Russia & China United: The USA Made Kissingers Nightmare Come True | Prof. Rein Müllerson

## Introduction The global order is shifting under the weight of choices made by states over the past three decades. What was once described as a unipolar moment—an era in which one power set the rules and boundaries—has begun to fray into something more complex and contested. The recording of the conversation with Prof. Rein Müllerson surfaces a central argument: the Ukraine war did not erupt in a vacuum but is part of a deeper reconfiguration of geopolitics and geoeconomics, a process that has accelerated recent alignments and hardened rivalries. If the West treats its interventions as routine while decrying others’ interventions as transgressions, the result is a hardened divide that pushes erstwhile neutral or undecided states toward alternative security arrangements. The stakes are not merely academic; they are states, borders, and the fragile architecture that has, until recently, contained large-scale great-power confrontation. ## Rein's paper on changing superpower dynamics 00: 14:11 - From unipolar to multipolar: Spheres of influence vs. security Prof. Rein Müllerson’s recent paper, published with a major Western press, argues that the war in Ukraine both epitomizes and accelerates a larger geopolitical reconfiguration. The arc is familiar: the Cold War’s bipolarity gave way to a post-Cold War unipolarity centered on the United States, which then produced a “short American century” that overextended itself and provoked countervailing responses. Müllerson stresses that mistakes made during this unipolar phase—military interventions far from home, attempts to export democratic models by force, and the heavy-handed containment or weakening of rivals—have shortened the life of American hegemony and encouraged a tipping point toward multipolarity. A key element in his thesis is the transformation from “spheres of influence” to competing visions of “spheres of security.” Whereas spheres of influence recall traditional power politics and the idea that great powers have privileged interests in neighboring spaces, the emerging multipolar vocabulary Müllerson highlights places emphasis on shared or regional security arrangements that reduce the security dilemma for smaller states. He sees this shift as both normative and pragmatic: states now seek arrangements that stabilize rather than provoke, and the insistence on interference by dominant powers risks consolidating opposition coalitions—most prominently, the closer alignment of Russia and China that Henry Kissinger once feared. Müllerson also reads recent rhetoric and symbolic politics—the renaming of institutions, the revival of “war” language in government structures—as reflective of a world where defense and offense blur. He cautions that the reflexive expansion of military footprints near rivals’ borders, even under democratic pretensions, creates perceptions of threat that reshuffle alignments. The result is a less forgiving international environment in which trade, diplomacy, and military postures intertwine to produce blocs and counter-blocs. ## What are the root causes of the Ukraine war? The conversation foregrounds several root causes often overlooked in simplified narratives. First, the expansion of NATO toward Russia’s borders stands as a central grievance in Moscow’s account. Müllerson reiterates that Western leaders gave informal assurances during the reunification of Germany that NATO would not creep eastward. Whether those assurances carry formal legal weight is debatable, but their political salience endures: expansions in NATO membership and military activities near Russian territory have been perceived in Moscow as existentially threatening, not merely political inconveniences. Second, the failure to implement and respect negotiated settlements—the Minsk Accords in particular—fed a cycle of escalation. Müllerson suggests that Russia’s initial military steps in 2022 were aimed at forcing compliance with agreements that had been tolerated in name but undermined in practice. He draws a parallel with classic crisis bargaining: increased hostilities and bombardments along the front, visible to observers, preceded the decision to intervene. In this frame, military action was presented by Moscow as coercive diplomacy—the painful instrument used to compel negotiation outcomes it deemed vital for security. Third, the record of external interference in Ukraine’s domestic politics—overt and covert—intensified the perception of Ukraine not merely as a sovereign actor but as a geopolitical chessboard. The pointed example of public expressions of support for opposition forces and diplomatic involvement in government formation contributed to the conviction in Moscow that Ukraine’s political trajectory could be steered by outside actors. That conviction reinforced Russian fears about losing a buffer and a zone of influence. Finally, Müllerson points to larger