Sweden: The New Frontline Against Russia | Torbjörn Sassersson

## Preparing for War with Russia? The central tension emerging from the conversation is simple and stark: Sweden’s move from long-standing nonalignment into full NATO membership has shifted the country from a perceived haven of neutrality into a potential front line. This is not only a question of formal alliance ties and base agreements; it is a deeper shift in national posture, political imagination, and the kinds of risks Swedish society is asked to absorb. The change in rhetoric since 2014 — accelerated by the Ukraine war and intensified public messaging about Russia — has reframed security from a default state into a condition to be actively manufactured, often through fear. Participants in the exchange repeatedly described a deliberate campaign to make Russia seem nearer, weaker, and more threatening — a narrative that helped make NATO accession politically viable. But the payoff of that narrative is ambivalent: on one hand, joining NATO and signing defense cooperation agreements with the United States offer formal guarantees and military logistics that many Swedes now count as protection. On the other hand, those same guarantees can be read as invitations. Once a country is integrated into allied deployments and infrastructure plans, it can become a staging ground or target in a future East–West confrontation. The point is not hyperbole; Sweden and Finland sit much closer to St. Petersburg and the Russian border than many NATO members, and the presence of allied assets changes the strategic map. The conversation makes an important, often-overlooked observation: security is not purely physical, it is psychological and political. Many Swedes may feel safer because they are reassured by the alliance’s umbrella. But that sense of safety is conditional and tied to an escalatory logic that has costs. Building infrastructure, expanding the defense industry, and deepening interoperability are all measures that prepare a country for the logistics of war as much as for deterrence. As a result, Sweden faces the paradox of trading a policy of reduced exposure for one with amplified strategic importance — and therefore potentially more exposure — in any great-power crisis. ## The US-Greenland Controversy The episode about Greenland, which surfaced in the conversation as both a regional scandal and an emblematic sign of geopolitical volatility, crystallizes how alliances and great-power competition are now unsettling the Nordic space. The idea that an external power could openly propose acquiring a massive Arctic landmass — and in doing so redraw strategic and resource maps — triggered anxieties that ripple through Scandinavia. For Sweden, the Greenland debate is more than curiosity: it is a reminder that sovereignty in the Arctic and North Atlantic is contestable and that the United States, under some political leaderships, may act in ways that stretch or even disrupt alliance norms. This controversy also foregrounds a tension within the Nordic identity: a sense of shared history and regional solidarity collides with the reality that countries have different constitutional relationships and strategic priorities. Greenland is part of the Danish realm, but its fate touches all Scandinavian countries because of cultural ties and shared security space. The debate in the conversation about whether Denmark “owns” Greenland or whether Greenlanders should determine their own future is telling. It signals that national sovereignty and local self-determination are being re-evaluated under the pressure of mineral interests, missile-defense calculations, and Arctic geopolitics. Finally, the Greenland storyline serves as a cautionary tale about the unpredictable behavior of allies. If traditional partners can contemplate extraordinary moves — buying votes, altering the status of territories, repurposing logistics hubs — then smaller states must factor in not only adversarial threats but also the instability that may flow from friendly powers when their strategic calculus shifts. For Sweden, the lesson is to reassess assumptions about how stable alliance commitments really are, and to consider whether closer European defence cooperation could be a hedge against capricious great-power actions. ## Domestic Issues & Media Narratives Beneath high-level geopolitics, the conversation revealed a domestic landscape in which elite consensus and mainstream media framing have narrowed the range of acceptable debate. Long before NATO accession, the mainstream narrative tilted toward portraying Russia as an omnipresent threat; since then, that framing has hardened. Independent journalists and alternative outlets, the primary speaker included, see themselves as providing balance: publishing Russian perspectives, documenting dissenting European views, and challenging the claim that there is simply one correct way to interpret security dynamics. Yet these outlets operate in a crowded