Malta's Former Top-Diplomat REVEALS: Quiet Revolution of BRICS and NAM | Evarist Bartolo

## Malta's geography and the logic of neutrality Malta's long history as a crossroads in the central Mediterranean helps explain why neutrality became more than a rhetorical stance; it was a strategic, economic and social necessity. The conversation with Evarist Bartolo repeatedly returns to the island’s geography: a deep, year‑round natural harbour and a position between Southern Europe and North Africa made Malta valuable to seafaring empires long before the modern state system. That value, however, did not translate into local agency. Malta’s strategic significance invited control rather than partnership, and it is precisely this reality that shaped the island’s choice — and later declaration — of neutrality. Rather than emerging from abstract ideology, Malta’s nonalignment was a pragmatic response to colonial and military pressures. As Bartolo recounts, the British retained military control because navies and imperial planners regarded Malta as a lynchpin in the route to India and beyond. For Maltese political actors who wanted a diversified civilian economy and social stability after independence, persistent foreign basing was an obstacle. Dom Mintoff’s choice to pursue non‑alignment was aimed at freeing Malta from a mono‑economic dependency on military spending and docks, and converting geopolitical marginality into economic autonomy and dignity. The Maltese example underscores how neutrality can be a tool of national development for small states squeezed by great‑power calculations. ## Imperial mindsets and the persistence of strategic outposts The exchange turns to a broader pattern: how former empires retain an imperial mindset even as they criticize similar behaviour in others. Bartolo’s historical lens highlights a continuity of attitudes — from explicit 19th‑century pronouncements that treated Malta as a mere harbour, to contemporary instances where metropolitan powers cling to overseas bases and territories. What emerges is not only hypocrisy but an institutional inertia. Empires bequeath networks of ports, airfields, and exclusive arrangements that endure well after formal decolonization. This persistence is visible across cases: islands retained as strategic outposts in the Indian Ocean, Gibraltar and the Falklands in the Atlantic, and lease arrangements that extend effective control. Bartolo’s account of how Britain quietly embedded NATO and US forces in Malta without formal Maltese consent reveals the mechanics by which sovereignty can be hollowed out: informal arrangements, military habits, and the slow normalization of a base economy. When nations rhetorically champion anti‑imperial principles while preserving imperial instruments, neutrality becomes both a moral claim and a defensive necessity for the smaller polity. ## Bandung as a rupture: anti‑colonial solidarity and a new political imagination The discussion situates the Bandung Conference in 1955 as a foundational rupture in postwar international politics. Bandung was not merely a diplomatic meeting; it was an assertion by formerly colonized peoples that they would determine their own futures. Bartolo’s narrative stresses how Bandung converted moral rhetoric — the idea that political authority rests on consent — into concerted political action by diverse states across Asia and Africa. For the first time, leaders who had been subjected to external rule met to articulate an alternative world order centered on sovereignty, economic development and dignity. Bandung’s radical potential lay in its challenge to a world organized by colonizers for their own benefit. It sought to replace extractive hierarchies with cooperative frameworks, insisting on the right of newly independent states to control their resources and developmental choices. Yet the conference was also realistic: its leaders knew that formal independence would not automatically translate into economic justice. The earliest non‑aligned leaders were primarily focused on improving the living standards of impoverished populations, not simply rearranging diplomatic alignments. This blend of moral rhetoric and practical developmental concern made Bandung a durable reference point for successive generations even as the movement’s capacity was contested. ## Coups, intervention, and the limits of non‑alignment during the Cold War The optimism of Bandung met violent resistance. One of the clearest strands of the conversation is the catalogue of interventions that sought to blunt nationalist projects which threatened existing geopolitical or economic interests. From the coup in Indonesia that toppled Sukarno to the overthrow of reformist or nationalist leaders across Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, external meddling often followed domestic moves to redistribute wealth or reduce foreign dependence. Bartolo points to the pattern: leaders who pursued national development agendas — using resource nationalism, land reform or alignment with alternative powers — were vulnerable to removal. The Cold War provided both opportunity and cover for such interventions. Western powers often interpreted independent economic policies as Soviet‑aligned threats; in turn, right‑wing domestic actors found allies in external intelligence and military services. The result was a political economy in which sovereignty could be compromised not only by gunboats but by covert action, economic coercion and the suborning of local elites. Non‑alignment offered a normative shield and a diplomatic forum, but it could not always shield countries from the hard instruments of power deployed when core interests were perceived to be at stake. ## The quiet revolution: economic rebalancing and the BRICS‑NAM convergence A pivotal theme in the latter part of the exchange is how global economic power has shifted in ways that recalibrate the original assumptions behind post‑war blocs. Over seventy years, many states that once belonged to the Non‑Aligned Movement have seen their share of the global economy grow, while the relative dominance of older Western coalitions has declined. Bartolo notes a striking fact: the aggregate GDP and demographic weight of NAM states and the emergent economies far exceed those of the old G7. This redistribution opens spaces for new cooperation and reduces the leverage that traditional metropolitan powers previously exercised. The rise of BRICS and other south‑centred initiatives constitutes what Bartolo calls a “quiet revolution.” It is quiet because it reinscribes power through trade, investment and institution‑building rather than through the overt