systemic drivers: the West’s efforts to preserve hegemony by containing rivals, co-opting potential neutrals, and expanding institutional reach. These strategies produced backlash: alliances of convenience, strategic hedging by states like India, and a growing appetite for alternative security architectures that promise less friction with authoritarian or revisionist powers. ## How has Russia's perception of NATO changed since the 1990s? The evolution of Russian perceptions toward NATO is central to making sense of contemporary tensions. In the early 1990s, as the Soviet Union imploded, there existed at least rhetorical openness in Moscow to reinvented pan-European security frameworks that could include Russia. The 1990s saw talk, even occasional proposals, of Russia fitting into a broader European security order—an idea that would have turned NATO from a bloc into a more inclusive, collective security institution. That window narrowed as NATO pursued enlargement and as Russian domestic politics shifted from the instability of the Yeltsin years to the more assertive posture under Vladimir Putin. Müllerson highlights that much of the change is structural: when a great power feels weak, it may seek integration; when it regains confidence, it reasserts security priorities. Russia’s faint flirtations with NATO membership in the 1990s gave way to alarm as military infrastructures, exercises, and diplomatic commitments approached Russia’s borders. An event that might have been manageable in the era of détente or shared institutions became intolerable when Moscow perceived itself marginalized from the checks that could have made expansion palatable—hence the hardened opposition and, ultimately, the use of force to create new facts on the ground. In short, NATO’s eastward movement was not experienced as benign enlargement by a neutral or indifferent Russia; it was felt as strategic encirclement. That perception does not justify war, but it explains why Moscow treated the issue as vital, not peripheral. ## Can neutrality de-escalate the conflict? One of the most consequential ideas emerging from the discussion is the rehabilitative potential of neutrality. Müllerson and the interlocutor agree that neutrality can serve as a breathing space in an increasingly polarized world. States that declare and credibly maintain a neutral posture can reduce the incentive for neighboring powers to view their territory as a prize or a staging ground. Where neutral arrangements are backed by security guarantees, demilitarized zones, or institutional frameworks that include monitoring and enforcement, they can defuse immediate tensions. Importantly, neutrality must be credible. That requires both internal commitment—laws, consistent policy, domestic consensus—and external guarantees that reassure all sides. In the conversation, India is invoked as a strategic actor attempting to balance relationships without being dragged fully into a Sino-American confrontation. Müllerson also notes that states in Europe and Eurasia might prefer security architect

Russia & China United: The USA Made Kissingers Nightmare Come True While the West condemns Russia's war in Ukraine, it conveniently forgets its own "sphere of interference"—from Victoria Nuland hand-picking Ukrainian leaders to NATO's relentless eastward expansion. Is this hypocrisy fueling the geopolitical reconfiguration of the world? And could neutrality be the key to de-escalation? To discuss this and more, today I’m talking again to Dr. Rein Müllerson, the former President of the Law School of Estonia’s Tallinn University. We explore the profound geopolitical reconfiguration shifting the world away from a unipolar moment and toward a multipolar reality. We break down the true root causes of the Ukraine war, from broken Western promises on NATO expansion to the deliberate undermining of the Minsk Accords. We also dissect the hypocrisy of Western foreign policy and discuss why neutrality is re-emerging as a vital tool for de-escalation and security for smaller nations caught between great powers. Links: Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 - Introduction 00:00:49 - Rein's paper on changing superpower dynamics 00: 14:11 - From unipolar to multipolar: Spheres of influence vs. security 00:21:08 - What are the root causes of the Ukraine war? 00:30:55 - How has Russia's perception of NATO changed since the 1990s? 00:37:59 - Can neutrality de-escalate the conflict? 