media ecosystem where the major channels set the tone. That narrowing is consequential. Public debate about whether NATO membership was achieved through democratic means — the absence of a referendum was singled out in the conversation — has been muted. The media’s focus, according to the discussion, tends to prioritize topics that align with established political agendas: climate policy, identity questions, and pro-immigration positions. Critiques of mass migration or skepticism about alliance policies are often caricatured as right-wing or reactionary, which drives some critics into quieter corners of public life or into alternative platforms. The chilling effect extends to individuals worried about sanctions or reputational reprisals; a handful of people are reportedly self-censoring to avoid being targeted by punitive measures embedded in European foreign policy frameworks. This dynamic affects governance too. When the media narrative is uniform and public discourse narrowed, policy choices — from base agreements to defense build-ups — can proceed without sustained public scrutiny. The conversation implies that Swedish political elites now operate within transatlantic circuits of decision-making that incorporate Pentagon and Brussels priorities. As a result, domestic debate about the costs, trade-offs, and democratic legitimacy of those decisions is less vibrant than it needs to be for a healthy polity facing strategic transformation. ## Sanctions & Energy Costs 00:29: 45 Societal Decay: Crime, Economy & Infrastructure Economic and social impacts from Europe’s response to the Ukraine conflict — especially sanctions — came through as unevenly appreciated in the Swedish public. While some countries have felt immediate industrial dislocations from losing Russian energy and trade ties, Sweden’s position is complex. The conversation suggests a level of public ambivalence or ignorance about how sanctions are evolving, even as some individuals in alternative media closely monitor lists of designated persons and worry about extraterritorial legal risks. The possibility that EU sanctions now target private citizens raises questions about civil liberties and about how dissent is policed in a climate of geopolitical confrontation. On the economic front, domestic pressures are manifesting most clearly in energy costs and infrastructure debates. Electricity prices have surged, and while this is linked to renewable transitions and the particulars of Sweden’s grid, the security overlay complicates policy choices. Investments in defense and preparations for potential deployment come alongside worries about crime, decaying infrastructure, and the functioning of social services — what one might call the softer elements of societal resilience. The conversation painted a Sweden that is economically stretched in different directions: building defense capacity while also wrestling with the costs of green transitions, migration pressures, and rising living expenses. There is also the creeping sense of societ

Sweden: The New Frontline Against Russia | Torbjörn Sassersson Is Sweden actually safer now that it has joined NATO, or has it just painted a target on its own back? With talk of American bases and a strange push for Greenland, one must to ask: is Scandinavia becoming the next war zone? Thorbjørn Sassersson is here to help with insights. He is an award-winning Swedish journalist who runs an independent news outlet. Links: Newsvoice: https://newsvoice.se/english/ Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com (Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: https://pascallottaz.substack.com/s/academic) Merch & Donations: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Intro: Is Sweden Safer in NATO? 00:07:08 Preparing for War with Russia? 00:10:47 The US-Greenland Controversy 00:20:43 Domestic Issues & Media Narratives 00:23:19 Sanctions & Energy Costs 00:29: 45 Societal Decay: Crime, Economy & Infrastructure 00:35:10 Ukraine Fatigue & New Political Parties 00:45:34 Outro #Pascal Welcome back, everybody. Today we have an update on what's happening in Sweden, the formerly neutral Nordic country that became a NATO member in 2024 and also signed a defense cooperation agreement with the USA, which now allows the hegemon to establish 17 military bases in the country. So, do the Swedes actually feel safer now? Here to help with this question is Torbjörn Sasserson, an award-winning Swedish journalist. Torbjörn, welcome. Thank you very much, Pascal. Well, thank you for coming online. I really would like to know what's going on in Sweden right now. So maybe my initial question: do people in Sweden, now in 2026, feel safer than they did in 2024 before becoming a NATO member? #Torbjörn Sassersson Yeah, to answer that question, we need to go back a few years, because Sweden used to be a country that didn’t want to join NATO at all. But since 2014 and onward, there’s been a lot of scare propaganda. They wanted people