US Plans For MORE Porxy-Wars. Sanctions On Unwilling Pawns | L. Kasradze & Col. L Wilkerson

## Sanctions as Extralegal Instruments What emerges from this exchange is a startling consensus: personal sanctions have migrated from a tool of foreign policy to an instrument that cuts directly into civic life, often bypassing ordinary legal safeguards. The conversation underscores how sanctions—once framed as targeted, proportionate measures against foreign actors—are being repurposed inside the polity of the sanctioning actors themselves. People designated under these regimes can instantly lose access to bank accounts, contractual rights, and freedom of movement; they may be left with token sums for living expenses and forced into costly, uncertain litigation merely to survive. The result is not a regulated administrative response but a form of coercion that substitutes executive edict for adjudicated process. This shift is not merely semantic. The participants trace out a pattern in which sanctions operate outside the conventional checks and balances of criminal or civil law. Instead of a transparent investigatory and prosecutorial sequence, listing decisions are made through political bodies and administrative procedures that do not conform to normal standards of notice, evidence disclosure, or judicial review. The effect is to create a shadow legal order: sanctions act like penalties but without the procedural safeguards that typically accompany deprivation of rights. The conversation argues that describing such measures as “non-punitive” is an oxymoron; when rights and livelihoods are stripped away, the practical result is punitive regardless of the label affixed. ## Human Rights and the Erosion of Due Process Closely tied to the extralegal character of modern sanctioning practices is a profound human-rights concern. The discussion repeatedly returns to the ways in which these measures collide with guarantees of fair process, freedom of expression, and proportionality. EU internal law and regional human-rights norms were raised as potential protective bulwarks, yet the conversation documents how these normative frameworks are being stretched or circumvented. Where treaty obligations and case law have historically required human-rights compliance in EU actions, the rapid adoption of individual listings has exposed gaps between principle and practice. The group also warns of the chilling effects on public debate. When dissenting voices risk being branded as promoters of “disinformation” or “destabilizing activity,” citizens and commentators may self-censor, fearing loss of employment, reputation, or basic economic functioning. The conversation locates this not only as an individual injustice but as a systemic threat: democratic deliberation depends on the capacity to contest prevailing narratives without fear of administrative exile. That erosion of pluralism is what makes these measures more than an enforcement anomaly; they become instruments that reshape the boundaries of permissible speech and political contestation. ## Sanctions as a Form of Warfare One of the most provocative claims in the exchange is that modern sanctioning—particularly economic embargoes—amounts to a kind of hybrid warfare. Participants draw on recent historical examples to argue that prolonged economic pressure can produce systemic collapse in targeted societies, degrade standards of living, and precipitate political destabilization. Characterized as “structural violence” or “economic statecraft,” this form of coercion can intentionally or predictably lead to humanitarian harm while being pursued under the mantle of foreign policy objectives. The conversation insists that the violence of sanctions is not an accidental by-product but often an intended instrument: when policymakers celebrate public unrest or economic malaise as progress toward geopolitical goals, they reveal a deliberate strategy of using deprivation to achieve regime change. Seen in this light, the moral and legal stakes shift: sanctions are no longer merely a tool for signaling displeasure but a form of collective punishment with long-term social costs. This is particularly troubling when the architecture of accountability—international courts, multilateral oversight, or political checks—is weak or bypassed. ## Institutional Drift and the Concentration of Executive Power A recurring theme is institutional drift: mechanisms designed for exceptional use have slid into routine governance. The conversation tracks how executive agencies and intergovernmental councils have assumed expansive discretion to designate individuals and entities, often without robust external oversight. The result is a concentration of power that allows administrative organs to impose deprivations that would otherwise require a judicial hearing or legislative mandate. Participants worry about the implications for multilateral institutions. When regional bodies or powerful states implement unilateral sanctioning