Power Moves East: China Teaches USA a Big Lesson | Chas Freeman

The global balance has shifted from a century of American maritime and political predominance to a more complex, multipolar contest in which China is asserting diplomatic agency, regional actors are hedging or defecting from U.S. security guarantees, and conventional assumptions about freedom of the seas and the utility of force are being challenged. The recent summit in Beijing — as discussed in the conversation with Ambassador Chas Freeman — was less an isolated encounter between personalities than a signal: a rising great power confident enough to stage pageantry and practical enough to press for problem-solving on shared interests, while Washington confronts strategic constraints it can no longer ignore. ## Competition, Common Interests, and Iran The meeting in Beijing reinforced a foundational truth: rivalry does not preclude cooperation where interests overlap. The exchange reaffirmed mutual stakes in keeping key maritime chokepoints open and in preventing nuclear proliferation, even as profound competition continues across trade, technology, and influence. As the conversation emphasized, China’s posture in these exchanges has been deliberate. It seeks to be seen as a stabilizer of international institutions — a defender of consensus-based rulemaking and the UN system — rather than an irredentist power bent on global disruption. Iran sits at the crossroads of these dynamics. The interlocutor’s reading of the situation, drawing heavily on Ambassador Chas Freeman’s experience, is stark: the earlier hope that Iran would forswear a nuclear weapon appears increasingly dim. That conclusion flows from Tehran’s demonstrated capacity and intent, and from the political logic inside Iran that now rewards nuclear hedging. For China, the calculus is pragmatic: nonproliferation is a public good, but coercive military options carry risks that could imperil China’s trade and energy lines, and drive instability on its periphery. Thus Chinese offers of diplomatic help on Iran are neither gratuitous nor naive; they are consistent with Beijing’s interest in regional stability and unimpeded maritime commerce. What this means for U.S. policy is uncomfortable. The United States cannot assume that displacement of its preferences on Iran, or the development of independent regional security architectures that exclude U.S. bases, amounts to an automatic loss of influence. Rather, it reflects the limits of military-centric approaches and the willingness of regional powers to pursue arrangements that better match their own security and economic priorities. Washington faces a choice between adapting diplomatically or doubling down on coercive fixes that the conversation argues are increasingly unrealistic. ## The Strait of Hormuz and the End of Maritime Hegemony One of the most consequential threads in the conversation concerns the changing character of sea power. Historically, Britain and then the United States sustained maritime order through naval dominance; states outside the maritime camp accepted a regime in which high seas mobility and chokepoints were governed de facto by the blue-water navy. The dialogue, particularly Freeman’s intervention, highlights a technological and geopolitical rupture: land-based missiles and long-range drones can now threaten vessels hundreds or thousands of miles from shore, and asymmetric actors can obstruct key straits from littoral positions. The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Iranian actions in the Strait of Hormuz are part of a broader pattern that demonstrates how land powers can leverage relatively inexpensive precision fires to contest access. That trend undercuts the centuries-old practicalities of maritime hegemony. If littoral states or nonstate proxies can interdict shipping with plausible deniability, and if coastal states demand transit fees or assert a new quasi-sovereignty over throats of the ocean, then the old bargain — American naval insurance in exchange for alignment — erodes. This is more than rhetorical. The conversation points to emerging precedents: talk in Southeast Asia about charging passage fees, Gulf states rebuffing U.S. overflight or basing for operations targeting Iran, and a general unwillingness to permit foreign military operations that carry domestic or regional blowback. The implications are deep: commercial flows may reroute, insurance and naval escorting costs will rise, and the geostrategic premium on forward bases will diminish if host states see more downside than benefit. In short, the United States confronts the beginning of the end — or at least a substantial diminution — of a maritime order it once assumed permanent. ## China Steps Out of Diplomatic Passivity China’s diplomatic maturation was a recurring theme. For decades analysts portrayed China as cautious, reactive, and confined to economic tools. The conversation underscores a different arc: China is moving from defensive restraint to