Russia & China Checkmate: US Empire Just Ended | Dr. Daniele Ganser

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The neocons can't bomb this one away: the strategic partnership between Russia and China deepened to a degree that it can now reshape the face of the non-western world. This is everything that previous generations of US strategists have warned against. Dr. Daniele Ganser joins Pascal to discuss his new (German language) Book "Kampf der Giganten" and the changing relationship between China, Russia and the United States. Ganser argues that Western policy has drawn Beijing and Moscow closer, while both speakers examine NATO expansion, the Ukraine war and missed diplomatic opportunities. They discuss Iran, Swiss neutrality, sanctions and Europe’s colonial legacy before considering a more cooperative multipolar order. The conversation closes with their hopes for independent media, public dialogue and a stronger international peace movement. Daniele's Links: Website: https://www.danieleganser.ch/ Kampf der Giganten: https://www.danieleganser.ch/buecher/kampf-der-giganten/ YouTube: https:/

Summary

Dr. Daniele Ganser argues that a deepening strategic partnership between Russia and China marks the end of unipolar U.S. dominance and the emergence of a multipolar order. He traces a sequence of missed diplomatic opportunities—post‑Cold War assurances against NATO expansion, Russia’s 2021 draft security proposals, and halted Istanbul peace talks—that provoked Moscow and pushed it closer to Beijing. Ganser situates the Ukraine war within great‑power dynamics, comparing it to the Cuban Missile Crisis and framing Western policy as imperialist in effect. He highlights how U.S. choices, including NATO enlargement and covert interventions, have incentivized defensive alignments among non‑Western states and fostered anti‑imperialist coalitions involving Russia, China, and Iran. The conversation also touches on Swiss neutrality, sanctions, Europe’s colonial legacy, and the role of independent media and peace movements in advocating for diplomatic alternatives to military confrontation.

