Europe’s Century Of Humiliation Has Just Begun | Arnaud Bertrand

## Europe’s security sidelined: a historical rupture The image of European security being negotiated in a Saudi ballroom without a single European at the table is jarring because it violates a long, painstaking evolution of continental agency. The conversation makes clear that this is not mere choreography; it may be a structural break. For the first time in more than a millennium, decisions that define European security are being brokered primarily by powers outside Europe — notably the United States and Russia — with Europe reduced to bystander status or, worse, to payer-in-chief for choices others make. That sidelining is not simply an affront to diplomatic protocol. It accelerates a strategic humiliation that risks reorienting political alignments, defense doctrines, and the sense of European self-determination. Arnaud Bertrand frames this moment as the culmination of larger shifts: a U.S. administration that recognizes and embraces a multipolar order, and a Europe that has over decades ceded critical levers of foreign policy and strategic autonomy. Seen from this angle, the Riyadh talks are emblematic rather than exceptional — tangible evidence that the post‑1945 Western consensus has frayed to the point of near collapse. ## The United States’ strategic reorientation: from architect to revisionist One of the most consequential themes in the discussion is the transformation of U.S. posture. Arnaud highlights a striking rhetorical and strategic pivot: senior U.S. officials are openly acknowledging a multipolar world, and the emerging American stance treats the previous liberal-institutional architecture not as an immutable good but as an instrument that has been weaponized against U.S. interests. This is not a tweak; it is a reappraisal that moves the United States from self-styled architect of a rules-based order to revisionist actor seeking a different balance of advantage. The practical consequences are obvious in the reported behavior of the new administration: direct bilateral negotiating with Russia over Europe’s most existential conflict, exclusion of European interlocutors, and transactional bargaining that aims to shift the financial and security burdens onto European capitals. The consequence is two-fold: a reassertion of American agency in ways that are transactional rather than managerial, and a renewed willingness to use Europe's dependence as leverage. For Brussels capitals, the message is stark — the United States may no longer police Europe’s security in the way it did during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. ## Europe as vassal: the self-inflicted roots of humiliation A core contention in the exchange is that European weakness is not simply a product of U.S. will but also of European choices. Arnaud stresses that Europe did not become subordinate overnight; that status was cultivated over decades through political alignment, policy mimicry, and institutional dependencies. Episodes such as Western endorsement of interventions and external narratives — the Romanian election annulment example discussed in the conversation — reveal how European politics have often been shaped by external agendas and rapid follow-the-leader dynamics. The notion of Europe as a “vassal” is provocative but illuminating. It draws attention to the governance choices that surrendered levers of influence: reliance on NATO for security, willingness to follow U.S. policy prescriptions, and lack of robust strategic autonomy. The present humiliation is therefore partially homegrown. If strategic dependency allowed outside powers to determine Europe’s fate, the remedy must be political will and institutional restructuring. Whether European leaders can summon that politics — and whether electorates will tolerate the sovereignty trade-offs necessary for an independent defense posture — remains the pivotal question. ## Ukraine: the human and geopolitical cost of proxy wars The conversation repeatedly returns to the human toll and moral contradictions of the Ukraine crisis, framing the war as both a localized tragedy and a symptom of great-power competition. Arnaud’s analysis underscores a grim arithmetic: thousands, likely hundreds of thousands, of lives and a generation’s social and economic prospects sacrificed in a proxy struggle that also enriched foreign military-industrial networks. The tragedy is compounded by the post-war politics that may prioritize resource allocation and debt repayment over Ukrainian reconstruction and sovereignty. Equally troubling is the prospect that Ukraine could be asked to shoulder reparations or share future resource revenues as part of geopolitical bargaining — effectively converting a nation’s ruin into collateral for external interests. The conversation treats this not merely as cynical realpolitik but as an ethical failing: proxy wars produce multiple fronts of damage, including exploitation of the very populations