The US Empire Is Crumbling FASTER | Amb. Chas Freeman

## Iran, Yemen and the widening regional crisis The conversation opens with a stark diagnosis: the conflict space in West Asia is fracturing along multiple, partly independent fault lines rather than cohering into a single, controllable crisis. The blockade activity in the Bab al-Mandab and the ascendancy of Ansar Allah in Yemen are presented not as Tehran’s precise instrument but as expressions of locally rooted dynamics that happen to align with Iranian interests. The result is a dangerous, escalating mix where regional actors exercise agency and collisions between them produce broad economic and security reverberations. That agency shows itself in concrete operational shifts: attacks on Saudi airports, interdiction of Saudi-bound shipping, and the intermittently contested safety of international air lanes. These moves have immediate tactical effects—raising shipping costs, constraining exports through chokepoints, and elevating insurance premiums for tankers—but they also have strategic implications. The conversation highlights how local contests can magnify into global economic stressors; energy market volatility, driven by disrupted Saudi exports and the rerouting of flows via the Suez, has direct political consequences back in capitals that believed themselves insulated from Middle East volatility. Crucially, the participants emphasize that what appears to be a single theater of conflict is actually a mosaic. Riyadh’s military response, the use of proxies or mercenaries, and the activation of regional ententes (Pakistan-Turkey-Saudi consultations) reflect a recalibration of influence, not a simple extension of Tehran’s hand. This complexity undermines binary narratives—such as a U.S.-led campaign choreographed to weaken a single adversary—and instead points to a multipolar scramble shaped by fractured authority and opportunistic alignments. ## America in retreat: military and economic costs A central theme emerging from the exchange is the erosion of U.S. material superiority and the political strains that accompany it. The conversation documents a sobering inventory: damaged platforms and depleted inventories, withdraws of high-value aircraft from forward bases, and a drained “magazine depth” that limits the United States’ capacity to sustain high-intensity operations. These are not merely tactical setbacks; they call into question longer-term deterrent credibilities and the ability to project force simultaneously across multiple theaters. Economic consequences are equally significant. Sanctions and embargo strategies aimed at coercing states like Iran have a long history of unintended outcomes. The panel argues that economic pressure, applied without accompanying viable diplomatic pathways, tends to harden target states and incentivize strategic hedging—most notably, development of longer-range strike capabilities. Moreover, campaign-level inflation and rising fuel costs feed domestic discontent, shrinking political room for leaders who promised stability and growth. The political cost of prolonged conflict and austerity is visible in declining voter enthusiasm and fractious domestic politics; when foreign adventurism generates tangible hardship at the pump or in household budgets, domestic support for confrontation collapses. One of the more forceful claims in the exchange is that by committing scarce military stockpiles to a protracted confrontation, the U.S. risks undercutting its capacity to respond to other great-power contingencies. The irony is underscored: military action meant to assert dominance may, through attrition and miscalculation, accelerate relative decline. ## China’s gains and Saudi Arabia’s autonomy An unexpected beneficiary of current turmoil, according to the conversation, is China. Far from being crippled by energy-market disruptions, Beijing has turned the crisis into an accelerant of domestic transformation. Chinese investments in renewables and electric vehicles gain traction as energy insecurity stokes demand for alternatives; state-guided industrial policy and consumer uptake position China to expand its technological leadership at a moment when competitors flounder. The broader point is geopolitical: Western strategies premised on constraining China through regional insecurity are short-sighted. Instead of weakening Beijing, turbulence in West Asia has created commercial opportunities and strategic space for China to deepen ties through trade, energy collaboration, and technology exports. That shift illustrates a wider structural trend—the diffusion of leverage away from single hegemonic actors and toward diversified global partners. Parallel to China’s rise is Saudi Arabia’s deepening strategic autonomy. The conversation stresses that Riyadh’s calculus is no longer a simple derivative of Washington’s agenda. Financial pressures from lost oil revenue, coupled with pragmatic recalculations about security partnerships, have driven the kingdom toward a more independent