Building a Private 'Trump UN': The Massive Board of Peace Scam.

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This one is wild. Trump is (ab)using a UN Security Council Resolution that was meant to structure some form of post-Genozide Gaza to form his very own extraterritorial international organisation...

Summary

Pascal Lottaz argues that the proposed "Board of Peace" charter circulating under Donald Trump is less a rival United Nations and more a personalized international vehicle designed to concentrate authority and mobilize funds. He reads the charter and UNSC Resolution 2803 as granting the entity international legal personality and immunities, enabling it to operate extraterritorially and outside national law. The charter names Trump as inaugural chairman with sweeping appointment, agenda‑setting, veto, and dissolution powers, a lifetime diplomatic immunity provision, and a built‑in succession mechanism favoring his choice. Organizationally, Lottaz outlines an Executive Board, a Gaza Executive Board tied to a Palestinian National Committee, and an International Stabilization Force, but notes the charter oddly omits direct references to Gaza. He concludes the structure functions like an investment and development vehicle—“peace‑building” as building—capable of attracting donor cash and acquiring land, while remaining legally insulated and politically centered on Trump rather than on multilateral governance.

Article

## A private UN in all but name: the core claim What emerges from the conversation is a startling and novel use of international law: the creation of an extraterritorial organization built around a single individual’s authority, backed by a United Nations Security Council resolution. At first glance the project is framed as a peace‑building mechanism for Gaza; on closer inspection it looks like an attempt to carve out a legally protected, politically flexible, and financially capacious vehicle that can operate beyond the normal constraints of states and markets. The central worry the discussion raises is not simply that an actor is proposing to manage reconstruction and governance in a conflict zone, but that the design converts the language of peacebuilding into an instrument for private power, immunity, and profit. ## The legal linchpin: Security Council Resolution 2803 The conversation repeatedly returns to one structural fact: the Board of Peace rests on the legitimacy conferred by a UN Security Council resolution. Resolution 2803, adopted with the votes of key Western powers and abstentions from other permanent members, is presented as the constitutional authorization that grants the Board international legal personality. That legal personality is the key difference between a private corporation and the proposed entity. International organizations enjoy immunities, privileges, and capacities that allow them to sign contracts, own property, receive contributions, and claim protection from domestic jurisdiction. The Security Council’s premature blessing—endorsing an entity before its instruments and governance are publicly established—creates a foundation that observers in the conversation view as worryingly permissive. The legal logic is straightforward in technical terms: if an organization is recognized as having international legal personality, it can operate “between” and sometimes above states, claiming exemptions from local law and judicial oversight. What makes this case unusual is the placement of private agency at the center of that arrangement. The conversation highlights that international organizations are normally creature structures of states or multilateral treaty processes; rarely do they crystallize around a single private individual who is also directly named in founding documents. ## Anatomy of the Board of Peace: a monarchy in charter form The charter described in the exchange reads less like a neutral multilateral constitution and more like a corporate articles-of-incorporation with a monarch. According to the text discussed, the inaugural chair is explicitly named, and that chair holds sweeping appointment and agenda powers: invitations to states, the terms of membership, the power to set meeting agendas, and an effective veto over decisions. Executive organs will be appointed by the chair, and subsidiary entities can be created, altered, or dissolved at the chair’s discretion. This concentration of authority breaks with several features of classical multilateral design. Democratic or collective decision-making, rotating presidencies, and distributed appointment processes are all mechanisms used in traditional organizations to diffuse power and ensure legitimacy. The proposed charter