World War III Imminent | L. Kasradze & A. Kachikian

The conversation presents a stark, urgent thesis: a series of fragmented regional crises — centered on Iran and rippling through the South Caucasus, the Gulf, and beyond — could cohere into a much larger, systemic conflagration. What emerges from the exchange is not merely a set of tactical warnings about military moves or energy chokepoints, but a broader picture of geopolitics in which miscalculation, proxy gambits, and competing great-power interests multiply local instability into global risk. The speakers use the South Caucasus as a lens to read this crisis in miniature: overlapping alliances, historical grievances, economic vulnerability, and strategic corridors make the region both brittle and consequential. ## South Caucasus danger assessment The conversation treats the South Caucasus as a tinderbox: small sparks can set off wide fires. The region’s precariousness is explained through a combination of historical trauma, recent territorial shifts, and external patronage. What stands out is the sense that local actors have become instruments in larger contests rather than independent shapers of outcomes. The war over Nagorno-Karabakh, the 2008 conflict, and the long-running tensions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are presented as precedents that reveal how fast local disputes can escalate when external powers see opportunity. This assessment stresses two linked dynamics. First, the internal political fragility of regional states makes them susceptible to manipulation. Leaders who fear domestic accountability or who depend on external backing may make riskier foreign-policy choices. Second, proximity to bigger theatres — notably Iran and the Persian Gulf — means that shocks elsewhere can reverberate through trade, energy, and security ties. The conversation repeatedly returns to the image of the Caucasus as a corridor: a place where pipelines, supply routes, and military options intersect, making it strategically attractive but also highly exposed. The overall danger assessment is less about immediate invasion than about cumulative pressure: demographic flows, propaganda campaigns, and low-intensity violence that together can push the area beyond a tipping point. The participants emphasize that the South Caucasus will not be immune to the fallout if Iran is weakened or dismembered; the closure of north–south communications or sudden waves of refugees or paramilitary activity could instantly make the region central to a wider conflict. ## Northern front against Iran The conversation interrogates the idea that Iran might be attacked or dismembered from the north, whether through Kurdish militias, Azerbaijani incursions, or other land-based operations. What comes through is skepticism — both about the feasibility of a northern invasion and about the wisdom of such a strategy. The discussants underline that Iran is more cohesive, nationally and militarily, than many Western analysts assume, and that occupying or holding significant Iranian territory would require enormous ground forces and an inevitably long counterinsurgency. Yet the northern front remains a danger because land incursions could be attempted indirectly through proxies, misattribution, or staged provocations. The conversation flags the specter of proxy activation: Kurdish forces, Azeri contingents, and even Turkish interests might be encouraged or manipulated to open a second front. This is dangerous not only for Iran but for the Caucasus itself: any northern escalation would likely pull in neighboring states through spillover violence, refugee flows, and the activation of ethnic solidarities across borders. A crucial point made is the asymmetric cost of such a northern campaign. Whether through drone warfare or artillery, Iran would be able to make life miserable for any occupying force, turning islands or buffer zones into lethal traps. Thus, even limited interventions risk becoming quagmires with high casualties. The conversation cautions that grand strategic visions — pan-Turkic corridors, buffer zones, or ethnic partitioning — ignore the realities of nationalism, local resistance, and the practical limits of projection in rugged, defended terrain. ## Gulf fallout and regional blowback The conversation places the Gulf at the heart of immediate economic and humanitarian consequences. Attacks on shipping lanes, strikes on oil infrastructure, or occupation of strategic islands would not only raise energy prices globally but would produce acute shortages and humanitarian distress across the Middle East and beyond. The discussants argue that the Gulf states — even U.S. allies — stand to suffer disproportionate damage, which underlines the paradox that a supposed security operation could devastate its beneficiaries. Beyond the immediate economic fallout, the exchange emphasizes political blowback. Gulf partners might find themselves sacrificed to larger strategic aims, prompting recalculations