The Manufactured Enemy: How Anti-Russian Myths Survived for Centuries | Dr. Manuel Ramos

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Russia as an "enemy of civilization" is one of Europe's oldest and most successful fabricated war-narratives ever. From the aristocracy of old to the modern Epstein class, the big bad enemy in the east has been essential to some quarters of the Atlantic elites. Dr. Manuel Ramos joins Pascal to trace the historical construction of Russophobia, focusing on the forged Testament of Peter the Great. Ramos argues that its image of permanent Russian expansion survived exposure and shaped European political language, imperial rivalry and contemporary threat perceptions. They discuss Napoleon, Britain’s Great Game, racial stereotypes, Russian responses, cultural admiration and Europe’s economic troubles. The conversation asks how inherited enemy images obstruct diplomacy and whether Europe can rebuild a more balanced relationship with Russia. Manuel's Links: Substack: https://manueljoaoramos.substack.com Russophobia Forged — Part 1: https://manueljoaoramos.substack.com/p/russophobia-forged Ru

Summary

Dr. Manuel Ramos argues that Russophobia is a historically constructed political grammar rooted in a forged “Testament of Peter the Great” that depicted Russia as an eternal, expansionist war machine. Tracing the myth from early 18th-century Polish and Swedish contexts into Napoleonic and Victorian Europe, Ramos shows how the forgery—though debunked—became embedded in elite discourse, visual geopolitics (Mackinder), and policy-making from the Crimean War to Cold War strategy. He highlights recurring tropes: simultaneous portrayals of Russians as both primitive/Asiatic and cunningly Europeanized, the projection of a perpetual design for conquest, and reciprocal Anglophobia in Russian culture. Ramos situates these narratives within imperial rivalry, racialized othering, and European socio-economic crises, noting how Russophilia and cultural admiration also coexist. He cautions that inherited enemy images distort diplomacy and asks whether Europe can overcome this entrenched grammar to rebuild a more balanced relationship with Russia.

