Jeffrey Sachs EXPOSES Europe’s War Lies. Peace Process Collapsing.

## A war stalled by politics, not geography What emerges from the conversation is less a failure of diplomacy than a failure of political will. There is an off-ramp from the fighting that would reduce bloodshed and stabilize Europe — a settlement that hinges on Ukrainian neutrality, credible security arrangements for Russia, and territorial compromises. Yet those pragmatic building blocks cannot survive the crosswinds of domestic politics, entrenched narratives, and European posture. The exchange makes clear that the war’s prolongation owes as much to elites, habits, and symbolism as it does to tanks and missiles. Ending a war is not simply a matter of placing proposals on a table; it requires political leaders to withstand their own constituencies, reshape narratives, and reforge institutions that can broker and guarantee a deal. ## Four actors, four logics The discussion frames the conflict as driven by four principal actors whose interests and internal constraints make a simple compromise elusive. One actor publicly demands a negotiated end predicated on strict security guarantees and territorial adjustments. Another, representing Ukrainian state authority, rejects those terms in favour of maximalist aims, including territorial integrity without concessions and legal reckoning. A third — the United States — has a fissured position: on paper a negotiator willing to entertain neutrality and concessions, but in practice hemmed in by a hostile legislature and powerful security agencies. Finally, Europe projects unanimity while internally divided, with a mix of reluctant dissenters and vociferous advocates for continued resistance. This quartet produces an unstable equilibrium. The military situation on the ground is fluid, and battlefield dynamics can make diplomacy easier or moot. Yet more decisive than military gain is the politics of signaling: leaders in all capitals calculate not only what settles the war but what will be perceived at home and by allied publics. The result is a political stalemate that makes a negotiated settlement theoretically possible but practically difficult. ## Europe’s posture: nostalgia, dominance, and the costs of obedience One of the starkest diagnostics in the conversation is the role of European elites. Far from presenting a homogenous peace-making bloc, European politics contain a powerful current that equates compromise with weakness. This posture is rooted in historical identities — the imperial and balance-of-power traditions that continue to inform strategic imagination — but it is also stoked by contemporary narratives of moral clarity and victimhood. In that mix, neutrality for Ukraine is framed as capitulation rather than a pragmatic route to preservation. The consequences are material and severe. Continued insistence on maximalist objectives has deepened the material devastation of Ukraine, strained European economies, and run the risk of escalating a regional war into broader confrontation. Political leaders who champion sustained resistance often do so to preserve domestic prestige and to signal to internal constituencies that they are defending values. Yet what the conversation emphasizes is that such signals can be self-defeating: they prolong suffering, undercut the chance for reconstruction, and place Europe in a riskier strategic posture rather than a safer one. ## Domestic political obstacles to peacemaking Across the major actors, powerful domestic constituencies act as obstacles to compromise. In the United States, the executive branch’s capacity to negotiate is constrained by an assertive legislature, influential intelligence and military bureaucracies, and a vibrant pro-war lobby. A president may possess formal authority to change course, but the conversation underscores the gap between constitutional power and political viability. Competing advisers, media cycles, and the imperatives of electoral survival fragment any coherent long-term strategy. Similarly, Ukrainian leadership is characterised in the exchange as a martial government that does not necessarily represent the full spectrum of popular opinion. That concentration of decision-making power narrows the bargaining space. On the Russian side, hardline elements and the imperative to secure territorial gains make concessions politically costly. In short, peacemaking takes place in the shadow of domestic institutions and pressures that reward bellicosity more than compromise. This is not a new observation, but it is a vivid reminder that the mechanics of peace require not just an agreement between capitals but political work within them. ## Narrative power and historical continuity The conversation repeatedly returns to narratives: how long-standing stories about empire, victimhood, and threat shape decision-making. Two narratives are particularly salient. The first is a deep-rooted Russophobia that, according to the discussion, has been