Europe's 28-Point Fantasy: A Counterproposal to Fail | David T. Pyne

Europe’s unfolding peace proposals are less an orderly negotiation than a collision of political visions—Washington’s transactional blueprint, Brussels’s security sensibilities, and Moscow’s uncompromising red lines. The recorded exchange analyzed here surfaces a central paradox: a U.S. draft that gestures toward settlement while embedding incentives and deal‑breakers that many European capitals find unacceptable, and a European counterproposal that preserves positions Moscow will not tolerate. The result is a diplomatic moment rich with opportunity but riddled with traps—structural, political, and moral—that could doom any durable settlement unless the leading parties reckon with what each truly needs to feel secure. ## NATO Membership & Security Red Lines At the heart of the impasse sits NATO: whether Ukraine’s future will include membership, permanent alliance footprints, or strict exclusions. The American draft under discussion signals a pragmatic departure from immediate Ukrainian accession, treating NATO membership as a deferred possibility. European reaction, by contrast, leaves that question deliberately ambiguous—an approach designed to preserve political options and reassure Kyiv’s supporters. From the perspective that emerges in the conversation, Moscow treats NATO’s expansion or persistent NATO presence in Ukraine as an existential threat. Any treaty that leaves a pathway for alliance forces—or even temporary deployments that become effectively permanent—will be unacceptable to Russia. Conversely, European insistence on preserving NATO options reflects deeper anxieties about abandoning allies and setting precedents for spheres of influence in Europe. Those anxieties are politically potent in capitals that view partnership guarantees as a bulwark against future aggression. The practical tension is stark: a credible peace must reconcile Russian demands for exclusion of NATO forces and long-range strike capabilities with Ukrainian and European demands for security guarantees and sovereignty. Proposals that attempt to thread the needle—caps on armament ranges, limits on active troop numbers, demilitarized zones—are vulnerable to interpretation fights. The conversation underscores that diplomatic clarity on NATO’s role, not equivocation, will determine whether any treaty survives initial acceptance or lapses into renewed confrontation. ## Economic Interests, Corruption & Amnesty Clauses The debate also surfaces an uneasy marriage of geopolitical settlement and economic extraction. The American draft’s investment and profit‑sharing clauses—portrayed as reconstruction incentives—read to many commentators like an economic playbook as much as a peace plan. That mixture of rebuilding and potential private gain alarms Europeans and Russians alike; it invites accusations that the United States would leverage settlement for corporate advantage. Closely entwined with economic terms are clauses on reparations and amnesty. European proposals, according to the exchange, push for reparations far beyond what Russia would accept—numbers commensurate with frozen Russian assets—while the U.S. draft contains provisions for mutual amnesty that could shield actors on both sides from international prosecutions. These amnesty provisions are the kind of pragmatic compromise that often appears in conflict resolution: they reduce incentives for continued fighting by lowering the stakes for leaders. But they also trigger moral and legal objections, particularly when corruption and possible war crimes are at issue. The conversation highlights a particularly combustible case: the potential extension of amnesty to Ukrainian officials who may face corruption charges. If an international agreement forces third-party states to recognize such amnesties, it undermines accountability mechanisms and could entrench kleptocratic networks. Europeans pushing for more stringent anti‑corruption language see justice as central to reconstructing a viable, prosperous Ukrainian state. Proponents of generous amnesties insist that without personal guarantees for leaders and combatants, there will be no signatory willing to stop the war. The trade-off between accountability and peace looms as both ethical and strategic. ## Republican Rifts & The Neocon Influence Within Washington, the 28‑point proposal has exposed fissures that matter as much as intergovernmental disagreements. The conversation points to two competing currents in U.S. policy formation: a transactional, America‑First diplomacy associated with certain senior figures, and a muscular, neoconservative tendency in Congress and parts of the foreign‑policy bureaucracy that resists compromise. This schism is not merely theoretical. Several senators and congressional leaders have publicly denounced elements of the Trump‑era draft—some branding it as too accommodating to Moscow, others accusing its authors of naiveté