Article

## Kampf der Giganten: China, Russia and the United States The conversation grapples with a simple but seismic claim: the strategic convergence of Russia and China marks the end of the unipolar era led by the United States. This is not presented as a fleeting alignment of convenience but as a structural realignment with geopolitical consequences reverberating across regions and institutions. Dr. Daniele Ganser’s new book is cast as an attempt to map that realignment—its origins, its misread signals, and the missed diplomatic moments that turned rivalry into a durable counterweight to Western dominance. The heart of the argument is that decisions made in Washington and Brussels—especially the steadfast adherence to an “open door” NATO policy—helped produce the very bloc the West now treats as its main challenger. Ganser frames February 4, 2022—the moment Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping publicly lined up against further NATO enlargement—as a turning point. Seen from this vantage, the two leaders did more than issue a joint statement; they announced a joint strategic posture against what they perceive as progressive U.S. encroachment. For many policymakers steeped in Cold War realist warnings, the logic is painfully familiar: great powers should avoid being driven into each other’s arms by a third party. For Ganser, that logic has been ignored to Western detriment. ## NATO expansion and missed diplomacy over Ukraine A recurrent thread in the exchange is the narrative of missed diplomatic opportunities. The Russian drafts of December 2021, offering a basis for negotiations over European security arrangements, are held up as a clear example. According to the account laid out during the conversation, these drafts were not ultimatums but invitations to negotiate; their dismissal by the United States and NATO hardened Russian views and removed a potential pressure valve. The Geneva and pre-invasion diplomacy in 2021 is invoked not to exonerate violence but to call attention to agency and avoidable escalation. The picture presented is of repeated overtures by Moscow to secure a written or negotiated limit on NATO’s eastward expansion—overtures that were not taken seriously. That unilateral posture, coupled with the celebration among certain Western circles when confrontation seemed to unfold, feeds into a broader thesis: strategic provocations and the political incentives to present Russia as the sole aggressor shaped subsequent policies in ways that now appear short-sighted. The Ukraine war, in this telling, functions as a theatre in which the strategic interests of great powers play out, often at the expense of the populations directly affected. The Istanbul talks of April 2022 are recalled as one of several near-misses where conflict might have been constrained. The narrative implicates Western leaders in decisions that made a negotiated settlement more difficult, thus transforming a regional crisis into an epochal contest between great powers. ## The Cuban Missile Crisis and great-power security Historical analogies are used to illuminate present dilemmas. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is invoked as a precedent for how great-power security concerns are negotiated and resolved when spheres of influence collide. The exchange underscores the asymmetry of agency between smaller states and the great powers: Fidel Castro’s objections to removing missiles from Cuba did not command final authority in a conflict primarily structured by Soviet–U.S. bargaining. That 20th-century pattern—great powers making decisions that subordinate smaller actors’ preferences—remains instructive. Applying that lesson to Eastern Europe, the interlocutors argue, clarifies why Moscow reacted strongly to NATO’s post-Cold War trajectory. The promise reportedly offered to Gorbachev—no eastward expansion of NATO—remained in the memory of Russian elites even as the alliance broadened. Whether or not a formal written guarantee existed is less important than the political expectation that was created. For Moscow, the incremental addition of Eastern European countries and an expanding Western military presence looked like a systemic breach of security assurances. The Cuban Missile Crisis analogy thus reframes the conflict: it is not merely a matter of one state’s aggression but a contest over the rules governing great-power interaction. ## China, Russia, Iran and opposition to US power From the conversation emerges a broader anti-imperial reading: China, Russia, and Iran are framed as part of a coalition resisting Western-dominated global structures. This is not to assert moral equivalence between actions or to downplay wrongdoing; rather it is to acknowledge the political logic that binds these states. Ganser suggests that historical experiences—colonialism, humiliation by foreign powers, and the memory of exclusion from the post–Cold War order—shape their view of sovereignty and security. That perspective helps explain why Beijing became willing to take a public stand on European security in 2022. It had hitherto avoided direct engagement in what Western policymakers treated as their backyard. But when Moscow declared a red line and was rebuffed, Beijing’s intervention signaled a new willingness among major non-Western powers to contest the rules of the global order. The implication is that the West’s framing of its own efforts as defensive or emancipatory risks overlooking how its policies are perceived as expansionist or exclusionary by others. Iran surfaces in the conversation less as an equal partner than as a regional pivot that, when aligned with Moscow and Beijing, strengthens an anti-hegemonic constellation. The deeper point is systemic: when multiple states whose histories include foreign intervention perceive a durable bias in international institutions and alliances, they will tend to seek alternatives and form partnerships that reduce their vulnerability to Western pressure. ## Swiss neutrality, sanctions and direct democracy Neutrality is treated not as an archaic relic but as a live political choice with contemporary resonance. The Swiss experience is deployed to ask whether neutral arrangements could have offered a different path for Ukraine—one that might have dampened great-power fears without infringing on Ukrainian sovereignty. The conversation highlights the contrast between smaller states’ capacity for maneuver and great-power imperatives: neutrality can be an instrument to dissipate tension if recognized and guaranteed, but it requires credible security arrangements and third-party commitments. Sanctions and punitive measures are critiqued for their bluntness and tendency to harden rivalries. Rather than compelling compliance or fostering compromise, sanctions can drive targeted countries into self-reliant blocs and encourage alternative trade and finance infrastructures. The conversation places particular emphasis on the moral and practical pitfalls of broad-based sanctions: they often produce humanitarian spillovers and stimulate the search for circumvention mechanisms, thereby accelerating the development of parallel systems that reduce Western leverage. Direct democracy is raised as a corrective to elite-driven foreign policy. If public opinion and civic deliberation were more central to decisions about alliances and war, some of the more cavalier strategic gambits might face stronger domestic constraints. The exchange implies that robust democratic processes in smaller states could alter their susceptibility to being drawn into great-power contests. ## Europe’s colonial legacy and changing global role Europe’s role in the global order is scrutinized through the lens of colonial history and post-imperial responsibility. The conversation suggests that Western policymakers’ assumptions about universal norms and political models reflect a selective memory of empire. Former colonial powers and their contemporary institutions sometimes promote policie