eliminates most of these guardrails. Even voting procedures that appear to allow for majority decision-making are subject to the chair’s approval, rendering the “votes” effectively confirmatory rather than genuinely sovereign. Another striking provision cited in the conversation is the membership rule: states are invited to join at the chair’s discretion, and terms of membership are limited to a short initial period except for large financial contributors. The implication is explicit—money buys permanence. That inversion of normative membership principles (from political equality to pay-to-stay) converts governance into a commodity and underlines the line between a public-interest multilateral body and a private investment platform cloaked in diplomatic language. ## The Gaza nexus: NCAG, Gaza Executive Board, and the ISF Although the charter reportedly avoids direct mention of Gaza, the Board’s raison d’être is intertwined with a proposed governance structure for Gaza. A technocratic National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), composed of local figures of Palestinian descent, is being presented as the on-the-ground administrative partner. Alongside the NCAG are two internationally organized instruments: a Gaza Executive Board to liaise and manage governance issues, and an International Stabilization Force (ISF), ostensibly a security mechanism to enable transitions. The conversation draws attention to the institutional separation and overlap: the Board of Peace (political arm), its Executive Board (secretariat-like function), the Gaza Executive Board (the operational field committee), and the ISF (security implementer). Some individuals would serve on multiple entities, blurring lines between political oversight, operational management, and security functions. The result is a nested architecture in which the internationally created body presides over a local technocratic committee, while an international force enforces the conditions under which governance will occur. Two dynamics are worth underscoring. First, the NCAG is explicitly non-sovereign—a subordinate implementation partner rather than an independent government—raising questions about ownership, representation, and accountability in post-conflict governance. Second, by divesting the ISF from the core charter while still anchoring it in Security Council authorization, the design attempts to preserve a military capability under international legitimacy while keeping it functionally connected to the Board’s political project. ## Immunities, investment potential, and the privatization of peacebuilding A recurrent theme in the exchange is the way international legal personality confers operational advantages that can be repurposed for private ends. Once the Board has legal standing, it can solicit state and private funds, enter contracts, own assets, and claim immunity from domestic litigation and regulatory regimes. The conversation contends that such features create the preconditions for what amounts to an investment fund or construction vehicle: “peace‑building” becomes shorthand for infrastructure, contracts, and long-term economic projects implemented under the protective umbrella of an international organization. Examples from established organizations help illustrate the point: the UN’s unique privileges in host countries can create regulatory loopholes (labor and tax issues are frequently cited). Transpose those dynamics onto an entity with looser governance, a leadership with direct commercial incentives, and membership rules influenced by financial contributions, and the potential for capture and self-dealing becomes evident. The structure effectively monetizes access and influence, with the chair centralizing the ability to direct resources and contractual opportunities. From the perspective of nonalignment and neutrality, this is troubling. Peace operations gains legitimacy by claiming to serve public goods; when the architecture of legitimacy is repurposed to create private income streams or geopolitical patronage networks, the trust that underpins international assistance erodes. The conversation suggests that this is not merely a governance quirk but a strategic repurposing of multilateral form for private advantage. ## Motives, longevity, and geopolitical implications The discussion places motive at the center: beyond the immediate goal of administering a volatile territory, the design appears to anticipate a long tail of activity—projects across regions, investments, and enduring institutional presence. The chair’s appointment for an initial term coupled with exemption clauses for mega-donors implies that the entity could outlive the chair’

