US & EU Nuclear ESCALATION Is Insane | Profs. I. Hughes & P. Kuznick

## Introduction The conversation makes a stark case: the global nuclear order is fraying at the seams. What emerges from the exchange is not merely a catalog of near-misses and tense rhetoric, but a layered diagnosis of systemic failure—diplomatic, legal, and moral—that is actively widening the gap between the world as it is and the world it must be to avoid catastrophe. Far from being an abstract policy debate confined to think tanks and treaty texts, the stakes are existential. The discussion frames the crux of the problem clearly: treaty protections and deterrence doctrines that once managed risk are now being strained by geopolitical competition, technological change, and political choices that normalize militarization rather than constrain it. ## Global danger and NPT review The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been the central pillar of the postwar nuclear order for over half a century. The conversation conveys a grim assessment of its current review process: instead of cooperative problem-solving, the NPT forum has become a theater of accusation. Delegations trade blame—over Iran, Russia, China, and the policies of the United States—rather than working through shared obligations and trust-building measures. That shift is consequential because the NPT is not only about preventing new nuclear states; it also imposes disarmament obligations on the handful of recognized nuclear states. The weakness highlighted in the review context is twofold: the treaty’s nonproliferation provisions have worked reasonably well in restricting overt state proliferation, but the disarmament commitments have been allowed to ossify into political rhetoric rather than actionable plans. This erosion matters in practical terms. When the nations that possess the largest arsenals refuse to take credible steps toward disarmament, it undermines the social contract the NPT represents. Non-nuclear states observe this stasis and read the implicit message: nuclear weapons remain the ultimate guarantor of security, so their acquisition remains a compelling option when faced with pressing regional threats. The review conference, ideally a mechanism for course correction, instead has exposed the widening gap between legal commitments and political realities. ## Proliferation pressures rise A key thread in the exchange is how proliferation pressures are rising across multiple regions. Public opinion in some U.S. allies and U.S. partner states increasingly favors national arsenals; political leaders raise the possibility of indigenous nuclear capabilities; and material and technological conditions—civilian nuclear programs, stockpiles of separated fissile material, latent industrial capacity—make the transition from “can if needed” to “will if necessary” disturbingly plausible. The conversation points to worrying indicators: major regional powers contemplating nuclear options, calls from security elites for national deterrents, and public sentiment in countries such as South Korea and parts of Europe that leans toward acquiring nuclear arms. These pressures are not isolated. They feed off one another in a chain reaction. If one regional actor moves closer to a weapon, neighbors will perceive existential risk and political voices favoring their own programs will gain traction. The result could be a cascade of proliferation that undermines global stability. The NPT’s value proposition—security in exchange for restraint—relies on a credible pathway toward disarmament. Without movement on that side of the ledger, nonproliferation becomes harder to justify politically and morally. ## Deterrence and first strike risk 00:17: 26 Disarmament failure and collapse The conversation challenges the moral and empirical foundations of deterrence theory. Historically, deterrence has been presented as an insurance policy: if all parties can credibly threaten devastation, no one will start a nuclear exchange. Yet that logic contains perilous assumptions—perfect information, rational actors, reliable command-and-control systems—that do not always hold. What is especially alarming is the revived and increasingly influential doctrine suggesting that nuclear war might be winnable. Advances in surveillance, cyber warfare, precision strike, and artificial intelligence are invoked by some strategists to argue that a first strike could disable an adversary’s second-strike capability, potentially preventing retaliation. This thinking destabilizes the entire architecture of mutual assured destruction. If either side doubts the survivability of the other’s deterrent, the incentive structure shifts toward preemption, hair-trigger postures, and more aggressive forward deployments. The conversation also stresses the practical mismatch between deterrence as a moral theory and the reality of modern arsenals—thousands of warheads, vastly more destructive than the bombs used at the end of World War