Transcript

Russia & China Checkmate: US Empire Just Ended | Dr. Daniele Ganser The neocons can't bomb this one away: the strategic partnership between Russia and China deepened to a degree that it can now reshape the face of the non-western world. This is everything that previous generations of US strategists have warned against. Dr. Daniele Ganser joins Pascal to discuss his new (German language) Book "Kampf der Giganten" and the changing relationship between China, Russia and the United States. Ganser argues that Western policy has drawn Beijing and Moscow closer, while both speakers examine NATO expansion, the Ukraine war and missed diplomatic opportunities. They discuss Iran, Swiss neutrality, sanctions and Europe’s colonial legacy before considering a more cooperative multipolar order. The conversation closes with their hopes for independent media, public dialogue and a stronger international peace movement. Daniele's Links: Website: https://www.danieleganser.ch/ Kampf der Giganten: https://www.danieleganser.ch/buecher /kampf-der-giganten/ YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCgrHgV7atBftQk8dXwIDktg Neutrality Studies Links: Neutrality Studies Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Support Neutrality Studies: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Neutrality Studies shop: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Time Stamps 00:00 Kampf der Giganten: China, Russia and the United States 03:29 NATO expansion and missed diplomacy over Ukraine 13:21 The Cuban Missile Crisis and great-power security 27:49 China, Russia, Iran and opposition to US power 44:14 Swiss neutrality, sanctions and direct democracy 49:54 Europe’s colonial legacy and changing global role 57:14 A peaceful multipolar century? 1:07:42 Independent media and building a peace movement #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today, we have an update and book talk with my friend and colleague, Daniele Ganser, a Swiss peace researcher and historian. Daniele, welcome back. Hi, Pascal. Thanks for having me. Well, thank you for coming online, and thank you very much for writing another wonderful book. Let me show that very quickly. It has a German title, but if we translate it, it reads “Fight of the Giants: China, Russia, the United States, and the Emergence of a New World Order.” #Daniele Ganser Daniele, tell us, what is this book about? The main story is that China and Russia have really aligned against the United States. That's really the main story. And it's a very important story, I think, because, you know, the U.S. said, “China is our biggest challenger.” And so, actually, it's the biggest strategic mistake to bring your biggest challenger together with another strong power. -- 1 of 23 -- #Pascal I mean, these are all the things that all of the U.S. realists of the Cold War warned against, right? And this is actually what people like Nixon actively tried to prevent by reopening relations with China. And now we are at the point where Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping constantly consult each other, and their entire state apparatuses are consulting with each other. In your estimation, how huge is this shift? #Daniele Ganser I think it's massive. I really think it's massive because one date that I think is very important is the 4th of February, 2022. So that's 20 days before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. And people, you know, very often talk about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and they don't talk that much about the meeting between Putin and Xi Jinping on the 4th of February, 2022. And at that moment, Putin and Xi Jinping stepped in front of, you know, a world audience, if you like, because it was during the Olympic Winter Games in Beijing. So that's, you know, a pretty visible event, the Olympics and stuff. So they stepped forward and said they don't want—and that's very important—they don't want any more NATO expansion to the east. So I looked at it and I was like, since when have the Chinese said anything about European security policy? I mean, they've never said anything in the last 2,000 years, I think, if I'm correct. But that moment marked a shift. You know, the Chinese said, “We don't want any NATO expansion.” Obviously, it was Putin who didn't want that, but they said it together. Xi Jinping sort of did the underwriting. And on the other hand, the Chinese obviously said, “We don't want any American meddling in our internal affairs,” which is obviously the Taiwan question. And so I really think Putin and Xi Jinping said, “We don't want the dominance of the U.S. empire.” I know there's a huge debate, but for me, multipolarity started on February 4, 2022. #Pascal That is a very interesting thesis. And honestly, I forgot about this. I forgot that this happened. Although, you know, in January of 2022, a lot of things took place. Of course, even before that, to me, one of the most important moments was actually when, on December 17, 2021, Russia sent two draft treaties, one to Washington and one to NATO, to say, “Guys, we need to hammer out this security arrangement.” And basically, they were laughed out of the room. The U.S. and NATO both told them, “Well, Ukraine is ours. You have to suck this up, period.” They didn't say it this way, but that's what they conveyed to the Russians by not even negotiating with them. So after that, Russia actually consulted with China. I mean, that's more or less how it went down. Do you think Vladimir Putin wanted to make sure that China was on the same page as the Russians before going into the military operation? Absolutely. Absolutely. #Daniele Ganser -- 2 of 23 -- Yeah, I think you nailed it. That's the situation. Putin first, you know, checked that he had backing from Beijing, and once they said, “We agree, we see your problem,” then he went west. And it's funny that you mentioned the situation in 2021 because it's also in the book. The book right now is only in German, but hopefully, maybe a publisher will translate