Article

## The historical construction of Russophobia For centuries, Europe has narrated Russia not merely as a competitor but as an existential threat — an enemy of civilization whose impulses are timeless and irresistible. The conversation with Dr. Manuel Ramos traces how that image was not an organic product of Russian actions alone but a constructed political grammar that Western elites cultivated and recycled. Far from being a fringe prejudice, this manufactured enemy became a tool to shape policy, justify military adventures, and stabilize identities across ever-changing European fault lines. Understanding that genealogy matters because inherited enemy images do political work long after their factual basis has been discredited. Dr. Ramos emphasizes that Russophobia functions as both story and instrument. It provides a simple explanation for complex international shifts: when things go wrong in Europe, the explanation that “Russia always wanted to conquer us” is ready-made. The power of the narrative is that it requires little factual support; its force lies in repetition, imagery, and political utility. Once imprinted in elite discourse and culture, the image circulates independently of archival truth, shaping perceptions and policies across generations. ## The forged Testament of Peter the Great Central to the conversation is the Testament of Peter the Great — a purported deathbed document that allegedly laid out a program of global Russian domination. Dr. Ramos outlines how this document, despite its dubious provenance and eventual scholarly debunking, became a foundational myth. First appearing in 1710 and then remade and repurposed across Europe, the “testament” evolved into a compact, memorizable grammar of threat: a list of objectives and methods that explained Russian actions as parts of a grand, continuous design. What is striking is how little the document itself mattered once the ideas it supplied took hold. Even after scholars in the 19th century exposed the forgery, the myth persisted. Political leaders, diplomats, and journalists internalized the “testament” as if it were a factual roadmap of Russian intentions. Dr. Ramos points out that this mechanism — where a forged or false text becomes a heuristic for reading a rival’s actions — is a classic political technology. The content of the myth need not survive scrutiny so long as the symbolic structure survives. In practice, that meant that later European leaders read all Russian foreign policy through the rubric of a supposed eternal expansionism. ## The myth of permanent Russian expansion From the forged testament grew a broader, more pernicious meme: that Russia is a perpetual war machine, a polity whose raison d’être is expansion. The myth simplifies empire into inevitability. It converts episodic campaigns, local conflicts, or pragmatic alliances into evidence of a teleological drive toward hegemony. Dr. Ramos stresses that the narrative is not merely descriptive but explanatory and predictive: every Russian act becomes a signpost toward an eventual master plan. This interpretive lens produced a double bind. When Russia appeared to assimilate European practices or adopt Western institutions — Peter the Great’s reforms being the canonical example — that same “Europeanization” was recoded as a more dangerous camouflage. Integration became infiltration; modernization became a strategy to wreck European civilization from within. The myth thus acquires a paranoid flexibility: conciliatory gestures are always suspect because they fit the script of deeper, hidden intent. Importantly, Dr. Ramos does not deny Russia’s imperial history. Empires expand, and Russia’s territorial growth across Eurasia is real. The analytical problem is the move from historical expansion to an essentialized destiny. The latter attributes continuity and design where contingency and changing interests would better explain policy. It makes diplomacy impossible because any offer of cooperation will be read as a tactical maneuver toward conquest. ## Imperial rivalry and Britain’s Great Game The nineteenth century crystallized the myth in particularly consequential ways. As Britain consolidated global maritime predominance, the empire looked anxiously at continental rivals. The Testament and its derivative tropes supplied a persuasive narrative to frame Russia as the inland anti-imperial force — a land-based threat to Britain's interests in the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and, crucially, India. Dr. Ramos highlights how the “Great Game” against Russian influence in Central Asia and Afghanistan was animated by a larger, culturally potent story about Slavic autocracy and Asiatic despotism pushing toward European civilization. This period also shows how myths can migrate across policy communities. The Testament was printed and reprinted in Britain, cited by strategists, and infused into the public imagination by pamphlets and political speeches. Churchill’s and Truman’s references to the document illustrate how a forgery can feed into high-level planning and shape the contours of international strategy. The result was not merely a balance-of-power rivalry; it was a rivalry framed in moral and civilizational terms that justified intervention and containment as duties, not choices. Dr. Ramos underscores an additional element that made Russia singular in Western imaginations: the Mongol legacy. Even where Russians were Christian and Europeanizing, the supposed residual “Mongol” traits — authoritarian governance, methods of domination — were invoked to paint Russia as a hybrid threat, neither fully European nor completely foreign. This allowed European actors to argue that Russia could not be integrated into a European order the way France or Britain could; instead it needed to be checked and bounded. ## Russia’s European identity and the common European home A persistent paradox runs through the history Dr. Ramos sketches: Russia has repeatedly sought entry into European political and cultural space even as Europeans have often refused that membership. From Peter the Great’s reforms to Gorbachev’s vision of a “common European home,” Russian elites have aspired to belong to a pan-European family. Yet the politics of exclusion pushes back: Europe’s insistence on difference has been a consistent theme. Dr. Ramos argues that Europe’s refusals are not merely about culture or geography. They are about ambition and appropriation. European powers sought the benefits of integrating Russia — economic ties, cultural exchange, territorial rearrangements — without granting equal status or mitigating the image of Russian threat. That unequal dynamic allowed Europe to extract gains while preserving a narrative that kept Russia at arm’s length. The tension between Russian aspirations for inclusion and European narratives of exclusion has been one of the most durable drivers of mistrust. This dynamic also had domestic political uses in Europe. Portraying Russia as the outsider enabled internal consolidation: if Europe must defend itself from an external, morally inferior other, that justification supports centralization, military spending, and political unity against an imagined predator. The result is a feedback loop: external threat legitimates internal politics, which in turn reinforces the external threat narrative. ## Enemy stereotypes and Russian responses One of the conversation’s clearest insights is that stereotyping is reciprocal. The manufactured image of Russia as expansionist has not only shaped Western policy; it has also affected how Russian elites and publics see themselves and their options. Dr. Ramos points out that accusations of Russophobia are sometimes used within Russian political discourse as counter-claims: when critics in the West claim Russian designs, officials respond by diagnosing Western paranoia. The myth has thus become both a mirror and a weapon — something that Russians read back into West

