Iran War Round 3? US Desperation Setting In | Prof. S. M. Marandi

The recent exchange with Professor S. M. Marandi laid bare a central paradox of the current crisis: Iran appears simultaneously vulnerable and emboldened, constrained by economic pain yet empowered by strategic levers that make coercion costly for its adversaries. What emerges from the conversation is not a simple story of one side winning and the other failing, but a dynamic negotiation in which local actors, asymmetric tools, and diplomatic contingencies reshape conventional calculations about deterrence, leverage, and the limits of American power. That paradox—of weakness producing a kind of strategic strength—runs through every strand of the discussion, from Gulf diplomacy to media narratives, and frames why the recent strikes may represent desperation rather than decisive escalation. ## Gulf states and regional diplomacy The conversation highlighted how the Gulf has become a chessboard of shifting alignments rather than a monolith of anti-Iran sentiment. Bilateral talks between Iran and several Gulf states are moving at uneven speeds: progress exists with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE even as Washington’s behavior complicates matters. The practical effect is a layered diplomacy where regional capitals pursue independent calculations driven by trade, energy, and security concerns. Iran’s ability to calibrate pressure on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz gives Tehran bargaining chips that these Gulf states must take into account; they cannot treat the situation purely through the lens of ideological solidarity with the United States. What stands out in the exchange is the fragility of these budding understandings. Gulf governments have taken small steps—sending delegations to public events, engaging in talks in Doha—but these are tentative. Riyadh’s choice to send a relatively low-level delegation to the Iranian leader’s funeral, for example, signaled willingness to engage without fully embracing Tehran. Simultaneously, the Gulf’s vulnerability to disruptions in energy flows pushes them toward de-escalation, even while external pressures—especially from Washington and allied lobbying—pull them the other way. The result is a diplomatic tightrope where missteps by any actor could quickly harden positions. ## Khamenei funeral and public support The scale of public participation at the funeral ceremonies was one of the most striking elements discussed, and it complicates Western assumptions about Iranian domestic stability. Tens of millions of people reportedly turned out under extreme heat conditions—an unmistakable public signal that cuts across simple narratives of regime weakness. The crowd’s presence reveals social resilience and suggests that popular legitimacy, at least in moments of national crisis, remains robust. The conversation underscored how such demonstrations of mass mobilization translate into diplomatic leverage. A regime that can point to widespread domestic backing gains bargaining power externally; negotiators can credibly claim domestic constraints on concessions and punishments that might otherwise be possible. Importantly, the funerals also disrupted Western expectations of a popular uprising against the Iranian government—one of the implicit hopes of some policymakers—and instead provided Tehran with moral and symbolic capital that strengthens its hand in regional and international negotiations. ## Iran’s media and propaganda battle A second, subtler victory discussed was Iran’s unexpected strides in information operations. Where Tehran once lagged in narrative warfare, young activists and creatives stepped into the breach, producing compelling content that circulated widely. The conversation noted the emergence of grassroots media initiatives—social video, viral clips, and energized messaging—that reframed the conflict in ways Western outlets found difficult to suppress entirely. This media resurgence matters because it alters the international conversation. When domestic images of solidarity and resistance travel globally, they complicate the West’s ability to craft a simple condemnation narrative. Moreover, the conversation highlighted that U.S. political behavior—its strikes, its rhetoric, and controversial allies’ actions—has been counterproductive from a public diplomacy perspective, making it easier for Iranian and allied voices to gain traction. In short, Iran’s newfound media agility has become another form of asymmetric leverage: it shapes perceptions, influences sympathies, and narrows the political space for punitive measures without reputational cost. ## Red card and US empire decline A recurring theme in the exchange was the perception that American global hegemony is fraying. The image deployed—of a red card shown to the United States—captures how the MOU dynamics have revealed limits to U.S. coercive reach. The U.S. violations of the