USA Can’t Beat China In South America | Dr. Ezequiel Bistoletti

## Introduction The sudden, brazen operation against Venezuela—an attack that killed dozens and resulted in the capture of President Maduro—functions less as a one-off incident than as a symptom of a shifting international order. The exchange captured in the conversation with Dr. Ezequiel Bistoletti interprets this event as part of a larger pattern: an emboldened, chaotic United States pursuing a revival of hemispheric dominance at a moment when its global primacy is under sustained challenge. What emerges from the discussion is a picture of blunt force diplomacy, strategic overreach, and the necessity of negotiation in an environment where the tools of the past—covert influence, economic coercion, and military occupation—no longer reliably produce desired outcomes. This article teases out the debate’s core threads: whether the operation was a negotiated handover, an act of treachery, or a grand miscalculation; the contours of a renewed Monroe Doctrine and local resistance; China’s deepening economic role; and the fragile domestic balance that sustains Venezuela’s Bolivarian state. ## Interpretations of the Operation: Deal vs. Miscalculation Three plausible readings of the operation coexist in the conversation. The first is transactional: a negotiated removal of a figurehead in exchange for internal concessions, with Washington and a domestic faction carving out an arrangement to secure oil access or political leverage. The second is betrayal: an inside job in which state actors within Venezuela colluded to introduce external forces into an internal power struggle. The third, and the interpretation Dr. Bistoletti favors, is miscalculation—a high-risk attempt at decapitation that presumed systemic collapse would follow but failed to appreciate the regime’s resilience. This third scenario most tightly integrates the observable aftermath. Helicopters traversing Caracas without a coordinated defensive response, the rapid installation of a new president, and the U.S. narrative of “running” Venezuela all pointed toward a planned, decisive operation. Yet the expected cascade—mass defections, military fracture, immediate control of oil assets—did not materialize. Instead, Venezuela’s institutions showed cohesion, public demonstrations favored the standing government in many instances, and the regime’s channels of external support, particularly China, remained intact. The result is an occupying power abruptly compelled to negotiate with the very entity it sought to supplant. The broader lesson is the recurrent pattern of strategic hubris: powerful states overestimating the efficacy of kinetic interventions when local legitimacy, asymmetric political structures, and external actors complicate neat outcomes. Whether an explicit deal existed is less consequential than the operational assumptions that underpinned the incursion. If the operation rested on the belief that regime change could be engineered top-down, then its failure illustrates the gap between kinetic victories and political control. ## The Monroe Doctrine 3.0 and Regional Resistance Dr. Bistoletti frames the incursion as part of a reassertion—call it “Monroe Doctrine 3.0”—in which the United States is responding to the terminal crisis of unipolarity by hardening its posture in the Western Hemisphere. The logic is twofold: reclaim strategic resources and blunt the advance of peer competitors, principally China. But what is new, according to the discussion, is the removal of the rhetorical veneer that once cloaked interventions—humanitarianism, democracy promotion, and liberal norms have receded, replaced by an explicit assertion of geopolitical entitlement. The regional response is far from monolithic. Latin America splits along familiar yet evolving fault lines: countries with centrist or left-leaning sovereigntist orientations—Mexico, Brazil and at times Argentina—push back or equivocate; others like Argentina under Javier Milei and Chile under a rightward swing align closely with U.S. positions. That fissure mirrors a global alignment in which Europe largely endorsed the U.S. posture while Russia and China vocally opposed it. It also reveals the practical limits of hemispheric control: populist currents, historical anti-imperialism, and national self-interest make a full acquiescence to Washington’s renewed heavy-handedness unlikely. Importantly, Dr. Bistoletti underscores that overt US tactics—public pressure on elections, visible threats against governments, and open talk about territorial or resource claims—are producing a backlash even among states that have traditionally cooperated. The presence of a deep anti-imperialist tradition across political spectrums in Latin America constrains the establishment of foreign military bases or overt occupations. Instead, the U.S. appears to be trying to reassert influence through ad hoc interventions, economic intimidation, and political alignments—an approach