of alliance utility. Domestic pressures in these states — from price shocks to disrupted food and water supplies — could lead to instability that no external power intended. The conversation also notes how these dynamics reshape regional alignments: states that feel betrayed or expendable may hedge, seek new patrons, or even distance themselves from a Western-led approach that threatens their welfare. The broader implication is that military ventures in the Gulf create cascading risks: economic recession, refugee flows, and political crises that can feed into conflicts in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the wider Middle East. The Gulf is thus not an isolated theatre; its disruption is an accelerant for global instability. ## Armenia corridor and outside control 00: 30:18 Georgia and the propaganda fight The discussion frames Armenia as emblematic of how small states become corridors and bargaining chips for larger powers. Armenia’s position between Russia, Turkey, and Iran — and now between Western influence and pan-Turkic aspirations — makes its sovereignty particularly vulnerable. The conversation paints a bleak picture of elite capture and external control: political leaders under pressure domestic and international may align with outside agendas to remain in power, further reducing a nation’s strategic autonomy. Georgia is presented as a model of staying under the radar, but not immune. The conversation highlights the role of propaganda and information warfare as tools to reconfigure identities and loyalties. Narratives about kinship, historic grievance, and victimhood are weaponized to justify territorial claims or political interventions. This battle over storytelling is seen as a prelude to kinetic action: once populations accept redefined identities, political mobilization for intervention becomes easier. The speakers stress that control of corridors — physical and informational — is what external powers seek. Infrastructure, pipelines, and transit routes are strategic prizes; so too are the hearts and minds of populations along those routes. The discussion implies that preserving regional agency will require not only diplomatic resistance to external designs but also robust civic resilience against propaganda and elite capture. ## Ukraine lessons and war warnings The conversation draws explicit parallels between Ukraine and the current crises: Western interventionism, underestimation of Russian responses, and the potential for protracted conflict. What emerges is a warning that tactical successes in air or cyber campaigns do not translate into strategic victory, especially when they provoke major powers with the capacity to retaliate indirectly or through proxies. The participants argue that the Ukraine experience demonstrates how quickly a limited war can expand into a grinding, multi-domain conflict with global consequences. A key lesson highlighted is the danger of treating local conflicts as tests for broader geostrategic aims. If Ukraine became a proxy battlegrou

World War III Imminent | L. Kasradze & A. Kachikian The Political West is risking it all. Under US leadership, the old colonial empires that never got over their loss of power are about to launch the largest global war since the 1940s. And for what? With Lasha Kasradze from Georgia and Arthur Khachikian from Armenia, I trace the risks, the fear, and the brutal logic of the failing western empire. Links: Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz. substack.com (Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: https://pascallottaz.substack. com/s/academic) Merch & Donations: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00: 00:00 Introduction 00:00:33 South Caucasus danger assessment 00:09:27 Northern front against Iran 00:20:00 Gulf fallout and regional blowback 00:25:12 Armenia corridor and outside control 00: 30:18 Georgia and the propaganda fight 00:35:35 Ukraine lessons and war warnings 00:38:45 China Russia and system balance 00:44:00 Democracy crisis and closing thoughts #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. My name is Pascal Lottaz, and I'm joined today by two of my favorite analysts from the Caucasus, Lasha Kats-Ratze from Georgia and Arthur Kachikian from Armenia. Arthur, Lasha, welcome back. Thank you so much. I'm glad to have you both on the same program for once—usually I have you separately. But today we want to talk about what's happening in general in the Southern Caucasus and, of course, in the border region with Iran. Can I maybe ask both of you first for your assessment of what we should be aware of as we speak today, on this 24th of March? Maybe we start with Arthur and then Lasha. #Arthur Kachikian Thank you. I’ll tell you what we should be aware of: it’s a coming economic catastrophe. I’m not an economist, but from what I’m seeing in the news and the headlines, the prices for fuel, gas, oil—and then food prices—are going to skyrocket. We’re facing a global economic crisis. In