posture. The emergent entente between Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia—though embryonic and consultative rather than institutionalized—signals a regional bandwidth for cooperative security outside the NATO-U.S. orbit. Such arrangements are not mere proxies of a great power but instead reflect middle-power actors filling governance gaps left by retreating patrons. ## Israel’s eroding support Another theme driving the discussion is the attenuation of Israel’s traditional political insulation, particularly within its most important external supporter: the United States. The panel points to a palpable shift in public opinion and partisan alignment. Support for Israeli policy among Democrats has diminished; even among independents and younger cohorts, sympathy is faltering. This trend is compounded by the international fallout from Israel’s conduct in its recent campaigns, which the conversation characterizes as a self-inflicted reputational catastrophe. The domestic political calculus inside Israel is also under pressure. Proposals to transform Israel into an auto-determinative Sparta-like polity—relying less on external patrons and more on internal mobilization—are seen as unrealistic by many interlocutors. Survival has depended historically on external security guarantees and diplomatic cover, and as those fray, Israel faces strategic dilemmas. The erosion of American credibility—exacerbated when Washington’s words diverge sharply from its deeds—further complicates Jerusalem’s calculations. The exchange warns that diminishing external support will not only reshape Israeli strategy but will feed regional dynamics that Israel had hoped to manage through external backing. ## Switzerland’s neutrality debate and the prospects for neutrality The dialogue turns to neutrality not as an abstract doctrine but as an operative strategy in a changing diplomacy. Switzerland’s debate over neutrality is emblematic of a broader contest: can neutral posture survive the moral and political pressures of highly polarized conflicts? The conversation treats neutrality as a pragmatic choice for states that seek to maximize maneuverability and avoid entanglement in great-power rivalries. Neutrality, the participants suggest, is regaining relevance as middle powers look for pragmatic approaches to security. Rather than serving as passive nonalignment, modern neutrality can be an active instrument of regional stability—opening channels of communication, hosting dialogue, and enabling de-escalatory measures. The example of Switzerland provokes reflection on whether neutral states can act as honest brokers in an era of eroding alliances and toxic polarizations. The answer offered is cautiously optimistic: neutrality is not a panacea, but it is a credible strategic posture for states prioritizing autonomy and mediation over bloc politics. ## NATO’s failure and Ukraine’s future The conversation does not spare NATO from critique. Allies face acute coordination f

The US Empire Is Crumbling FASTER | Amb. Chas Freeman The Proxy War in Ukraine and the War of Aggression against Iran are not shaping up the way they are supposed to, and the Washington establishment is in panic mode. Ambassador Chas Freeman—a former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Undersecretary of Defence—does not think that these errors are part of a deeper strategy to weaken China, but the outcome of many individual failures. American power is, in fact, retreating as wars, sanctions and depleted arsenals expose the limits of dominance. He examines Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia’s growing autonomy and China’s gains from the energy crisis. With Pascal Lottaz, he discusses Israel’s eroding support, Switzerland’s neutrality debate and NATO’s failures. Their conversation explores whether cooperative security, regional partnerships and greater freedom for middle powers can replace confrontation, drawing lessons from ASEAN and considering the prospects for diplomacy in a changing world. Chas's Links: Chas Freeman's Substack: https://chasfreeman.substack.com Books and Publications: https://chasfreeman.net/books-and-publications/ Neutrality Studies Links: Neutrality Studies Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Support Neutrality Studies: https://neutralitystudies.com /donate Neutrality Studies shop: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Time Stamps 00:00 Iran, Yemen and the widening regional crisis 09:21 America in retreat: military and economic costs 16:48 China’s gains and Saudi Arabia’s autonomy 24:07 Israel’s eroding support 30:31 Switzerland’s neutrality debate 35:12 Can neutrality replace confrontation? 