that produces resistance as often as compliance. ## China’s Economic Influence and Infrastructure in South America If the United States’ strategic calculus centers on curbing China’s inroads, the conversation makes clear that China is already the continent’s dominant economic partner. By the mid-2010s Beijing had supplanted the United States as the primary destination for Latin American exports, and Chinese financing, construction of infrastructure, and long-term energy partnerships have only deepened that footprint. Venezuela, once geopolitically tethered financially to the U.S., is a case in point: after sanctions severed many ties, Chinese credit, technology, and market access became central to Caracas’s recovery efforts. This economic relationship has several implications. First, it weakens the utility of military or coercive strategies aimed at securing resources: control on the ground is insufficient if extraction and market access are mediated through rivals. Second, China’s pattern of investment—roads, ports, refineries, and long-term offtake agreements—creates dependencies that go beyond simple trade. These ties enable states to bypass dollar-based systems and cultivate alternative commercial architectures, which in turn undercuts the economic levers that Washington has traditionally wielded. The conversation situates the petrodollar question within this context: the U.S. is anxious about the erosion of dollar dominance as trade among developing countries and BRICS partners increasingly uses national currencies. Interfering directly with Venezuela’s oil sector is thus not just about barrels; it is about currency architecture, payment systems, and the symbolic control of hydrocarbons as a strategic asset. But as past examples show—most notably Iraq—when the U.S. destabilizes a producer it can inadvertently open up that market to competitors. Chinese firms, with state backing, have been ready to step into such vacuums. ## Assessing Domestic Support for the Bolivarian Government At the heart of the conversation is a cautious assertion: the Bolivarian regime retains meaningful domestic support and institutional durability, which complicates any calculus of swift regime change. Several structural factors sustain this resilience. Venezuela’s political economy is deeply oil-dependent; the state’s capacity to distribute resources and patronage—despite contraction—creates networks of loyalty. The social programs implemented under Chávez reshaped clientelist and participatory mechanisms, embedding regime-friendly constituencies. Militarily, tiers of loyalty have been secured through material tie-ins and institutional placement. As Dr. Bistoletti observes, the prospect of widespread civil uprising is mitigated by the fact that many who opposed the regime have emigrated; those who remain are either supportive or deterred by state capacity. The conversation also highlights the role of armament and armed mobilization: a regime that arms millions—whether rhetorically or literally—signa

USA Can’t Beat China In South America | Dr. Ezequiel Bistoletti Links: Ezequiel's channel (Spanish): @demoliendomitosdelapolitica Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com (Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: https://pascallottaz.substack.com/s/academic) Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall. com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:00:44 Reaction to the Invasion of Venezuela 00:08:15 Interpretations of the Operation: Deal vs. Miscalculation 00:14:17 Protecting the Petrodollar and Challenging China 00:16:55 The Monroe Doctrine 3.0 and Regional Resistance 00:22:39 Prospects for the Rodriguez Presidency and Civil War 00:31:48 China’s Economic Influence and Infrastructure in South America 00:36:51 The Collapse of Global Norms and Potential for Escalation 00:43:31 Assessing Domestic Support for the Bolivarian Government #Pascal Welcome back, everybody. Today I'm happy to be joined once more by my friend and colleague Dr. Ezequiel Bistoletti from the wonderful Spanish-language YouTube channel *Demoliendo Mitos de la Política*, or in English, *Demolishing Political Myths*. Ezequiel, welcome back. #Ezequiel Hi Pascal, it's nice to be here again. #Pascal Ezequiel, you’re Argentinian. You look at world affairs through a South American kind of prism. The United States—the Yankees—just invaded Venezuela. They killed about 80 Venezuelans, Cubans, and others who were there guarding the president, and then they kidnapped the president. Being from the region, how do you see that? I mean, what went through your mind when you heard the news? #Ezequiel Well, somehow I expected something like this to happen. But let me tell you, I’m Argentinian, of course, but I wrote my thesis about Venezuela and Chávez. I actually lived there while doing my field research, so I’m pretty familiar with the situation. I think, Pascal, to understand what happened, we have to start with a bigger picture—the terminal