to feel afraid of Russia. By 2022 or so, they had managed to shift the sentiment from safety to fear. So it was time to make the decision to join NATO. But they never asked the people. They didn’t ask us. We didn’t have the chance to vote on it. #Pascal No referendum about it, right? Whether it would be about neutrality or not—yeah. #Torbjörn Sassersson -- 1 of 15 -- So, are we safer? Probably people feel safer now because they’re scared. #Pascal So, yeah, there we are. And this defense agreement with the United States—where do we stand now? My latest information from about half a year ago was that the U.S., although it has the right to establish these bases, actually hasn’t acted on it yet. Where are we? #Torbjörn Sassersson I think that’s correct. We don’t hear very much. On the other hand, we don’t know what they’re doing—if they’re preparing something, if they’re moving material to these bases or not. But as far as I know, nothing much is happening, no. #Pascal So, what’s the general development in Swedish politics when it comes to NATO and Sweden’s approach to Russia? #Torbjörn Sassersson Well, the fear‑mongering is still going on. People are generally afraid of Russia. Could you ask that question again? #Pascal Sorry, just what are the developments going on when it comes to Sweden and NATO, and Sweden and Russia? Because we actually hear quite a lot about Finland. You know, Mr. Stubb is quite popular on the international scene and has been inserting himself in discussions with the United States. But Sweden—it's relatively quiet, actually. #Torbjörn Sassersson Well, you mean internationally or—internationally, yes. Well, I guess so. We have our defense minister who’s traveling back and forth to the Pentagon and Brussels and so on, and he’s in charge of that. People just tend to read the news, see what’s going on, and then there’s not much debate. But also, the media we have—the established media—they don’t really want debate about it. They tell us what’s going on, and we should just listen, I think. #Pascal -- 2 of 15 -- Where does this leave you as a journalist? I mean, what are you busy with—what issues are you working on that you think mainstream media in Sweden doesn’t cover? #Torbjörn Sassersson Well, as an independent journalist, I try to show what other countries are thinking about what’s going on. For instance, we publish what the Russians are saying about it, what Orbán is saying about it. We do what we think the big media should do. We have our readers—not so many, maybe, because most people go to the bigger channels—but at least we reach some people. And we know we reach people within the government, even if they never admit they’re reading our news. So if they want a more nuanced or varied picture, the politicians and decision‑makers go to alternative or new media. #Pascal Has your view on the whole NATO issue changed at all? You know, it wasn’t easy for Sweden to join NATO—not so much because of Brussels, but because of Ankara. Turkey blocked Sweden’s entry for over a year. Has there been any progress in the relationship between Sweden and Turkey since then? #Torbjörn Sassersson You mean since we joined NATO? Mm-hmm. I'm not really sure. The reason Turkey wanted to block it was because they wanted to make a deal with us, and it was about people they wanted to get hold of in Sweden, we think. #Pascal They wanted some people extradited, right? People who were basically supportive of the opposition in Turkey—opposition to Mr. Erdogan. #Torbjörn Sassersson Yeah, that's right. And also there was that one Koran burning—what’s it called? The Koran burning. He was the one burning them, and he was maybe, probably targeted. I don’t know, but he was murdered. So he burned some Korans in Sweden, he moved around, he was threatened, and he was killed. But the connection to the NATO thing—I don’t know, but it’s possible. #Pascal Okay, so overall, the security situation for Sweden and how it integrates with NATO—has that stayed the same as before? Or has it become more, I mean, are they putting more effort into it? Are you seeing a lot in the news about Sweden in NATO? -- 3 of 15 -- #Torbjörn Sassersson Sure. The Swedes are adapting to NATO’s demands. What they want is better infrastructure, and they talk about using Sweden as a deployment area for a war against Russia through Finland. So they’re building up the infrastructure, and the defense industry has a lot to do. They’re making a lot of money right now because there’s new demand for material for that. #Pascal This is what’s so scary. I mean, aren’t people now seriously afraid that, instead of being more secure inside NATO, they might become the next frontier after Ukraine—to carry out the proxy war with Russia? #Torbjörn Sassersson Yes, that’s one idea we’ve proposed—that Sweden could actually be the next deployment area after Ukraine. I even wrote about it myself. And there are other countries like Kazakhstan and Moldova and so on; they could also become