confident initiative. Beijing’s mediation in regional disputes—Saudi-Iran rapprochements, its growing engagement with Moscow, and now an emerging role in shaping a post-conflict Gulf security architecture—reveals a power that understands how to use its leverage cautiously but effectively. Ambassador Freeman’s reminiscences about counsel to Beijing after 9/11 — urging it to take a more active role in Afghanistan — are instructive because they show the evolution from the “Wu Wei” stereotype of passive Chinese foreign policy to a hands-on diplomacy calibrated to protect core interests without resorting to overt military adventurism. This pace of engagement has practical consequences: China can convene or at least host conversations that exclude American military primacy, and its emphasis on state-to-state diplomacy appeals to regional leaders eager to hedge between Washington and Tehran, or between Washington and Moscow. China’s diplomatic posture is also performative. Receiving an American president with ceremonial respect while asserting its narrative of peace and multilateralism serves both domestic legitimating functions and external signal-sending: Beijing can be the face of order and calm even as it advances influence. The result is a diplomatic theater that yields real political returns. ## Washington Debates Diplomacy or More Bombing Within Washington, the debate over how to address Iran and the broader Middle Eastern conflagration remains polarized. The conversation identifies two camps: one accepting strategic limits and arguing for damage control and disengagement, the other advocating punitive escalation or even regime-fracturing operations. Where the White House lands will depend on politics as much as strategy. A central practical point is inventory. The United States and its partners are not as well stocked for sustained conventional escalation as many imagine. Weapons, munitions, and defensive systems have been consumed across conflicts; Israel’s capabilities have been strained; regional basing options are narrowing. Military action, therefore, is not just morally fraught — it is materially constrained. That should push policymakers toward diplomacy and negotiated settlements, yet domestic political incentives and ideological commitment to military instruments can obscure realism. The conversation also raises a democratic governance concern: the erosion of checks and balances on presidential war-making. As military options become politically attractive but strategically dubious, the old mechanisms — congressional oversight, public debate, institutional reticence — appear frayed. That erosion increases the risk of miscalculation. The argument here is normative as well as practical: a foreign policy that reverts to reflexive bombing because it lacks diplomatic imagination will likely compound instability and international alienation, further empowering regional actors to seek alternative security arrangements that bypass the United States. ## Europe, Russia, and the Danger o

Power Moves East: China Teaches USA a Big Lesson | Chas Freeman The US-China summit in Beijing confirms once more: US Hegemony is over. It's a multipolar world now. I'm joined today once again by Ambassador Chas Freeman to discuss the shifting balance between the United States, China, Iran, Russia, and Europe. Ambassador Freeman's HP: https://chasfreeman.net Ambassador Freeman's Susbtack: https://substack.com /@chasfreeman662157?utm_source=global-search Support us on Substack: https://pascallottaz. substack.com Our Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com 00:00:00 Trump Meets Xi: A New Recognition of China 00:03:00 Competition, Common Interests, and Iran 00:06:16 China’s Strategic Confidence and US Pressure Campaigns 00:09:03 The Strait of Hormuz and the End of Maritime Hegemony 00:12:06 Taiwan, Japan, and the Risks of Escalation 00:15:06 China Steps Out of Diplomatic Passivity 00:18:00 West Asia After the Iran War 00:21:43 Washington Debates Diplomacy or More Bombing 00:27:10 Presidential War Powers and the Collapse of Checks and Balances 00:33:00 Europe, Russia, and the Danger of Self-Fulfilling War 00:36:00 The Lost Art of Diplomacy and Closing Thoughts #Pascal Welcome back, everybody. We are very lucky to be joined today again by Ambassador Chas Freeman, former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Under Secretary of Defense. Ambassador, welcome back. #Chas Freeman Thank you. Glad to be with you. #Pascal Chas, you are also one of the people in the United States who, within the government of course, has had a lot of experience with China, among others. You translated for Nixon when he went to China back in the ’70s. How are you looking at the current meeting of Trump with Mr. Xi? #Chas Freeman Well, I think it was not unimportant. First, it's the first time in nine years that an American president has traveled to Beijing. Second, he traveled to Beijing very much to meet Xi Jinping as an equal. There was no hierarchy. Third, I