Nuclear Annihilation Is Closer Than Ever Before. This Is Crazy.

The world now confronts a paradox: a revived great-power rivalry coincides with a fading public and political fear of nuclear catastrophe. What emerges from this exchange is an urgent warning that nuclear danger rests not in abstract arsenals but in the everyday calculus of misjudgment, escalation, and erosion of trust. The conversation frames the conflict in Ukraine not simply as a territorial struggle but as a crucible in which global nuclear risk has been amplified — and where the policies and political habits of the past half‑century have produced brittle, dangerous equilibria. If the last three years have taught anything, it is that the instruments of war and the institutions of deterrence are inadequate to contain the human and strategic consequences of a major power war. What follows synthesizes those lessons and sets out pragmatic — if difficult — steps to move away from the edge. ## The Renewed Nuclear Threat The conversation insists that nuclear risk is not a distant abstraction or an elite technical problem; it is immediate, diffuse, and compounded by political volatility. With strategic treaties approaching expiration and high-level communication sporadic or politicized, what was once a slow-burning governance challenge has become acute. The New START treaty’s looming lapse was highlighted as a critical watershed: without formal limits, verification, and dialogue, incentives for risky deployments and misperception increase. The discussion makes the point that nuclear danger today is multiplied by three forces: intensifying tactical and strategic competition, the normalization of brinkmanship in political rhetoric, and the fragmentation of diplomatic channels that once helped manage crises. Equally important is the change in the informational and decision-making environment. Rapid information flows, domestic political pressures, and leaders’ inclination to act impulsively shorten the window for deliberate, sober strategic thinking. Missteps that once might have been contained can now cascade quickly into crises with global implications. The conversation therefore reframes nuclear risk as an emergent property of political dynamics rather than merely the arithmetic of warheads and delivery systems. ## Lessons from Miscalculation and the Fog of War A recurrent theme in the exchange is the “fog of war” — the idea that even the best-informed actors misread intentions, capabilities, and popular will during conflict. The recent crisis in Eastern Europe demonstrates this clearly: invading forces misjudged resistance and political fallout; backers and opponents misgauged their own room for maneuver and the limits of each other’s objectives; third parties misinterpreted signals and over-assumed control. The conversation argues that these miscalculations are not aberrations but structural features of interstate conflict, especially where deep historical grievances and identity politics mix with high technology and fast decision cycles. This has consequences for nuclear risk. Once escalation begins, feedback loops — battlefield setbacks, domestic political pressures, and the lure of “decisive” force — can push leaders toward riskier options. Deterrence logic presumes clear, rational calculation of costs; in practice, the fog of war blurs those calculations. The discussion therefore calls for humility in strategic planning and the institutionalization of pause mechanisms: robust, depoliticized channels that allow cooling-off and verification before any resort to nuclear signaling or force. ## Humanitarian Costs and the Need for Inclusive Peace Beyond strategic theory, the exchange returns repeatedly to human suffering as the central moral and practical imperatives for ending the conflict. The staggering displacement, casualties, and family separations highlighted in the conversation are not incidental: they shape domestic politics, fuel revenge cycles, and harden publics against compromise. Sustainable settlements are unlikely where trauma and social fragmentation are ignored. The conversation presses that humanitarian realities must be central in any diplomatic design, not sidelined as afterthoughts. The discussion also stresses that peace processes must be genuinely inclusive. Negotiations that exclude broad sectors of society — women, civil-society organizations, internally displaced people, and local leaders — are unlikely to produce durable outcomes. Reconciliation and reconstruction require local buy-in and mechanisms for justice, accountability, and reparations. In short, political settlements must address both interstate dimensions and the internal fissures within affected countries. This dual focus reduces the likelihood that unresolved domestic grievances become the seeds of renewed conflict, which in turn lowers tail risk for escalation to the strategic level. ## The Geopolitical Backdrop: NATO, Expansion, and Missed Opportunities A sustained part of