🚨Saudi Arabia Stops US Military Support, Ends US Operation Freedom | Larry Johnson

## Iran Negotiations: Why a Deal Looks Out of Reach The conversation makes clear that the prospects for a negotiated, durable end to hostilities with Iran are dim. At the heart of the impasse is a mismatch of expectations: Iranian negotiators demand immediate, tangible relief from sanctions and restitution for frozen assets; Washington’s negotiating posture, at least as described in the exchange, envisions phased measures and conditional concessions. That gap is not just tactical. It is shaped by a deep trust deficit born of past broken promises and sudden reversals, and it drives Tehran to seek guarantees that the United States and its partners cannot—or will not—provide. Larry Johnson emphasizes that credibility matters more than clever bargaining. Iran’s leadership recalls the promises of the previous nuclear deal and the abrupt U.S. withdrawal; those memories make Tehran insist on upfront compensation and ironclad assurances of nonaggression. For negotiators, this creates a dilemma: conceding too much risks domestic political blowback in Washington, while conceding too little signals to Iran that diplomatic options are exhausted. The result is a fragile equilibrium where talks persist, but with low odds of producing a durable settlement unless external power dynamics change the incentive structure. ## Gulf States: Eroding Faith in U.S. Security Guarantees One of the clearest themes in the exchange is the erosion of Gulf rulers’ confidence in American protection. The Gulf monarchies have spent vast sums on advanced air defenses and hosted U.S. bases in exchange for security guarantees. Yet attacks that penetrated those systems and caused damage to U.S.-forwarded facilities exposed the limits of that arrangement. The conversation argues that this operational failure has precipitated a strategic reassessment across the peninsula. Practical politics follow performance. If hosting U.S. forces makes a regime a target, and those forces demonstrably cannot prevent strikes, then the calculus of alliance shifts. Several Gulf states—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait—now face the choice of continuing to subordinate their military geography to U.S. operations or asserting neutrality to avoid reprisals. The claim that Saudi Arabia has banned U.S. use of its airspace and bases, if verified, would be a watershed: it would demonstrate the willing decoupling of Gulf security arrangements from U.S. operational needs and would fundamentally constrain American options in the region. ## Blockade and Military Limitations: Theater Versus Reality The conversation repeatedly distinguishes between political theater and hard military facts. Washington’s talks of a maritime blockade and “Operation Freedom” created an image of control, but the operational requirements of a true blockade are much more demanding. Boarding and seizing ships require escorting warships and prize crews; carrying out such a scale of interdiction would expose aircraft carriers and task forces to new vulnerabilities. The practical reality, as discussed, is that the U.S. fleet in theater lacks the hull numbers and logistical depth to interdict at the scale needed to strangle Iran’s trade. Beyond ship numbers, there are alternative corridors and partners that blunt any unilateral blockade: overland links to the Caspian and Central Asia, and the opening of Pakistani routes, are highlighted as examples. These logistical lifelines mean sanctions and blockades can be porous in practice. More fundamentally, the conversation stresses that the U.S. may have misread Iranian resilience and cohesion. Where some U.S. narratives portray an imploding Iranian leadership, the exchange paints a different picture: a leadership cohort forged by wartime experience that has proven resilient and united, capable of absorbing pressure and adapting supply lines. ## Energy Markets and the Real Economy: From Futures to Pumps The intersection of military confrontation and energy markets is where global politics turns into household economics. The speakers insist that markets are being driven by two separate price realities: the paper futures market and the physical price at loading docks and pumps. Futures pricing, sensitive to sentiment and hedging, can diverge sharply from the spot price experienced by importers paying to unload cargoes. This disconnect creates room for both market manipulation and acute pain in importing countries. The real-world consequences are immediate and distributive. Higher energy inputs cascade through transport, fertilizer, food, and consumer prices. The discussion underscores that inflation in this context is not primarily a monetary phenomenon but a reflection of supply constraints—shortages that feed through to everyday items. The cumulative effect is political risk: household budgets tighten, and leaders tied to domestic economic performance face exposure. For