The "Collective West" Is Over. Russia Is Looking Ahead | Dr. Andrey Kortunov

## The collapse of a useful shorthand: why the “Collective West” no longer fits For decades, policymakers and analysts relied on the phrase “the Collective West” as a convenient shorthand for a coherent bloc led by the United States and backed by its European and extra‑regional partners. The recent exchange with Dr. Andrey Kortunov complicates that picture: what once functioned as a single actor has become a more fractured, more transactional, and arguably less predictable set of relationships. This matters not only for how Moscow reads Western intentions, but for how Washington, Brussels, Tokyo and capitals in the Global South calculate risk and opportunity across a host of security, economic and diplomatic arenas. The core takeaway from the conversation is simple: the unitary West that Russian strategic planners assumed three years ago has given way to a more variegated geopolitical landscape — and both sides are having to manage their expectations accordingly. ## The old narrative and why it unraveled Since the onset of the Russian military operation in Ukraine, a dominant Russian narrative framed the West as a unitary actor: a bloc with internal hierarchies but one led by an “Anglo‑Saxon” core that set the tone and pulled European allies along. This story explained NATO enlargement, antihostile policies, and sanctions as the handiwork of a US–UK axis that continental Europe grudgingly followed. In the conversation, Kortunov argues that this binary — Anglo‑Saxon versus continental Europe — has lost much of its explanatory power. Washington’s recent policy shifts under a new administration, he notes, have revealed inconsistencies not only between Europe and the United States but within the Anglo‑Saxon camp itself. London and Washington no longer appear as a single, synchronized engine pushing a homogenous line. That unravelling matters because Moscow’s strategic decisions were premised on assumptions about cohesion and leadership. If the principal engine driving anti‑Russian measures is weaker or more divided than supposed, then the calculus for deterrence, alliance management, and long‑term strategic planning must change. Kortunov stresses that Europe has shown resilience, passing fresh sanctions despite internal dissent, yet the most consequential uncertainty now originates in Washington. If the United States — historically the prime mover — adjusts course, the ripple effects could reorder alliance behavior in Tokyo, Canberra, Seoul, and capitals across Europe and Asia. ## Expectations management in Moscow One of the clearest threads in the conversation is Moscow’s insistence on managing expectations. Dr. Kortunov points to a familiar pattern: Russian optimism gets kindled by signals from Washington, only to be tempered by memories of unfulfilled promises. The first Trump presidency is cited as a cautionary tale — an interval of high expectation that produced little sustained change in US–Russian relations and, in some respects, intensified adversarial policies. This sobering institutional memory shapes how Russian elites interpret current openings. Enthusiasm is balanced by skepticism: gestures such as summit invitations or shuttle diplomacy are welcome, but they do not replace concrete outputs. For Russian strategists, a change in rhetoric must be matched by reversible, tangible steps — restoring consular services, reopening embassies, resuming air links, or agreeing protocols for military transparency — before heavier, more politically fraught items can be discussed. Kortunov’s argument is pragmatic: incremental restoration of habitual diplomatic mechanisms is both a confidence‑building exercise and a firewall against the disappointment of symbolic breakthroughs with no structural follow‑through. ## The endgame: a European security architecture, not just a ceasefire Beyond diplomacy’s procedural basics, the conversation repeatedly returns to substance: Russia, as presented by Kortunov, seeks more than an end to hostilities in Ukraine. The broader objective is a renegotiated European security architecture that delivers robust guarantees for Moscow. From this vantage, debates over Ukraine’s place in European institutions and NATO’s borders are not peripheral but central. Russia frames NATO enlargement — particularly the prospect of Ukraine’s accession — as an existential security hazard, one that cannot be left to episodic bargaining. This demand reframes the task of negotiation. It is not merely about achieving a ceasefire or prisoner exchanges; it is about a durable settlement that addresses perceptions of strategic encirclement. Kortunov emphasizes that restoring confidence in Europe requires mechanisms that extend beyond bilateral détente. Confidence‑building in this sense must be multilateral and comprehensive, covering arms control, demilitarization measures, and verifiable limitations on alliance expansion. Whether Western capitals are prepared to