the conversation engages with the long arc of post‑Cold War policy decisions. NATO expansion, the treatment of Russia after the Soviet collapse, and the role of Western economic and security policies surfaced as long-term contributors to current instability. The speakers do not offer a simplistic exoneration of any one actor; rather, they construct a layered argument: security arrangements that felt prudent to one side looked threatening to the other, and a succession of missed diplomatic opportunities hardened attitudes and fed nationalist narratives. This background matters because it shaped perceptions of vulnerability and entitlement that then influenced crisis behavior. The conversation suggests that had there been a genuine, politically credible project to integrate or accommodate Russia’s legitimate security concerns — without sacrificing the sovereignty and democratic aspirations of neighboring states — the current spiral might have been avoided or mitigated. While this counterfactual cannot undo what has been done, it nevertheless informs the pragmatic politics of how to rebuild trust: addressing historically rooted security anxieties will be necessary to craft any durable European order. ## Why Diplomacy and Trust Matter Now A throughline of the discussion is the indispensable role of diplomacy and mutual confidence in averting nuclear catastrophe. The erosion of dependable channels between major powers, the politicization of negotiation at home, and the delegitimization of diplomacy as “appeasement” have all weakened the scaffolding that once kept crises from spinning out of control. The conversation emphasizes that trust is not a luxury but an operational necessity: treaties, verification systems, and routine military-to-military dialogue reduce uncertainty and provide alternatives to violent escalation. Rebuilding those practices requires both technical fixes (verification regimes, hotlines, joint risk-reduction protocols) and political decisions to shield crisis-management mechanisms from partisan winds. The exchange is clear that high-level agreements matter, but so do mid-level bureaucratic pathways and people-to-people ties that sustain communication during bad periods. Renewing diplomacy also involves depoliticizing arms control: making it a bipartisan, cross-cultural priority backed by civic institutions, academic networks, religious communities, and civic leaders who can hold governments to account when they lapse. ## Pathways to De-escalation and Nuclear Risk Reduction The conversation does not indulge in utopian prescriptions; instead, it advances pragmatic, staged steps toward reducing risk. First, extend and strengthen treaty frameworks that provide transparency and limits — even interim accords that preserve verification and open channels while broader negotiations proceed. Second, institutionalize crisis-management tools: military-to-military incident protocols, public and private communication channels, and third-party mediation mechanisms that can a

Nuclear Annihilation Is Closer Than Ever Before. This Is Crazy. The scariest thing about the West at the moment is that Europe and the US seem to have lost all fear of nuclear weapons when, in fact, the danger of one little mistake to end the world has never been greater. The danger that nuclear weapons pose is larger than climate change, viruses, and a AI gone crazy COMBINED. Why are our leaders not worried, especially after the last 3 years of constant super power escalation? Here with me to discuss this are three wonderful guests. I‘ve got with me: Governor Jerry Brown, the 34th and 39th governor of the state of California. We are also joined by William D. Hartung, a Fellow at the Quincy Institute and the previous director of the Arms and Security Program at the Center for International Policy. And last but jot least Cynthia Lazaroff is with us, a Documentary Filmmaker & Founder of U.S.-Russian exchange initiatives and NuclearWakeUpCall.Earth This panel was convened by Katrina vanden Heuvel the President of the American Committee for US-Russia Accord and and former editor of The Nation magazine. Find there work here: https://usrussiaaccord.org #M1 And it's very simple to state that nuclear danger is real and it's not in anybody's interest. And so let's do something about it. I think Trump, I don't say it's certain, but it's possible that he and Putin could come up with something. I just wish that more people in Congress could say something, do something. So, stimulating other people, whether it's the churches, the university presidents, or senators or congresspeople, they ought to be talking about the nuclear danger and incorporating that into the larger settlement between the U.S. and Russia. #F1 Welcome. I'm Katrina vanden Heuvel. I'm editor and publisher of The Nation magazine, 160 years strong, and president of the American Committee for U.S.