some Asian countries, there are already fuel shortages. This is going to spread. And we’re looking at this madness, this project of occupying the Strait of Hormuz and the island of Kharg, which is going to further escalate the conflict, lead to American casualties, and make American soldiers sitting ducks for Iranian drones and missiles. So even militarily, this makes absolutely no sense. And even if it succeeds, it paves the way for the U.S. to go into Iraq- and Afghanistan-type scenarios—eight years in the first, twenty years in the second. I no longer know how to reason with people who make these decisions. That’s, you know, in brief—that’s what I would say in brief. #Pascal -- 1 of 16 -- Lasha, what is your main focus right now as you try to understand what's happening in and around Iran? #Lasha Kasradze Well, I share the pessimism. Unfortunately, I'm looking at the glass half empty here because, look, we know that this war—first the 12-day war and now this plan to destroy and dismember Iran and other sovereign nations—there’s something much larger to it. Of course, there’s a very strong, fundamental element here, which is, you know, Israel and the way negotiations have been taking place. I would go back to the early ’90s, when Israel wanted to penetrate the region via Azerbaijan. That element cannot be excluded. But there’s a larger picture here, of course. This is about weakening and exporting chaos into the wider region. And the aim here is Russia, the aim here is China—at the expense of the minions, the South Caucasian republics. Of course, it’s about this: if Iran falls, Armenia is not going to have a good day. Russia cannot afford to sit this one out like it did when Serbia happened in the ’90s. It just couldn’t do anything, and then it sort of unleashed its revenge on Georgia in 2008 and then eventually Ukraine. That philosophy of the West doing what it pleases didn’t go down well with Putin. But at the same time, they couldn’t do anything with Kosovo when Bush shaved off Kosovo, a historic part of Serbia. Long story short, I don’t think Russia can afford to do the same. I think Russia is paying very close attention to what’s happening. So is China. And the South Caucasus—it won’t be good for the South Caucasus if Iran falls or gets dismembered one way or the other. So, you know, if this war escalates, all three republics will come under pressure. I'm still sticking to my guns and saying that if Aliyev thinks this is some sort of triumph—well, there was a short-term triumph; we all know what happened with Nagorno-Karabakh. But there’s no strategic depth and no strategic future, if we can appraise the situation that way, for either Azerbaijan or Armenia. So what is Pashinyan thinking? Maybe Arthur can give us a better take on that. I know that Georgia is staying under the radar to a large extent, very cleverly. But overall, I think this whole Iranian fiasco poses a potential disaster for the entire region, not to mention the economic effects and geoeconomic projects that are taking place. #Pascal No, it does. Arthur, are you seeing any signs of panic coming from Armenia or the region in general? I mean, this is highly, highly dangerous for the South Caucasus as well, right? In addition to all the crimes happening daily with the bombardment of Iran. #Arthur Kachikian Well, yes, I’ll agree with my colleague—my esteemed colleague. If you look at the big picture, this is an attack on Russia and China. After Iran falls, all the north–south communications from Russia to -- 2 of 16 -- Iran and farther south will be cut off. So the isolation of Russia will increase—you know, Russia will become more isolated. And China will be cut off from its energy supply in the Persian Gulf. So this is an attack on Russia and China. Iran is a key ally to both of these countries. I agree with Lasha that Russia can’t afford to do nothing. But at the same time, Russia can’t really afford to get involved, because it’s already engaged in this very large-scale conflict with basically the entire NATO bloc in Ukraine. So it’s hard to imagine how Russia could take on another region. The Caucasus as a whole is another powder keg. You can draw a parallel with the Balkans or the Middle East—it’s like a second Balkans or a second Middle East. It can explode. It did explode in the ’90s. If you remember, there was the war in Chechnya, the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia and then Ossetia, and the conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over Karabakh, which doesn’t exist anymore. The population has been expelled. So it is a powder keg, and it may explode. I think in this region, what we're looking at is probably the hegemony of Turkey and Azerbaijan. They're in close alliance. This will not go very well for Armenians. This person who was brought to power by third countries—this is not really our leader. He's an autocrat, a tyrant. He's arresting the leaders of our church, arresting journalists, beating them up, arresting