think it represented a recognition on the part of Donald Trump, if not on the part of everyone in his administration, that we can't afford not to deal with China, that -- 1 of 11 -- there are too many problems in the world that can't be dealt with without Chinese contributions. China is now a world power. If you define a world power as a power whose interests must be taken into account everywhere in the world on virtually every issue, then China is a weak world power, but it is yet a world power. And so this meeting demonstrated that the two sides, who are rivals, can communicate, can meet. There will be another meeting September 24th at the White House. Presumably after that, Xi Jinping will address the UN General Assembly when it opens. And I think both sides got something useful out of it. Donald Trump got pageantry, which inflates his ego and pleases him. It's not unimportant, given the danger of him being in a bad mood. There may or may not have been some trade deals of significance. As usual with Trump, there was no effective preparation for this meeting in advance. No Sherpas climbed the summit to define what could be achieved. We have the possibility of some aircraft sales and soybean sales. And the two sides reaffirmed a common interest in the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. After all, China is the world's largest trading power, and it has a very great interest in freedom of navigation. There was no agreement on what to do about the closure of the Strait of Hormuz or how to open it. But the two sides recognized the common interests, and Xi Jinping evidently offered to be helpful if he could be. And on the issue of non-proliferation, China reaffirmed its desire, its hope that Iran would not develop a nuclear weapon. As you know, I think that hope is now in vain. That is, Iran has no choice but to develop a nuclear weapon, and it will if it has not already. But that's another topic. In the end, the two sides, in other words, confirmed the current status of the relationship as a competitive relationship tempered with some recognition of common interests. And on the Chinese side, Xi Jinping got the opportunity to be a statesman greeting Donald Trump on an equal basis. That affirms Chinese prestige. He had an opportunity to express China's policies, which aim at stability and peace rather than disruption, distinguishing himself from Donald Trump and the United States in that way. And of course, he had an important opportunity to educate Donald Trump directly about the importance of the Taiwan issue to China. And evidently there was some impact there, at least on a temporary basis, because Donald Trump has now said that he doesn't see any merit in supporting independence or starting a war with China over the status of Taiwan. So he has some decisions yet to make about arms sales to Taiwan. He claims he has not made those decisions. I suspect the political atmosphere in Washington will force him to sell those weapons. But he clearly understands the risks now, that this could tip the United States into a war 9,500 miles away from Washington. So this was not an insignificant event, even if it made no real news. And its main impact was to divert attention from the Epstein files and the war in West Asia, temporarily, to a pageantry in Beijing, which of course the Chinese managed with their customary skill. #Pascal -- 2 of 11 -- Right. So in a sense, we've seen a meeting that didn't go bad, right? Nothing that kind of exploded in the face of the world. But can you maybe talk about it and your interpretation of what this tells us in the context of all the other things that are going on? The unsuccessful war against Iran, also Xi Jinping's recent meeting with the leader of Taiwan, the Republic of China's KMT leader, the leader of the opposition party, which was also a big event. What's happening with Cuba, how the United States is trying to put again pressure there, and maybe also with the way the proxy war in Ukraine is going. Do you have any kind of reading from that perspective of this cordial meeting in Beijing? #Chas Freeman Well, certainly Xi Jinping received Donald Trump with grace, and it was a good show on his part. I think the Chinese once again demonstrated to anyone who pays attention, as opposed to looking at them with prejudice and paranoia, that they are a bulwark of the decaying global order. That is, they wish to preserve the role of the United Nations, international law, and consensus-based rulemaking rather than unilateralism. And therefore, they are not so much a revisionist power. Of course, they might choose to improve things a little bit, but they are basically a force for peace and stability. They are not engaged in foreign wars. They have no desire to engage in them, and so forth. There are, of course, misinterpretations of the Chinese relationship with Iran. Some Americans claim that Iran is a Chinese client state, but that is basically absurd. Iran is an independent sovereign nation. It's actually