Iran War Round 3: Tehran Prepares Knock-Out Blow | Prof. S.M. Marandi

## Risk of a renewed US war The central thrust of the conversation is stark: Tehran is not waiting passively for another round of strikes; it has been preparing for a confrontation the United States may reinitiate. The speakers describe a strategic calculus in Iran that has shifted from seeking diplomatic fixes to preparing for decisive military consequences should hostilities resume. That shift is grounded in a belief that further U.S. attacks would not be limited to punitive raids but could attempt to impose systemic damage—while Tehran, having endured earlier campaigns and sanctions, is investing in resilience and retaliation. The scene on the ground in Tehran illustrates this paradox: daily life proceeds largely as normal—streets, markets, transport—but beneath that urban normality lies the reality of siege conditions, damaged infrastructure and economic strain. The blockade of Iranian ports and targeted strikes against energy and industrial facilities are read as acts intended to cripple Iran’s economy. Yet those measures have not, so far, peeled away popular resolve. The account emphasizes Iranian societal resilience rooted in long-term exposure to sanctions, wartime memory, and cultural-religious cohesion. That popular endurance is a critical variable: for Iran, the war is existential; for the U.S., it is a strategic choice subject to domestic constrains and global economic blowback. Militarily, the conversation underscores the risk calculus on both sides. U.S. forces are described as forward-deployed across the Gulf and neighboring states, in positions that would facilitate a short, intense strike campaign should policymakers opt for one. Yet Iranian capabilities have evolved since earlier rounds: efforts to produce missiles and drones, to harden and expand underground production and launch facilities, and to diversify targeting options have increased Tehran’s capacity for sustained counter-strikes. The interlocutors argue that a conventional American campaign would confront not only Iranian military responses but also a cascading disruption to global trade—oil chokepoints are vulnerable and already affecting commodity flows—raising the political and economic costs for any Washington administration contemplating renewed large-scale hostilities. ## Saudi- Pakistan-Türkiye agreement The recently announced trilateral arrangement among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Türkiye is treated as more transactional than transformative. Participants in the conversation note that the agreement looks less like a new security bloc and more like a compact focused on defense trade, pragmatic cooperation, and shared interests—especially Saudi needs for military suppliers and Pakistan’s economic and political incentives. The silence around the detailed text of the agreement, and the absence of a multilateral framework or clear operational provisions, indicate an intent to signal rather than to construct a binding, NATO-style alliance. Examining motives helps explain why such a trilateral notice does not fundamentally alter regional balances. For Riyadh, the deal is largely a response to immediate vulnerabilities—Yemen’s offensive capabilities and the blowback from earlier Saudi adventurism—rather than an orchestrated pivot to confront Tehran directly. Pakistan’s motivations appear primarily economic and political; its security relationship with Riyadh has long been mediated by financial support, and domestic instability and regional pressures make Saudi patronage attractive. Türkiye’s interest centers on expanding influence and weapons exports rather than committing to direct military confrontation with Iran. Crucially, the conversation points out that neither Ankara nor Islamabad share Riyadh’s appetite for confrontation with Iran. The trilateral announcement therefore reads as a hedging mechanism: each state pursues distinct objectives while creating a diplomatic cover for closer, selective coordination. Absent convincing evidence of operational interoperability or a shared strategic doctrine, the pact is unlikely to compel Iran to redraw its regional posture in any fundamental way. ## Could Saudi Arabia become unstable? There is a persistent theme of fragility when the participants turn to internal Saudi dynamics. The kingdom’s political order under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is portrayed as less monolithic than external displays of authority suggest. Elite consolidation has been achieved through extraordinary measures—purges, detentions, and the sidelining of rivals—and that model breeds brittle loyalty. The conversation explores how a concentrated ruling family, contested succession practices, and dependence on expensive security guarantees leave Saudi political structures vulnerable to unforeseen shocks. Beyond elite politics, the economic and military strains of the recent years—protracted