39:09 NATO’s failure and Ukraine’s future 44:14 A changing world: ASEAN and regional cooperation #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies today for an update with the always brilliant Ambassador Chas Freeman. Chas, welcome back. #Chas Freeman Thank you. Glad to be back, Matt. It's been quite a while. #Pascal It's been a while, and I really wanted to pick your brain a little bit on what your assessment is of where these big international conflicts are heading that we're seeing. On the one hand, now, if we start with Iran, we have something like a phony phase of this war where there's little missiles or no missiles flying very much, although there are attacks on some of the tankers that are trying to get through. And we have in Yemen Ansar Allah that is making big strides forward. So I wonder how you are assessing the West Asian situation at the moment. -- 1 of 14 -- #Chas Freeman Well, I think the situation between Saudi Arabia and Yemen is very serious. It is escalating. But I think it is a product of their relationship. It is sui generis. It is not at the instance of Iran. It is disconnected from the broader Israeli-American assault on Iran and Iranian reactions to it. I'm sure the Iranians are delighted by the Ansar Allah blockade of Saudi shipping, which is all it is. It is not a general blockade. It is simply a blockade of the Saudi-owned or Saudi-bound or Saudi-departing shipping that goes through the Bab al-Mandab. It is a dangerous situation. It is drawing in others. There are reports that the Saudis have asked Syria to supply mercenaries to fight in Yemen. Clearly, the entente between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—it is not an alliance, although it has that name. It is not an unconditional commitment of mutual aid. It is a contingent commitment of cooperation and consultation. But that has been activated, and the Turks and Pakistanis are basically backfilling Saudi defense requirements in the kingdom while the Saudis escalate against Ansar Allah in Yemen. Of course, there is—and I think the Turks and the Pakistanis have made it quite clear—they don't intend to and feel no obligation to engage in a war outside the territory of Saudi Arabia. So this is happening. The effect of the blockade of the Bab al-Mandab, of course, is to further put pressure on oil prices because of the restriction of Saudi exports. The East-West Pipeline, which was damaged by Iraqi militias acting probably in concert with at least Ansar Allah, maybe with Iran as well, has been repaired and apparently is again pumping oil to Yanbu. But it can't be exported safely through the Bab al-Mandab. It has to go through the Suez Canal, which means smaller ships. And that indeed, you know, the price of shipping has gone up enormously. The supertanker now goes for $1.4 million a day. This is because so many— no, it's just so many of the— this is the chartering cost. It includes, of course, the insurance issue. But the main thing is that there are so many tankers bottled up in the Persian Gulf. Now, some are getting out, as you mentioned, and I suspect that they're getting out with the assistance of the U.S. Navy. But I suspect they're also paying off the Iranians in the case of a successful exit from the Strait of Hormuz. It's not clear what's going on. The claims of the Trump administration that everything is back to normal are utter nonsense. And everyone can see that because of the price of oil and gas, diesel, jet fuel in particular, at the pump. So this is a dangerous situation. It continues to escalate. Ansar Allah is attacking Saudi airports and warning aviation that it is not safe in the kingdom's airspace. The Saudis are mounting an offensive. They apparently have taken back Mocha, the port from which the Dutch first began the export of coffee, which is why in English coffee is sometimes called mocha. Anyway, it's a teeter-totter. They can't tell what is happening, really. On the question of Iran, I would say that things are a great deal clearer. There is a complete impasse. The Trump administration claims there are talks going on under the surface. I doubt that. -- 2 of 14 -- There never were direct talks in any event. There were talks brokered by Qatar and Pakistan, and even those have broken down. Donald Trump says that he intends to bomb Iran after the midterms. Not clear why the midterms have anything to do with Iran. They seem to have something to do with Donald Trump. But he won't bomb them before the midterms. But at this point, his credibility is so damaged that his statement that he won't bomb them is taken by some to mean he will bomb them. And we don't know. There is no answer to this militarily. And the answer that Scott Bessent, the Secretary of the Treasury, probably the worst Secretary of the Treasury we've had in our entire history, which is saying a good deal, he is engaged in a war of economic attrition with Iran, trying to apply maximum pressure through sanctions to Iran. This, of course, is the strategy which was earlier applied to North Korea and which produced a nuclear weapon that can strike the United States. So what we're doing with threats to annihilate Iran, delivered at the UN General Assembly, of all places, by Donald Trump, with Scott Bessent claiming he's going to bring down the regime through sanctions, immiserate Iran, and so forth— what we're