regimes that circumvent Security Council processes, they undercut the exclusive instruments of collective security and damage the authority of global governance. This bypassing of multilateral channels not only erodes the legitimacy of sanctions themselves but also weakens the institutional fabric designed to arbitrate disputes about force, coercion, and international responsibility. In the absence of transparent, agreed-upon standards, the door opens to politicized applications and inconsistent criteria across jurisdictions. ## Chilling Effects and the Politics of Narrative The conversation repeatedly highlights how sanctions serve a narrative function as well as a coercive one. By labeling certain speech as propaganda or destabilizing conduct, sanctioning bodies effectively privilege a state-sanctioned account of complex events. The practice of listing commentators, journalists, and analysts for expressing dissenting interpretations transforms contestation into administrative peril. This is not an argument about whether particular comments are true or false; it is an argument about who gets to adjudicate truth and what penalties follow from being found “unreliable.” Such dynamics create a climate of intimidation that reaches well beyond those formally designated. Academic freedom, investigative journalism, and public debate are all pressured when the sanctioning threat looms. The conversation makes clear that fear of punitive administrative action alters behavior: institutions and individuals may decline to commission investigative work, platforms may decline to host controversial views, and citizens may shy away from political mobilization. These ripple effects strike at the heart of democratic pluralism and the capacity for corrective discourse in the political sphere. ## Remedies: Litigation, Transparency, and Institutional Reform Given these concerns, the conversation explores possible pathways to counterbalance the excesses of current sanctioning practice. Legal remedies are a first line of defense: where judicial review exists, it must be strengthened. Participants note that access to courts, full disclosure of evidence, and meaningful appellate remedies are necessary to prevent arbitrary designations. However, litigation alone is insufficient; courts constrained by deference doctrines or secret evidence will not fully restore due process. Consequently, the conversation urges a two-track approach: use the courts where possible, and simultaneously pursue systemic reforms. Transparency is one concrete proposal. The discussion calls for fixes in the listing procedures: clearer criteria, public justification of designations, and the right to receive and challenge the evidence being relied upon. Where secrecy is necessary for security reasons, the conversation suggests independent oversight mechanisms—ombudsmen, special advocates, or panels with security clearance—that can review material and contest state claims without exposing sensitive sources. Such intermediaries could make administrative processes

Sanctions Against Individuals. What Can Be Done? An Expert Panel. Join a live-streamed webinar with the international lawyers, Alexandra Hofer and Roberto Zamora, who will be discussing the legal and political options to address the draconian EU Sanctions Regime that is unfolding over EU residents. #Pascal Hello, everybody, and welcome back to Neutrality Studies. My name is Pascal Lottaz from Kyoto University, and I’m joined today by my colleagues Dr. Alexandra Hofer and Roberto Zamora, both of them lawyers and legal professionals. Roberto is from Costa Rica, currently in the EU, and Alexandra is from the EU as well. Both have been working on human rights and international law, and Alexandra especially on sanctions law. So, today in this webinar, we want to discuss the recent developments in the EU sanctions policy and what can be done about this completely new regime we’ ve got. So, Alexandra and Roberto, welcome. #Alexandra Hofer Thank you. #Pascal Thank you so much for joining. Maybe just to introduce, we’ll probably be joined by Jeffrey Sachs in a moment, who will also speak a bit about the EU sanctions and ask some questions. But, you know, to start, I think most people have seen this: the EU has rolled out this new regime within its own framework—the EU sanctions against Russia—where they’ve started designating individuals on this list. One of my countrymen, Jacques Baud, has been caught up in this. The EU is accusing him and sanctioning him for, let me read this: Jacques Baud, a former Swiss Army colonel and strategic analyst, is a regular guest on pro-Russian television and radio programs. He acts as a mouthpiece for pro-Russian propaganda and spreads conspiracy theories—for example, accusing Ukraine of orchestrating its own invasion in order to join NATO. There's a second paragraph in the accusation, but that’s basically it. Once you’re listed on this sanctions list, normal life basically ceases to exist. You lose