-Russia Accord. And today, we're very pleased, very grateful to have the opportunity once again to team up with Pascal Lottaz and host this gathering for Neutrality Studies. Thank you, Pascal. I'm mindful that the turmoil and tragedy in Ukraine long predates the three years since the Russian invasion, which we marked on Monday. We nevertheless and quite suddenly seem only a month into Donald Trump's second term to be reaching a kind of endgame. Today, we plan to discuss this, of course, but also we feel it's important, as all of you on this call know, that talks have begun, but there are larger questions. The settling of the war is critical, but it does not automatically solve all the other outstanding problems with the U.S.-Russia relationship, especially after three years of no discussion between President Biden and Vladimir Putin. At least there's some diplomacy. We believe that among the -- 1 of 26 -- most critical of these outstanding problems are the vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons that each country possesses, which ring the globe. The landmark strategic nuclear accord signed under Obama, as all of you know, New START, will expire one year from now, in February 2026. This, we think, is among the most urgent of post-Ukraine war priorities for the administration. So we have much to get to. We have remarkable panelists, and I look forward to the conversation. Pascal, over to you. #M2 Thank you very much, Katrina. And thank you very much to the American Committee for U.S.-Russia Accord, which you're heading, for setting this up and reaching out. Hello, everybody. I am Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm honored to host this panel of outstanding personalities to discuss the very sad third anniversary of large-scale violence in Ukraine. Much about this is still hotly contested, starting from the name itself. Is it a war? Is it a special military operation? And when exactly did it start? Did it begin with the transgression of Russian troops into Ukrainian territory on February 24, 2022? Or did it go back to the fateful days of 2014 when the democratically elected government of Viktor Yanukovych was overthrown and an armed rebellion started in the Donbass and militia forces appeared in Crimea? Or does it even go further back to the 1990s and the several rounds of NATO expansion? Many of these questions and viewpoints remain to be settled and agreed upon. Here with me to discuss this are three wonderful guests. I've got with me Governor Jerry Brown, who was the 34th and 39th governor of the state of California. We are also joined by William D. Hartung, a fellow at the Quincy Institute and the previous director of the Arms and Security Program at the Center for International Policy. We've got Cynthia Lazaroff with us, a documentary filmmaker and founder of U.S.-Russian Exchange Initiatives and Nuclear Wake-Up Call.Earth. And, of course, last but not least, Katrina vanden Heuvel, the president of the American Committee for U.S.-Russia Accord and the former editor-in-chief of The Nation magazine. Everybody, welcome. #F2 Thank you, Pascal. #M2 Well, maybe to the three panelists, and let's start with Governor Brown. But I will also ask Cynthia and Bill to give your views on this. Over the last three years, the last three sad years, what do you think is most important that we have learned about the conflict that is going on? Please feel free to focus on a micro subject or on the macro picture as you think. What's the learning outcome of the last three years, Governor Brown? #M1 -- 2 of 26 -- I would say it reaffirms the notion of the fog of war, that you never know what you're getting into when you embark upon the serious matter of taking over another country. We know from history that many moves have been made. They can look good on paper. Sometimes they can look good for many months, but they often turn sour. So I'd say prudence and restraint are very much implicated where we are. The tragedy is there. So Putin, I think, was surprised. Obviously, he was surprised. Also, the valor and the ingenuity of the Ukrainian people and the leadership of Zelensky and others, their military people, their citizens, they rallied and they repelled the Russian invasion, which probably, without knowing all the details, reflects an arrogance of power, the arrogance that they thought with the number of troops they could just take over Ukraine. Perhaps Putin also thought that the Ukrainians would welcome them, or at least enough to make the operation he launched much easier than it turned out to be. So I'd say the determination of the Ukrainian people in holding back the Russians and advancing, and now holding back the Russians as they make a slow advance, the suffering, the acceptance of hundreds of thousands of deaths and injuries, this is monumental. And the lesson to me, of course, is the folly of humankind. How do we get into these things? How could Putin ever do this? How? And of course, in the history. So Putin has his flaws, I'd say, real culpability here. But over the last 10 years, 20 years, a lot of