00:53:18 - Final remarks: Comparing Trump, Gorbachev, and Deng Xiaoping #M2 Hello everybody, this is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking again to Dr. Rein Müllerson, the former president of the Law School of Estonia's Tallinn University. Rein, welcome back to the channel. #M3 Thank you for having me. #M2 Well, thank you for saying yes, because you recently wrote and published a very interesting paper. And you just told me that one of the things that makes it also interesting is that it was published with Oxford University Press, because Oxford University Press is a Western publisher. And there were some critical voices who didn't really want that paper published, because you're writing about the revolutions in superpower dynamics and how everything is changing. And it's not changing very much in favor of Western and NATO powers. -- 1 of 13 -- And you describe what's going on in this. Can you give us a little bit of the arguments of the paper, and also your take on whether the recent renaming of the Defense Department in the US to the Department of War actually supports your argument or not? #M3 It's an interesting question. I am not so sure whether this title or name will remain after Donald Trump is gone. Probably, they will rename it once again, because every country now has ministers of defense. King's College, where I worked for almost 18 years, has a War Studies Department. It is perhaps a British tradition. All the other countries have their defense ministers or departments. If everybody only defended themselves from attacks, there wouldn't be any conflict, any wars. But unfortunately, it is not so. We see many, many conflicts in today's world, not only between the West and Russia on the territory of Ukraine, but also in the Middle East and some other places as well. So I don't think that the name will remain, but it does reflect the reality in the world, really. #M2 And so, considering that reality, what are these new superpower dynamics that you see—this geopolitical reconfiguration that's going on? Could you describe it to us? #M3 Yes, I write about it in my article, and I believe that the conflict or war in Ukraine epitomizes and accelerates this geopolitical as well as geoeconomic reconfiguration of the world or international relations. However, this process started a long time ago, even before February 2022, when the so- called full-scale Russian invasion happened. I would say that in 2022 it was not a full-scale invasion at all. It was a very limited use of military force, in my opinion, in order to force Ukraine to negotiate in accordance with the Minsk agreement, more or less—and I'll maybe come back to that later. It has become more or less a full-scale conflict now, that's true, but at that time it was not in any way a full-scale invasion. It started even before 2014, when the coup d'état happened in Kyiv, in Ukraine. Then I saw with my own eyes—though on TV, I was not in Kyiv or in Ukraine at that time—how Senator John McCain expressed his personal and American support for the opposition. Can you imagine, for example, the famous Russian politician and somewhat clownish Zhirinovsky going to Estonia, let's say, and advocating for their opposition? So it is unimaginable. And Victoria Nuland and Jeffrey Pyatt, the then American ambassador to Kyiv, discussed the composition of the government in Ukraine. It was such an arrogant and flagrant violation of the non- interference principle in international law. You can't imagine it. In that respect, I recall that it was in -- 2 of 13 -- 1967 when General de Gaulle was in Montreal, in Canada. He made a speech, was probably carried away a bit by the warm welcome, and he finished his speech with "Vive le Québec libre!"—they welcomed a free Quebec. You know what happened? Yes, de Gaulle resigned a year later, but during this period, the relations between Canada and France were very frosty. It was considered unacceptable, such interference in the domestic affairs of Canada. This reconfiguration of international relations started, in my opinion, when the Cold War ended. It had been that way for many decades already. The balance of power Cold War system then emerged, but rather shortly after, a unipolar moment in international relations appeared. There was one hyper-power, to use the words of the former foreign minister of France. This was meant to be an American century, but it was shortened by a series of mistakes made by different American administrations, such as the war on terror, for example—especially its extension to Afghanistan, where the US and its allies stayed for more than 20 years. The attempt to democratize the wider Middle East, as it was called—I would say that this was such a Fukuyamian, or Fukuyama's, moment in history. Though Fukuyama was criticized, and he even criticized his own works later, nevertheless, at least the West was Fukuyamian, and not only the West, but many people in other countries as well. Meanwhile, China continued its peaceful rise. And also, Russia came out of a coma, which was self- inflicted, but also a kind of assisted suicide, I believe, because many in the West wanted to weaken Russia. Especially Dick Cheney expressed the view that the smaller Russia would be, the better it would be. And today, one would be, in my opinion, justified to generalize that the world has reached a tipping point, characterized by the efforts of the until recently hegemonic West to preserve and also extend its hegemony