Europe's Defeat Is Much LARGER Than It Seems | Alexander Mercouris

## War, peace and the role of neutral states The conversation opens from a stark premise: war is not merely a rupture of politics, it is the collapse of order and the birthplace of the most grotesque crimes. This philosophical starting point anchors a wider argument about the responsibilities of statesmanship in an era of resurgent great-power rivalry. From that vantage, the preservation of peace becomes the highest political duty, achieved not through dominance but through careful management of relations among powers—especially when those powers are unequal. Neutral and small states are not marginal actors in this logic; they are stabilizers when they keep their autonomy and resist becoming instruments for the ambitions of larger patrons. The exchange insists that when small states are weaponized by great powers, the result is predictable: escalation, megalomania, and systemic destabilization. A further normative claim runs through the discussion: mutual respect among great powers is a non-negotiable precondition for durable peace. Attempts by one power to maximize advantage at the expense of others, or to subsume them within a single bloc, are inherently dangerous. History furnishes repeated examples—Serbia in 1914, Greece in the 1960s, and, in the contemporary frame, Israel and Ukraine—where small-state adventurism, buttressed by great-power patronage, amplifies the chances of catastrophic conflict. Seen this way, neutrality is not a passive abstention but an active hedge against imbalance; neutral states can dampen competition and provide diplomatic breathing room when the major powers otherwise push toward collision. ## Europe and the great-power system A central historical claim in the discussion is that for centuries the international order was European in structure and imagination. Great-power politics, from the 17th century onward, were overwhelmingly a European affair: empires, alliances, ideological struggles, and the great wars emerged from the continental stage and radiated outward. The two world wars are offered as the paradigmatic cases: European conflicts that became global because European powers had spread their influence across the world. This Eurocentric framework shaped how states conceived of power, sovereignty and civilizational status well into the twentieth century. But that structure is now unraveling. The speakers argue that the long European dominance in technology, industry and finance has weakened, creating space for new centers of power to assert themselves. The international game is no longer primarily a European contest; it is increasingly global, multi-civilizational and multi-polar. The assertion that Europe once monopolized the notion of “civilization” and the management of world affairs forces us to confront how disorienting the loss of that claim has been for Western elites and publics. The result is not just a strategic reordering but a crisis of identity for Europe in the world system. ## Russia’s European identity One of the most consequential themes in the exchange is the profound shift in how Russia understands itself. For centuries Russia saw itself as, and was seen as, part of the European great-power constellation. This was not a superficial cultural claim but a strategic orientation: Russia participated in European diplomatic games, fought European wars, and integrated European political currents—most notably socialist ideas—into its national life. The memory of the Soviet role in the liberation of Europe during the Second World War has been central to Russian self-understanding; rhetoric and popular culture reinforced the narrative of Russia as a European liberator. Yet the speakers argue that since the end of the Cold War and especially after the crises of the 2000s and 2010s, that European identity has been ruptured. The sense of being rejected, misunderstood, and encircled has transformed Russian political imagination. This is not merely rhetorical posturing; identity determines strategy. When a state that once sought inclusion within European security and economic architectures concludes that Europe is hostile or exclusionary, its strategic priorities reorient. The change is existential: Russia is not simply repositioning as a great power within Europe but reimagining itself as something other than a European nation-state. ## China’s rise and Western decline Closely linked to Russia’s reconfiguration is the ascent of China and the broader shift in global economic, industrial and technological balance. The conversation highlights how China’s growth has overturned long-standing Western presumptions of permanent primacy. Where a 1960s television series could treat “Civilization” as synonymous with Europe, the contemporary world is marked by the rise of non-European civilizations asserting economic and technological leadership. China’s manufacturing dominance, its technological investments and its role in stabilizing the post-2008 global economy are all cast as watershed moments that forced Western elites to confront their declining centrality. This transformation is not only material but psychological. The perception of relative decline has produced a nervous consolidation impulse within the West: sharper alliance-building, efforts to contain or constrain competitors, and a heightened emphasis on zero-sum logic. In practical terms, these dynamics reshape how Beijing and Moscow are perceived and engaged. Where earlier Western policy sought to fold large powers into a single liberal order, the new environment incentivizes bloc-formation, hedging strategies, and the politicization of trade, technology and finance as instruments of competition. ## The 2008 crisis and pressure on Russia The financial crisis of 2008 functions in the conversation as both a catalyst and a symbol. It exposed vulnerabilities in Western economic structures and revealed that stabilization could come from outside the traditional centers of financial power. China’s role in the recovery signaled a redistribution of economic agency. For Russia, the crisis coincided with intensified diplomatic and strategic pressure aimed at pulling Moscow into a Western orbit or at least ensuring its subordination to Western-led arrangements. Ukraine becomes the focal point of that pressure in the speakers’ analysis: the site where Western alignment efforts collided with Russian security imperatives and identity anxieties. Viewed from Moscow, the events surrounding Ukraine were not a localized dispute but a manifestation of a broader Western attempt to consolidate power and marginalize a rival. Military strikes, proxy