things were done by Europe, by the other countries in Europe, and by American presidents that did not build the kind of understanding and respect that might have prevented this war. I certainly think this war was not in the mind of Putin 20 years ago. And so a lot of things happened, and I'd say there's a lot of blame to go around. I don't want to compare culpabilities because Putin launched the war. He started killing people. That's of a certain magnitude. Now, all that speculation is for historians and perhaps moralists. What is important now is how do you get out of it? What are the moves that can bring this war to a close, to make the relations in Eastern Europe more stable, give people a sense of security, and find a way for the West, for the countries in Europe and the United States, to work with Putin and Russia? A very different character, I'd say, has very different flaws than Americans have. A lot of flaws to go around, I would say, blind spots. So, yes, there's a lot to be done. I'd say the most important thing now is to work out ways to stop the war and then, going forward, to constitute, if at all possible, a different kind of relationship. That's the way I see it. I think it's possible. No matter what your judgment of Putin is, whatever his many character flaws are, he still was someone who was working with the West not too many years ago. And remember, the U.S. worked very closely with Stalin. Nixon could clink champagne glasses with Mao Zedong. So I wouldn't focus on Putin, the personality. I'd focus on the suffering and the pathways forward to reduce the evil, the conflict, the war, and get more stability and understanding in that part of Europe. #M2 -- 3 of 26 -- The interesting thing is that some of my viewers of this channel will argue that a lot of the blame is to be found in Europe and the US for the de-escalation that didn't happen before. But the interesting thing is it doesn't even matter which one we subscribe to because of the genesis. What matters now is whether or not, with these different interpretations of what happened, we will converge into a virtuous spiral that brings us to de-escalation or not. But Cynthia, may I ask you about your primary insight? And if you want to react to anything you've heard, please feel free to do so. #F2 Thank you, Pascal. Well, I appreciated the governor's overview and looking at the different points of view in all of this, really the kind of broad look at what's happened. I'm in the place where we are looking at the staggering human costs of this war, which the governor referenced, with over a million dead or wounded and ongoing escalatory risks. If you look at the 14.6 million people in need of humanitarian aid, 3.7 million internally displaced in the country, 6.8 million seeking refuge outside the country, and then the millions of families separated by the war, including children taken without a parent to Russia. A survey conducted by the International Rescue Committee found that 74% of its clients had been forcibly separated from a close family member. So then, you know, these are just some of the staggering costs for people. And so for me, President Trump's call for a ceasefire and jump-starting negotiations now to end the war are significant positive steps and long overdue to really stop the suffering and the killing and to bring this conflict to an end. I think one of the challenges is that if you look, and when I speak to my Ukrainian friends, they remind me that the conflict started in 2014. Now, people might have a different point of view within Ukraine, but when I hear about this, it's that the conflict started in 2014. That was the first phase of the war, and February 2022 was the second phase of the war. But I think one of the challenges is if you go back to 2014, every ceasefire in Ukraine since 2014 has failed. And those ceasefires have failed for many reasons. The Minsk Accords that put them in place, the Minsk Agreements, were deeply flawed. But one of the main reasons they failed was lack of political will on multiple levels. In the West, the narrative is that the Ukraine war is a conflict between Russia and Ukraine. This is certainly one level of the conflict, the obvious level, but there are two other levels: the American-led geopolitical conflict between the U.S. and NATO and its allies, which is now shifting, and then also the civil war dimension of the conflict within Ukraine itself, which is deeply divided between East and West. So in my conversations with Ukrainian civil society representatives, they tell me that an enduring peace can only be achieved by addressing all three levels of the conflict, including the third level, which is maintaining the peace within Ukraine itself. They see an inclusive, human-centered peace process with the meaningful participation of civil society and women from across Ukraine, representing a wide spectrum of views, where they can voice their needs and interests, especially those stakeholders most impacted by th