meant to be protected. Ukraine’s predicament is an object lesson in how smaller states are instrumentalized by larger patrons whose strategic calculus may include economic recuperation as much as warfighting aims. ## Russia’s calculus: neighborly realism and long-term stability A notable insight from the exchange is the suggestion that Russia may, paradoxically, be more attuned to European stability than the United States currently is. Arnaud draws historical parallels — especially the consequences of the Sino‑Soviet split and the collapse of the USSR — to argue that Moscow understands the dangers of humiliating a neighbor into destabilization. For Russia, the contiguous geography, shared history, and the trauma of large-scale European disruption counsel caution. A Europe reduced to privation, chaos, or extreme right populism is not an abstract risk; it is a proximate threat to Russian interests. This reasoning complicates simplistic narratives that cast Russia solely as an expansionist revanchist power. While Moscow pursues strategic advantage, it also calculates the externalities of extreme containment or total humiliation of neighboring systems. If Russia sees value in a stable, albeit non-aligned or neutral, Europe — and in securing buffer arrangements that prevent future Western encroachment — it may negotiate accordingly. The conversation suggests that Russian diplomacy is likely pragmatic, shaped by geography and history in ways that U.S. planners, insulated by oceans, are not. ## NATO’s fate and the awkward prospect of European strategic autonomy Perhaps the most consequential institutional question posed is NATO’s future. The speakers consider scenarios where peace settlement mechanisms explicitly exempt NATO’s Article 5, leaving European states as the primary guarantors of Ukrainian security. That would effectively convert NATO into a conditional, U.S.-calibrated alliance rather than an automatic mutual-defense compact — a defanging of the organization’s guarantee. Arnaud’s critique of NATO is blunt: in his view, decades of dependence on U.S. protection created a leverage mechanism whereby American strategic preferences could easily be imposed on European politics. The remedy, he argues, should be a European defense architecture that aligns with continental interests — whether through a standalone European army, a reconfigured mutual-defense alliance, or more robust national capabilities tied together under EU auspices. But the institutional and political barriers are formidable: member states are reluctant to cede sovereignty to Brussels, historical memories and divergent threat perceptions complicate defense pooling, and political elites may prefer the short-term comfort of American guarantees. The conversation rightly underscores a paradox: an empowered European defense posture could unsettle Russia in ways the current U.S.-centred NATO does not, but in the long-term it might better secure European autonomy and reduce the leverage external patrons hold. Whether European publics

Europe’s Century Of Humiliation Has Just Begun | Arnaud Bertrand [Part 1 of 2] The USA and Russia just met for a first preparatory peace meeting in Saudi Arabia and EU leaders are not only angry about this but they are not even invited to join the talks! This is the first time in over 1000 years that Europe's security is decided completely by outside forces. Has its century of humiliation begun? Today I’ve got again the fantastic Arnaud Bertrand with me, one of Twitter/X’s best and most profound political analysts. I recommend everybody subscribe to Arnaud as he really hits the nail on the head every single time. He does fantastic current affairs and data analysis. Aranaud’s Twitter/X Profile: https://x.com/rnaudbertrand? s=21&t=hvGzg_IUq7IAn6aFBkjy5w #M3 I actually checked. There is no time in Europe's history when the security architecture of its own continent was decided by outside powers without anyone from Europe at the table, which is what's happening right now between the Trump administration and Russia in Riyadh, in Saudi Arabia. That's never happened. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies. And today I've got again the fantastic Arnaud Bertrand with me, one of Twitter's best and most profound political analysts. I recommend everybody subscribe to Arnaud as he really hits the nail on the head every single time. He does fantastic current affairs and fantastic data analysis. Arnaud, welcome back to the channel. #M3 Thank you again for inviting me. I'm very pleased to be here, Pascal. #M2 I'm glad to have you here to give us an update on all the things that are happening at light speed compared to the last three years when it comes to peace negotiations between Russia and the United States. We are talking today on February 19th, and the first meeting between Lavrov and Rubio just happened. Could you tell us the other things that are important to keep in mind that are going on around us right now? #M3 -- 