crisis of the unipolar order, the accelerated decline of the United States, the political struggles within the U.S., and, in that context, the emergence of Trump. And from there, four big changes in U.S. foreign policy. -- 1 of 13 -- That is a retreat in Europe, as everybody knows; a shift to China; an attempt to retreat in the Middle East—which is naturally impossible because of Israel—and, and this is the important part for America, a toughening in the American continent. That includes not only the Latin American part of the continent but also Canada and eventually Greenland as well. So, in that context, we have this attempt to reestablish a new kind of Monroe Doctrine—this “Dunrow Doctrine,” as they call it now. And, naturally, we see the attempt to seize all the opportunities and natural resources of the region. But not only that—that’s a big part of it, but not the only dimension. You also have this intervention in Venezuela, along with many other indirect interventions taking place in Argentina, Chile, Colombia—wherever you go in Latin America. And I could even say that, with regard to Canada as well, there’s a struggle to somehow push China out of the picture. And China is, by a huge margin, the main trade partner of practically all countries in Latin America, the only exception being Mexico, naturally. Nevertheless, its presence is growing there. So we have this attempt at a kind of “Monroe Doctrine 3.0.” We have the search for natural resources, but we also have this confrontation in the American continent with China. And naturally, there’s also an attempt to send a message to all the regional powers that might try to pursue a sovereign foreign policy. I’m talking here mainly about Mexico, but above all, this is a message to Brazil. In this context, the U.S. starts something that I now call blatant imperialism. The U.S. has always been imperialistic, particularly with regard to Latin America, but now this is a blatant type of imperialism. They don’t just do all the things they’ve always done; they now say, “Okay, we are going to run Venezuela.” That’s the wording that... #Pascal And that’s new, right? That’s new. They always tried to hide it—to put a kind of velvet, humanitarian glove over the iron fist of the United States. But they’ve stopped trying that. Now it’s just… no. #Ezequiel This patina of justifications that you had in the past—about democracy, capitalism, liberal freedom, and so on—simply disappears. You could say, of course, that they’re using narco-terrorism and drug trafficking as excuses, but even when they say that, five minutes later they’re openly admitting it’s actually about the oil, and that they’re going to run things there. On the same day this happened, we also had statements from Trump, Marco Rubio, and other top members of the U.S. administration about Greenland: “We need Greenland. We’re going to take Greenland.” And we also had, naturally, claims that there would be a new round of attacks against Iran. So this is what I call blatant imperialism, right? We could also mention that since Trump came to power, I think he’s already carried out six or seven attacks. There’s Somalia, there’s Nigeria, there’s Syria, Yemen, now Venezuela—and it’ll continue like this. So this is a general situation, and in this context, at least on my channel, many of us analysts -- 2 of 13 -- were expecting something like this in Venezuela. We knew there wasn’t going to be an open invasion. That’s something the U.S. elite has learned from Iraq and Afghanistan: going in with boots on the ground sooner or later becomes a disaster. So what they do now is just attack, put pressure, and try to run things, as Trump said. At the same time, Pascal, what I see is a completely chaotic and anarchic imperialism. So there’s a total lack of strategic planning. One day they say one thing, and the next day they say exactly the opposite. In the case of Venezuela, I think they just went for it, hoping that this attack would suddenly bring about the fall of the Bolivarian regime. That’s actually what they had predicted in their war simulations, according to the U.S. media, but it didn’t happen. The vice president took power, as expected. The military remains loyal to the regime, and the streets are completely calm. In fact, the demonstrations we’ve seen within Venezuela were demonstrations in support of the Bolivarian government. So we have this blatant imperialism, but also a lot of mistakes and anarchy. And this is the situation they’re in now—they need to negotiate with Venezuela. #Pascal And this is the situation they have. Do you have an idea of what actually went down? Because there’ s still this... this puzzlement, like, okay, why go in and take out only Mr. Maduro? Did the U.S.—does the U.S.