campaigns in Yemen, international opprobrium over civilian-casualty-intensive operations, and the hefty costs of defense purchases—have heightened Riyadh’s exposure. The Yemeni theater, in particular, is framed as an open wound: attacks on Saudi infrastructure and the disruption of Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab shipping create economic and reputational costs that feed domestic unease. The interlocutors suggest that instability in Riyadh could arise not only from palace politics but also from the cumulative fiscal and social stress of a foreign policy that imposes steep returns without commensurate gains. Nonetheless, the conversation resists facile predictions of collapse. The Saudi state retains deep resources, international backing, and a security apparatus capable of neutralizing many kinds of internal dissent. What emerges instead is a portrait of a powerful but precarious monarchy: stable enough to deter most immediate threats, yet susceptible over time to the compounding effects of foreign entanglements, elite discontent, and regional ripple effects. ## Iran’s missile strategy and US bases The exchange lays out Iran’s missile and drone strategy as central to its deterrent posture. Iranian forces have reportedly made strides in precision, launch endurance, and dispersal—skills honed through repetitive engagements and adaptations to earlier targeting. The strategy appears dual-purpose: to deny easy freedom of action for adversaries in the short term and to impose unacceptable costs in a protracted campaign. Underground production facilities and hardened storage sites are cited as investments designed to sustain a pace of strikes even if above-ground assets suffer losses. From the conversational account, targeting logic centers on U.S. military infrastructure in the region: bases, supply nodes, and maritime assets that enable long-distance power projection. Iran’s aim is to disrupt the operational calculus of any strike force—by threatening logistics, refueling assets, and command-and-control nodes—so that the geographic proximity advantage enjoyed by Washington’s allies can be rendered brittle. The interlocutors suggest that the U.S. faces a consequential choice: either accept a degree of vulnerability to asymmetric Iranian strikes or commit to an escalatory campaign that risks wide-area economic and military fallout. There is also an economic component to the missile strategy: the capacity to interdict or threaten key maritime routes increases Iran’s leverage by elevating global commodity prices and stressing the economies of nations dependent on Gulf supplies. By tying military and economic coercion together, Teheran can multiply the strategic returns on its weapons development. ## Iran’s security approach and Gulf states The conversation advances a counterintuitive case: Iran’s security policy, from Tehran’s perspective, is about removing perceived regional threats rather than exporting instability. That rationale frames Iranian actions as defensive—aimed at preventing encirclement and hostile regimes from establishing proximate capabilities that

Iran War Round 3: Tehran Prepares Knock- Out Blow | Prof. S.M. Marandi While the US lives in fantasy world about the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran has been busy preparing for the next phase of the war, which doubtlessly the US will restart once more. Since there is no diplomatic solution, Tehran is coming around to the conclusion that with the next battle, a decisive military change in the region must occur—in the US satellites. Prof. Seyed Mohammad Marandi joins me to discuss daily life in Tehran, Iran’s trade routes under blockade, the risk of renewed US attacks, Saudi Arabia’s position, missile strategy, and relations with Gulf states. He argues that Iran seeks to remove regional threats rather than spread instability, and recommends books for understanding Iran. Links: Seyed Mohammad Marandi on X: https://x.com/s_m_marandi Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00:00:00 Tehran after the bombing 00: 04:18 Iran’s trade routes and the blockade 00:11:39 Risk of a renewed US war 00:20:28 Saudi- Pakistan-Türkiye agreement 00:24:03 Could Saudi Arabia become unstable? 