Iran Checkmate: US War-Regime COLLAPSING Fast | Danny Haiphong

## Introduction The conversation captured in this exchange returns us to a stark geopolitical truth: the post-1945 order that once allowed Washington to project near-uncontested power is fraying under the pressure of determined regional actors and a reconfigured global economy. What emerges from the discussion is not a simple narrative of American retreat but a more complex diagnosis: a United States whose elites appear willing to gamble national and global stability to preserve geopolitical prerogatives, while rising powers — notably Iran, Russia, and China — exploit both material leverage and discursive opportunity to reshape the balance of power. Danny Haiphong’s analysis insists that the contest is as much about narrative and legitimacy as it is about missiles and oil tankers. The stakes are a new multipolarity that could either stabilize international relations through pluralism or destabilize the global economy through episodic, high-risk conflicts. ## The state of the US empire The United States is not simply declining in a linear sense; it is experiencing multidimensional stress. The conversation emphasizes that material constraints — depleted ammunition stockpiles, eroded air defenses, stretched logistics — have real effects on Washington’s capacity to sustain high-intensity operations. Yet these logistical limits do not automatically translate into strategic retreat. Instead, Haiphong argues, the American ruling class is making an explicit calculation: to commit whatever remains of its resources in a long, grinding confrontation if doing so might prevent the consolidation of rival centers of power. That calculus explains the persistence of escalation even in the face of tactical setbacks. This is a paradoxical form of imperial behavior. An empire that can no longer secure clear victories still seeks to extract short-term profit and maintain structures of dominance. The pursuit of prolonged conflict becomes an instrument of domestic rent-seeking — a way for the military-industrial complex and affiliated elites to secure contracts, influence, and political advantage even as the macro-strategic picture deteriorates. Haiphong’s point is not merely that the U.S. is losing wars but that loss has been reframed as a tolerable cost if the long-term distribution of global influence remains favorable to the ruling class. ## US public anger and elite interests Public opinion in the United States, according to the exchange, is increasingly at odds with elite policy. Polls show broad opposition to renewed military aggression in Iran, reflecting a population fatigued by perpetual war and squeezed by stagnant real wages, rising costs, and economic insecurity. Haiphong highlights a critical political asymmetry: elites who benefit from militarized foreign policy are insulated from its domestic costs, while the general populace bears the consequences through worsening living standards and the risk of economic upheaval. This divergence has political implications but not an immediate corrective effect. Structural features of American politics — disenfranchisement, polarized media, and the influence of money — mute the translation of popular anger into policy reversal. The conversation suggests a tipping dynamic rather than an imminent collapse: anger may slowly erode trust in institutions and catalyze shifts in party alignments and local races, but only over time will that domestic pressure compel a fundamental reorientation of foreign policy. In the meantime, the ruling class can exploit short-term gains, deepening the disjuncture between elite interests and public welfare. ## Iran, Russia and China’s soft power One of the most striking insights in the discussion is how states like Iran, Russia, and China are exercising influence in ways that transcend conventional military metrics. Iran’s recent campaign, for instance, combined calibrated military strikes with a savvy information strategy that resonated with many international audiences. The Iranians displayed restraint in some technical domains — avoiding an overt nuclear escalation and not targeting the U.S. homeland — while demonstrating the ability to disrupt global energy flows via the Strait of Hormuz. That combination of military restraint and tactical leverage proved potent. Russia’s experience in Ukraine illustrates a different pattern: battlefield resilience without equally effective narrative outreach in Western media spaces. China’s influence, meanwhile, is more systemic, rooted in economic integration, infrastructure investment, and the appeal of a development model that many nations now find attractive. Haiphong frames these three countries as exemplars of power through sovereignty: they refuse to be subordinated to Western diktat and, in doing so, offer a model for others. Soft power here is not merely cultural persuasion; it is the ability to present an alternative geopolitical project that promises concrete material benefits and relative autonomy from Western coercion. ## Economic sovereignty and Western decline Economic sovereignty emerges from the conversation as the nucleus of contemporary strategic competition. Iran’s capacity to threaten the Persian Gulf choke point demonstrated that control over energy routes can translate into disproportionate leverage over global markets. Beijing’s deep trade ties and growing self-reliance in key sectors insulated it from some sanctions and permitted more assertive economic maneuvering. For Haiphong, economic sovereignty — the ability of states to shield themselves from external financial and trade pressures — is now a primary determinant of geopolitical resilience. This reality accelerates the perceived decline of Western hegemony. The West’s capacity to weaponize finance and trade has been undermined by decoupling trends, new payment mechanisms, and the sheer scale of non-Western markets. More than that, the conversation points to a moral and ideological erosion: the narrative of Western exceptionalism is losing purchase as countries compare lived results. When development and diplomacy from non-Western states appear more reliable than coercive Western policies, the normative foundation of the old order weakens. That decline, Haiphong warns, is not benign; it will provoke desperate countermeasures from elites who see their privileged position threatened. ## What the West can still contribute Despite the critique, the discussion retains a pragmatic view of what a post-imperial West might still offer. The West can contribute institutional