access to your bank accounts and all payment methods. Nobody can give you anything. No EU citizen is allowed to enter into contracts with you. You’re not allowed to enter the EU, or if you’re already in the EU, to leave the state you’re currently in. Pretty -- 1 of 21 -- draconian measures. And Alexandra, we talked about this once already, but how do you currently understand these measures now, after half a year of seeing them being applied to people within the EU? #Alexandra Hofer Can you maybe clarify what you mean—how do I understand them? Like, what do I think their purpose is? #Pascal Maybe not the purpose, but how they work as a legal regime. One of my main points so far has been that they’re extralegal measures—not because they’re illegal, but because they circumvent the normal legal system. Do you see them that way too? #Alexandra Hofer Yeah, I think that's a fair qualification. I tend to see sanctions, let's say, as a security tool. The ones adopting them usually have some security purpose in mind, and very often I think these security measures are extralegal—they don’t follow what we’d assume to be the general channels where we’ d have the usual checks and balances on executive power. And of course, I think this creates huge problems for human rights because of the way these measures are qualified, which we’ll probably discuss today. But yeah, I think with these measures, what’s really being brought to the fore is how problematic sanctions are when they’re adopted against individuals, and the many absurdities they can raise. #Pascal Roberto, you’ve also been working in the human rights space. When you learned about these sanctions—being imposed by the EU on people within the EU rather than outside—what went through your mind, and how did you make sense of what was happening? #Roberto Zamora Well, maybe I’ll disagree a little bit with you here, because I do see these sanctions as illegal—in the sense that there’s a lack of foundation according to EU law. But from a strictly human rights point of view, it’s very concerning. In my view, these sanctions violate quite a number of provisions regarding human rights. They’re also based on a failure to fulfill several obligations that the EU has undertaken. For instance, Article 6 of the Treaty on the European Union states that the European Union must accede to the European Convention on Human Rights, something that has not been done. Nevertheless, there is case law from the Court of Justice of the European Union indicating and establishing that the application of human rights is mandatory and binding within the activities of the -- 2 of 21 -- EU. What I see is the rise of a regime that’s tending toward absolutism—totalitarianism—in very, very concerning ways when it comes to human rights. So, coming from Latin America and being a migrant here, now working in academia—and, you know, within academia there’s criticism and critical thinking, opposite points of view—well, I’m personally worried. I mean, how much can we, from academia, criticize what is going on? The arbitrariness the EU is using in applying these sanctions makes the situation very worrying. There’s a lot to be concerned about. #Pascal And I see that we’ve just been joined by Jeffrey Sachs. Jeffrey, welcome, and thank you very much for coming online. #Jeffrey Sachs Of course. Sorry I'm late. I apologize. #Pascal It's always great having you, so no worries at all. We just did an opening round on how everybody understands these sanctions, which is the topic of today's webinar. The European Union started about half a year ago—almost a year now—imposing sanctions on individuals inside the EU, and it’s had really dramatic repercussions for the people affected. Basically, they become prisoners with no legal rights and have to go to court just to get a basic 500 euros a month to pay for food. Now, the US has also imposed sanctions on individuals, including the UN Special Rapporteur for the Palestinian territories, Francesca Albanese. Jeffrey, can you make any connection between the US and European sanctions? #Jeffrey Sachs Well, I can’t in any informed way, because what Europe is doing is both shocking to me, and I’m online trying to understand better what the situation is. From the U.S. point of view, I think the main thing I’d say is that there’s become an absolute addiction to sanctions—on individuals, designated corporate entities, and governments—over the last 20 years, as if it were a newly discovered tool of statecraft. Especially after 9/11, the U.S. government found that sanctions were a very cheap, quick, flexible way—without any public scrutiny, congressional oversight, or need to explain—to launch economic warfare, and geopolitical warfare in general. So the personal sanctions should be seen in that U.S. context, at least. And I think that's probably true in the European context as part of a much broader use by the executive authorities of unconstrained power that doesn’t require any review. I focus much