entertain a reworking of the post‑Cold War security settlement is the crux of the matter — and the primary obstacle to any meaningful rapprochement. ## Building credibility: baby steps, not grand summits A recurring practical lesson from the conversation is skepticism about top‑down fixes. Grand summits generate headlines but do not automatically convert into policy change. The Helsinki meeting in 2018 is invoked as a cautionary example: the personal chemistry between leaders did not translate into durable institutional or strategic shifts. Kortunov’s recommendation is clear: prioritize small, concrete, reversible measures over theatrical summitry. Restoring functional diplomatic channels, negotiating mutual prisoner releases, agreeing on de‑confliction measures, and initiating localized arms control talks would create a positive momentum that a summit could later formalize. This stepwise approach serves dual purposes. It lowers the political cost of compromise by allowing each side to claim incremental wins to domestic audiences. It also erects scaffolding for larger agreements that require technical verification and mutual habituation. Crucially, these measures also serve as credibility tests. For Moscow, the willingness of Washington to rebuild ordinary diplomacy — consular access, visa regimes, regular ambassadorial talks — is a basic but telling indicator of seriousness. For Washington and its partners, Russian compliance with demilitarization or transparency measures would similarly validate further concessions. ## Multipolar signaling: BRICS, the Global South, and leverage Another dimension of the conversation highlights Russia’s broader strategy to offset Western pressure: deepening ties with the Global South and leveraging platforms like BRICS. Kortunov points to Russia’s success in enlarging and energizing BRICS as evidence that isolation is not a sustainable Western strategy. The Kazan summit and subsequent declarations raised Moscow’s international profile and signaled to the United States that Russian diplomacy can cultivate alternatives to Western institutional dominance. Yet the implications are double‑edged. From a US perspective, an ascendant BRICS is perceived as a potential challenge to the dollar‑centric financial order, which naturally raises concern. From Moscow’s perspective, however, stronger ties across Asia, Africa, and Latin America are both an insurance policy and a bargaining chip. If Russia can credibly show it is no longer geopolitically marginal, Western capitals may be more inclined to take Russian security concerns seriously in negotiations. At the same time, reliance on an emergent multipolar architecture will not substitute for the bilateral Russian–US dynamic that often sets the broader terms of international order. ## Where this leaves international politics The conversation with Dr. Andrey Kortunov underscores a transitional moment. The neat categories and assumptions that structured Western–Russian relations for decades no longer hold w

The "Collective West" Is Over. Russia Is Looking Ahead | Dr. Andrey Kortunov Today I’m speaking to Dr. Andrey Kortunov, the Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council. Last week, Dr. Kortunov published a short but highly interesting article about what he called “The Grand Bargain”. In the piece, Dr. Kortunov analyses the warming relations between Washington and Moscow and asks if the two Great Powers together will manage to rewrite history. Dr. Kortunov's analysis can be found here: https://russiancouncil.ru/en/andrey-kortunov/ #M3 Well, you know, my take is that in Moscow, the name of the game is expectations management. Because, of course, they tend to be optimistic, and I think it was a surprise, but a very pleasant surprise, that Trump was ready to make such dramatic changes in the US approach to Russia, to Ukraine, and to many European security matters. But at the same time, we have the experience of the first Trump administration back in 2016. Expectations were very high, and most of these expectations did not come true. The relationship between Moscow and Washington did not get any better. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies. Today, I'm speaking to Dr. Andrey Kortunov, the Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council. Last week, Dr. Kortunov published a short but highly interesting article in Russian, which was then translated into English and published on the homepage of Russia Today, about what he called the Grand Bargain. In this piece, Dr. Kortunov analyzes the warming relations between Washington and Moscow and asks if the two great powers together will manage to rewrite history. This is what we want to discuss today. So, Dr. Kortunov, welcome. #M3 Thank you. #M2 Dr. Kortunov, in your piece, you make this interesting argument, and I think you make the argument toward your Russian audience, which is: Did we misunderstand the collective West? Could you -- 1 of 14 -- maybe explain to us a little bit, and