or worse. The conversation names neoconservative opposition as a decisive domestic roadblock: those who view Russia through a zero‑sum prism fear that any legal architecture allowing Russian military posture near Europe or permitting Ukraine to remain outside NATO will be read as a strategic defeat. Equally significant is the assertion that personnel choices in any administration determine outcomes. Appointments of officials sympathetic to neoconservative doctrine can translate presidential inclinations into policies that undermine negotiated settlements. The result is a layered domestic contest in which foreign policy is the sum of electoral politics, ideological commitments, and bureaucratic stovepipes. The exchange suggests that unless political leadership marshals coherent levers to manage congressional pushback, meaningful concessions required for peace will be politically untenable in Washington. ## Administration Power Struggles & Diplomatic Backchannels Beneath public posturing, the conversation reveals a complex anatomy of backchannels and intra-administration rivalries. Track‑two diplomacy and unofficial envoys appear to have played a major role in producing the U.S. draft under review. That same informality fuels both flexibility and fragility: backchannel accords can sidestep cumbersome procedure, yet their secrecy invites leaks, denials, and sabotage. Participants in the exchange argue that the United States displays a bipolar foreign‑policy style—oscillating between “peace‑first” overtures and “support‑Ukraine” escalations driven by internal politics and personnel. Leaks of the draft and counterproposals have the effect of politicizing negotiations before they are mature. This creates an environment where parliamentary allies can posture, bureaucrats can resist, and adversaries can exploit ambiguity. The recorded discussion also highlights concrete levers the United States holds: intelligence sharing, military logistics, and communications infrastructure are all forms of influence that Washington could wield to compel or cajole partners. The suggestion that temporary suspensions of support could be used as a bargaining chip underscores how diplomatic bargaining often blends carrots and sticks. But using those levers risks accelerating Ukraine’s military collapse or fracturing the coalition backing Kyiv—outcomes few in Europe are willing to accept. ## The Venezuela Connection & Global Strategy 00:36: 34 Anatomy of the Leak: Sabotage or Strategy? The transcript’s most surprising turn connects disparate theatres of geopolitics: references to external actors like Venezuela and to the tactical question of how the draft leaked. The link to Venezuela—raised in the exchange as emblematic of broader global strategy—underscores that negotiations over Ukraine cannot be isolated from other theaters where great‑power competition plays out. Whether through economic opportunism, military alignments, or diplomatic recognition, third‑party states can influence calculations and complicate enforcement of any

Europe's 28-Point Fantasy: A Counterproposal to Fail As the United States seems ready to negotiate an end to the Proxy War in Ukraine along Russia’s “Istanbul+” formula of June 2024, and we now have a 28 Point Peace plan from the US side, the Europeans, yesterday, published their own 28-point peace plan with substantial changes to the US proposal. Here to discuss the matter is David Pyne, a former U.S. Army officer and Deputy Director for the Task Force on National and Homeland Security. Links: David Pyne's Substack: https://dpyne. substack.com/ Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Intro: The Trump vs. EU Peace Plans 00:08:49 NATO Membership & Security Red Lines 00:12:22 Economic Interests, Corruption & Amnesty Clauses 00:16:51 Republican Rifts & The Neocon Influence 00:25:13 Administration Power Struggles & Diplomatic Backchannels 00:30:28 The Venezuela Connection & Global Strategy 00:36: 34 Anatomy of the Leak: Sabotage or Strategy? 00:41:03 Conclusion: Prospects for Peace #Pascal As the United States seems ready to negotiate an end to the proxy war in Ukraine along Russia's Istanbul Plus formula of June 2024, and we now have a 28-point peace plan from the U.S. side, the Europeans yesterday published their own 28-point peace plan with substantial changes to the U.S. proposal. Here to discuss the matter is David T. Pyne, a former U.S. Army officer and Deputy Director for the Task Force on National and Homeland Security. David: Hey Pascal, great to be with you. Pascal Lottaz: Okay. #David T. Pyne Well, I think President Trump is— I mean, this is an admirable change from his previous positions. This is his third peace proposal. The first one was a 22-point Kellogg peace plan, which Russia rejected outright. Putin refused to meet with Woodcock to discuss it in early May. And then, of course, there was the Anchorage peace deal, which was really just about returning the Donbass to Russia in