and beating up lawyers—things we would never see in the West. But sadly, he's supported by the West. Not the first or last dictator supported by the West. This guy's strategy is total submission. He's basically surrendered Armenia. He's carrying out, executing every order he gets from our neighboring countries and from Europe. His only objective is to stay in power, because if he’s not, he’ll have to answer a lot of questions about the disaster he brought upon Armenia. So Armenia has once again become a playing card— just a pawn, or a minion, as Lasha says—in the hands of the great powers. We have a lot of experience with this, and all of it is very, very tragic. It usually ends with Armenians being exterminated. The Kurds learned this lesson twice in the last eight or ten years, and we’ve learned it over the last 150 years. One of the reasons the genocide of Armenians happened was because they trusted certain powers to protect them, defend them, and, you know, tried to rely on them. This is how it ended. So there’s a big danger of this conflict spreading to the Caucasus. I hope it doesn’t. There have been several pretty severe warnings to Azerbaijan issued by certain authorities— commentators including Professor Marandi—and somehow I suspect he probably knows something when he says this. Perhaps there’s some kind of official position he’s reflecting in what he’s saying. I certainly hope that Azerbaijan does not get involved. So far it has been very careful, even after the drones fell on its territory. But it is a powder keg; it may explode. Things can get a lot worse if this conflict continues. #Pascal -- 3 of 16 -- Hey, very brief intermission — I was recently banned from YouTube. Although I’m back, this could happen again at any time. So please consider subscribing not only here, but also to my mailing list on Substack. That’s pascallottaz.substack.com. The link will be in the description below. #Lasha Kasradze And now, back to the video. #Pascal May I just ask—back in the very first week of the war, we heard that there were plans or at least talks about, on the one hand, Kurdish militias possibly intervening from Iraqi territory, and on the other hand, Azerbaijani forces maybe coming in from the north, from the Caucasus, right? But neither of those things really happened. So I don’t know if that was just media chatter and rumor, or if some people in the background were actually working on it. Does one of you—maybe let’s start with Russia—have any information on whether there’s still something going on about this, like escalating the war from the north? Because at the moment, we’re still mostly focused on the Gulf region, on the Strait of Hormuz, and the missile war. But is there a danger that there might still be some kind of land invasion coming—not by U.S. boots on the ground, but by people crossing the border from one side or the other? #Lasha Kasradze I haven’t heard anything to that extent or in that detail, Pascal, except to say that the whole Kurdish issue has been a long-standing problem in the Middle East. Turkey has perhaps brilliantly used this to its own advantage. Erdoğan has played a good game, but how far his gamble will prevail and continue is another question. We remember how he used this to his advantage when Syria collapsed. But the thing is, Turkey is a huge element in this—an essential part of the whole issue. Right now, it’s sitting on the fence, playing its regional balance, and it’s worked out for Erdoğan. Let’ s be honest about that. In terms of Iran, I don't subscribe to the whole idea of Iran’s dismemberment and the Azeri minority—or if you can even call it that. There are actually more Azeris living in Iran than in Azerbaijan. But the whole notion of separation is very deeply etched in Iran’s nationalism. So any disruption there is a higher-order issue. I mean, in terms of rallying Iranians—to join what exactly? To join Azerbaijan? To dismember? They won’t like it. Sure, ethnically there’s overlap, but nationally they have a very strong sense of identity as Iranians. And from some of the research I’ve done on that, they’re just not going to separate from Iran. Um, with Turkey—Turkey is interesting. It’s been playing this sort of “I’m a member of NATO” card, taking care of the whole Kurdish issue, taking advantage of that, and resolving it to a certain extent. -- 4 of 16 -- But Turkey is playing a game, I think. It’s gambling. What happens, you know, because the Turkish situation is—Turkey has this whole pan-Turkic idea that it has vis-à-vis Israel, vis-à-vis Azerbaijan, of course. I’m afraid that Turkey, down the road, might be left naked and abandoned, really. Yes, Turkey has said—I think before the—well, I’m just sort of veering off here slightly. Before the invasion of Iran, if you remember, there was an article in Bloomberg saying that Turkey was willing to create a buffer zone within Iran if Iran fell. So those are the kinds of grand visions Turkey has, right? That whole pan-Turkic, Turan visio