doing is incentivizing Iran to develop the nuclear missiles that can strike the United States that it lacks. And I think in this regard, it's significant that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, the IRGC, has said that it is planning to work on extending the range of Iranian missiles. Up to now, they've had a range of about 1,000 kilometers, which has been enough to keep aircraft carrier battle groups at bay and, of course, to strike Israel. #Chas Freeman We now know that the damage that was done to the American military apparatus, specifically aircraft and missiles, was much greater than the Pentagon acknowledged. There is a report from the Congressional Research Service, as well as Inspector General's reports, which indicate that the number of aircraft destroyed was at least twice what is admitted. We've heard a statement from the foreign minister of Iran, Araghchi, who has an admirable reputation for truthfulness, saying that the Congressional Research report understates the actual number, that it's actually quite a bit greater. So a lot of damage has been done. And in the middle of all this, some long-term things are happening. I've been talking mainly about short-term things. Long-term results are, first, that American bases in the Persian Gulf are essentially evacuated, not functioning. We were driven back to Jordan. Jordan has been struck by the Iranians on repeated occasions. Some of the damage that wasn't reported apparently was at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan. And so the U.S. is in retreat. We're now in retreat also from Fairford Royal Air Force Base in England, where we've had to withdraw the B-1 bombers, about a fourth of our B-1 bomber fleet. These are aircraft that are no longer manufactured, and it costs about $300 million each. So they're very precious. There were 12 of them at Fairford. They've now been withdrawn to North Dakota, I believe. And so we're in retreat, more generally, from this war militarily. The depletion of weaponry, the #Chas Freeman -- 3 of 14 -- Depletion of the magazine depth, as it's called—that is, the supply of weapons for the U.S. armed forces—has been extreme. This causes real questions to arise about Donald Trump's threats to resume a massive bombing of Iran. Every time we bomb Iran, we should get a thank-you note from Iran, Vladimir Putin, and Xi Jinping, because we are damaging our capacity to deal with either of them militarily. Economically, I think it's very clear that the Iranian people have been inured to economic suffering. They can take a great deal more of it than the American people or Europeans can take. And so it's very unlikely that the war of economic attrition will succeed in bending Iran to our will. And of course, there is no diplomacy because the so-called memorandum of understanding, which was negotiated in the early summer, was essentially repudiated by the United States once it was signed at Versailles in the presence of Macron by Donald Trump, but not honored. And the Iranians are very clear. President Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Araghchi, others, the Speaker Ghalibaf in the Iranian parliament, have all made it clear that they regard the United States as having absolutely no credibility at all and not being a worthy interlocutor. So there's no diplomacy, and Iran is saying that it can sustain a state of war with the United States for three to four years. If this is the case, the damage to the global economy will be far greater than what has been suffered to date because it was mitigated by the release of strategic petroleum reserves generally, and by the Chinese ability to fall back on renewable energy supplies and to direct their refineries to reduce consumption. China had prepared itself for an energy crisis to an extent that no other country had. But the Chinese are running out of the capacity to make further cuts. So I think the future is very uncertain. The only thing that is certain—and this will end my comments, which have been far too long, I guess, but this is a very complicated situation now—the only thing that is certain is that inflation is now afflicting the global economy. It's very much felt by voters in the United States. The war with Iran is enormously unpopular. The Republican voters who had turned out in good numbers in previous elections in support of Donald Trump and their party—or I should say, the party that he has assumed a dictatorship over—turned into a virtual cult. The Republican voters are very unenthused about voting. Many of them complain that they voted for Donald Trump and he promised various things. He's done the exact opposite. He promised peace. He's brought war. He promised control of inflation. He's generated it. He promised the reindustrialization of the United States. He hasn't achieved that. His tariffs, his wars, have taken a terrible toll on ordinary people, many of whom find it hard to survive financially. His tax reform has enriched the plutocracy, the 1%, at the expense of everyone