1 of 9 -- Sure. I mean, there is so much going on with the new Trump administration that just making a list of what happened in one month is going to take hours. I think one of the first things I tweeted about when the new Trump administration started were some declarations by Rubio, which really stood out from previous U.S. administrations. He recognized the existence of the multipolar world order. He clearly said that we are in a multipolar world order, which I don't think any U.S. official, especially so senior, had ever said before. The Biden administration was all about clinging to the previous order. So that new administration really differs in that they recognize that the previous order is just gone, right? It's a multipolar world now. And what he also said is that not only had the previous order disappeared, but its features needed to be completely changed because, I think, the language that he used was that those features were being weaponized against the U.S. The previous order had become a weapon. So the U.S. has gone from being the country that created the previous order to now a country that sees it as a weapon used against it and seeks to completely change it. So it's quite an incredible shift. And then, of course, you had, I mean, let's jump directly to what's happening in Europe right now. You had J.D. Vance's incredible speech at the Munich Security Conference, basically giving a big sermon to Europeans, announcing, you know, we basically don't share your values anymore. Like, we don't recognize you. That's not who we are. We are ideologically different from you guys, which is also incredible because it sort of enacts the end of the Western alliance, which was a key feature of the world since World War II. #M2 Although it's very important to recognize that what Vance said was that we, the United States, are sticking to our guns, right? We are sticking to democracy, plurality, freedom of speech, and so on, while you, what you have been doing in reality is you've been restricting democracy, you've been restricting freedom of speech, you've been restricting all of these values that we hold dear, even though you proclaim that you're for those, right? So Vance kind of put a mirror in front of their faces. #M3 Yeah, but it's extremely hypocritical because why did Europe become this way? It's by following the U.S., right? So one example that he gave in his speech was that of Romania. You know, as you remember, there were elections in Romania, and then the people voted for a far-right candidate. And those elections were annulled because of supposed Russian interference in social media and TikTok. And the U.S. was the first one to cheer that. I actually found the statement by the U.S. State Department, which predates any statement by the EU. So it led that cheering of an annulment of elections based on a lie, because it was proven after that it was a lie. Those claims of Russian interference on TikTok were actually paid for by the candidate that lost, the Romanian candidate, or rather, the party of the Romanian candidate that lost. So it was something -- 2 of 9 -- happening inside Romania. It had nothing to do with Russia. And so the U.S. led that, and the Europeans followed. A lot of what Vance was criticizing Europe for was actually what the U.S. did as well and often led Europe to do. So it's very convenient for the U.S. to blame Europe for all of that. We get it; the U.S. wants to send a message that they're not like that anymore. But it's also very hypocritical to put it all on Europe when Europe has been a vassal of the U.S. for quite a few years, and they were just being good vassals in many ways. #M2 Yeah, but that's what happens. If you make yourself a vassal and then there's a change of owner, then don't... I mean, again, like... This is what you set yourself up for. And this is why they're freaking out at the moment, isn't it? But let's continue a little bit. We'll go into this later, but about the peace negotiations now and the reaction from Europe about this, because it really seems as though we are now at a point where it's clearly understood that Russia and the U.S., both of them, want a solution. So the question is only how are we going to solve this diplomatically? But there's no more question if we're going to solve it diplomatically, right? #M3 Yeah. So, I mean, clearly, the U.S. wants a solution. And of course, the most important fact here is the exclusion of Europe. I'm not sure exactly why the Trump administration decided to exclude Europe. But typically, when you're not at the table, as the expression goes, you're on the menu. So I suspect that this is why. We can see that from some of the declarations of U.S. officials, notably around security guarantees to be given to Ukraine afterwards, which I can't remember which official said, but basically, the message is the expectation is it will be mostly given by Europeans and not the U.S. And that's the really costly thing, right? The security