expertise, technological innovation, and governance experience — but only if it reframes those capacities toward cooperative ends rather than unilateral domination. Haiphong suggests that a genuine contribution would require humility: accepting multipolarity, relinquishing coercive instruments that undermine global public goods, and investing in shared infrastructure, climate resilience, and debt relief programs that uplift rather than subordinate. Practically, this means a Western policy reset that privileges economic partnerships, multilateral dispute resolution, and development assistance decoupled from political conditionalities. Such a shift would also demand domestic reforms: addressing inequality and restoring civic trust so citizens do not view foreign adventurism as a necessary path to prosperity for a select few. The conversation underscores that the West’s remaining soft power — credibility, liberal institutional frameworks, scientific collaboration — will wither if it continues to equate strength with military coercion and elite enrichment. Conclusion The exchange with Danny Haiphong compels a sober rethinking of power in the 21st century. We are not witnessing a neat U.S. collapse nor a seamless ascendancy of a new hegemon; we are seeing the advent of a more contested, networked international system where economic sovereignty, strategic patience, and narrative legitimacy matter as muc

Iran Checkmate: US War-Regime COLLAPSING Fast | Danny Haiphong American journalist Danny Haiphong joins Pascal Lottaz to discuss the Iran war, US power, public anger in the United States, and the rise of a multipolar world. They examine Iran’s military and media strategy, China’s growing appeal, Russia’s role, economic sovereignty, and what a post- imperial West could contribute to a more balanced global system. Links: Danny Haiphong YouTube: https://youtube.com/@geopoliticshaiphong The Chronicles of Haiphong Substack: https://chroniclesofhaiphong.substack.com Danny Haiphong on X: https://x.com/GeopoliticsDH Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com /shop Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:00:30 The state of the US empire 00:09:42 US public anger and elite interests 00:20:16 Iran, Russia and China’s soft power 00:35:20 Economic sovereignty and Western decline 00:43:36 What the West can still contribute #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies, today again with the wonderful American journalist Danny Haiphong. Danny, welcome back. It's great to be back. Thank you very much for saying yes to this. You have one of the wonderful YouTube channels that constantly provides very important updates on the wars, on the U.S. empire, on what's happening inside and outside. And I recommend to everybody to check out your YouTube channel under your name, Danny Haiphong, of course. But today I wanted to ask you a little bit more about the macro picture. What do you make of the position the U.S. empire is in at the moment? Especially now—we're talking on July 17th, your 16th in the evening—and it seems to me that this Iran war business is getting worse and worse for the United States, but that they somehow run out of ideas. Therefore, just bomb a little bit more until you can't anymore. #Danny Haiphong Well, thanks again, Pascal. It's a good question, what state the U.S. empire is in, because I believe many are confused, especially because it appeared with the MOU, which many prominent analysts and commentators called a surrender document. Many had rightfully said that the United States was defeated by Iran during those 40 days of hostilities that spanned from February 28th to early April. And then we had this MOU document, which was supposed to be exactly what it said it was—a memorandum of understanding, really the basis for talks to end the war, not an end to the war, as many people wrongfully assumed. Now that's completely torn up. And so a lot of people are asking, well, how could this be? -- 1 of 15 -- Many have said that the United States is running out of ammunition, running out of key stockpiles of ammunition, major weaponry. It is running out of air defenses, and this is particularly clear now as we see Iran's retaliation—its drone strikes, its missile strikes—essentially get wherever they want and hit very key targets in Kuwait, in Bahrain, for example. And so the question is, well, how would the United States keep doing this? Well, the thing about dwindling stockpiles, the thing about surrender, the thing about all the various factors that we could analyze about why the United States lost this war, don't really matter to an empire that is not only rapidly in decline but controlled by an elite that sees this war as existential for its future, for its very existence. Many, I believe now, there are many who said that the United States has no interest in being in this war, and that would apply to the majority of the population. But it does not apply to the ruling class that actually believes that sacrificing everything—the global economy, the military apparatus, the military infrastructure of the United States—essentially risking maybe the future of the U.S. as a hegemon itself, is all worth it if one of the major pillars, and maybe the most important gateway to the multipolar world, is taken out, and that is Iran. So it appears what's happening actually is that the United States elites, they are making a calculation that they will actually draw down all of their stockpiles. They will risk the global economy going to $200 a barrel per oil, a major worldwide depression. I mean, a worldwide depression is built into the system itself. That's going to come eventually. Eventually, there will be an economic crisis. The question is whether the Iran war will be the spark of that, and that would be historically unprecedented in many ways. A war directly causing a worldwide economic crash hasn't really been seen before, even though wars have always contributed, or at least in many instances have contributed, to economic crashes. But to be the reason, the core, the fundamental root of it, that's a lot different. And so I believe that's what's happening right now. It is a gamble. It is a calculation. And I actually do think, and this is going to be something that we are going to talk about a lot over the next months to years, that the U.S. empire has been stymied by Russia, by Iran. Now we see the news about China. China is now favored worldwide far more than the United States. We see China cutting its import of oil, in large part because it already is energy independent for 