U.S. politics, rising gasoline prices and visible inflationary pressures translate into electoral vulnerability—a practical constraint on escalation decisions. ## Regional Realignment: China and Russia Filling the Vacuum A salient analytical thread is that Moscow and Beijing are not passive observers; they are actively shaping a new regional security architecture. The conversation suggests coordination between Russia and China in presenting alternative frameworks to Gulf states—frameworks that exclude American primacy and offer political and economic incentives. Diplomatic engagement between Tehran and Beijing, and synchronized messaging about regional security, signal an effort to institutionalize a structure in which U.S. intervention is unnecessary or unwelcome. For the Gulf, the calculus is attractive: diversify partners, reduce dependence on a single hegemon, and hedge against the risk that U.S. force will draw the kingdom into retaliatory crossfire. If Gulf states move toward a posture of neutrality—closing airspace, banning basing, restricting overflights—the operational capacity of the U.S. to project power into Iran’s neighborhood would shrink rapidly. That strategic pivot would not only reshape military options but also accelerate processes of de-dollarization, alternative trade arrangements, and deeper economic ties to Eurasian powers. ## The Path to Resolution: What Iran Actually Wants Understanding Tehran’s red lines reframes how to think about an exit from the crisis. The conversation places Iranian priorities in pragmatic terms: security guarantees against future attacks, immediate economic relief, and a diminution of foreign military footholds in neighboring states. Those demands are transactional and verifiable, yet they also touch core interests of regional patrons and the United States. Meeting them would require higher political will and an acceptance of risk that many in Washington appear reluctant to shoulder. The interlocutors suggest that a path to de-escalation therefore depends not merely on bargaining finesse but on altering the material balance of incentives. That could involve third-party guarantees—perhaps brokered by powers with growing regional influence—or a broader, multilateral security framework that includes regional actors’ concerns. Without such a structural shift, episodic negotiations and tactical pauses will likely substitute for a durable settlement. ## Implications for U.S. Policy and Global Stability The implications are stark. A combination of military constraints, economic pain at home, and the diplomatic inroads of rival powers creates a narrow, unstable space for U.S. policy. Short-term measures—futures-market signaling, strategic reserve releases, limited strikes—cannot substitute for addressing the structural issues that created the crisis: regional security vacuums, credibility gaps, and the politicization of force. If Gulf states formalize restrictions on U.S. operations and deepen ties with Eurasian powers, the United States will find its strategic re

Saudi Arabia Stops US Military Support, Ends US Operation Freedom | Larry Johnson This is huge: Saudi Arabia puts an end to US "Operation Freedom" by banning the US from using Saudi Airspace or Bases. Is the Gulf finally going neutral? Larry C. Johnson — former CIA analyst — breaks down why U.S. strategy is failing, why the blockade is largely theater, and why China and Russia are filling the vacuum. Plus: a live bombshell tip mid-interview that changes everything. Essential viewing for anyone trying to understand what's actually happening. Support Larry here: https://larrycjohnson.substack.com Our Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Our Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com 0:00 Introduction 1:01 Iran Negotiations: Why a Deal Is Unlikely 5:01 Gulf States: Losing Faith in U.S. Security Guarantees 9:59 False Intelligence & Iran's True Situation 15:53 Energy Prices & the Gasoline Shock 18:58 Futures vs. Physical Oil: A Market Disconnect 26:56 Breaking: Saudi Arabia Bans U.S. Operations from Its Territory 32:00 De- Dollarisation & the Shift in Global Financial Power 38:00 The Economic Tsunami: Fertiliser, Food & Cascading Inflation 43:00 Path to Resolution: What Iran Actually Wants 44:49 Israel in Panic & the U. S. Missile Inventory Crisis #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today we are joined again by the one and only Larry Johnson. Larry, welcome back. #Larry Johnson Senor, good to see you. #Pascal Very good seeing you, too. You are one of the best analysts to actually give us the updates on what is going on, at least from the U.S. side, in the Iran war. Can you maybe give us a rundown as we speak on my Thursday morning, May 7th, your Thursday evening, May 6th? #Larry Johnson Yeah, so I figure I should start bringing, you know, props to these interviews. I should wear, like, a neck brace. You know, people that have been in an accident, injured their neck, or they're walking