Transcript

Building a Private 'Trump UN': The Massive Board of Peace Scam. This one is wild. Trump is (ab)using a UN Security Council Resolution that was meant to structure some form of post-Genozide Gaza to form his very own extraterritorial international organisation with which he will most likely do investments around the globe. Peace-Building without peace. Trumpian to the core. Follow us on Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Our shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com #Pascal Donald Trump is working on establishing his very own international organization, and we should talk about it. Over the weekend, media outlets like Haaretz reported that Trump’s “Gaza Board of Peace” aims to rival the United Nations and its Charter. So, what is this, and how should we understand it? Is Trump actually trying to build a rival UN organization? I would argue no—that’s not what he’s doing. What he’s doing is something very Trumpian: he’s trying to build an organization for himself, one that he can use as a vehicle even after he’s out of office as President of the United States. Let’s see how we should understand this. This message has to do with the charter of the Board of Peace that was sent out over the weekend to fifty or more states. Luckily, we have the text of that Board of Peace—or at least, I should say, it’s correct that we don’t have it from an official source yet, at least not one I could find. But the Times of Israel claims it has seen and actually published the full text of the charter. Let’s suppose this is the actual charter text. It reads to me like something I can believe. So let’s go through it, and then I’ ll try to explain what’s currently going on. The charter itself isn’t very long, and it’s quite something, I promise you, for anyone who’s seen these kinds of documents before. And maybe the good news first: Trump is not building a rival UN. He’s not creating an alternative structure, but he definitely is trying to set something up that can be a vehicle for him. The first article in the mission of the charter already states what it’s going to be: the Board of Peace is an international organization that seeks to promote stability, restore dependable and lawful governance, and secure enduring peace in areas affected or threatened by conflict. The Board of Peace shall undertake such activities—peace‑building functions—in accordance with international law and as may be approved under this charter. And I think the key phrase here is really “peace‑building functions.” And maybe we should even take away the “peace,” but focus on the “building,” because Donald Trump, in this charter, does not include, for instance, an article on the military power of the board. It doesn’t include an article on collective self-defense, so this is not a form of alliance. It’s all about -- 1 of 9 -- setting up an organization as shallow and as hollow as possible, but with him as the kingpin. We’ll go through this in a moment, just so you can see how far the powers of the chairman go, because he appoints himself, through this charter, as the chairman of the organization—and the chairman is really, more or less, the king of the organization, who has all the power in his hands. Let me just back off for a moment and show you that the White House recently made a statement, on January 16th, about Donald Trump welcoming the establishment of the so‑called National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, the NCAG. Now, what is the NCAG? It’s the structure, or the governance board, envisioned by Trump’s peace process at the United Nations. And I should also say here, all of this is a very big insult, actually—a sham to any real peace process that would take into consideration all sides’ needs, especially the Palestinian needs. But for the sake of this video, which is about explaining the structure that Donald Trump is trying to build, I’ll leave all moral considerations aside. We’re just going to focus on what Trump is trying to do and what kind of organization he’s trying to establish. I just want to explain the different parts of this plan as we see it. One part is this National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, which is made up of about 10 to 15 members of Palestinian descent, both inside and outside Gaza. And I’m sorry—I’m relying here on Wikipedia. It’s just been the fastest so far at integrating different data points. So, this committee was only formed on the 16th of January. I’m speaking to you today on the 19th—so, three days ago. And this is the kernel of what is envisioned to be a future administrative body—a technocratic body made up of Palestinians in Gaza to administer Gaza on the Palestinian side. And I must emphasize this: this is going to be on the Palestinian side. We have several members here who will each have some portfolio. Ali Shata will be the chair; Abdul Karim Ashour will be responsible for agriculture. You can see how this board of Palestinians is designed to resemble the kernel of a governance structure for Gaza—post‑Hamas and post‑slaughter, I suppose, which at the moment is still going on—post‑genocide. So this is on the side of the Palestinians. And then what’s happening is that Donald Trump, on his side, on his “Board of Peace” side, is building an international structure that will have oversight over this National Committee for the Administration of Gaza. So the National Committee is anything but sovereign. It’s nothing more than the implementation partner on the ground for what the Board of Peace is going to do. Now, the confusing thing is that Donald Trump is currently building several aspects of the Board of Peace, and what he recently sent out—the Charter, actually the Charter of the Board of Peace—doesn’t mention Gaza even once. The Charter only talks about the structure of the Board of Peace, which is strange, because the Board of Peace is supposed to be the implementation structure from the side of the international community, justified by a very, in my