embedded in parts of European political culture for generations. This predisposition renders many Europeans and Western policymakers predisposed to interpret Russian actions through a lens of hostility, making any compromise appear illegitimate or treacherous. The second narrative concerns the Middle East, where a century-long colonially inflected project has entrenched outcomes and made moral clarity difficult. The persistence of these narratives means that contemporary crises rarely reset public perceptions quickly. Short media cycles, performative politics, and entrenched interest groups all conspire to recreate old scripts rather than allow for fresh, pragmatic thinking. The upshot is that public opinion and elite rhetoric often harden rather than open possibilities for de-escalation. ## Institutions and the unfulfilled potential of multilateralism If narratives and domestic politics block bilateral or unilateral solutions, the conversation points to the UN Security Council — an institution widely regarded as weakened — as a plausible, though underused, mechanism for progress. The Security Council contains the principal actors in a single forum and has the normative legitimacy to frame and seal agreements. Yet decades of institutional atrophy, procedural sclerosis, and geopolitical rivalry have eroded its ability to act decisively. Reinvigorating multilateral machinery would require both political courage and a redefinition of purpose: members would need to accept uncomfortable compromises, commit to enforcement and verification, and reimagine how guarantees are provided — whether by joint peacekeeping, international security arrangements, or legally binding treaties. The conversation suggests a metaphorical “conclave” in which major powers are required to negotiate until they produce a result, underscoring that the problem is often not a lack of technical solutions but a lack of political compulsion to see them through. ## What a realistic peace process would require The exchange offers a sobering but concrete yardstick for what a feasible peace process must deliver. First, Ukraine’s neutrality must be credible — not a rhetorical commitment but a treaty-level arrangement with guarantees and verification mechanisms that allay security fears. Second, legitimate security arrangements must be negotiated that reduce the likelihood of future escalations; this could include international observers, demilitarized zones, or multilateral security pacts. Third, territorial adjustments must be managed in ways that minimize human suffering and create pathways for return, compensation, and local governance. Fourth, any settlement needs robust reconstruction guarantees, economic support designed to rebuild society rather than perpetuate dependency, and transitional justice mechanisms that prioritize reconciliation over punitive spectacle. Political leaders who seek such a settlement must do more than negotiate; they must reshape the domestic conversation. That requires public explanation, framing c

Jeffrey Sachs EXPOSES Europe���s War Lies. Peace Process Collapsing. The peace process between the US and Russia might have hit a brick wall. And the Europeans couldn ‘t be happier, since all they want is drag the US back into the dead-end that is project Ukraine. What are they even thinking? Today I’m talking to Professor Jeffrey Sachs, a Professor at Columbia University, advisor to countless governments, and a prolific analyst—I’m absolutely sure you all know him very well. Today we discuss the state of US-Russian peace negotiations on March 27th, 2025, the narrative shift on Israel-Palestine, and more. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to Professor Jeffrey Sachs, a professor at Columbia University, advisor to countries and governments around the world, and a prolific analyst. I'm absolutely sure all of you know him very well. Professor Sachs, welcome back. #M1 Pascal, great to be with you, as always. #M2 Well, thank you so much for taking the time. And maybe before we go into the larger picture, I would like to get your take on a couple of current affairs. We are talking today on May 27, 2025, and the peace negotiations between—let's face it—the U.S. and Russia are at a very peculiar point. Just yesterday, President Trump actually said he doesn't understand Vladimir Putin: how is it possible that he bombed Kiev? What is your take on where these negotiations are at the moment? #M1 I think we should consider the four parties to this war. There's the Russian side, of course. There's the United States. There's Europe, broadly speaking—both the EU and Britain. And there is, of course, Ukraine. So where do the four sides stand on this? The Russians say very clearly, here are the terms for ending this war: three components—Ukraine's neutrality; security arrangements that are satisfactory, that don't put Russia back into a disadvantage by a Western military presence on Russia's border; and territorial concessions