around—that's what we need after watching, you know, you're watching Trump's policy reversals. You know, one minute, Project Freedom; next minute, no, that's on pause. One minute, oh, we're making advances; next minute, oh, we're going to bomb them. Well, the market spin has been that -- 1 of 17 -- there is progress on negotiations and still holding out some hope that those negotiations will produce a permanent end to the war. I don't see it. The obstacles or the demands of Iran are completely incompatible with what Donald Trump and his team are willing to accept. The Trump team wants to phase in sanction relief, you know, not give it right away. Iranians want it right away, and I don't blame them. They've been down this path before with the JCPOA, where they were promised sanction relief and just had to, you know, show that they're acting in good faith. They acted in good faith. They did everything they were asked to do. And then Trump tore up the agreement, and nobody eased the sanctions that were on them. They want the money that's been frozen returned to them. In fact, they put out their plan today for how they're going to manage the Strait of Hormuz. And anybody who's been enforcing sanctions against Iran is not going to be allowed to use the Strait of Hormuz, just straight up. Anyone that allowed their land, their country—like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan—any of those countries that allowed the United States to use their facilities to carry out attacks in Iran, they’ve got to pay a fine. They're going to be expected to help share in the remuneration. So I think there are just too many obstacles and that a lot of this may be staged. It may be theater. Now, if you listen to what Marco Rubio said yesterday at his press conference, there was no conciliation in that at all. It was all about basically why Iran's such a bunch of bad guys. They're evil. They're a bunch of fanatics, religious extremists, on and on. But it's like the United States needs to look in the mirror because a lot of the things we accuse the Iranians of doing, we're actually doing. But apparently, the Chinese had told Trump that if you launch another attack on Iran, forget about coming here. Xi Jinping will have no time for you. #Pascal Yeah, right, because we have the upcoming meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping later this month, and we just had Araghchi in, I think, Beijing meeting with the Chinese foreign minister yesterday or today. What do you make of that? Did you hear anything about what the discussion there was? #Larry Johnson Well, the most important takeaway from that is they talked about regional security—the architecture for regional security. Those were the words the Chinese used. Gee, where else have we heard that, Pascal? Putin. Putin's exact words. So what this means is China and Russia, man, they're singing from the same sheet of music. They're not off on independent acts. This is a coordinated effort. And they're delivering that same message to the Saudis, Qataris, Emiratis, Bahrainis, and Kuwaitis. Because I think they're going forward with a plan that is not going to include the United States. In fact, the report is that the Saudis, when this Freedom Project was announced, that was done without consulting with the Saudis, without giving the Saudis a heads-up. -- 2 of 17 -- So the Saudis reportedly reacted by telling the United States, you cannot launch any more air operations out of Saudi Arabia. You're done. So I'm trying to confirm that right now. But if that's the case, I mean, it was reported in the press, but I'm trying to check it out through my military sources to see if, in fact, that happened or if that's just, you know, some more spin. I think China and Russia are trying to set up a situation where they will be the dominant forces now in the Persian Gulf. And the other thing I think sort of grates on the Saudis and the Qataris in particular, and Bahrain and Kuwait, is they were promised protection by the United States. We got your back, man. Here's our great air defense systems. Watch these work. And it didn't work. #Pascal And they're now proving to be just that—just toys. #Larry Johnson Yeah, yeah. And pricey toys, let's not forget that, man. They cost a pretty penny. So they exposed that the U.S. air defense system really didn't work. And the bases, the U.S. bases, were widely hit and significantly damaged. So it would not be uncommon for these Gulf Arabs to start looking around and saying, what? We've been basically paying the Americans billions of dollars. We've been buying protection. And what did they give us? They got us sort of roughed up here. #Pascal Do you think it's sinking in by now in these Gulf states that that's the state of affairs? Because I talked to Mohamed Marandi last week, and he told me, look, Pascal, if the Arab states today just declared their neutrality and said, like, no more overflights by the U.S., no more basing, no more docking in our ports, no