—have a deal? Did they have a backdoor deal with Delcy Rodríguez, like, “Okay, we’ll take him out, you become president, and then you do as we say, and we’ll even tell everybody that’s what’s going to happen, and you just, you know, comply—or we’ll do even worse things to you”? And she’s basically on board. So it’s basically an internal power struggle that Maduro also lost. Is that what happened? Or is she a chavista and actually, you know, her words are truthful, and the United States just, as you said, didn’t realize that it’s not just Maduro but an entire system? I mean, which interpretation do you lean toward? #Ezequiel There are three main possible interpretations—three possible hypotheses. The first one is that there was an agreement, right? “Let’s take down Maduro, and somebody else comes up.” That’s the first one. Then there’s the interpretation of possible treason—that someone committed treason, and that’ s why this happened so easily. It was surprising to see those helicopters flying around Caracas without anyone shooting, at least with a MANPADS. You know, you just need one person to fire one over the shoulder, a MANPADS against a helicopter. We didn’t even see that. And then there’s the third interpretation. This is the one I lean toward so far. The idea is that they carried out this successful military intervention, expecting that everything would then follow—the collapse of the government—and from then on, they’d have control over Venezuelan oil. But that didn’t happen. So the third -- 3 of 13 -- interpretation would be a miscalculation. Nevertheless, regardless of which interpretation is right among these three, the final result is the same. Even though they claim they’re running things and will control all the Venezuelan oil, now they necessarily have to negotiate with Venezuela. They’re now in a position where they have to negotiate with Venezuela, and Venezuela, naturally, also has to negotiate with the U.S. But actually, Venezuela’s position has always been open to negotiation. It was the U.S. that didn’t want to negotiate with Venezuela. And talking about these strategic mistakes, these miscalculations—if you look at Venezuela’s oil trade up until 2013 or 2014, around the time Chávez died—the vast majority of Venezuelan oil was sold to the U.S. That had always been the case. Venezuela even had its own refinery, called Citgo, in the U.S., refining Venezuelan oil, which is a very specific type of oil with a lot of sulfur, and it’s… it’s the opposite of light. It's very heavy oil—that's the word. So this is how things were going, even with Chávez until he died. Chávez had a very nationalistic, very anti-imperialistic rhetoric, yet he always kept selling oil to the United States. And since 2014—I think this was under Obama—there were several waves of increasing sanctions because of this hostile policy toward Venezuela. The U.S. government and American oil industries started to retreat from Venezuela and could no longer trade as they used to, or at least not in the same amounts. So who is Venezuela selling its oil to nowadays? It's China— about 80%, right? So you see here, Pascal, what I'm trying to say when I talk about these continuous, erratic, imperialistic interventions that try, for instance, to get control of the oil—but they actually bring about the opposite result. And we should remember that this is similar to what happened in Iraq in 2003. It’s the Chinese who are exploiting the oil in Iraq now. So again, we see imperialism at play, but there’s also a lot of chaos, a lot of unsystematic decision-making, a lack of strategic thinking. And now what we’ll have, again, is a negotiation in which both sides will have to sit down and decide what to do with the oil in the current situation. #Pascal I mean, this is one of the reasons why some people interpret that the main reason for the United States to invade Venezuela is not to get its hands on the oil, but to stop Venezuela from selling oil in currencies other than U.S. dollars—to basically replace the Saudi petrodollar with a Venezuelan petrodollar and stabilize the international currency, rather than getting the actual oil. Do you put any thought into that kind of argument? #Ezequiel I think that, again, all of this is happening in the bigger context of the confrontation between the U. S. and China, in this shift from the old unipolar world order to the new multipolar one. So it’s also naturally about China’s presence in the region. When Trump started imposing tariffs on basically -- 4 of 13 -- every country, in the case of Latin America, the agreements that were finally reached were: okay, we’ ll stop these new tariffs, we’ll suspend that, but you have to stop trading with China. That’s what they imposed on Mexico. Something similar was said to Argentina. They tried to do that with Brazil, but they couldn’t. They couldn’t. Brazil said, “OK, we will, if you put these tariffs on us.” And the case of Brazil was particularly funny because there was no economic justification at all. They just said, “No, this is because the courts in Brazil have condemned Bolsonaro, who is a friend of Trump.” But Brazil was able to say, “OK, we don’t trade with you anymore. We trade with China,