80% of its oil energy usage. And it is willing to play with the oil markets for itself and its own interests, and also for the interests of the world. Its exports are surging internationally, its global exports. So all of these countries have stymied the United States. And so what the U.S., I believe, has calculated—the elites have calculated—is that they need to be in a long war. They started one with Iran, and they don't want to end it, no matter what the result is. So this defeat actually now risks just piling up more and more, because nothing that the United States is doing right now is going to institute regime change in Iran. It's not going to get Iran to capitulate. It's only making the population in Iran angrier. As we speak, the United States is hitting bridges along the southwest, the southern coast of Iran, along the Strait of Hormuz, and now entering the realm of infrastructure strikes. -- 2 of 15 -- And that's only going to make the population even more hungry for what some call revenge, but really justice is what the Iranian people are calling for. And so no matter what Iranian leaders may think, they're going to have to follow the will and the interests of the people. And that means this war will not only continue, but Iran has already said that they haven't even scratched the surface of what they are capable of doing in a war that is existential for them as well. So it's not really even about survival anymore. This is really about Iran's existence and its consolidation of the stature that it's been able to develop on the global stage now, with even prominent mainstream development— academics, intellectuals, experts—calling Iran a fourth power, but that might be misleading. I think the reality is that Iran has kind of demonstrated what it means to exert power through sovereignty, and so it joins countries like Russia and China that are able to do the same thing, and maybe serves as a model—maybe a really dangerous model—for the United States, where you have perhaps a middle-development country, a country that has been starved by sanctions, but yet one that refuses to give up and has a population that is ferociously independent. It serves as a model for other countries that find themselves in maybe similar but somewhat different circumstances. So this, I believe, is what's happening. I don't believe we're going to see a major shift in the outcome of this war. Really, what the United States is doing—the leaders are always trying to prolong it so they can continue to gamble on various scenarios that they've been playing out, which are likely to either backfire or some combination of the two. It's not looking great for the United States in this war, but a lot of the time, especially in the last several decades, the U.S. empire—it doesn't really matter to the elites whether they win or lose. They just want to see that the final outcome of the war will be in their interest, and then in the short term, which is really the immediate part of their minds, is to profit as much as possible from this for as long as possible. So there's this short-term goal of just continuing to, um, create the justification for, let's say, big contracts for the military-industrial complex, because they'll need them now that they've depleted so much of the U.S. stockpiles. And then, of course, in the long term, well, I wouldn't call this a strategy. It's really just a reality. The reality is that the United States needs to prolong wars in order to have any chance to affect an outcome. It's almost like going in blind. You know that right now China, Russia, and, include Iran in there, are not nations that are capable of being destroyed, capable of being overturned and overthrown, capable of being controlled or dictated to. So the decision is to, for as long as possible, be at war with them and experiment with any kind of possibilities that could sustain damage and leave you in a better position. That's the calculation. It's not a great one, but that's where we are. #Pascal Hey, just a very quick note. The best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on neutralitystudies.com. Links below. See you there. Yeah, I completely agree with that kind of assessment, which is why I wonder about the state of empire itself. Because, you know, the one -- 3 of 15 -- thing that surprised me the most with this war is how strategic Iran is approaching it and how Iran is willing to absorb the attacks that it can stop, but at the same time then assert that it can hit anything it likes in its own vicinity. The one thing Iran hasn't done is it hasn't built A, a nuclear weapon, B, long-range missiles. So it doesn't threaten actually the heartland of the United States, right? There's no way it can fire at New York, period. And it seems to me that this is also part of it. It's not trying to do that. It's trying to threaten the U. S. bases in the immediate environment. But the one thing that they found out, and that is now kind of changing the calculation, is that it can impose real economic hurt on the U.S. through the Strait of Hormuz, which is, by the way, something that the Russians have never achieved. In four and a half years of war against the NATO alliance, they never managed to somehow impact the economic interests of the U.S. elites. So the U.S. elites, even when they are engaged in a forever war, the elites profit off that, right? They get more money, they get wealthier. Congratulations, by the way, to the United States for having the first U.S. dollar trillionaire in the world. I mean, what an achievement. The whole population must be really glad that the average wealth has risen without anyone getting an extra dollar from other people. But this is the problem of the empire, isn't it? The empire shields the elites, who then, even when they are engaged in a war that is hurtful to everybody else, still get more money out of it. And we see how this is awesome for Palantir. We see how this is awesome for Donald Trump. Another billion just by sitting there, right, and manipulating the markets. But this game, I think, is becoming more transparent, especially to China, Iran, Russia, and so on. Do you see any kind of changes in the way that common folks in the United States start looking at their own leadership and these kinds of people who are really contributing to the worsening of everybody's livelihood, the standard of living inside the U.S.? #Danny Haiphong Well, the poll numbers are showing that there is deep opposition to what the U.S. is doing in Iran. Of course, some of this is partisan, in the sense that you might