more using any of our capabilities to implement any kind of warfare against Iran, then the war is over with that very announcement, because the United States couldn't do it without them. And by now it seems that this is just the physical reality that's going to be there in the Gulf. So do you think it's sinking in, or will it still take time until even the UAE comes around and Qatar? #Larry Johnson Well, if the UAE doesn't come, and the UAE actually has taken very provocative steps—oh yeah— alienating itself from the other Gulf Arabs. The tensions with the Saudis are back up. In fact, these guys were considered, a few months back, close to going to war with each other. But Iran's demand is it wants security guarantees that it's not going to be attacked again. So how does that get translated into action? Well, one way is that they are forbidden to have any U.S. military bases in any of those countries that are adjacent to Iran, because if the military is not there, they're going to have a tough time launching attacks. -- 3 of 17 -- And the problem, I guess, the other incentive for the Gulf Arabs maybe to pursue that is that if you do allow the U.S. in, you become a target. And in the era of drones and short-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, you're the target now. And they've suffered damage. We don't really have a full calculation yet, but some of the early indications are that there will be literally years spent trying to restore some of these capabilities. #Pascal Hey, very brief intermission because I was recently banned from YouTube. And although I'm back, this can happen anytime again. So please consider subscribing not only here, but to my mailing list on Substack. That's pascallottaz.substack.com. The link's going to be in the description below. And now, back to the video. And when it comes to the United States, you know, my friend here in Japan—she's an analyst—just asked me, so is the war over now? Because Trump actually announced it's over, right? But the blockade is still on. So it seems to me that the United States is really unwilling at the moment to go back to the kinetic phase. They do not want to shoot anymore, probably because they've run out of missiles, because there's just not enough things left to shoot. But it seems that the strategy is not to wind it down. The strategy is just to shift the way you impose hurt on Iran. Is that about it? #Larry Johnson Let me get it. This is a layered answer. Sorry to be so hesitant. Number one, the CIA and/or this Foundation for the Defense of Democracies have fed false intelligence into the Trump administration. And the nature of this intelligence is twofold: convince them, number one, that the Iranian leadership is coming apart at the seams, that there's nobody in charge, they're at each other's throats. And they believe that. #Pascal You believe that the White House believes this false intelligence? #Larry Johnson Absolutely believes it. And then coupled with that is that the economy is hanging by a thread, that the soldiers aren't getting paid, that the unrest that's beneath the surface is just waiting to bubble up. And so one more punch, and this, you know, we're back to what they were told the first week: we decapitate, man, they're not going to last three days, four days max. And they're being told that again. And you see Scott Bessett, he repeats it. You see Marco Rubio, he repeats it. Donald Trump repeats it. So I don't care what other negotiations are going on as long as you've got that belief about the situation. Now, what they don't understand—and I don't think, I've discovered this about a week ago or so—is that right now the Iranian leadership is probably more united than at any time in the 46-year history of the Islamic Republic. -- 4 of 17 -- Why? Because the top leaders share one thing in common. They all fought in the 1980–88 war that Iraq inflicted upon Iran. They all did. Pezeshkian, he was drafted into the army, but he was a medic, and he did all of his service as a medic with the IRGC. Araqchi, the foreign minister, he was in the IRGC. Ghalibaf, the Speaker of the Parliament, he was in the IRGC. Then the Ayatollah, Mojtaba Khamenei, he joined the IRGC when he was 17 in 1987 and fought for two years. He was in four major battles. So you've got a generation of guys who, you know, the youngest is Mojtaba, who's 56. The oldest is Pezeshkian. He's my age. He's 71. I look better than he does, I'll just note. #Pascal I'm better preserved. #Larry Johnson But they all, they come out of it, they all fought. So that was a—and they did that as young men, you know, between the ages of 17 and 30. That shapes who they are today. So they've been attacked again, just like they were attacked in 1980, only more viciously. So the notion that they're at each other's throats and divided, that's just Western propaganda. That's crap. And then as far as the economy being on—you know, it's running on fumes—they're going to collapse any minute now. The