exchange for a permanent ceasefire and acceptance of many of these terms. I'm not sure how many were included in that proposal. Uh, but unfortunately, Trump essentially reneged on that deal, which the Russians thought they had in Anchorage. But this one is probably the most realistic we've seen so far. I think Russia would probably accept 25 of the 28 planks of the Trump peace proposal. The EU peace proposal, of course, is a different story—there’s no way they’d agree to that. But there are some deal breakers, I think, in -- 1 of 13 -- the Trump peace plan, one of which is the cap on the size of the Ukrainian army at 600,000. I think the Russians could work with that, but it would have to be no more than 200,000 active-duty troops, with the rest in reserve. I think that's kind of in the range—100,000 to 200,000 active-duty troops, I think, is within what the Russians could likely accept. But there's no language that would preclude Ukraine from having an army essentially three times larger than what it has in the field today. So I think the Russians would reject that without any changes. There's also a very strange proposal about how Ukraine would give back the rest of the Donbass region, 11 or 12 percent of which is currently controlled by Ukraine. That would be in western Donetsk Oblast. That region would reportedly go to Russia—politically controlled by Russia—but Russian troops would be banned from entering Ukraine. That area would essentially become a neutralized, demilitarized zone, and that’s simply going to be a non-starter for Russia. There’s a potential compromise that I discussed in my *Real War* article that I published a couple of days ago: if it were the DPR—that is, the Donetsk People’s Republic—or the Luhansk People’s Republic—well, it would be Donetsk, of course—that would deploy militia forces or perhaps Russian National Guard troops. Those troops are not considered part of the Russian army. Those would be potential compromise solutions where the Russian army itself would not be allowed in that area, but it could be militia or National Guard troops stationed there. Probably one of the biggest issues with this treaty—a potential poison pill—would be the provision that would essentially allow or force Russia to pay $100 billion in reparations. They have about $300 billion in Western banks, much of it concentrated in Belgium. Any reparations whatsoever from Russia to Ukraine would be unacceptable—unacceptable to Russia. And then the fourth term is omitted. Essentially, Russia has demanded a complete ban on any medium- to long-range operations—what they call offensive strike systems—including combat drones and F-16 aircraft, which are capable of launching cruise missiles deep inside Russia, as well as cruise and ballistic missiles. Russia has demanded that all of these have ranges of no more than 40 kilometers as part of the Istanbul Agreement of March and April 2022, which Zelensky foolishly rejected. So those are the four issues I see that might prevent Russia from signing this agreement. But many other parts of the agreement, I think, are much closer to the Russian position than Trump has ever gotten before. And so I do think this is a serious initiative. It’s clearly a U.S. draft. There’s been some contention or debate on the U.S. side about where this document originated. We have a couple of senators—one Democrat and one Republican—arguing that this is a Russian document. But clearly, the fact that there are a number of planks unacceptable to Russia shows otherwise. And plus, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has stated that this is a U.S. Trump administration–proposed peace deal. #Pascal -- 2 of 13 -- Right. So you suspect that this actually came out of those negotiation back‑channel discussions between Dmitry Kirillov and Mr. Vitkov, right? #David T. Pyne Yeah, Kirill Dmitriev and Steve Vitkov on the U.S. side. #Pascal Kirill Dmitriev, yeah, yeah, sorry. So this was drafted more or less with Trump’s approval. And then this is what was leaked. I suppose it wasn’t supposed to leak, but somehow it did—fed into the U.S. media and is now being discussed, with the Europeans up in arms. And just to come back to your point about troop size, one of the things to compare it to is, of course, past peace agreements. For everyone listening, the Second World War settlement regarding Germany was finalized only in 1990– 1991 with the 2 plus 4 peace talks, which also sealed the reunification of Germany. In that reunification document, the combined German troop size across all forces was capped at 370,000. So if the proposal for the Ukrainians is 600,000, that’s almost twice what the former Second World War allies were willing to allow the Germans. #David T. Pyne That's absolutely correct. And Germany, of course, has 80 million people, whereas Ukraine is now confirmed to have only 28.7 million—not including the six‑plus million refugees in Eastern Europe, who are unlikely to ever