or domination by containing potential or actual rivals, as well as trying to co-opt those who would prefer to benefit from remaining neutral—maybe a bit later about this neutrality, really true—who would benefit from not taking sides in this new superpower rivalry in the world. And using this term "tipping point," I mean that there is a relative balance between the old world— that is to say, the Western-dominated world—and the emerging new multipolar world. There are signs that this relative balance, in my opinion, won't last long. The West is continuing to make mistakes that are counterproductive to its efforts to prolong its hegemony. For example, the West, particularly the United States, as well as its European vassals, I would say, has actualized the so- called Kissinger's nightmare. You probably remember that Henry Kissinger, when he was Secretary of State and advisor to President Nixon, had this nightmare that the Soviet Union and China would combine forces and thereby oppose American dominance or hegemony in the world. Now, especially the Trump administration—but not only the Trump administration—has done exactly that. Russia and China have become almost allies and partners in the world. This is not only about the conflict between the West and Russia in Ukraine. Because the crimes against humanity, war crimes, and even genocide committed by Israel against Palestinians, and its bullying behavior vis-à- vis its neighbors—for example, the recent attack against Qatar—will turn the Arab and Muslim world, -- 3 of 13 -- and not only this world, against Israel, but also against its supporters in the West. This is what I would characterize as a radical reconfiguration of the world. It affects not only international relations, but the domestic policies of many countries as well. These sovereigntist forces have become more influential in many countries, including Western countries. India has a very interesting position now. It wants to remain neutral and not be dragged into the conflict between China and the West. This is how I would characterize this radical reconfiguration of the world today. #M2 I agree with you. And, you know, what we are seeing at the moment is a change in what kind of politics individual states can pursue. Excuse me. And it's also a rethinking of how we are viewing the long trajectory that we are on. Let me just ask you this, because for the longest time, for the last seven or eight years, I have had this question in the back of my mind. We were calling—very recently we called the period between 1989 and, you know, the 2020s—the post-Cold War period. To me, I always thought this description cannot stick because you cannot be post-something forever; there needs to be something next. So we will probably reimagine what we call the post-Cold War. And it seems to me, as you just used the word, that we went from—or that we are now conceptualizing what we are living in—as going from the bipolarity of the Cold War into a unipolar moment, and now into a multipolar moment, which I think is part of this rethinking of what we are in. I wonder if you see it like that as well. And secondly, if you... So if multipolarity is what we should expect, then secondly... Dr. Jeffrey Sachs recently made this observation that what states should strive for is not spheres of influence, but spheres of security—of shared security—and neutrals being part of that because they de- escalate the security dilemma on both sides. And in a sense, what we are witnessing is still the United States clinging to this concept of having a sphere of interference, and that Ukraine is the place where it is allowed to interfere, and in Georgia and in Armenia. And it will try to do so with its little color revolutions because that's what it's very good at. And we are seeing how this isn't working anymore. It's like it's now hitting a brick wall. And maybe that's part of this change. What are your thoughts on that? #M3 I believe you are right, and I especially like this. You spoke about spheres of influence, spheres of interference, and so on. I would say that, yes, there are spheres of interest—security interests included. For example, in Ukraine, I would say that Russia has an interest not necessarily in influencing—maybe Russia wants to influence as well—but the main issue is to have a sphere of interest, which means that there is, in the place of Ukraine, a government which is not at least hostile to Russia. Similarly, you can see—it's interesting also—that it is not Russia which moved -- 4 of 13 -- closer and closer to the West; it was NATO which came to the borders of Russia. And also, it is not China which is going to the Caribbean, to Mexico, or to Canada; it is the United States which is coming closer and closer to China. And maybe in passing, it's worth recalling that China generally has not shown much interest in dominating the world. That may be changing a bit. You remember, it was in the 15th century, probably during