II, and with global environmental consequences that transcend immediate blast damage. When deterrence fails or is deliberately reshaped toward offense, the risk is not merely a limited exchange but a breakdown in disarmament commitments that could culminate in systemic collapse. ## Iran and the limits of war Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its role in the NPT framework emerge as a central, contested flashpoint. The conversation underscores how the Iranian case crystallizes the broader dilemma: robust diplomatic engagement would mitigate risk, but the political climate often favors coercion over negotiation. Iran insists on rights to peaceful nuclear technology; opponents fear latent weapons capability. This stalemate has already induced extreme pressure in the region—pressure that could prompt other states to pursue nuclear options as hedges. Crucially, the discussion stresses that war is a blunt and hazardous instrument for resolving proliferation concerns. Military action against nuclear facilities is fraught with uncertainty, risks regional conflagration, and can accelerate proliferation by convincing neighbors they must go nuclear to survive. The conversation highlights an uncomfortable truth: force may seem to offer a rapid solution to proliferation, but it often produces counterproductive strategic outcomes, including heightened arms races and deeper mistrust, which further erode the NPT regime. ## Trump and nuclear launch power One of the most unsettling dynamics the conversation explores is the concentration of nuclear launch authority in political executives and the attendant risks when that authority rests with personnel prone to erratic decision-making. The capacity for a single national leader to order nuclear strikes, combined with systems designed to enable rapid or preemptive responses, introduces acute dangers when political stability itself is uncertain. Discussion participants point to how modern command-and-control arrangements, coupled with a willingness in some quarters to contemplate early nuclear use, create scenarios where miscalculation or impulsive action could have irreversible consequences. The conversation also underscores the problem of human psychology and institutional momentum: once systems are structured around decisive executive authority and swift military options, it becomes harder to step back. The more nuclear policy normalizes the idea of rapid action—whether in deterrence doctrine or in operational readiness—the smaller the margin left for diplomacy, deliberation, and mistake correction. ## US allies and security shifts Shifts in security alignments and alliances figure prominently in the conversation. As the United States recalibrates commitments and as regional actors reassess their strategic positions, allies increasingly contemplate hedging strategies. In Europe, the extension of nuclear umbrellas raises uncomfortable questions about actual willingness to absorb escalation on behalf of others. In East Asia and the Gulf, economic and secu

US & EU Nuclear ESCALATION Is Insane | Profs. I. Hughes & P. Kuznick Pascal Lottaz speaks with Ivana Nikolić Hughes of Columbia University and Peter Kuznick of American University about the NPT review conference, nuclear deterrence, first strike thinking, Trump and launch power, pressure for more states to seek nuclear weapons, the role of US allies in the Gulf, Europe and Japan, and the small but real hope offered by the nuclear ban treaty and public action. Links: Nuclear Age Peace Foundation: https://www.wagingpeace.org/ Nuclear Insanity Substack: https://nuclearinsanity.substack.com/ The Untold History of the United States by Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick: https://www.simonandschuster.net/books/The-Untold-History-of-the- United-States/Oliver-Stone/9781982102531 Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz. substack.com (Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: https://pascallottaz.substack. com/s/academic) Merch: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:00:24 Global danger and NPT review 00:05:05 Proliferation pressures rise 00:08:38 Deterrence and first strike risk 00:17: 26 Disarmament failure and collapse 00:23:19 Iran and the limits of war 00:29:28 Trump and nuclear launch power 00:43:42 US allies and security shifts 00:56:17 Nuclear ban treaty and final hope #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. My name is Pascal Lottaz, and I am joined today by Dr. Ivana Nikolic-Hughes, the Director of the Frontiers of Science Program at Columbia University, and Dr. Peter Kacnik, Professor of History at the American University in Washington, D.C. Ivana, Peter, welcome. Glad to be with you. #Hughes Thank you, Pascal. Thanks for having me. #Pascal Glad to have you again. We were in an exchange recently about your experiences at the NPT conference where you were, and also several articles that you wrote about Japan, but also other U. S. allies and this