engagements and diplomatic coercion reinforced the Russian perception of being under siege by a Western coalition. The cumulative effect was to harden Russian resistance and to foster a deep sense of betrayal. In this framework, Western policy—especially when it appears uncompromising—does not produce reintegration or moderation but rather rupture and reorientation. ## Russia’s turn away from Europe The consequence of these converging trends is what the conversation labels as Russia’s “secession” from Europe. This is more than a rhetorical shift toward Eurasian vocabulary; it is a strategic and civilizational reorientation. Where once Russia sought partnership, or at least parity, within a European framework, it now looks east and south for alliances and models. China, India and other Asian powers are framed as natural partners for a state that feels alienated from its traditional European interlocutors. That partnership-building includes strategic cooperation, economic ties and mutual recognition of “civilizational” claims. The implications for European security are profound. A Europe that alienates a neighbor with whom it once shared overlapping identities and mutual security concerns risks creating a rival bloc rather than integrating a partner. The speakers caution that this is not merely a matter of policy mistake

Europe's Defeat Is Much LARGER Than It Seems | Alexander Mercouris Europe has lost all and any sympathies of Russians for generations and this will alter the course of European history even more than the war in Ukraine. The way in which the EU elites have managed to shock the Russian population is poorly understood in the West but of monumental importance. Kyoto University Symposium 2026: "Geopolitics in the Time of Monsters" Presentation 8: Alexander Mercouris Alexander Mercouris examines the decline of Europe’s central role in world politics and the dangers of competition among great powers. He argues that China’s rise, Western economic insecurity and Russia’s changing identity are transforming the international system. Drawing on history and visits to Russia, he discusses neutrality, diplomacy and the responsibility to preserve peace. Audience questions challenge his interpretation of European identity, explore American strategy towards Russia and China, and assess sanctions, military doctrine and the idea of civilizational states. Alexander's Links: Alexander Mercouris on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com /@AlexMercouris The Duran on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@TheDuran Neutrality Studies Links: Neutrality Studies Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Support Neutrality Studies: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Neutrality Studies shop: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Time Stamps 00:00 War, peace and the role of neutral states 04:39 Europe and the great-power system 11:27 Russia’s European identity 16:54 China’s rise and Western decline 21:01 The 2008 crisis and pressure on Russia 26:50 Russia’s turn away from Europe 35:21 Discussion: military doctrine and great-power politics 56:46 Sanctions and the civilizational state #Alexander Mercouris Well, indeed. #Alexander Mercouris Well, thank you very much for that very wonderful introduction, Pascal. Well, I'm going to talk about our topic, geopolitics in the time of monsters. And it's been suggested that the subject is global order and international perception. And I'm going to talk a bit about that. And I'm going to start with some statements of opinion or belief. I'm going to express them rather dogmatically. I hope people don't mind, but please feel free to challenge them. Firstly, I consider war to be the collapse of order. I consider war to be a major catastrophe, a humanitarian catastrophe, a catastrophe in every respect. To my mind, it is times of war that bring forth monsters, and, you know, real monsters. And, well, the jurists at the International Court in Nuremberg in the 1940s, I think, said it best: that war is the ultimate crime because it enables and makes possible all of the other great international crimes. -- 1 of 15 -- Now, following from that, it is also my settled belief that the primary duty of a statesman is to do whatever is possible to secure and preserve peace. I think that that is achieved best through careful and skillful management of relations between the great powers, and we will come to a discussion of what great powers are. I think that the management of relations between great powers can only be successful if it is based on mutual respect. I think that an attempt by one great power to maximize its power at the expense of the others is inherently dangerous and threatens peace. And I think that small powers have an important, indeed essential, role in the system to play. And I believe, and this is a topic I know close to Pascal's heart, I think neutral powers also have a vital role to play in stabilizing the international system. I think when one power seeks to align all the small powers against the other great powers, and when small powers let themselves be aligned in that way, I think that also tends to destabilize the international system and to threaten peace. And going back to something that Arta said about the dangerous behavior of some small powers and the way that they can also lose sight of the limits of their power, it's important, in my opinion, to say that that is true, but that tends to happen, from my knowledge, when a small power receives the unconditional support of a great power, and the small power believes that it can then pursue its most extreme ambitions and irredentist objectives using the power of the great power that supports it. So we've had examples of this: Serbia before the First World War, Greece, my own country, in the 1960s, Israel today. In the first case, Serbia backed by Russia. In the second case, Greece backed by Britain. Today, Israel backed by the United States. This is when megalomania takes over, and the effect of the small powers, by the way, invariably has been catastrophic. I would argue that Ukraine is probably another example of this. So these are, as I said, certain statements that I've made, and they've been rather dogmatically expressed. If people want to push back against them, then that's fine. Now, when we talk about great powers, I think there is something else which is very important to say, which is that the international system as it has existed, the global international system, as it has existed for several hundred years, has been centered on Europe. Europe has been the place where great powers have been located increasingly. So from the 