view, misguided United Nations Security Council resolution. That's this one here—Resolution 2803. This resolution was adopted last year, on the 17th of November, by the Security Council. In favor of it were the three big powers: the United States, the UK, and France. Russia and China abstained from voting, which is why it passed. It was a surprise; I -- 2 of 9 -- thought they would torpedo it, but in the end, Russia and China let it go through. In the Security Council resolution, what we read—and again, this has been passed, so it’s now a binding resolution of the United Nations—it says that it welcomes the establishment of the Board of Peace as a transitional administration with international legal personality. And this is key to understanding what Trump is doing. He's trying to build his own little kingdom, his own little international organization of which he is king, with international personality. This is very different from just having a corporation—you know, an LLC or a stock company in the United States, or one in Switzerland, or one in Japan—because this is envisioned to have the same legal international personality as the United Nations or other international organizations that operate on an intergovernmental basis. Take the Bank for International Settlements, take the IMF. Those organizations are created by treaty and then hover on top of the nation-states, and actually between the nation-states. And Donald Trump is trying to build his very own organization. It’s important to understand this because the entire legal construction now hinges on Resolution 2803—it’s the blessing from the Security Council that this Board of Peace shall be established. The stupid thing, in my view, that the Security Council did was give its blessing before that thing actually existed. To talk about this, I made a little PowerPoint explanation. I hope this makes sense, because it’s quite confusing what he’ s doing at the moment, but it all has a very clear structure. So, on the one hand, you have Donald Trump himself, who is appointed as the chairman of that organization. And we’ll look at that. The charter mentions Donald Trump by name. It’s not the president of the United States being crowned chairman—it’s Donald Trump himself, by the charter. I’ve never seen a charter of an international organization that works like this, because usually you appoint people who have some function in the state, not private individuals. But it just shows how much this is shaped to be a league of Trump, or whatever we want to call it. So, under the chairman, what’s happening right now is that an executive board is being formed. And Mr. Trump actually tells us about this in his little statement here: the founding executive board has been formed. And this founding executive board includes Secretary Marco Rubio, Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner— Donald Trump’s son-in-law—Tony Blair, and a couple of others, all appointed by Donald Trump. The chairman appoints everybody; he can appoint whoever he wants. This is going to be the founding executive board that will then launch all these activities. Let’s go back to this little scheme here. At the same time, the Board of Peace and Donald Trump are establishing other organs—what we call them in international law—of this organization. One is the Gaza Executive Board, and the other is the International Stabilization Force. Now, this is where it gets confusing. So the Board of Peace has an Executive Board and a Gaza Executive Board. Again, this is all inside the White House briefing. The White House wants to have someone to work with the National Committee that was formed on Gaza, but Trump doesn’t want it to be the Executive Board itself. So he creates a second board that deals with Gaza. In support of the Office of the High Representative -- 3 of 9 -- of the NCAG, a Gaza Executive Board is being established. The board will help support effective governance and the delivery of best‑in‑class services that advance peace, stability, and prosperity for the people in Gaza. The appointed members are Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, Minister Hakan Fidan, and Ali Al‑Tawadi. Hakan Fidan, as far as I understand, is the foreign minister of Turkey, and there are a couple of others, including Tony Blair. But you see, these people now sit on both boards, right? They’re on the Executive Board and they’re on the Gaza Board. So Donald Trump actually separates these things to already divide the functions here. And lastly, we have an International Stabilization Force. This is, of course, the military arm of this peace plan, which is supposed to make sure that the IDF will eventually withdraw from Gaza—although I think that’s highly illusory. But this International Stabilization Force is being put in place now by the power of the Security Council. Actually, the Security Council authorizes the BOP, the Plan of Action, and also authorizes member states to work with the BOP to create this International Stabilization Force. So the ISF is created with the blessing of the Security Council. And, of course, the implementation is done through the Board of Peace, which is why this is such a big deal, right? The board then has authority even over this International Stabilization Force. But I should emphasize that the ISF is not part of how Trump is currently setting up the Board of Peace itself. So the ISF remains separate. As I see it, what we’ll have is basically the ISF and the Gaza Executive Board working together to implement Donald Trump’s will in Gaza. Now, what happened over the weekend is that Trump sent out the Board of Peace charter, and he’s now trying to put another board between the Executive Board and the Gaza Board. So there are a lot of boards going on—the Board of Peace and the members of the Board of Peace. It’s really confusing. But the Executive Board is going to be like, you know, the Secretariat of the United Nations. It’s going to look a bit like the Secretary-General and his office at the UN