the main audience of this podcast here is going to be English- speaking and Western-language-speaking audiences. How is Russia understanding the West, and what is your argument about how it might have to be readjusted? #M3 Well, let me start by saying that since the beginning of this special military operation three years ago, Russia has endorsed a rather clear and, to some extent, logical narrative about the West. The first assumption is that the West is collective, that there is a high degree of cohesion within the Western community. But within this collective West, there are nations that lead and nations that are being led. And if you follow some of the official documents, you'll find that there is a clear distinction between the, quote-unquote, continental Europe on the one hand, and the Anglo-Saxon world on the other. The perception is that the anti-Russian policies and sentiments are generated primarily by and within the Anglo-Saxon world, while continental Europe has to follow the Anglo-Saxon leadership, maybe even reluctantly, because clearly continental Europe has more interest in working with Russia, including economic relations, trade, investment, energy, and also traditional cultural and other types. Meanwhile, the Anglo-Saxons can afford the luxury of an uncompromised fight against the Russian Federation. And, of course, these are the forces which allegedly stood behind the enlargement of NATO and other developments that were detrimental to Russia's security interests. Today, this narrative is shattered because, first of all, it's not clear how we can define the so-called Anglo-Saxon role. If you look at the positions taken by Washington and by London on relations with Russia and on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, you'll see very clear differences—maybe more than just differences, but I should say contradictions—between the Republican administration in Washington and the Labour government in London. So the whole idea of Anglo-Saxons, which looked rather logical a year ago, is now put into question. But second, more importantly, it is not clear where anti- Russian sentiments and anti-Russian policies are more consistent and more stable. Is it the Anglo-Saxon world, or is it the continental European countries? And, of course, what we see today suggests that the United States, in particular under the Trump administration at least, is not as committed to this very rigid, very consistent anti-Russian strategy as some European nations, including Germany or France and, of course, the United Kingdom. So that suggests that this narrative, which emerged since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, has to be reviewed and maybe revised in certain ways because the current geopolitical realities question these assumptions that looked so natural and so logical two or three years ago. #M2 The term "collective West," which I also used on this program quite a lot, is kind of a term of convenience in order to describe the larger—let's call it the US alliance system. On the one hand, -- 2 of 14 -- NATO on the European side. On the other hand, of course, also countries like Japan and Korea and maybe partners like Taiwan and all of the countries that then basically also decided to put sanctions in one way or another on Russia. So, do you now think that this term and this idea of who belongs together has to be fundamentally revised, or is the shift more of a form of gradation? #M3 Well, a frank answer to this question is that no one knows. But what we know for sure is that the West has demonstrated spectacular resilience in terms of its cohesion over the last three years because there were many predictions that the cohesion of the West, which emerged after the beginning of this crisis, would not last for a long time and that we would see some countries changing their positions and questioning the overall collective strategy. And indeed, there are some dissidents in Europe. Look at Hungary or Slovakia or some other nations which are not happy with the current policies and which would like these policies to be changed. However, these dissidents did not prevent the European Union from passing new and new packages of sanctions against Russia. And just a couple of days ago, there was a new package of sanctions announced, which suggests that these decisions cannot really change the integrity of the European Union and the cohesion of the West at large. However, the challenge came from another side. And, of course, the irony of the situation is that this change has come from Washington, which used to be not only the leader but the country that inspired many of the decisions made in Europe on Russia. So the big issue right now, in my view, is how this very unorthodox and, to some extent, unexpected shift in US policy might or might not influence the positions of other Western countries. And that relates not only to members of the European Union or the United Kingdom. It is also a question for countries, let's say, in