by Ukraine. Ukraine—which doesn't mean the people of -- 1 of 8 -- Ukraine, but means a martial law government headed by Zelensky—says no to all of that. NATO: no territorial concessions and no concessions to Russia. So it's not offering— in fact, I should say the Ukrainian peace plan is reparations, war crimes, tribunals. It's a total victory plan for Ukraine. The United States, in the person of the President of the United States, says, let's cut a deal: yes, Ukrainian neutrality; yes, some territorial concessions; yeah, we'll figure out something on security. And the position between Trump and the Russian government has not been decisively the same, but not consequentially divergent either. In other words, the Trump and Putin positions are close enough that one could actually find an agreement. But we should understand that the United States' political structure is itself divided. So Trump does not have all the power, or call all the shots, or have unanimous weight. Congress is belligerent, strongly Russophobic. The U.S. deep state—meaning the CIA, much of the Pentagon, and so forth—is deeply anti-Russian. And so Trump's position faces a lot of internal U.S. opposition as well. There are supposedly about 80 senators, organized by Lindsey Graham of South Carolina and Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, who are pushing for tough sanctions against Russia. This represents the hardline, 30-year "destroy Russia" faction of U.S. politics, and it continues. Trump hasn't ended that; he continues to face it. Then there's the European side. While there are a few voices in a few small countries—notably Hungary and Slovakia—and many political parties in Europe that say, "End the war, this is a disaster for Europe and for Ukraine," the predominant voices— meaning Starmer in the UK, Macron in France, Scholz in Germany, and Tusk, the so-called "four musketeers" in Poland—are saying, "We support Ukraine 100 percent, including Zelensky's maximal demands." So what we have is a mess. We don't have the convergent process that we should have, because I think that the Putin-Trump line—that there is a reasonable end to this war that serves Ukraine's interests, Russia's interests, Europe's interests, and the U.S. interests—is actually correct. And at the core of that win-win-win-win is Ukraine's neutrality. This has been the cause of the war all along: the U.S. attempt to expand NATO, which, ironically, the Europeans opposed privately when it was first presented. But now the Europeans are the great champions of this because Zelensky champions it. We should understand, though, that every moment when we say "Zelensky," we're talking about a kind of dictatorship. We're talking about military rule by a small group that is not tested at all against the real interests of the Ukrainian people, or by a vote of the Ukrainian people, or by opinion surveys of the Ukrainian people. So my view is that Trump has been on the right track, but he's opposed within his own team by people like General Kellogg, by Marco Rubio, and by others who are much more mainstream, Russophobic parts of the U.S. political structure—which has been the way U.S. politics has been for many, many decades, even before 1991, going back to 1945 at least. The U.S. has been anti-Soviet and anti-Russia, and Trump hasn't overcome that. -- 2 of 8 -- So we're a bit paralyzed, except on the battlefield, where people are dying in large numbers and Russia is taking more territory. Then you have the really, sadly preposterous scenario of the past week, where Ukraine sent hundreds and hundreds of drones to attack Moscow and other Russian cities. And when Russia retaliated, the President of the United States wrote that Putin's absolutely crazy. This is an absurdity. Anyone who steps back beyond the immediacy of the moment, and even looks within the context of a week, understands that the provocation comes from both sides, and that the fundamental problem is no compromise on the Western side, other than what Trump has tried to put forward—against the opposition of European leaders, against the opposition of his own deep state, and against the opposition of much of the U.S. political class, which is really a military- industrial-backed class. So all of this means great disappointment. Trump could have the upper hand if he's consistent. He is the President of the United States; he has the authority to make U.S. foreign policy. But when he posts something like "Putin is absolutely crazy," as he did in the last 24 hours, this is not only a little bit bizarre, but very sad and alarming, because it shows how easy it is for the warmongering side in the West to keep up its 30-year anti-Russia campaign. #M2 Yeah, but isn't it also just a textbook example of how difficult it is for two nations to make peace? Because even when you have a moment when the top doves—and let's face it, Trump and Putin are doves—even when they want to cooperate, they face their own opposition. And Trump