memorandum, particularly around frozen assets and control of shipping lanes, were portrayed as symptomatic of a broader decline: Washington can still inflict harm, but it struggles to convert military pressure into political outcomes without incurring countervailing costs. The conversation made clear that these developments are more structural than episodic. U.S. economic vulnerabilities, domestic political fragmentation, and the potency of targeted asymmetric responses in places like the Strait of Hormuz combine to erode automatic assumptions of American impunity. The practical implication is a more constrained U.S. policy toolkit. When economic self-interest—such as the need to keep oil flowing—intersects with waning credibility, decision-makers face tougher choices. The strikes discussed in the conversation therefore look less like confident imperial action and more like efforts to project strength amid strategic contraction. ## Lebanon and the fragile MOU The memorandum of understanding extended beyond Tehran and Washington; Lebanon was an explicit test of American leverage. The discussion underlined a central grievance: the U.S. had obligations to press Israel to stop its offensive and restore stability, but instead the pattern of violence continued. Isolated incidents—targeted killings and continued bombing—served as evidence that the MOU’s protections were porous. Lebanon’s role in this context is twofold. First, its continued instability undermines the credibility of any agreement that claims to halt violence in the region. Second, Lebanon is a strategic node linking wider Levantine dynamics to Iranian influence. If the U.S. cannot or will not curb Israeli actions, then Tehran’s partners and patrons will view the memorandum as selectively enforceable. That perception risks unraveling confidence in the accord and pushing local actors to prepare for contingencies outside diplomatic bargains—running the gamut from localized escalations to renewed proxy campaigns. ## Risk of another war with Iran Perhaps the most consequential theme was the assessment of whether recent escalations portend a new, broader war. The conversation balanced alarm with restraint: while the risk is real, Iran’s strategic posture suggests deterrence rather than an all-out offensive. Tehran’s management of the Strait of Hormuz operates more like a calibrated faucet than a binary on/off valve—measured pressure that can be dialed up to signal displeasure and impose costs without triggering full-scale conflict. Crucially, the dynamics discussed imply that miscalculation remains the central danger. U.S. strikes—particularly if framed as retaliation or punishment—can provoke tit-for-tat responses that spiral. But Iran’s own strategy appears aimed at preserving leverage for negotiations: nuclear advances and maritime control are bargaining chips meant to compel compliance rather than to invite annihilation. The conversation thus painted a picture of hazardous stability, where both restraint and brinkmanship coexist and where small shocks could cascade if political leaders misread intentions

Iran War Round 3? US Desperation Setting In | Prof. S. M. Marandi Early on July 8, 2026, the US launched the largest air strikes against Iran since the MoU was signed a month earlier. Is this the continuation of the war, or a desperate move by the dying Empire? Professor Mohammad Marandi of the University of Tehran discusses the US-Iran MOU, Hormuz tensions, Iranian assets, Lebanon, Gulf talks, and the risk of another war. He also covers Khamenei’s funeral, Iran’s media response, US power, Europe’s decline, and why Tehran sees the current moment as unstable but full of leverage. Links: Seyed Mohammad Marandi on X: https://x.com /s_m_marandi Seyed Mohammad Marandi on Telegram: https://t.me/s_m_marandi Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction and MOU violations 00:06: 27 Hormuz leverage and nuclear talks 00:11:26 Gulf states and regional diplomacy 00:16:17 Khamenei funeral and public support 00:20:11 Iran’s media and propaganda battle 00:25:23 Red card and US empire decline 00:28:40 Lebanon and the fragile MOU 00:33:31 Risk of another war with Iran 00:38:22 Europe’s decline and lost influence #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today, again, we have an update with Professor Mohamed Marandi, professor at the University of Tehran. Saeed, Mohamed, welcome. #Marandi Thank you very much for inviting me. It's always good to see you. #Pascal Always good having you back. And maybe before we start, should I rather call you Saeed or rather Mohamed? Which one of the two do you prefer? Both are good. Both are good. Okay, Saeed, in that case, can you give us an update on what's happening? I mean, just last night there were new strikes, new attacks, I mean, from both sides. As far as I understand, the Americans are not living up at all to their promises of also unfreezing Iranian funds. Iran has blocked three tankers, as far as