Northeast Asia. How could Japan react to the change in US policies? How might South Korea change its approach to Russia and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict? Can we expect any adjustments by Southeast Asian countries or by countries like Australia or New Zealand? And I think that these questions remain open. We do not know. But definitely, we have to reassess our understanding of the collective West, and the West is not as collective as it used to be, let's say, two years ago. #M2 It's a very good observation. And it's something that I think the West itself is trying to understand at the moment. The Europeans are clearly trying to understand what to do with their big partner, the United States. And one of the ironies is, of course, that the Europeans have been pushed toward this war for a long time, not only since 2014, but in 2008 as well. It was the George Bush administration that managed to convince the Germans and the French, Merkel and Hollande, to go along with the promise of offering Ukraine NATO membership many, many times. And we still don't have an official explanation for who blew up Nord Stream. -- 3 of 14 -- But the one thing we know for sure is it wasn't Russia. And so that only leaves a handful of countries that could have been involved in this. In Europe, the confusion at the moment is huge. In Russia, how do Moscow's foreign policy circles view these changes that are now clearly initiated by Washington and clearly initiated by a change of government that actually has majority US support? We know that the people elected Donald Trump, that they want this, and it's a majority of the US population. How does Moscow make sense of this change? #M3 Well, you know, my take is that in Moscow, the name of the game is expectations management. Because, of course, they tend to be optimistic. And I think it was a surprise, but a very pleasant surprise, that Trump was ready to make such dramatic changes in the US approach to Russia, to Ukraine, to many European security matters. But at the same time, we have the experience of the first Trump administration. Back in 2016, expectations were very high, and most of these expectations did not come true. The relationship between Moscow and Washington did not get any better under Trump. And in many ways, Trump was the first U.S. president who used sanctions against Russia in such a massive way. Trump decided to withdraw from the US-Soviet INF Treaty, and he showed no particular interest in negotiating an extension of the New START agreement. So, generally speaking, the first term of President Trump in power was not a very good time for the relations between Washington and Moscow. Of course, optimists would say that today Trump is different from what he was some eight years ago. He's more experienced, he's more committed, he is fighting the so-called deep state with more vigor than he did earlier, and he has a stronger team in the White House than he had eight years ago. Today, expectations might have more grounds. However, of course, it's yet to be seen, because definitely the inertia of the current negative trends in the relationship is huge. And the international sentiments fly high in Washington and here in Moscow, again, by many skeptics. There are many people who believe that it is a kind of trick that the United States will take advantage of Russia, one way or another. We cannot trust Americans. We cannot rely on what Trump says. So there are many skeptics on both sides. And it's yet to be seen to what extent these early promises will bring some fruits for the two sides and how this change in approach might lead to any breakthroughs, specifically on the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation, but also on more general issues of the European security architecture. #M2 This is, to my understanding, the main goal of Russia: having a genuine security architecture or at least getting a process underway to achieve one. Is that the case? #M3 -- 4 of 14 -- Absolutely. And if you follow the narrative coming from Moscow, they always argue that this is not just about Russia and Ukraine. It's about much broader issues of the European security architecture. Today, a lot of discussions in the West are focused on how to provide security guarantees to Kyiv. But, of course, in Moscow, they also think about security guarantees for Russia. This is why they are so emphatically opposed to NATO enlargement, because they perceive the enlargement of NATO, especially if NATO absorbs Ukraine, as a kind of existential challenge to Russia's security. That's why, you know, they would like to get back to some confidence-building measures in Europe, involving not only European nations but the United States as well. That's why they emphasize the need to demilitarize Ukraine, because otherwise, Ukraine might be tempted to resume its actions against Russia. So, just in a nutshell, it is definitely not only about ending this conflict. It's about European, and I would even venture to