a civilizational state with a history of many thousands of years and is not beholden to China or any other country in terms of its policies. It has taken decisions which the Chinese regret, as I said, this closure of the Strait of Hormuz, but the Chinese answer to this is the only appropriate one, which is diplomacy. There is no military answer to how to open Hormuz, but you are prepared to accommodate Iranian national interests and work out an arrangement with Iran, where for a small fee you can transit the strait. In fact, ironically, in terms of holding the strait open, the principal blockader of the strait now is the United States, not Iran, because Iran is quite prepared to let the vessels of friendly nations through the strait. I think, before I go on and talk about the visit of Zheng Yiwen, who is the chairwoman of Guangdong in China's Taiwan, I should mention that the significance for international order of the Iranian action in Hormuz is becoming apparent. Effectively, the world has been operating under rules set first by the British Navy and now the American Navy since 1763, when the Seven Years' War ended and the British overwhelmed the French in the maritime domain, something they confirmed at Trafalgar in 1805. The baton of global maritime dominance passed to the United States in March of 1943, when I was born, in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, when the Japanese Navy reached its farthest limit in the South Pacific, having earlier defeated the British. And so, basically, the baton of global maritime hegemony passed to the United States, and we have exercised that role since then, up to now. But things have changed. In the 18th century, there was a three-mile territorial limit established by the range of cannons. -- 3 of 11 -- In the late 20th century, in the 1980s, there was a political compromise on a 12-mile limit, which had no empirical basis whatsoever. But now we see that missiles can attack ships out to a range of 2,000 kilometers or 1,500 miles, and drones to a range of 300 kilometers or 200 miles. This kept the US Navy at bay. And it means that land powers can now, as the Houthis—I'm sorry, Allah— demonstrated in the Red Sea, blockade straits from the land, making things of the United States that had sunk the Iranian Navy basically irrelevant in terms of its impact. This sets a precedent, and we're now hearing the Indonesians and others talk about charging fees in the Straits of Malacca or the Lombok Strait or other straits that go through the Indonesian archipelago. I think we've seen a precedent set that is likely to be followed. And it really marks the end of 263 years of Anglo-American maritime hegemony, or perhaps not the end, but the beginning of the end. So then you asked, I think, about the significance of the Taiwan issue in the current context. I think Donald Trump clearly doesn't think it's worth it to defend Taiwan against an effort by the Chinese to complete their civil war with the reassimilation somehow of Taiwan. Taiwan has, of course, become quite a different society. It has a robust democracy. It is wealthy. It is egalitarian. It is very admirable in many respects. But Donald Trump doesn't care about ideological connections. So this is a dilemma, I think, for Japan, where you are, because the prime minister has stepped into this issue of the resolution of the Chinese Civil War in a way that has poisoned Sino-Japanese relations. And Taiwan is strategically significant to Japan, has been historically. The Dutch launched their opening of treaty ports in Japan from Taiwan. And Taiwan, of course, became the springboard for Japanese advances in the Philippines and elsewhere in Southeast Asia in World War II. So it has an undeniable strategic significance for Japan. And that significance now has to be dealt with in a somewhat less confident context. I think, I guess the final point I'd make, since you basically piled 14 questions into one statement, is that overall, what was demonstrated was Chinese confidence. They received Donald Trump with great confidence. They even received the Secretary of State, Marco Rubio—they changed the character, the ideogram, with which they transliterate his name from a common, basically meaningless surname to one meaning rash, impatient, rude, and so forth. #Pascal Oh, wait, did they do that? They used a different character, didn't they? #Chas Freeman They changed the ideogram for his surname—a very subtle move to indicate that he's still under sanctions. But they let him in under a different Chinese character. #Pascal Ah, sorry, sorry, I wasn't aware of that. So there are Chinese sanctions on Marco Rubio, actually? -- 4 of 11 -- #Chas Freeman Yes, he has been under sanction, I think, since 2021 for basically extreme anti-Chinese statements and advocacy and various claims that had no basis. Their money was at some point. He's still under sanction, but now apparently he's changed his name, or someone changed it for him, and that finessed the issue. An