EPIC Loss For Anti-China Hawks In Taiwan. This Changes Everything. | Dr. Joanna Lei

## Interpreting the KMT Recall Outcome The mass recall effort against 31 Kuomintang (KMT) legislators — 24 of whom ultimately faced ballots on July 22 — was meant to be a decisive referendum on the party’s standing and on broader Taiwan-China politics. Instead it produced a striking political rebuke to the recall campaign itself: all 24 MPs were reaffirmed by their constituencies. Far from demonstrating the KMT’s fragility, the result showed a more complicated dynamic. Voters did not hand an easy victory to the DPP-aligned civic groups; they registered skepticism about using recall as a blunt instrument and, in many districts, plainly resisted a narrative that painted large swathes of the opposition as traitors for being “pro-China.” Dr. Joanna Lei, drawing on her experience within the KMT and Taiwan’s legislative politics, emphasizes three features that made this recall unusual: it was initiated at the highest levels of the DPP’s political apparatus even as it was presented through civic organizations; it was indiscriminately targeted at all KMT-held districts rather than at legislators with specific legal or ethical lapses; and it largely lacked the traditional legal premises that have justified recalls in the past. Those characteristics help explain why many voters appear to have treated the campaign as partisan maneuvering rather than a legitimate corrective of malfeasance. The quantitative picture matters. About 6.2 million ballots were cast across these contests — roughly one-third of eligible voters. Among them, 2.3 million voted against recalls while 1.6 million voted in favor. That 11-percentage-point gap in contested districts suggests the electorate was not merely split; in many places there was a measurable pushback against the premise that KMT legislators deserved removal. The margin speaks to both the durability of local incumbency and a fatigue with hyper-partisan tactics that seek to unsettle the legislative balance outside of a general election. ## Impact of Failed Recalls on Upcoming Votes The failure of the first round reshapes the political calculus ahead of the second round of recalls scheduled for August 23. The remaining seven contested districts did not initially clear the second-stage signature threshold and therefore represent a different set of political realities: stronger incumbents, deeper local networks, and often higher margins of personal support. That makes them harder targets. But the legal and prosecutorial responses introduced earlier this year complicate predictions. Recall law amendments lowered procedural thresholds in 2016 and — more consequentially — added potential criminal penalties for signature forgery and other abuses in late 2023 and early 2024. Those changes give prosecutors discretionary tools to intervene in recall campaigns, including the capacity to detain suspects under statutes that treat certain signature offenses as imprisonable crimes. The result is twofold: civic groups collecting signatures now operate under heightened legal risk, and partisan actors can weaponize investigations to chill or discredit opponents’ mobilization efforts. Consequently, even if the political momentum appears to favor the incumbents in many districts, institutional actors — courts, prosecutors, and election-management bodies — are now more consequential arbiters of whether a recall proceeds. That institutionalization of enforcement, intentionally or not, raises the political stakes for groups attempting to use recalls as a mechanism to overturn a legislative majority. It also means that future outcomes may be determined as much by legal rulings and administrative gatekeeping as by voter sentiment alone. ## Public Sentiment on Pro/Anti-China Politics The recalls were framed by many organizers as a binary test of loyalty: pro-Taiwan versus pro-China. Yet the electorate’s response suggests this framing oversimplified public sentiment. Many voters who rejected the recalls did so not because they endorse closer ties with Beijing but because they rejected the tactics and the sweeping accusation that entire parties or districts had betrayed Taiwan. For a substantial slice of voters, the recalls appeared as partisan theater rather than a necessary corrective to corruption or malfeasance. Dr. Lei argues that the DPP and allied civic groups miscalculated the potency of the anti-China card. In districts where recall backers expected turnout to swell, results plateaued near the mid-20s for recall votes, showing an apparent ceiling for the campaign’s appeal. Voters are evidently sensitive to policy substance and governance capability — tariffs, disaster response, and everyday municipal concerns — and may punish perceived neglect of those priorities more than they punish perceived softness on China. That said, Beijing’s presence in the political environment cannot be entirely discounted. The People’s Republic of China