the Americans keep telling us, and they've been striking and doing actually quite big strikes, the biggest ones, I would say, since the memorandum. What's the situation like right now? #Marandi -- 1 of 13 -- Well, there's no surprise, I'm sure, that the Americans are violating the MOU that Iran and the United States agreed upon. They're violating different articles. In Lebanon, for example, they are supposed to force the Israeli regime, based upon their own commitment, to end the slaughter, to end the occupation, and to end the war. And just the day before yesterday, the Israeli regime murdered a young woman who was the principal of a school, her husband, and their maid. And they're constantly bombing the country. So that's one violation. And among the other violations is, of course, not releasing Iranian assets that were stolen, which were supposed to be handed over to Iran already. But the one that you're alluding to is the fact that the United States, in violation of the MOU, which says very clearly that during the period when the MOU is valid, the Iranians will manage the Strait of Hormuz. And ships that pass through have to do so under the supervision of the Iranians. And what the Americans went and did was open up their own corridors, which is in clear violation of the MOU. So the Iranians have been warning ships for many days now that this is not acceptable and that they have to move back and forth under Iranian supervision. The Americans have been forcing some of these ships to ignore Iran, and so Iran was forced to ultimately punish these ships that you spoke of. And since they were in violation, the Iranians struck them. Then the Americans again violated the MOU by bombing Iran, and Iran early this morning retaliated by striking U.S. bases in Kuwait and Bahrain. #Pascal What is this, in your estimation, going to do to the entire process? I mean, not that the Americans were in any way, shape, or form very truthful to what they promised in the MOU. But is this now the beginning of the final unraveling of the whole thing? Or is it to be interpreted as the Americans just lashing out again at the fact that there's apparently nothing they can do to stop Iran? #Marandi It's unclear. From the very beginning, the Iranians were skeptical. We have never had an experience with the United States over the past 47 years where they actually carried out their obligations in an agreement with Iran. And so the Iranians were not expecting anything. That's why the Iranians constructed the agreement with important details that give Iran leverage. In other words, the Iranians, when the Americans refuse to abide by their commitments or try to cheat Iran, have leverage within the framework of the deal to put pressure on the United States. That is what helps keep the Americans pretending to, at least, or dragging their feet. While dragging their feet, they abide by some of their commitments. So, for example, the siege on the Strait of Hormuz has been lifted, by the way. And the reason is that if they impose the siege, Iran will also impose a ban on ships moving through the Strait of Hormuz. That's the only reason why the Americans have lifted the siege. And if the Americans -- 2 of 13 -- refrain from carrying out their commitments, as we are seeing by not handing over Iranian assets, by trying to undermine Iran's authority over the Strait of Hormuz, by allowing the Israeli regime to carry out slaughter, then the Iranians will be able to slow down the pace at which ships pass through the Strait. And that, of course, puts pressure on Trump and the U.S. economy. So at the moment, the U.S. is in violation, and it's not in American interests. If you recall, Trump himself, when he was trying to justify why he signed the MOU, said that our energy reserves are very low and there are only four weeks left. So based on that assessment and that admission by Trump, you would imagine that he would be very keen on fulfilling his side of the bargain. But then again, if you look at things objectively, you have the Israeli regime, you have the Zionist lobby in the United States, and they do not want this deal to be implemented. They want to be able to continue bombing Lebanon, to occupy and annex the southern part of the country, and they do not want tensions to ease between Iran and the United States at any level. So they are continuing to put pressure on Trump, and that is why we see the Americans violating the deal in so many respects. #Pascal Right. But it seems to me that with the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has actually found a real, a serious pain point of the United States. And is it in that case correct to look at it now as, you know, Iran is moving towards a situation where it's not about open or close, not a binary of the Strait of Hormuz, but more like a faucet — you know, let’s let more or less go through depending on whether the Americans behave according to the MOU, which in my view is at