Transcript

The Manufactured Enemy: How Anti- Russian Myths Survived for Centuries | Dr. Manuel Ramos Russia as an "enemy of civilization" is one of Europe's oldest and most successful fabricated war- narratives ever. From the aristocracy of old to the modern Epstein class, the big bad enemy in the east has been essential to some quarters of the Atlantic elites. Dr. Manuel Ramos joins Pascal to trace the historical construction of Russophobia, focusing on the forged Testament of Peter the Great. Ramos argues that its image of permanent Russian expansion survived exposure and shaped European political language, imperial rivalry and contemporary threat perceptions. They discuss Napoleon, Britain’s Great Game, racial stereotypes, Russian responses, cultural admiration and Europe’s economic troubles. The conversation asks how inherited enemy images obstruct diplomacy and whether Europe can rebuild a more balanced relationship with Russia. Manuel's Links: Substack: https://manueljoaoramos.substack.com Russophobia Forged — Part 1: https://manueljoaoramos. substack.com/p/russophobia-forged Russophobia Forged — Part 2: https://manueljoaoramos. substack.com/p/russophobia-forged-ii Neutrality Studies Links: Neutrality Studies Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Support Neutrality Studies: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Neutrality Studies shop: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Time Stamps 00:00 The historical construction of Russophobia 03:09 The forged Testament of Peter the Great 09:51 The myth of permanent Russian expansion 17:56 Imperial rivalry and Britain’s Great Game 27:02 Russia’s European identity and the common European home 33:24 Enemy stereotypes and Russian responses 45:10 Russophobia, social crisis and Europe’s economy 52:31 Can Europe rebuild its relationship with Russia? #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today, we have a new piece to discuss with Dr. Manuel Ramos, who is an associate professor and senior researcher at the University Institute of Lisbon. Manuel, welcome back. Good morning—or good afternoon in your case. Good morning to you, sir. And you recently published two immense pieces on your Substack. They are huge, on the issue of Russophobia. Actually, you called them “Russophobia Forged,” as in how Russophobia was created over time. And it’s two essays, part one and part two. Both of them are very long. You really wrote down basically the entire genealogy of how the West, and especially Western Europe, created Russophobia as a political tool to define the proper way of understanding Russia. So I really wanted to talk to you about this because I was also recently at a conference back in June in Russia on Russophobia, and the analysis is very similar. Russophobia is, of course, a political -- 1 of 14 -- concept, one that is constantly revived and thrives on a couple of very racist stereotypes. But you looked at the genealogy. Can you maybe walk us through the beginnings of Russophobia and then its development? #Manuel Ramos Okay, let me start by saying that I live in Portugal. I'm Portuguese, and in 2022, I was confronted with something that I always sort of knew: lots of Portuguese are Russophobes. This has to do with the Soviet Union. It has to do with the so-called third miracle of Fatima. I mean, it's a very local thing, but anyway. And suddenly I read in a British newspaper that there are three countries that stand out as very, very Russophobic: Ukraine, Poland, and Portugal. And I thought, what? Why are we so Russophobic? So, in the wake of the start of the war, I read Professor Diesen's book on Russophobia, and that was, in a way, my starting point. And so I felt this was a huge thing. And then I read Rice's paper on the testament of Peter the Great, and suddenly things sort of became clearer. The so-called testament of Peter the Great sort of stems from a maybe fabricated occurrence involving Peter the Great on his deathbed. And this is something for internal Russian court consumption. There were lots of struggles over succession, and there's one point when someone says, yes, Peter said he renounces his testament and he's going to write a new testament on his deathbed. He says, "Give everything to..." and he dies. And so, in a way, Peter the Great, on his deathbed, sort of created the possibility of someone writing his testament because he didn't have a standing testament. In 1710, the first occurrences of this story of the testament appear. It relates to the Swedish-Russian conflict and the battle of Poltava. Charles XII loses the battle and goes to Constantinople, and there a Hungarian says, yes, there's a secret testament in St. Petersburg, in the coffers of the palace. And then there's a Cossack hetman, Orlik, who is a very interesting person because, in Ukrainian historical circles, he is given the title of the father of the Ukrainian constitution. But he was an exile. He went to Poland. #Manuel Ramos And in Poland, he started talking about the testament and composing the first version of it. The testament has lots of versions because each version sort of appropriates the historical facts and repudiates the facts or elements that are not interesting for that historical period. So it's like a myth that creates its own transformations and variations throughout the 19th century. So you have this story that is, in the beginning, sort of a local story, becomes a regional story, and then, in the late 18th century, reaches Paris. And this is the moment that I think is important, because that's the moment when the testament becomes an official tool. Because it becomes... #Pascal -- 2 of 14 -- Sorry, may I just ask? So, to this day, we have no idea if that actually happened or not. We can be pretty sure that there is no such testament. I mean, also because, even according to the story, you know, he died before he dictated it. But the idea is that back in—what did you say, 1710?