publicly welcomed the failure of the recall, albeit cautiously to avoid appearing to meddle directly in local contests. The DPP’s response — branding the result as evidence of mainland influence or infiltration — reveals a political strategy of delegitimizing the opposition’s support by linking it to foreign interference. Whether that linkage is persuasive to most voters is doubtful; the data suggest instead that many citizens used the ballots to signal a desire for political stability and an end to relentless partisan escalation. ## Role of NGOs and Foreign Influence in Taiwan The recalls underscore the increasing centrality of civic groups in Taiwan’s political life. But their prominence raises hard questions about transparency, funding, and foreign entanglement. Civic organizations played a central operational role in initiating and driving the recall signature campaigns. At the same time, accusations floated during and after the vote point to international actors — not only the PRC but also U.S.-linked groups with capacity for social-media campaigns and data monitoring — as exerting influence in varied ways. Dr. Lei notes that influence is multidirectional: international actors that support Taiwan’s democratic resilience may also be active in social-media ecosystems that shape public sentiment. Meanwhile, domestic civic groups can be vehicles for party messaging disguised as grassroots activism. The result is a dense and contested civic space in which external resources, digital campaigning, and local grievances interact. This makes it harder for voters to parse authentic grassroots energy from coordinated political pressure and for analysts to attribute causation to any single external influence. The legal amendments governing recall procedures have sought to address malpractice — notably forgery and fraudulent signature collection — but they risk chilling legitimate civic engagement if enforced heavy-handedly. Prosecutorial intervention can deter bad actors, yet the selective use of such powers risks appearing partisan. For a democracy that relies on a robust civic sphere, the balance between curbing abuse and preserving citizens’ right to petition for recalls has become a central institutional question. ## Can the KMT Build Ties with Mainland China? A recurring accusation during the recall campaign was that KMT legislators are “pro-China.” The electorate’s rejection of the recall does not equate to a mandate for immediate rapprochement with Beijing, but it does clear space for the KMT to recalibrate its approach to cross-strait ties. Dr. Lei argues that the KMT faces a structural challenge: building pragmatic channels with the mainland without triggering domestic backlash or feeding narratives of betrayal. The practical constraints are both political and social. Domestically, any visible rapproachment invites framing as a sellout to Beijing; externally, China’s own political objectives and coercive tools limit the kind of reciprocal gestures that could build public confidence. The KMT’s st

EPIC Loss For Anti-China Hawks In Taiwan. This Changes Everything Today I’m talking again to Dr. Joanna Lei, a former KMT lawmaker in Taiwan as well as a media executive in the US. Today is August 7th and only 10 days ago, on the last weekend of July we had a rather important extraordinary election in Taiwan. 24 KMT parliamentiarns were under the threat of being unseated in a mass-recall. Now, recalls are a proper constitutional measure in Taiwan to take down law makers before their mandate is over. It’s a bit like an impeachment for a president— sometimes if someone did something criminal or outrageous, you might wanna get rid of them before their time is officially over. However, what we have never seen is a coordinated attack on so many parliamentarians at the same time and all of them against KMT members, that is the party holding the majority in parliament but not the executive branch which is held by President Lai Ching- te, a DPP politician. Now, the recall failed epically, all 24 MPs were reaffirmed by their constituencies. What this means is what we wanna discuss today. Links: Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:01:36 Interpreting the KMT Recall Outcome 00:03:33 Was the Recall an Attempt to Overturn Parliament? 00:10:48 Impact of Failed Recalls on Upcoming Votes 00:14:40 Law Changes and Recall Abuse vs. Democracy 00:16:07 Public Sentiment on Pro/Anti-China Politics 00:18:00 Voter Motivation & Possible Chinese Interference 00:23:11 Role of NGOs and Foreign Influence in Taiwan 00:29:45 Political Impact of the Second Recall Round 00:35:02 Can the KMT Build Ties with Mainland China? 00:38:36 Why Political Cooperation With Mainland Remains Difficult 00:41:23 Will the DPP Rethink Foreign & Economic Policy? 