this point a kind of yardstick for Iran, right? It's a sort of measuring tape to assess whether the U.S. is living up to its commitments or not. And if they don't, then you just go back to punishing the U.S. with what actually hurts. Is that what's going on? #Marandi Exactly. That was very well put. If the United States abides by its commitments in accordance with the agreement, then the Strait of Hormuz is normalized. And if the United States refuses to abide by its commitments, depending on the degree to which it refuses to do so, then the Iranians will be able to limit the number of ships that pass through the Strait. Of course, Iran also has another form of leverage, and that is the nuclear program. The Iranians have said that if the United States does not abide by its commitments, we're never going to get to negotiations over a final deal with regard to the Iranian nuclear program and the broader sanctions regime. So if Trump wants a deal over the nuclear program, he has to abide by his commitments. If Trump wants the flow of energy and other resources to go through the Strait of Hormuz like it was five months ago, then he's going to have to abide by his commitments. Otherwise, he's going to drag down his economy and the global economy with it. #Pascal -- 3 of 13 -- Hey, just a very quick note. The best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on neutralitystudies.com. Links below. See you there. The question to me about the nuclear agreement that Trump says he wants is, like, does he mean that? I mean, from everything that happened since 2018, it seems to me that that was always a convenient talking point, but that they actually don't care. I mean, this is something to dangle in front of the Iranians in order to make them jump through hoops. But actually, I mean, it seems to me that that really doesn't hurt them very much, whereas the Strait of Hormuz actually really, honestly does. And now Iran is in the position where it can condition the United States during the war by saying, like, if you hurt us, we'll hurt you back. And it will hurt for real until they get it. And now it seems that Iran is working on doing that again, saying, like, well, if you don't live up to your promises, we're going to hurt you again, like Pavlov with his dogs. Right? So, but the nuclear deal—do you believe the Americans actually want it? #Marandi Oh, yes, absolutely. I mean, you're absolutely correct. Ultimately, if Trump can't get a nuclear deal, he'll just change the topic and talk about something else. He'll move on. That's what he does. When he fails with regard to the tariff war, he shifts gears and moves somewhere else. When he fails against Iran in the war, he changes the topic and moves somewhere else. And his base usually follows him. Most Americans don't, but his base will continue to follow him no matter where he goes, at least for the time being. However, the Strait of Hormuz is different. And if the Strait of Hormuz is not open and if trade is not normalized, then we're heading for disaster. And that is the only reason why he agreed to the MOU in the first place, because he failed in the war. He failed at siege warfare, and he literally had no option but to accept the MOU, which was very favorable to Iran because of those failures. And now, again, because of the pressure from the Zionist lobby, the Israeli regime, especially over Lebanon but also on all these other issues, he is trying to refrain from carrying out his commitments, yet his expectation is that the Iranians will abide by theirs. And that's just not going to happen, as we've seen during the last 24, 36 hours. #Pascal It's quite fantastic now that the United States still operates under the assumption that they're free to do whatever they want and the consequences will be suffered by others, because Iran figured out a way to make that not another reality. But what's your assessment about the Gulf states now? One of the things that surprised me is that some of the negotiations, follow-up negotiations, are actually happening in Qatar. Because, yeah, Qatar isn't exactly on good terms with Iran either. However, we are also seeing other Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, that sent a delegation to the funeral of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. What's happening there? -- 4 of 13 -- #Marandi When you were speaking about the United States ignoring its commitments, I was reminded of a speech — I think it was Clinton who once said that the United States always abides by its commitments unless it doesn't. Yeah, so they're above the law, and that's American exceptionalism. In fact, there are some striking similarities between American exceptionalism and Zionism, in that they are above and beyond everyone else. So if someone else does not abide by their commitments, they can be punished — they're rogue. But if the United States does not abide by its commitments, that's because they feel that it is nec