new deployment areas. But Sweden and Finland are very, very close to St. Petersburg and Moscow, so it would be a more intense war if they used us to attack Russia, because, as you know, the politicians in the EU, in Britain, and so on, they think they can actually beat Russia. #Pascal Hey, very brief intermission because I was recently banned from YouTube. And although I'm back, this could happen again anytime. So please consider subscribing not only here, but also to my mailing list on Substack—that’s pascallottaz.substack.com. The link’s in the description below. And now, back to the video. Is that something—like, is that discussion the same in Sweden? I mean, are there politicians or important people in Sweden who believe that a NATO–Russia war could be won? #Torbjörn Sassersson Sure, yes, yes. They don't say it straight out, but it's clear that the picture they put out is that Russia is weak, that they’re useless. They can’t even take the whole of Ukraine—as if they wanted to—but they don’t. So these people in Sweden think Russia is weak and useless. So why not take them, with the help of NATO and the United States? But now… you know, NATO may not survive much longer because of—well, I wouldn’t say it’s only Trump—but the Trump administration, at least, wants to take country after country, and now Greenland. And Greenland is owned by Denmark, as you know. So now Sweden, Denmark, and other countries are sending all these troops to Greenland to protect it against the United States, which is NATO. Everything is changing so fast, it’s even hard to know what’s going to be on the news the next day. -- 4 of 15 -- #Pascal Yeah, it is. It’s extremely hard right now, especially for Sweden. It’s the Greenland issue. Doesn’t this touch a lot of people personally too? Because Greenland is part of Denmark, and Denmark is one of the five Scandinavian countries, right? Yeah. Yes, you’re not one country, but I mean, the Scandinavians do have a feeling of belonging together—of brotherhood. Does that affect Swedes even more strongly than, say, other Europeans, like the Portuguese, when the United States talks about taking away Greenland? #Torbjörn Sassersson Yes, I think so. I mean, we have Scandinavia. We haven’t been at war with each other for hundreds of years. So of course, yes, people feel it has something to do with them if Denmark loses Greenland. But there are also other discussions now emerging—should Denmark really have the right to keep owning Greenland? Really, should Denmark have the right to own Greenland? Because it’s… it’s like a continent, Greenland. It’s huge. And why shouldn’t Greenland belong to the Greenlanders? So it’s not only about whether the United States has the right to take over Greenland, but whether Denmark even has the right to keep it. #Pascal Yeah, but the independence of Greenland has been an important topic for, let's say, Denmark for quite a while, right? And Greenland has an autonomous status within Denmark, right? So what's— I mean, so far, the idea has been that if Greenland were to become independent, it would go through a public referendum there. Right. But Mr. Trump isn’t talking about a public referendum; he’s just talking about incorporating it, period. Isn’t that scary? And isn’t it also scary to the Swedes that the United States now argues the only thing that can keep Greenland safe is incorporating it? Because that’s also an admission that NATO couldn’t keep Greenland safe. Isn’t that highly problematic? #Torbjörn Sassersson Yeah, I think that suddenly Denmark is very eager to protect Greenland, but most of the time they’ ve kind of forgotten about it, I’d say. It’s not like they’re developing Greenland very much. You never hear about Greenland in the news—ever—until now. #Pascal Although usually that’s a good thing. Usually, you don’t want to be in the world news. #Torbjörn Sassersson Right, yes, that’s true. -- 5 of 15 -- #Torbjörn Sassersson When it comes to Sweden, we have this debate now about Denmark and the United States. There’s one thing I remember—Trump said he was even willing to pay every single Greenlander some money to vote to join the United States. And that’s quite terrible if he openly wants to buy the voters. But I’m not sure he’ll actually go through with that. I don’t know if you have any other information about it. #Pascal I mean, as far as I know, Greenland has about 50,000 inhabitants, something like that? #Torbjörn Sassersson Yeah, 57,000 or something like that, yes. #Pascal 57,000. So even if you offered each one of them half a million dollars, it would still only be around $36 billion. I mean, that’s more or less pocket change for the United States, which is now looking at a defense budget of $1.5 trillion. It’s utterly insane. I mean, a couple of billion dollars—you could just do that. I mean, that’s even thinkable. #Torbjörn Sassersson I think Trump is thinking like that. He’s thinking about all the money he can make from the minerals and whatever oi