—the Russian czar left behind a testament in which he actually wrote down the intention to conquer. That's the point, right? The Russian intention to conquer Europe and the world was apparently written in there. And that myth then gets a life of its own. But yeah, can you take it from Paris? Mm- hmm. #Manuel Ramos So, in a way, even in Poland, the idea of the testament was a tool for reaction. I mean, the idea was that, yes, the Russians are coming, so we have to do something. But, of course, it is with Napoleon and his very complicated relations with Tsar Alexander that the testament becomes something that can be a pretext for the invasion. #Manuel Ramos Because by now, the standard elements of the testament, which by the early 19th century become a set of 14 points, become the grammar. And what fascinates me, actually, is that no one reads the testament. It was debunked in the late 19th century by an Estonian historian, Berkholz. But you don't need the testament now because it's been imprinted. So the story itself doesn't hold water, but the contents are all there. So when you listen today to Ursula von der Leyen, to António Costa, to Andy Burnham, to Merz, they all have the testament in the back of their heads without knowing anything about it. I believe that 99% of the parliamentarians in the European Parliament have never heard of the testament. But it's like you don't need to read the actual story, the actual testament, the actual forgery, because it has become imprinted in discourse. It has been imprinted in imagery. And I think that, in the late 19th century, Mackinder's view of the world and of Russia transformed the testament into a visual tool. #Pascal So what vision of Russia does this forged testament create, and what jargon does it then embed in the cultural memory of Western Europe, basically? #Manuel Ramos Yeah, there are quite a few. Like I said, the most complete versions have 14 points, but it is a testament that says that Russia is a war machine, is in a state of perpetual war, and is an expanding machine. And its destiny, the objective of Russia, is timeless. It goes beyond the contingent interests of each tsar. It is something that is beyond contingent politics. It's an eternal design for expansion: -- 3 of 14 -- expansion to the Baltic, expansion to the Indies, expansion to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. And also, it has an element which I believe is very interesting. It's the idea of total domination of the world, a design for total hegemony, with very interesting elements like the idea that you have to sow discontent in Europe. You always have to, you know, play the European powers against each other. And inside each country, you have to play the actors against each other because that's what weakens them. And that's how we achieve global power—“we” being the Russians in the testament. So every act or behavior or initiative by the Russians towards appeasement is read as a mask for conquest. So there's no way out. It's like a testament that has captured European and Western imaginations, but it has also captured the Russian imagination and Russian reactions. And sometimes, Russophobia and the testament are also tools in Russian international policy, because each time a European or a Westerner says, “Yes, you want to conquer us,” they say, “No, no, you're being Russophobic,” you know? So it's a two-sided game, which means that everyone is caught up in this grammar, the grammar of the Testament of Peter the Great. #Pascal The grammar of Russophobia and the entrenched tropes that are in there—apart from this underlying assumption that Russia must expand, right, and Russia will expand, and if we don't stop it, then it needs to be stopped with force. That's, of course, the logical conclusion. What other elements are there in these Russophobic tropes that allow for, you know, painting a picture? Because the Russians are painted in a very specific way. Can you go into the other tropes? #Manuel Ramos Yes, it's a very specific way, with lots of tones and shades and masks. What I mean is, you know, Peter the Great is the utmost symbol of Russian Europeanization. I mean, he is the one who introduces Europe into Muscovy. So he creates Russia as a European power. And so, in a way, the old tropes about Russia or Muscovy and Novgorod and all that are that, yes, they're Oriental. They're Oriental, Mongol, Asiatic. But Peter the Great is not Oriental and Asiatic. He introduced the West into Russia. But at the same time, because the testament declares that the design goes beyond the emperor's wishes—it's much more, it's grander than the Tsar's wishes—the fact that he's introducing the West into Russia and Europeanizing Russia is seen as a tool for destroying Europe. #Pascal Ah, the infiltration—as in, the Russians want to pretend they're Europeans so they can come here and destroy what is really European. #Manuel Ramos -- 4 of 14 -- Exactly. And so this is totally schizophrenic. But it is a schizophrenia that we can't escape, because every move towards Europe or against Europe that Russia makes is read through the Testament and is declared a suspicious act. And so it's like we're trapped. We're trapped because no move is good. You don't need to say that the Testament is false. And actually, one of the main researchers of the Testament, Subtelny, is a very interesting character. He came from, I believe, Kharkov, but he was born in Warsaw as a refugee. And he moves to Canada, like so many Ukrainians move to Canada. And he becomes a lecturer and is deeply interested in the Testament. And his work is outstanding. But his work is also captured by the Testament, in a way, because he actually believes that the Testament is false. He goes through the old versions and sort of brings together the different versions. Until then, you know, you had one version, another version, but there was no reading through all the old versions. That's what he did. But in a way, even though he believed that the Testament was a forgery, he also saw it as having a p