00:28:18 Iran’s missile strategy and US bases 00:38:07 Iran’s security approach and Gulf states 00:47:20 Where to follow Marandi and read more #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies today for an update with the always brilliant Professor Saeed Mohammad Marandi. Professor Marandi, welcome back. Thank you very much for inviting me. A great pleasure. Well, thank you very much for actually discussing again with us the situation in your hometown of Tehran, or the general situation of what's going on. We are currently in a kind of a weird phase. It's kind of not peace, but no more bombing, right? Can you maybe describe a bit the situation on this August the 13th? #Marandi Yes, for the time being at least. Excuse me. For the time being, at least, that's what is going on. There's, of course, a siege going on. The Americans have blocked all Iranian ports, which is an act of war itself. But there's no bombing, and life is normal in Tehran and across the country. If you come to Tehran and walk on the streets or take a bus or a taxi or take the metro, it'll seem very normal. You probably would not see any destroyed buildings because Tehran is huge. And in any case, most of those buildings have been torn down and they're being rebuilt. So you probably wouldn't see them anyway. But while businesses are active and restaurants are full and shops are full of people doing shopping, if you ask shop owners or businesses, I would assume that most of them would say business is not very good. -- 1 of 14 -- Inflation is pretty high. And the economic situation is more difficult than it was half a year ago, for obvious reasons. One is the siege, the sanctions, of course, that the collective West have imposed on Iran for many, many, many years, and the fact that the United States and the Israeli regime did bomb critical infrastructure. They bombed Iran's steel industry. They bombed petrochemical plants. They bombed Iran's natural gas production facilities. And, of course, they bombed homes and apartment blocks and brought down many apartment buildings. Let's say a 15-minute, 20-minute walk from here, there's an apartment building that was completely destroyed in an airstrike. They destroyed the whole building, I assume seeking a person. Apparently, I'm not quite sure, but apparently the former foreign minister lived there. They killed him and his wife, but also the entire building was destroyed and neighbors were killed. So, you know, the damage is extensive. Hospitals, multiple hospitals, were destroyed or damaged. In the latest attacks, a children's cancer hospital in the city of Ahvaz was attacked and had to be emptied. So there's a lot of damage. And yet, if you walk around, you won't notice any of it. It looks just like any normal city, Tehran. In fact, if you come to Tehran, it's a very nice city. They take the trash every night, the city does. It's clean. It's pretty advanced. It's not Shanghai, but among cities that I've visited across the world, it's one of the better ones. So despite all the sanctions and war and everything. #Pascal So, and how is the situation now developing with the non-West, like the trade relations with China and the relationship with Russia, now that Iran has withstood half a year of this warfare? And as you put it, the United States seems to believe that you can put an entire country under siege now with a blockade, a naval blockade. But there are, of course, trade links. And we've seen the Americans have been trying to smash also your land trade links with your railways and your road infrastructure. They seem to have the idea that if you can just strangle long and hard enough, in the end Iran will crack and break. It seems to me they are now settling in for a long war, a long siege. How is that developing, and is Iran able to keep its trade relationship with the non-West going? #Marandi Yes, well, the Americans tried that already. After the 40 days of fighting, where it began with Trump demanding unconditional surrender and ultimately failing, and he had to accept the Iranian 14-point plan as the framework for negotiations, a new brilliant idea came to his mind, and that was siege warfare. And he carried that out for more than two months. And it didn't work. And it was leading the globe towards disaster. So he accepted the MOU, the Memorandum of Understanding. And he justified it by saying that, "I don't want to be a Herbert Hoover." In other words, "I don't want to preside over another economic depression." So the siege warfare didn't work well then, and I don't think it's going to work well for the United States now either. Iran, just as it outlasted Trump back then, it'll outlast him now. I think the result of this war actually has been that Iran is diversifying its trade routes. -- 2 of 14 -- It's stressing on developing its routes to Central Asia, to China. In other words, Iran is appreciating even more than before the Belt and Road Initiative. So trade routes to Pakistan, or through Pakistan, through Afghanistan, but also to Pakistan and Afghanistan, are being developed. Central Asia, of course, the Caspian Sea, Caucasus, and of course Turkey and Iraq. So Iran has many land routes that it can use, and it's now trying to develop them further and as fast as possible to compensate for the problems. Of course, the problems will continue to exist, and they will bite. But Iran has been dealing with maximum pressure sanctions from the West, as I said before, for many years now. So there have been long periods when Iran effectively wasn't able to export oil. So it's not as if this is a completely unprecedented situation. #Pascal Hey, just a very quick note. The best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on