00:46:20 Current Political Balance in Taiwan #M2 Hello everybody, this is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking again to Dr. Joanna Lei, a former KMT lawmaker in Taiwan, as well as a media executive in the US. Today is August 7, and only about 10 days ago, on the last weekend of July, we had a rather important, extraordinary election in Taiwan. Twenty-four KMT parliamentarians were under the threat of being unseated in a so-called mass recall or general recall. Now, recalls are a proper constitutional measure in Taiwan to remove lawmakers before their mandate is over. It's a little bit like an impeachment for a president, because sometimes if somebody did something criminal or outrageous, you might want to get them out of office before their term is officially over. However, what we have never seen is a coordinated attack on so many parliamentarians at the same time, and all of them against KMT members. That is the party, of course, holding the majority in parliament at the moment, but not the executive branch, which is held by President Lai Ching-te, a DPP politician. Now, the recall failed spectacularly. All 24 MPs were reaffirmed by their constituencies. What this means is what we want to discuss today. So, Joanna, welcome back. -- 1 of 16 -- #F1 Thank you for having me. #M2 Well, thank you for agreeing to this, because it's not always clear how to interpret local politics in Taiwan. And since you've been working in it yourself and are engaged with it, I think you can give us quite a bit of perspective. Clearly, I mean, you're obviously supporting the KMT side, but I would like to know about that. How are you interpreting this, being from the party that was so severely, really kind of attacked on the legislative level? How are you reading what happened? #F1 Well, I think we should term it a general recall instead of a "great recall," which is a term used by the DPP. They thought that this great recall would give them a great success in overturning the KMT plus TPP majority in the Legislative Yuan. So the overall goal was to target all 31 districts held by KMT MPs. And if they got recalled—even if only six or seven were recalled—then the DPP could overturn the majority held by the coalition of KMT and TPP. So there are three characteristics that set this recall apart from others. The first one is that it's initiated by the highest level of the party, even though they veiled it under civic organizations. Secondly, all MPs—all 31—were targeted for recall indiscriminately. So there was no separation between good or bad, or satisfactory or unsatisfactory MPs. The third point is that there were no real legal reasons to recall them. They weren't involved in corruption, embezzlement, or any other legal issues. In our previous recalls, there was usually a legal matter involved—the nine failed recalls of individual MPs were based on legal reasons. But this recall is party-initiated, indiscriminate, without any legal basis, and purely on political grounds. #M2 Yeah, although it must be said that there's one more thing I want to clarify for everybody: we have three parties that are very important in your parliament—the KMT, the DPP, which also holds the presidency, and the TPP, right, with a T, not with a D. So the TPP and the KMT are basically the opposition that are now able to block the DPP in parliament. And that is a very unsatisfactory situation, of course, because the ruling— I mean, the executive branch doesn't have the legislative branch behind it. And what this seems like from the outside is an attempt to overturn that without calling a general election, but by only targeting individual members. Now, the DPP actually says that the KMT tried to counterattack them and also recall DPP members, but failed at the initial stage. So, in order to do a recall, you first need to gather a certain number of signatures in those constituencies. And the DPP -- 2 of 16 -- managed to do that—or DPP supporters managed to do that—in these 31 districts. But in the districts for the DPP members, the KMT's counterattack failed. Is that a fair assessment? #F1 It is a clear assessment. Let me just add something. We have five branches of government: legislative, executive, judicial, and then we have two other branches which are unique to Taiwan. One is supervisory, and another is for national examination. All five are currently held by the DPP, with the exception of the legislative branch. So the other four branches are tied together with the executive power. Whoever wins the presidency will hold the other four branches. So the legislative branch is the only branch where you can have a meaningful opposition. Therefore, the overturning of an opposition majority would be very critical—if it happens, all five branches would be under the DPP, which could be characterized as a totalitarian system. Now, going back to your second question, recall has three phases. The first phase is that you need to have 1% of the signatures. The second phase is you need to get 10% of the signatures in order to call an election, a ballot. And the third one is you need to have more than 25% of the local electors agreeing with the recall, and the number of those