relentless drive toward militarization. Ivana, can you maybe get us started a little bit with militarization—let's say the place that worries you the most at the moment in terms of the mindset that you're perceiving from the U.S. or these U.S. allies? #Hughes -- 1 of 20 -- I mean, I think everything worries me at this moment, Pascal. I think the situation is really quite dire. Obviously, what's going on in the Middle East is absolutely terrifying, and it continues. You know, we might have had some reprieves here and there, but that conflict is by no means over. Ukraine continues through this war, you know, four-plus years on. Maybe there are some signs of a possibility of an agreement or at the very least a ceasefire, but it's still obviously very shaky. You mentioned the NPT—just for the audience, this is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It's a very longstanding, decades-long treaty. It was negotiated in the 60s, signed in '68, entered into force in 1970. So it's been around for 56 years. And it's meeting right now, right here in New York City, where I'm sitting in my home. It's meeting for its 11th review conference, and it's a very, very contentious conference. Peter and I have been there for almost the entire two and a half weeks that it's been going on. It's going to finish at the end of next week, so May 22nd. Peter and I were there together for a side event last Friday. Dealing with civil society colleagues and like-minded diplomats has been very joyful for me. Everything else has been very difficult. I think you might just be able to imagine that the first week was basically spent in this general debate. And what was happening, much more than anything else, was different sides blaming each other for—you know, you can kind of imagine—who's blaming the U.S. for what's going on in Iran, who's blaming Iran, who's blaming Russia, who's blaming China, right? And it's just been this kind of back- and-forth bickering rather than really actually thinking about what they have in common, what they want to accomplish together, how they might bridge those differences together. And in particular, how they might set a path for this Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which, by the way, also includes obligations on nuclear disarmament. And those are the main ones that have not been met in terms of nonproliferation. The states that had joined this treaty decades ago have not proliferated. The only one that ever actually was in the treaty and then left it and developed nuclear weapons was North Korea. So in that sense, the treaty has been a success. On the disarmament side, which is that the five states that are recognized as nuclear weapon states—the U.S., Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China—have clearly not disarmed and are, in fact, pulling away from any efforts that would resemble a path toward disarmament. So I'll stop there and maybe give Peter a chance to add some more to the current context. #Pascal Yeah, Peter, like, how are you perceiving the NPT Review Conference? And just for everybody listening, I mean, the NPT is probably the most important, one of the last remaining actual nuclear treaties we've got. And it's a multilateral treaty, and almost everybody is part of it. And it is the key -- 2 of 20 -- pillar of, you know, maintaining, of keeping the nuclear weapon states down to one digit. At the moment, we have nine. The United States keeps claiming that Iran wants one—that would be number 10—but Iran keeps saying, no, we don't want it. We just want the benefits of the NPT, which is the right to have a nuclear program for civilian purposes—for energy and for medicine mostly. Absolutely. And they are claiming that, right, Peter? But it's not the case that the NPT was always like a cakewalk. It took 10 years to negotiate the thing, and also getting to review conferences was very difficult. If you compare the current situation with what you know from the history of it, where do you think it is at currently—the NPT as a regime, a global system? #Kuznick Pascal, I just finished an interview with Iran's Press TV. It was a written interview, not an oral interview. Tomorrow, in a few days, with them. But this was a written interview, and they asked me five big questions about the NPT and Iran's role and responsibility, and U.S. demands that they give up enrichment completely and send out all of their enriched uranium, highly enriched uranium. You know, Iran clearly—both morally and legally—is in a much stronger position on all of this than the United States is. But you ask where the NPT is historically, and it's hanging on by a thread, really. We've got so many countries on the verge of developing nuclear weapons, or at least thinking they have a right to and thinking they have a need to. Just to give you some examples, 73% of the people of South Korea say that South Korea should have its own nuclear weapons. Recently, the president of Poland, Duda, said Poland needs its