more on -- 3 of 21 -- the economic sanctions than on the individual sanctions in my own work. I’ll just say one thing that I think is, uh, interesting about the economic side, and that is that a couple of weeks ago, the Treasury Secretary of the United States, in Davos, boasted about how the U.S. had used this sanctions regime to crush the Iranian economy and to bring people out on the streets—and that this was moving in a very good direction, he said. So it was an unusually explicit, even vulgar, description of the economic warfare that the U.S. wages with these sanctions. Also, Bessent was interesting—he said this is “economic statecraft,” as he called it, which is quite a term in this context. But when we see the mass unrest in Iran, our mass media attributes it to the corruption and mismanagement of the Iranian regime. But Bessent said very clearly that this was our policy—to cause this to happen. And it did happen, and it’s moving in a very good direction. The only final point I’ll make is that even after Bessent said this, The New York Times would not report it. The mainstream media in the U.S. would not report the most basic facts of all. So we’re in a surreal bubble on all of this, where sanctions are unconstrained tools of power—unchecked by law, unchecked by any kind of legislative oversight, unchecked by public debate. And that’s why they’re so effective, because we’re in a world of executive abuse. And these are good tools for that purpose. #Pascal Thank you for that, Alexandra. I mean, you're a sanctions lawyer—you’ve worked with European sanctions for a long time. Can you maybe give us a short rundown of where they’re actually coming from? And, in your view, has the European Union learned something from the United States in applying them, or are they kind of sui generis? #Alexandra Hofer Yeah. Well, I would just say, I think—yeah, I agree a lot with what Professor Sacks said. And indeed, the comments made by Bessent, if I could just jump in on that a bit, were really interesting, because we tend to frame sanctions as a non-coercive tool—they don’t involve the use of force. They’re great because they’re a peacetime remedy. But I think when you see the case of Iran, or you talk about the sanctions against Venezuela, or against Syria, or any other country, these economic sanctions— and you see the level of destruction they bring on these populations—it resembles, or it amounts to, structural violence. You’re basically completely degrading the standards of living in many countries. Inasmuch as they are a violent form of what we call a state crash, to me they essentially amount to hybrid warfare. We can see how sanctions were used as a form of warfare against Syria and eventually led to the downfall of Assad, and apparently they’re hoping for the same thing in Iran. I think sanctions were used in a very similar way in Venezuela. Now, in the U.S., sanctions are well known for not having any scrutiny from the courts. In the EU it’s slightly different, because if you’ve been targeted by the EU, you can appeal to the European Court of Justice. A few years ago, Venezuela was given access to the European Court of Justice to contest the restrictive measures the EU had imposed on it. So there is some form of judicial review. -- 4 of 21 -- And I think that’s why, in Europe, because we have this judicial review, we tend to think that sanctions are fairer or more legitimate—because there’s a court process there. But I think, as I’ve discussed with you previously, Pascal, there’s a lot of room for improvement in this judicial procedure. As we discussed, the court tends to be quite deferential, giving a lot of room to maneuver to the Council of the EU in its listings and in imposing restrictions on human rights. Now, whether or not the EU has learned from the U.S. is kind of hard to say, but in some instances it does seem as if the EU is picking up on the more, let’s say, controversial practices of the U.S., particularly when the U.S. adopts extraterritorial sanctions. So it would seek to ensure that actors outside U.S. jurisdiction abide by U.S. sanctions. This has been quite controversial, and the EU typically condemns these types of measures. But in its sanctions regime against Russia, the EU has seemed increasingly willing to extend the jurisdictional reach of its restrictions—tipping into behavior we usually see from the United States. I think the parallel you made at the beginning to the measures against Francesca Albanese is interesting, because she was essentially sanctioned for her reports, especially after the one on the economic actors participating in the genocide against the Palestinians. So it was hitting the U.S.’s economic interests, let’s say. And in the EU, with the measures that have led to this discussion—like the ones we’ve seen against Jacques Bourg—we see individuals being listed because they’re presenting a narrative, or an alternative narrative, to the one the Council of the European Union would like to s