might have to cater, at least in his speeches, to the people who now accuse him of being soft on Russia. And on the other hand, in Russia, even just one rogue officer flying a drone into a Ukrainian civilian infrastructure building can give the hawks enough fodder to say, "We need to escalate, we need to escalate." The reason why I think Vladimir Putin gave a 2:30 a.m. speech in which he proposed the Istanbul Agreement was to make sure that the Europeans were in bed while the Americans were still awake, in order to sidestep the Europeans, who are also hawks and want to continue the war. Do you see any way in which these factions could still lead to at least a beneficial process—not a peace agreement, but at least a process that leads to more reconciliation? #M1 Well, look, we know that getting to peace requires skill. So it's not a simple matter, because there are always opponents of peace. If there were not, Jesus would not have had to say, "Blessed are the peacemakers." It would have been obvious. But the fact of the matter is, peacemakers face huge opposition. Even—well, not even—John F. Kennedy said it's much easier to be a warmonger in politics than it is to be an emissary of peace. And Kennedy faced this issue repeatedly. The circumstances you describe, where the two leaders want to make peace but the politics around them -- 3 of 8 -- is much more warmongering, are familiar. But leaders have the job of making the peace. That's their job assignment. What else are they good for? In other words, Trump has to prevail in this. That's his job. It's easy to say, "Well, I'm under pressure from Lindsey Graham, and I'm under pressure from all these neocons, and I'm under pressure from the military-industrial complex." But his job is actually to make peace. And for me, maybe one of many historical analogies that's worthwhile is the Cuban Missile Crisis, when Kennedy and Khrushchev wanted to avoid a nuclear war—in fact, nuclear Armageddon—but their advisors on both sides were very hawkish. Kennedy's advisers, almost to a person in the early days of the Cuban Missile Crisis, said, "Go bomb the Russians, go bomb the military bases in Cuba, invade Cuba." There were almost no voices for peace. So Kennedy had a two-level game that he was playing: one with his own government and the other with Khrushchev. He was extraordinarily skilled, and he was able to make an agreement with the Soviet side, and the world was saved as a result of that. The point I'm making is that Trump actually can prevail, or to use Trump's words, he holds the cards. He cannot be overwhelmed by Lindsey Graham or by Richard Blumenthal or by Starmer or by Macron. If Trump is consistent, he can make peace with Putin, which is to Ukraine's advantage. I just have to say, when I say these things, people jump up and down—"Putin apologist" and so forth. This is so absurd. At this stage, at the end of May 2025, Ukraine has been destroyed by this war. I said from the beginning that Ukraine would be destroyed by this war, that hundreds of thousands or a million plus would be dead or gravely injured, that the infrastructure and the economy would be destroyed. And for what? For nothing. Because the agreement that was on the table in April 2022 in the Istanbul process was far better than what Ukraine is going to get right now. And the agreement that was on the table in December 2021, that President Putin put to Biden—who I think was one of our most incompetent presidents—was vastly better than what's on the table right now. So this isn't about being a Putin apologist. This is about a basic fact, Pascal, that I would like to reiterate strongly. Those who say they're friends of Ukraine are either stupid or cynical, because they're destroying Ukraine. They're leading Ukraine to its death. And I mean that physically, I mean that in terms of lives lost, I mean that in terms of politics. These friends of Ukraine, telling Ukraine to fight on and "we'll give you the weapons" and so forth. They don't have the weapons. They're going to lose on the ground, and they're going to lose their country. I would put Biden, as this great friend of Ukraine, as the one who did the most destruction. But then I would put the British in an unending line of stupidity, I have to say. I can't stand watching British geopolitics because it's the nostalgia of imperial cynicism every day—when they have no empire anymore, but they still have the cynicism and they still have the nostalgia—and telling Ukraine to fight on as if that's the friendly thing to do for Ukraine. That's what's happening right now. Bottom line for me: Trump can make the deal. Trump can end this war. -- 4 of 8 -- But not if he tweets on one side that Putin's absolutely crazy. He should be explaining to the American people that, look, there is so much Russophobia and belligerence that even I, Donald Trump, am trying to stop the war. There are warmongers everywhere. That's what Trump needs to be explaining. That's what John Kennedy