projection of naval or military might alone. Chinese and other non‑Western state actors often frame engagement as trade and development partnerships rather than imperial tutelage — a contrast that resonates in places historically weary of intrusive Western prescriptions. For former non‑aligned states, such openings offer diversified options: access to infrastructure financing, alternative diplomatic partners, and an ability to pursue development without automatic alignment to one bloc. ## Small states and the art of strategic navigation Malta’s post‑Bandung trajectory illustrates the tightrope small states must walk in a multipolar world. Joining the European Union required concessions; it meant stepping back from formal NAM membership even while retaining a nominal neutrality. This compromise exemplifies a broader dilemma for small states: how to reconcile economic integration with political autonomy. Bartolo’s reflections highlight the pragmatic nature of Malta’s choices — seeking to anchor itself in markets and regulatory frameworks that promise prosperity while guarding against the militarization of its economy. For small but strategically located countries, neutrality is simultaneously a principle and a practice. It requires continuous diplomatic calibration, domestic policies that promote diversified economic bases, and constitutional or legal safeguards that

Malta's Former Top Diplomat on the BRICS- NAM Quiet Revolution Today I’m talking again to Evarist Bartolo, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malta. Since 2025 is the 70th anniversary of the Bandung conference which later gave birth to the nonaligned movement, and Malta used to be part of that we thought its a great time to talk about the lasting impact of Bandung. Links: Goods Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com #M3 There is something in the civilization of the West which makes it feel superior and makes it want to translate that superiority into domination and using military force, you know, to make you do what I want. Whereas from the Chinese civilization, it was, "We've come here to trade. We want to do business." I think, on the whole, that is still the difference between the different civilizations. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking again to Evarist Bartolo, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malta. Since 2025 is the 70th anniversary of the Bandung Conference, which later gave birth to the Non-Aligned Movement, and Malta used to be part of that club, I thought this is a great time to actually discuss this history and its contemporary relevance with somebody who's been working in that environment. So, Minister Bartolo, welcome back. Thank you very much. #M3 My pleasure to be here discussing this with you. #M2 Well, it was your idea, actually, which is a fantastic idea, I must say, because Bandung and the Non- Aligned Movement have, in my view, been much underrated in the history not only of the Cold War, but also of our world today. Could you maybe explain to us a little bit how Malta came to be part of the Non-Aligned Movement and what kind of importance you see in this entire 70-year history? #M3 Malta was part of the Non-Aligned Movement because, again, it wasn't an ideological choice of saying, "Let us be non-aligned." As a small country on the periphery of Southern Europe and facing -- 1 of 14 -- North Africa, we had, over our more than 8,000 years of history—especially when navigation advanced and ships could start crossing the Mediterranean, not just hugging the coast but going through the central Mediterranean—Malta became a very strategic location. If you wanted to control the central Mediterranean and the relationship between Southern Europe and Northern Africa, it was important to control Malta. Why not the other islands? Because Malta happens to have a very deep natural harbor which you can use year-round. So that's why it was Malta and not Lampedusa or Pantelleria. For 8,000 years, we were contested by the powers of the Mediterranean. Things got much more complicated for us in the 19th century when Britain entered the Mediterranean and, as you know, it was actually called the lifeline of the empire— going from London to India and passing through Gibraltar, Malta, and the Suez Canal. So it was very important to control Malta from that point of view, especially when ships couldn't travel very far because of the technology of the day. They needed to stop somewhere, take coal, take water. So that's why Malta became very important, because at first Britain was not really interested in controlling Malta. They didn't see any value in it until the admirals came to Malta—the people of the fleet. The people who were sitting in an office in London did not see Malta as important, but the people of the fleet saw Malta as very important and said, "Listen, we must control it and never let it go." Actually, the first time that the word "neutrality" was mentioned regarding Malta was in 1802, in the Treaty of Amiens, because they said, "We'll give Malta back to the Order of the Knights, but make sure that it remains neutral regarding Europe if there is a war." But then, obviously, that was very conveniently forgotten when Britain saw that Malta was very important to keep. And even when we were given independence in 1964—so I'm making now a leap of 164 years—they wanted to make sure that while they were letting go of Malta politically, militarily, Malta would still be embedded in the NATO bloc. In fact, without asking the government of Malta, they let in NATO. They let in NATO, they let the American Sixth Fleet, the fighter jets, land in Malta, and Malta became the southern headquarters of NATO without, obviously, asking the Maltese people or the Maltese government to endorse such a decision. So they wanted to make sure that Malta would be kept like this. But this was the basic difference between the two main political parties: you had the Nationalist Party, which wanted NATO to remain here, and the Labour Party, which saw that if we remained a base, this would negatively impact our economic development. Because basically, having a base in such a small country as Malta means the whole country is a base. So if you want to develop tourism, manufacturing, if you want to develop a civil economy where 60% of the workforce does not depend on the military base but has other job opportunities, the choice was either having a job at the dockyard, with the military services, or basically emigrating. Half the population of Malta had to emigrate in the '60s. This was the era of independence. So, if you want to make sure that people remain involved and have