neutralitystudies.com. Links below. See you there. #Marandi On the other hand, the Strait of Hormuz is closed for the most part. Very few ships pass through, and that, of course, is making the global economic situation worse. What Trump was worried about last time when he signed the MOU is what he should be, and probably is, worrying about today as well. So not only are crude shortages growing, especially now that Saudi Arabia has provoked Yemen and has started a war with Yemen, and Yemen is also imposing a siege on Saudi Arabia because the Saudis have imposed a siege on Yemen for many years. Now Yemen is returning the favor. So the Bab al-Mandab Strait is closed to Saudi oil. So the oil installations, its tankers, are being targeted by Yemen. And with the situation in the Strait of Hormuz as it is now, the crude shortage is growing, but also the shortages for all sorts of goods are accumulating: sulfur, helium, all sorts of different petrochemicals, LNG. And basically, the global economy is in need of all sorts of supplies from the Persian Gulf region, and they're just not available anymore. The fertilizers, which some are saying will create starvation in parts of the world in the coming year, God forbid—these are all getting worse by the day. So the United States, by imposing this siege on Iran, is imposing a siege on the world, just as it did a couple of months ago. So we'll have to see how that plays out. But the difference between Iran and the United States is that the Iranians are fighting for their survival. This is a war that was imposed upon them, and they've seen the intentions of the United States. When Trump speaks about exterminating the Iranian nation, the Iranians look and see what the Israeli regime and the Americans are doing in -- 3 of 14 -- Gaza, how they're exterminating Palestinians. And they know that if they show weakness, these two regimes or the Zionist lobby in the United States will destroy and decimate Iran. So the resilience of the Iranian people is extraordinary. And it is so also because of their cultural background, their culture, their civilizational heritage, their particular religious ideology as Shia Muslims. This has made them very resilient, and we've seen that in the funeral, how the people were united, how they came together. On the other hand, for the Americans, this is a war of choice, and Americans are opposed to this war, and it's not being waged for the American people. And so I don't see how the United States is going to be able to—how the American people are going to tolerate the difficulties that lie ahead because of the shortages and remain indifferent. So I think it's very clear that time is not on the side of Trump and that he's not going to win this war. #Pascal It's good that you're mentioning that because it seems to me that right now the U.S. seems to, you know, shift towards—well, the siege seems to shift toward a long war because shock and awe definitely failed. Regime change, a quick one, failed. Even the idea of, like, reviving the warfare failed. However, the situation, how it is at the moment, doesn't prevent the United States from sporadically doing another bombing campaign or whatnot. It doesn't prevent the United States from threatening an invasion and doing sporadic troop buildup. And it doesn't prevent the United States from trying to cause as much economic hurt to Iran as possible. And if we look at this, it seems to start to resemble the way that they approached Assad in Syria. And, you know, it took them 10 years. But after 10 years, they won with the help of their allies in the region, especially Turkey. And now, just about 10 days ago, we saw how Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan are forming something that people call an alliance, although I don't really think it is anything close to NATO. But if anything, it might signal the beginning of the outsourcing, right? The Americans love to outsource their wars. They love other people to implement their foreign policy for them, especially when it hurts everybody in the region except for Israel, right? But this strategy seems to be forming again. What do you make of it? And what do you think is Iran's approach toward it? #Marandi Well, there are a number of things here. One is, you're right that the Americans may actually begin striking Iran again. American forces in Saudi Arabia, in Jordan, in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, they've gathered, they're prepared, and the Iranians have noticed that over the past few weeks, the United States has become more prepared for some sort of operation and some sort of war against Iran. And some believe it could last between 10 days and two weeks. It's unclear. It doesn't mean it's going to happen, but the way in which they've arranged their forces in these countries and, of course, their naval assets seems to indicate that they're prepared for something -- 4 of 14 -- that may last 10 days or t