disagreeing must be smaller than that 25%. So there are two thresholds: more than 25% agreeing, and the number of those who disagree has to be smaller. So if the number who disagree is higher, then you still don't recall them. The current DPP-led, or DPP-associated groups-led, recall has passed the first and second phases, so we held the first phase of election or balloting on July 22nd, and there will be a second phase on August 23rd. Now, the counter-recall is actually a defensive move. When all DPP members were recalled, and then when all KMT members were recalled or subject to recall, KMT's legislators said, "Hey, wait a second, why are we going back to the public and being revoted? Why isn't it like in a normal democracy, where if the Legislative Yuan doesn't pass anything, then the executive branch will send it back to the Legislative Yuan? If the Legislative Yuan still doesn't agree, then you dismiss the Congress and go for a general re-election to get a new mandate." So now, with this so-called general recall, only the opposition members got re-elected or are subject to re-election. The ruling party members are sitting very comfortably in the Legislative Yuan. So the counter-recall is to address that particular problem and ask everybody to go back to the public and have everyone re-elected, examined by all the constituencies. However, the KMT-related group-led recalls were subject to extremely high scrutiny by the prosecutorial branch, by the police and prosecutors, and they were then sent to court. So none of them actually passed the 10% threshold. Therefore, you only have KMT members subject to the July 22nd balloting and the August 23rd balloting. #M2 -- 3 of 16 -- So, yeah, and one of the things that the DPP keeps saying is that it didn't initiate that recall as a party. These were separate NGOs, civil society groups that are just so fed up with KMT politics that they thought it was now necessary. I think the allegation against the 31 lawmakers is that they are too pro-China, that they are not for Taiwan enough, that they are basically traitors and therefore need to be unseated. But the DPP had no hand in this—it's the official party line. #F1 Okay, let me address it in two ways. The first is that the first public announcement or outcry for recall was initiated by the most senior party whip of the DPP in the Legislative Yuan, Ke Jianming. He is the most senior member in the LY at this moment—there's no one more senior than him. And he's been the senior party whip of the DPP for as long as you can remember. So he initiated this. Then you have a lot of civic groups organizing individual district-level recall movements, gathering signatures, and so on and so forth. That is correct. But towards the end, before July 22nd and 26th, you had, starting from Lai Ching-te, Cho Jung-tai, and also the Minister of Internal Affairs, all the MPs, and a lot of local officials all coming out, standing on the platforms of those civic organizations and calling on people to recall the KMT members. And the battle cry is your second point. The battle cry of all this is that we, the DPP, are anti-China and protecting Taiwan. They, the KMT, are pro-China and selling out Taiwan. And therefore, all the KMT members are not to be trusted and should be recalled. So the battle cry was at the highest level, even in Taiwan's local presidential election. And those were articulated or voiced by the highest level of DPP members. So the bookends—the beginning and the end—have direct involvement of DPP members. And even President Lai Ching-te gave the so-called unity speeches to promote further escalation of the recall movement. So he himself is directly involved. There is no denying that the DPP initiated, or at least announced it initially, and then pushed the final phase at the end of the day. #M2 Now, I mean, since all 24 recalls that happened 10 days ago failed, the electorate chose to reappoint these people. It sends a pretty strong message, doesn't it? And what kind of light does it shed on the soon-to-come remaining seven or so recalls that will be voted on at the end of this month, right? #F1 Well, the other seven are more difficult to be defeated, quote unquote, by the DPP because they didn't pass the initial 10%—the second phase 10% threshold—and needed to be pushed back and back so that they're in the second phase. So these are more senior players, politicians with stronger -- 4 of 16 -- local support, so they are harder to recall. However, the use of prosecutorial or judicial forces will probably still play a role, and also the organizations managing this election or the mechanism of this election may still come into play. So people still have to be very careful. I added the judiciary as well as prosecutorial forces because, in our general law of recall, 2016 saw the first major amendment to lower the thresholds to 1%, 10%, and 25%. But the second largest amendment happened at the end of last year into early this year, which introduced c