own nuclear weapons. Zelensky has said, either let us join NATO or give us nuclear weapons. There's a strong faction in Japan who have been saying for years that Japan should have its own nuclear weapons. We know Japan has a massive stockpile of plutonium and has the capability, scientifically and technologically, to develop nuclear weapons quickly. We sometimes say that Japan is a screwdriver twist away from having its own nuclear weapons. If Iran did move toward testing or developing a nuclear weapon, then Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates would all develop nuclear weapons immediately—probably other countries too. So the nuclear control, nuclear nonproliferation regime is very, very shaky at the moment. And then you've got countries like France offering to extend the nuclear umbrella over the rest of Europe. #Pascal Hey, very brief intermission because I was recently banned from YouTube. And although I'm back, this can happen anytime again. So please consider subscribing not only here, but to my mailing list on Substack. That's pascallottaz.substack.com. The link's going to be in the description below. And now, back to the video. -- 3 of 20 -- #Kuznick What we don't see at this point in history is people valuing diplomacy. We don't see negotiations. We don't see looking for peaceful off-ramps. What we've seen in recent years is diplomacy becoming a four-letter word. It happened under Biden. You know, Biden, instead of thinking about how we can try to resolve things diplomatically, kept giving Ukraine one advanced weapons system after another, even though he said that he didn't want to do anything that was going to provoke Russia into using nuclear weapons. When he gave permission to Ukraine to use the ATACMS missiles that the U.S. had given them to strike deep inside Russia, that was so dangerous. It was two years earlier before that that the CIA said it thought there was a 50-50 chance that Russia would use nuclear weapons. But nobody's respecting anybody else's red lines anymore. People are resorting to military means to solve diplomatic issues. And we're just going the wrong direction as a planet and as a species right now. And it doesn't take much. You know, one of the most intelligent refutations of deterrence theory that I ever heard came from none other than Fred Astaire. Sorry, what is deterrence theory? What is deterrence theory? Deterrence theory, we see this now. On August 20th, 2024, there were two crucial articles published that same day. One in the New York Times by their chief security expert, David Sanger, saying the U.S. is preparing to fight a simultaneous three-front nuclear war against Russia, China, and North Korea. But that same day, the scarier article was in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which said that there are two schools of nuclear strategists. One, the traditional school that believes in deterrence theory—maintaining a strong capability to retaliate with nuclear weapons, second-strike capability, and enough to wipe out your adversary— means that nobody's going to attack each other, so it'll serve as a deterrent. But the second school was a school that believed nuclear war can be fought and won. And they said with modern technology, artificial intelligence, new seismic technology, and cyber technology, the United States can now pinpoint the location of not only all the fighter jets and the bombers and the intercontinental ballistic missiles, but the United States can pinpoint the location of all Russian and Chinese submarines. And the subs were always a stable part of the triad. So as long as you had nuclear subs, you could wipe out your adversary. But now these people are arguing that we can actually knock out all of Russia's and China's nuclear subs in a way that they would not be able to retaliate against the United States for a preemptive first nuclear strike. Now, we've had these kind of lunatics around since the dawn of the nuclear age. Leslie Groves talked in December of 1945 about a preemptive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union then, if they were making any effort to develop nuclear weapons. You had these people around during the Reagan years. In 2006, Lieber and Press had an article in Foreign Affairs, the publication of the Council on Foreign Relations, saying the U.S. had developed a first-strike capability and we could wipe out Russia and -- 4 of 20 -- China without them being able to respond. The Washington Post reported that heads were spinning in the Kremlin because they thought this was official U.S. policy, and so it was in Foreign Affairs. So we've had this kind of thing. People are willing to gamble with the future existence of life on our planet on some crazy bet that this is going to work when it's so immoral, so illegal, so insane, but that we're up against madmen now with nuclear weapons. And Pascal Lottaz, in Israel and elsewhere. And Pascal Lottaz refuted that one? How did he refute it? #Pascal Th