it into English. And that moment in 2021 was interesting for you and for me because we're both Swiss. I mean, you're based in Japan, I'm based in Switzerland, but we're both Swiss scholars. And the meeting was in Geneva. Do you remember? There was a meeting between Putin and Joe Biden in 2021. And they actually met at Lake Geneva in a beautiful house and stuff. And Putin said, you know, “I have one problem, and that is NATO expansion. And please, can you just promise that Ukraine will never join NATO? Just promise that Ukraine will be like Austria or Switzerland, just neutral.” And Biden, as you rightly said, just said, “No, we have an open-door policy.” I mean, the war in Ukraine could have been stopped in Switzerland. And then, as you again rightly reminded people, in December 2021—it’s also in the book—the Russians actually put down a text and said, you know, “Just sign this text, and we won’t have a war.” Really, that was the idea. Sign the text, and it would basically mean Ukraine would never be a NATO member. And so Joe Biden again, and Antony Blinken and others, said, “No, no, we have an open-door policy. Whoever wants to join NATO can join NATO.” And that was really the last moment of the unipolar moment for me, because they just insisted on it. You said they tried to shove it down the Russians’ throats, but that’s really it. You know, as a superpower, you say, “I don’t care what anybody else says. You know, we just expand NATO. If they don’t like it, I don’t care.” And that’s really unipolar. And the unipolar moment for me is from the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 to, if you want, December 2021. #Pascal We have to talk about the neutrality issue one more time. But first, I want to pick your brain, or get your intuition. The Biden-Putin meeting was in the summer of 2021, right? It was relatively warm. Then, in December, came these treaties, which were draft treaties, and they were always up for negotiation. The Russians wanted to negotiate. This was not, “Sign it or we attack.” It was more like, “We need to negotiate based on this,” and that was then laughed out of the room. But one reading is that this was the great-power gamble of the United States, just saying, “You can’t do anything about it.” The other reading is that this was exactly the kind of provocation they wanted, and they knew the Russians would now actually prepare for a military intervention. And at that moment, on February 24th, I think, 2022, when the Russians actually did start the military operation, that's when the neocons and so on—the Victoria Nulands—opened the very good bottles of champagne, because that's exactly what you need in order to sell the narrative of the unprovoked war. I mean, if there ever was a provoked war, it was definitely this one. But this entire Western narrative could then really take hold because it was a shock. I mean, it was a shock. And I -- 3 of 23 -- was shocked, too. I didn't think the Russians would invade, mainly because I thought it would hurt them too much. Because I've never met a Russian who doesn't have family or friends in Ukraine. Just never. Even today, they still talk about it in terms of a civil war, right? It hurts them very much. So I thought they wouldn't because of that. But, well, obviously, that calculation was wrong. How do you interpret it? #Daniele Ganser Oh, yeah. First of all, I think it's a war between brothers. Yes, I fully agree. You know, it's very much like Scotland and England fighting. There are a lot of links, and so I'm very sorry for the families that are being torn apart and for the people being killed. And on the other issue, whether it was really, you know, by design to push the Russians to that point and have them invade and sort of, you know, be the guilty party, I very much agree that this was probably the calculation of the neocons, of Victoria Nuland and others in the United States. Why do I think so and agree with you on that point? Because, I mean, John Mearsheimer has pointed out that the Russian invading force was much too small to conquer all of Ukraine. So, you know, it was more an attempt to threaten the government or overthrow the government or just force them into neutrality. And then we had these peace negotiations in Istanbul. I'm very thankful for your channel, by the way, and that your audience is aware of these peace negotiations that took place in Istanbul in April 2022. And at that point, you know, the whole thing could have stopped. I mean, the Ukrainians and the Russians, those brothers, you know, they were ready to stop it right there and then. And then Boris Johnson flies in. And I'm sure you know that was after consultation with Joe Biden. He flies in and tells Zelensky not to make a peace deal and just to fight it out. And so I really think that they wanted this fight. But they didn't want to lose, okay? They didn't want to lose. That was the miscalculation. So, yes, I agree with you. I've also looked at this RAND study on balancing Russia. And, you know, if you read these studies, then you see it was never about the people in Ukraine. It was just a fight between the giants, the U.S. giant and the Russian giant, and they fought it out in Ukraine. And it looks like the Russian giant wins. And, you know, that has huge implications. We're still not there in terms of grasping what it all means, but it's a huge story. So I wanted to put it in the book and really explain how we got there. And there's one chapter in the book where I explain the rise of China, you know, and that they were not conquered like India, obviously, or like Algeria or Vietnam, but they had their clashes with the European imperialists. So you can also see the whole situation that we have now with China, Russia, and Iran as an anti-imperialist moment. And this is very interesting. #Pascal -- 4 of 23 -- It's highly ironic that the West—the United States and many Europeans—frames its war against Russia, the war in Ukraine, as an anti-imperialist war on their side, with Russia as the imperial power.