guarantees, putting men on the ground, and then the whole reconstruction of Ukraine. I think the reason why the U.S. is negotiating directly with Russia is so that Europe foots the bill for all of this. Also, Trump has publicly declared that he expects to get his money back from all the spending in Ukraine. I think it was The Telegraph that published a deal proposal between the U.S. and Ukraine on the sharing of the revenue of the natural resources of Ukraine 50-50 going forward. So, in effect, the U.S. is trying to be the one getting reimbursed for its expenses, while Europe had similar, if not bigger, expenses, and all the costs would be borne by Europe. #M2 This is again quite incredible because, on the one hand, much of what happened occurred because people in the United States pushed for it, right? Victoria Nuland, Blinken, and so on. On the other hand, the money that the U.S. spent was not money that they just threw out of the window or burned in a furnace. It was money that came straight back into their own military-industrial complex, right? They propped up their own economy, and even more, most of the money the Europeans -- 3 of 9 -- spent also went back there. So this was... And now shifting the narrative into, oh, we wasted so much money, you have to give us more money, is, on the one hand, absolutely incredible. On the other hand... I mean, this is what politics is. I mean, world politics is. I mean, what else would you expect? #M3 Yeah, yeah. I mean, exactly. That's been known since the ancient Greeks, right? You had Thucydides, who wrote that the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. And unfortunately or fortunately, I don't know, I mean, it's just a fact. This is the world we live in. Europeans can only blame themselves for being dragged into this situation. #M2 And they didn't even get the worst of the entire spiel, right? The worst is suffered by the Ukrainians, who lost all of these now hundreds of thousands, if not, I mean, at least hundreds of thousands of people, ruined for the next 20, 30 years. And now the talk is not on whether you get reconstructed, but who gets your resources, right? I mean, this is like a triple F in a way that is hard to imagine. #M3 Yeah, yeah, yeah. On the amount of reparations, I mean, the very notion that Ukraine will need to pay reparations to the U.S. is incredible on the face of it, right? Because it's as if it was defeated by the U.S., that the U.S. is a victor here against Ukraine, which... In some way, it is. I wrote a tweet about the fact that all proxy wars, at the end of the day, are a war on two fronts, with one front being against the main enemy and the other front being against your patron, right? Because he uses you for his own interest and not yours. Ukraine was extremely naive not to see that, to let itself be used this way. And, of course, Europe, too, is incredibly naive because, to a lesser extent than Ukraine, of course, it is going to have to bear most of the cost while getting absolutely no benefit out of this entire adventure. #M2 What do you think, from your observation, the Russians are making out of this? Because they clearly, I would think, see the same things that we see and have a similar analysis, probably. And they will try to make the most out of it, right? Now that you have a potential—not ally, but somebody who will play with you. And, you know, you can finally resolve this goddamn biggest issue at your border, while also still keeping in mind that you have other interests, right? The interest to keep a very good relationship with China, the interest to further BRICS. How do you think the Russians are engaged in this process now? #M3 -- 4 of 9 -- I was actually thinking about this very question. And I actually think that, paradoxically, despite some of the rhetoric, maybe the Russians have the Europeans' interests more at heart than the Americans, because they've lived through a sort of similar situation, right? I mean, you know, it can be compared with the Sino-Soviet split, right? What's happening right now is an American-European split. Clearly, they're splitting. We can see it. Everybody can see it. At the time, the Sino-Soviet split was at the expense of the Soviet Union. Ultimately, after Kissinger went to recognize China, China joined the US-led international order, the Soviet Union was left all alone and ultimately fell and had, you know, this decade or so of extreme hardship. And I think, I mean, if I were in Russia's shoes, given that Europe is my neighbor, I wouldn't want such hardship on them because it wouldn't be so much in my interest to have that, especially given Europe's history of periods of hardship really creating a lot of issues, wars, and so on. So I think the Russians are probably keener students of history. And it would not be such a stretch to believe that in the negotiations, they probably think about Europe's interests more than the Trump administration does. Because they've lived that and be