everyone around the world—that Iran was not pursuing nuclear weapons, that Iran was not a threat to the United States, and that this war was all about the Israeli regime and the Zionist lobby. That’s why the United States is at war. And of course, we could also allude to what Tulsi Gabbard said earlier, and to the IAEA never having any evidence that Iran’s peaceful nuclear program was ever anything other than peaceful. But it was clear that the United States had no intention of sincerely negotiating. And even though they lost the war, they thought they would defeat Iran, that it would collapse in a day or two. That didn’t happen. Then they said the missiles, drones, and other military capabilities would collapse—be destroyed. That didn’t happen. And now, at the negotiating table, they’re demanding what they couldn’t get on the battlefield. So, I mean, U.S. demands were included: Iran gave up its entire peaceful nuclear program. But why? Iran is a sovereign country. The revolution 47 years ago was about sovereignty— it was about dignity, honor, independence. And they also demanded to co-run the Strait of Hormuz. I mean, it’s not the Gulf of Mexico; they have no rights in the Strait of Hormuz. So why in the world would Iran manage the Strait of Hormuz with the United States? That’s just, you know... So this is basically the mentality of Washington right now. #Pascal -- 2 of 10 -- Hey, very brief intermission because I was recently banned from YouTube. And although I'm back, this could happen again at any time. So please consider subscribing not only here but also to my mailing list on Substack—that’s pascallottaz.substack.com. The link’s going to be in the description below. And now, back to the video. I mean, we started these negotiations with Iran saying, in an official statement, that the Americans had been asking for talks for 30 days already. And now that they had agreed to use our ten points as the basis for negotiation, we were willing to do that. Did they actually use any of those ten points and say, like, “Okay, fine, for instance, we’ll withdraw our troops from West Asia”? Was that ever something they were willing to commit to? #Marandi You know, it’s very interesting—as you rightly point out—at the beginning of the war, they demanded unconditional surrender. #Pascal Yes. #Marandi And then it gradually evolved into their 15-point plan, which was also ridiculous, and Iran rejected it. Then they accepted the Iranian 10-point plan as a framework for talks. That just shows they lost the war. They were the ones seeking a ceasefire, not Iraq. They were the ones whose position had changed, not Iraq’s. So Iran accepted the ceasefire because it never started the war. Iran never initiated escalation during the war. Oil, LNG, fertilizers, and petrochemicals were still passing through. Even after the war began, Iran didn’t completely close the Strait of Hormuz—only ships belonging to entities at war with Iran or considered hostile were not allowed. So when Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain—and the way to transport oil—and the Chinese or other countries that were not hostile toward Iran, like Russia and others, they were allowed to take their ships. Now, what exactly went on at the negotiating table? I don't know the details, because first of all, I was mostly involved with the Pakistani media while we were there. But also, obviously, a lot of the details were kept to a very small circle. There were some positive elements in the discussion, and some progress was being made, even though he was constantly— when he would speak with people on the phone outside—it would hinder progress. But at the end of the day, when it came to key points, the position he took was just so outrageous and so strange that it was clear this was designed to crash the talks. The Iranians thought that, hypothetically—because, as I said, there was great skepticism on the way there, on the plane—when we were speaking, no one was optimistic about the United States behaving reasonably or coming to terms with reality. But if progress had continued, there might have been a chance for some sort of interim agreement, a short-term deal, or an extension of the -- 3 of 10 -- ceasefire—something like that. It was possible. But when you look at what ultimately happened, and the ridiculous position taken by him, by Pence and his team, it was clear that it was never going to happen. But, you know, for the Iranians, there’s this myth, Pascal, that they were fooled by the Americans. Like before the 12-day war—we were negotiating, and they attacked. And then before this war, we were negotiating, and they attacked again. That’s not true. The Iranians knew the Americans were going to attack on both occasions. But they had to negotiate for two reasons. One, they wanted to make sure that people in the country knew Iran had done what it could. Because if you don’t negotiate and the other side attacks, then some people will start saying, “Well, if you had negotiated, this could have been resolved.” And second, for the sake of the international community—that’s important too—because then the United States will kill people but also produce propaganda to make you, the victim, look guilty. Just like in Gaza, just like right now with the genocide or the attacks we’re seeing in Lebanon, the Western media tries to make the victim look guilty. So they negotiated before both countries faced blitzkrieg-style attacks by the Americans and the Israeli regime, to make sure that the international community and ordinary Iranians recognized that Iran was trying to go as far as reasonably possible to prevent war. And going to Islamabad, it was the same. The Speaker of Parliament obviously risked his life—he was very courageous to go there. He went basically to tell the world, “Look, we’re here, we’re prepared to end this,” and also to show European people that we don’t believe their propaganda. We’re willing to solve this. It’s unreasonable that its president is a psychopath, that the regime in Washington is sinister, and that it’s pursuing Israel’s policies rather than policies linked to the needs of the American people. #Pascal Yeah, I mean, to me, Iran’s strategy has been very, very consistent. It’s based on reciprocity and non-escalation—saying, “No, we’ll fire back, but we won’t fire first, and we won’t go one notch up unless you do,” in order to inflict the same pain on you as you inflict on us, to force you to stop. And now they seem to be at the point where they’re willing to move toward stopping it. And here we are—as we speak, the ceasefire, the two-week ceasefire, is still holding, at least on the Iranian side. Of course, Israel is still bombing Lebanon, because Israel always interprets a ceasefire as “the other side stops shooting” while they keep bombing civilians indiscriminately. But what do you think the Americans want to do now? There are some interpretations saying the Americans aren’t looking for any real end to the war—they just want to turn it into something less damaging for them. So it’s a kind of charade to move toward an extended blockade and then continue a war of attrition—an economic war of attrition—with occasional bombings and so on. What do you think their game is at the moment? #Marandi -- 4 of 10 -- Well, you raise a very interesting point before your question, and that’s about Lebanon. Lebanon was indeed part of the ceasefire. The Pakistani prime minister explicitly said so. So Trump was lying when he said it wasn’t. Basically, he was told by the Israeli regime and the Zionist lobby that they wouldn’t abide by it, and so he had to change his stance. That raises serious questions about who’s in charge. When Vance calls it the Israeli regime’s prime minister during the negotiations, the question really is: who’s in charge? Who is the president of the United States? Is it Trump