19th century, when one spoke of a great power—and in fact, that was the time when the label “great power” began to be used—when one spoke of great powers, one meant European great powers. And this was the product of the enormous upswing that began to happen in Europe from about the 15th century, culminating in the 20th century. And, of course, the European great powers operated in a system of intense inter-power competition within Europe. And the great wars that tended to happen in Europe happened when relations between the great powers collapsed over times of crisis. Now, going back to some of the comments that have been made here, I would say that I personally agree that if we're looking at crises, particular crises in Europe, crises between great powers, crises that lead to wars, these unquestionably have internal social, economic factors that drive them. We -- 2 of 15 -- see this in the 17th century with the Thirty Years' War, when you have issues of conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism. You see it with the period of the Napoleonic Wars, the time of the French Revolution. Perhaps most saliently, we see this in what we call the world wars of the 20th century, where in some way they are connected to the crisis that begins to develop in Europe, of which the rise of labour and socialist movements is undoubtedly a factor. I am not going to explore this here. I think there are people much better qualified than me. I'm also going to say that I think the scholarship on this remains inadequate, probably because a lot of the scholarship is dominated by English scholarship. The English tend to separate foreign policy from domestic policy. The Germans have at times been different. Probably this reflects the fact that in England we do diplomatic history extremely well, and as a result we tend to isolate it from these other currents. But I would always say there is always, in my opinion, at the root of every crisis that there has been in Europe, an internal social crisis that drives the crisis between the great powers. #Alexander Mercouris So this is the background, this is the framework that we have been working with for a very long time in modern history. And to repeat, because the European powers became so powerful, because they expanded globally, because all of the major European powers, except significantly Russia, established overseas colonies in the Americas, in Africa, in India, wherever, when the European powers began to have conflicts with each other, those conflicts had a tendency to become global. The Europeans involved everybody else to a greater or lesser extent in their quarrels. And that, in my opinion, is why we call the wars of the early 20th century the World Wars. The First World War undoubtedly starts in Europe. The Second World War is somewhat different. At this point, you're beginning to see outside powers, powers outside Europe, begin to assert themselves. Japan, the country we're in, being one example. But even the Second World War becomes truly global and all-encompassing after it begins in Europe. So that is the framework. Now, when I was born in March 1961, European and Western primacy continued to be still almost unchallenged. I say almost unchallenged. Countries that had been former colonies after the Second World War began to achieve independence. India became independent. China established itself as an independent state in the 1950s. It was already beginning to be thought of by the end of the 1950s as a potential great power, but it was still very much marginal in the European and Western perception as a great power. And if we talk about the phenomenon known as the Cold War, the Cold War, as far as the Europeans, the Americans, and the Russians were concerned, was a conflict centered first and foremost on Europe. And here I want to say something about Russia, because Russia had established itself in the 18th century as a European great power. It was one of the constellation of great powers in Europe. And without any doubt, it conceived of itself in the 19th and 20th centuries as a European nation- state, a European great power participating in the game of great powers alongside all of the others. -- 3 of 15 -- And, of course, it got caught up and, to a great extent, catalyzed the revolutionary events of the early 20th century. I spoke about the rise of socialist and labor movements. That was the time when we had the Russian Revolution. Now, I think there is a major misconception about Russia after 1917. I think many people imagined that this was a major turning away from Europe. In the Russian self- conception, that was emphatically not the case. Socialism, the rise of socialist ideas, was absolutely part of the European mainstream at that time. And it was because Russia was a European nation-state and so conceived itself to be that those kinds of ideas took hold so powerfully there. And for Russian self-conception, the Second World War was absolutely, primarily, first and foremost, a war fought not just to defend Russia from German attack, but a war in Europe where the Russians conceived of themselves as playing a liberating role. Now, that may seem very strange to us because we don't think of the Soviet Union as a liberating force in Europe, but, of course, the Russians thought, and to a certain extent still think, otherwise. And this is very much the rhetoric that existed in Russia during the Second World War. So on the 7th of November 1941, with the Germans at the gates of Moscow, Stalin addresses the Red Army on Red Square. He says to them, "You have a tremendous duty. Your duty is not just to defend the motherland. It is to liberate Europe." And this continues to be the theme. And, as I said, it continues to be the Russian self-conception after the Second World War. I will give an example from Russian popular culture. In the 1970s, there was a massive Russian television drama series set during the Second World War about a Soviet spy operating in Germany during the war, and his primary ally is a Catholic priest. So they're both fighting together against fascism as part of the general European struggle. Now, this continues to be the perspective that the Russians have of themselves as a primarily European country through the whole period of the Soviet Union, up to the 1990s, and until very recently. Within Russia, there's always been a countercurrent. In the 19th century, its most articulate spokesman is Dostoevsky: that actually Russia is not really fully European. It needs to see itself as something else, that it has become excessively involved in European affairs. But this current has always existed, but it has never been the dominant one.