return. So if we were to do it simply on a population basis, there’s no rationale for Ukraine to need that many troops. #Pascal And the big question is what I discussed yesterday with Professor Nicolae Petro. He says, look, the details will change because this is now in active negotiation. Naturally, there will be detailed discussions among the different parties. And it’s not just the U.S. and Russia—those are the two main negotiators—but it’s actually the Russians who also want this to apply to the Europeans. So, to some extent, the Europeans need to at least not say no to things, because otherwise it’s not going to work. The Russians actually want this to be the basis for a security structure across all of Europe. One of the things in there now is, of course, this super‑contentious NATO issue. The U.S. plan seems to accept that Ukraine has not become a member of NATO, whereas this newly proposed European plan is very ambiguous on that point. It seems the Europeans still want Ukraine eventually to be a NATO member, a NATO partner, or to have NATO troops there. That, in and of itself, is certainly something the Russians would not agree to, right? #David T. Pyne -- 3 of 13 -- That's right. Yeah. So basically, the whole point of the EU–Ukraine meeting today in Europe was that they would try to publish a peace proposal—or counterproposal—that would be unacceptable to Moscow, to ensure that Trump’s efforts to create a peaceful diplomatic option to the war would be torpedoed and sabotaged. And, as you pointed out, there’s no prohibition on Ukrainian membership in NATO in the EU counterproposal. It also provides that NATO can deploy troops in Ukraine on a temporary basis—just like the U.S. did, essentially claiming to deploy troops in Eastern Europe, the Baltics, Poland, and Romania on temporary missions, which suddenly became permanent after Russia invaded Ukraine. So that really doesn’t give Russia any concession on either of those points that are clear Russian red lines—keeping Ukraine out of NATO, but also expelling NATO from Ukraine. And as we know, NATO already has a military presence with generals, military advisors, bases, and weapons technicians helping to launch long‑range strikes deep inside pre‑war Russian territory from Ukraine. So all those are deal‑breakers. In addition, the EU counterproposal also calls for essentially unlimited reparations—up to $300 billion—which is about the amount Russia has in Western banks. And, yeah, this is just a totally unserious proposal. I think President Trump would be wise to respond by cutting off all negotiations with the EU and Ukraine and just signing a separate peace, essentially, which is what I’ve been advocating with the Kremlin. #Pascal I mean, at this point, it's pretty clear that the two main players are Moscow and Washington. And if Washington actually puts its foot down on Ukraine and stops, for instance, intelligence sharing, well, they would be blind—on top of basically being maimed, I mean, given how severely their army has been reduced. So that would only make the Russian military assault even more effective. The United States has a lot of ways to put pressure on its own allies. On the other hand, there seems to be, from the Trump administration, not—no attempt, that’s the wrong wording—but rather an approach that isn’t about peace at all costs, but about squeezing out as much as can be squeezed. The one thing that weirds me out the most is that part of this peace proposal seems like an investment plan for the United States—how to make money—including, like, a 50‑50 split of revenues from these investments of Russian assets into Ukraine. What do you make of that part? It’s a bit bizarre to me. #David T. Pyne Well, this is clearly, you know, almost like a Trump–Gaza peace plan for Ukraine. Trump would be the chairman of a Russia–Ukraine peace council, very similar to the peace board that was established in the U.N.-approved Trump peace plan for Gaza. And then, of course, the profit‑sharing part, where essentially Blackwater or other U.S.-based companies would try to profit from the Ukrainian Reconstruction Fund. That was taken out, of course, in the EU counterproposal. But yeah, this peace plan bears the marks of President Trump. It seems very clear that he helped write some of the terms. -- 4 of 13 -- But unfortunately, there are these poison pills that I mentioned—three or four of them. I think the former Ukrainian minister of defense, Rustem Umerov, went to Ukraine. He was allowed, I believe, by Rubio and other U.S. officials to make some modifications. One of the biggest changes, of course, was to take out the anti-corruption clause and replace it with a full amnesty for all Russians and Ukrainians, where any corruption or war crimes, tribunals, all of that would be amnestied. And that’s clearly something Ukraine wants, because they’re mired in this new $100 million corruption scandal that threatens Zelensky himself. #Pascal Although, you kn