a decent life there, we had not to allow ourselves to have an economy dominated by military presence. And that is why the Labour -- 2 of 14 -- Party, through the leadership of Dom Mintoff, chose to be non-aligned. Way back in the '50s, at the same time as Bandung—we're talking 1955—Mintoff had written a very interesting article published by the New Statesman in London, "A New Future for Malta," which argued that Malta should be neutral and should not let its economy be completely dominated by a military presence, a naval military presence. And this makes Malta quite unique because when you see who met at Bandung, mostly they were African and Asian countries. Malta was the only European country then, after Mintoff met Nasser in Cairo. And Nasser told him—this was 1955, 1956—"Why don't you join APSO, which is the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, because we would support your candidacy to become independent?" Malta had not been mentioned as a likely candidate for national independence. Britain did not want to let Malta go. Though reluctantly, it knew it could not afford to keep the empire it had before. While the United States was pushing for Britain to let go of its colonies, I think not for any noble ideological reason, but because they wanted Britain to dismantle what was called the imperial preference. Imperial preference was that the British colonies among themselves would trade with very low tariffs, but then there would be high tariffs toward external countries, including the United States. And the United States, which was very worried after the Second World War that its surplus production would be too much for the American market, wanted to have global markets and viewed the former colonies of Britain as good places to have markets. So that is why the US pushed for the dissolution of the British Empire. So, we chose to be non-aligned because it also made economic sense for us. When Mintoff became prime minister in 1971, within 24 hours, he told NATO to leave. He told the admiral, Gino Berendelli, the Italian, to leave. He could do it also because there was no agreement, no treaty, no written agreement. So, the way they were brought in informally, they were told, "Pack up, pack up and leave." And in the meantime, he negotiated a new agreement with Britain so that by 1979, Malta would have no military bases. And, in its constitution in 1986, it would state that Malta would not join any military alliances, which was one of the principles of Bandung: no military alliances and no naval or military bases from which to attack other countries—another important principle from Bandung. Then fast forward to 2004, when we joined the European Union. The European Union said, "You cannot be part of a bloc. You cannot be part of the Non-Aligned Movement if you're going to join the European Union. We will respect your neutrality," and I hope that will remain constant. I hope it will remain constant. But you cannot be part of another bloc. And so, since then, we are not part of the Non-Aligned Movement. But we are still, at least nominally, neutral. So that is our story. The position of Malta is interesting because it's part of Europe, but at the same time, it's in the Mediterranean. So it's a Euro-Mediterranean country, which means its position has to be very sensitive towards Africa, because obviously we are very much aware that Africa is such a close neighbor of Europe. But also, we have been educated by history that Malta is an intersection of Europe, Africa, and Asia. We tend to forget that. We tend to think that Asia is far away. So it is our -- 3 of 14 -- geographic reality and our history that made us aware of a wider world beyond the Mediterranean, including Africa, Europe, obviously, and Asia. #M2 Yeah, you know, I keep saying the Europeans keep forgetting that Europe is really just the western peninsula of the Eurasian continent. I mean, it's one single landmass—they are connected. But what you're referring to is, of course, the West Asian part of the Middle East, right? To which Malta connects. #M3 Obviously, we have to go back to history to understand why Europe has developed such a Eurocentric, self-important perception in the world—to the extent that even when we make our maps, we decide that Europe is actually bigger than it really is, to put it center stage on the maps, and to put it on top, with Africa and quite a lot of other countries below Europe. So even the way maps have been constructed in the last 500 or 600 years is an ideological construction, you know, but it reinforces the idea that you are very important, that you have ruled the world, and that you still want to continue to rule the world. #M2 No, absolutely. But, you know, the story you just told me—or us—about Malta, how Malta became independent again, reminds me so much of what's happening right now in the Indian Ocean with Diego Garcia, right? The UK is finally being forced to give back a couple of islands, but keeping the largest one for another 49 years, right? And also leasing it to the United States and making sure that even on the other islands, Mauritius will not be allowed to make agreements with any other power within 26 nautical miles of the islands. I mean, this is coming from the United Kingdom, which accuses other states—Russia and China—of being imperial, of having imperial ambitions, while they themselves still possess all of these outposts. We don't even need to speak of Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands. Can you explain this imperial mindset, while being so afraid of everybody else being imperial? #M3 Well, again, let's go a bit back into history. So in the 1830s and 1840s, in Malta, they were asking for the liberty of the press. It had just started developing in Britain itself. And in Malta, they said, "Listen, we need to have the liberty of the press as well." Britain had promised that it would respect national sovereignty and that the kind of local government that Malta had before the Knights would be revived. That didn't happen. When they asked for liberty of the press, there was a big discussion in the Houses of Parliament and even in the House of Lords about whether Malta should be granted liberty of the press. -- 4 of 14 -- And there is a famous speech by the Duke of Wellington, who stood up and said, "Listen, are you crazy? Do we give liberty of the press to our ships? Do we give liberty of the press to barracks? Malta is a harbor, is a port, and nothing else. So the Maltese do not count. What's important is that there is a harbor, which is very important for our strategic control of the Mediterranean and as a gateway to other continen