The Next ESCALATION Against Russia | Dr. Jeff Rich

## Introduction and NATO 3.0 What is emerging from the recent exchange with Dr. Jeff Rich is a stark warning: Europe is reshaping NATO into something more overtly confrontational toward Russia, and that transformation risks pulling the United States and the continent into a permanent, escalatory posture. The term “NATO 3.0,” which circulated during the Ankara summit, is not mere marketing—it crystallizes a set of political choices: rearmament, the normalization of Russia as a peer enemy, and an effort to lock Washington into an enduring security commitment to Kyiv. Seen from the perspective of a historian who studies entanglements of empire and memory, these moves are not just tactical responses to a single war. They are the latest bend in a long arc of political, psychological, and institutional forces that shape Western policy toward Russia, with consequences that are both strategic and existential. The conversation places emphasis not only on the public rhetoric of summit communiqués but on what those statements seek to do: to reconfigure alliances, to build military-industrial momentum, and to manufacture a consensus that treats Russia as an implacable foe. In practical terms, NATO 3.0 looks like a Europe that arms itself to deter the next perceived Russian aggression, commits to defense spending targets, and attempts—through both diplomatic theater and institutionalization—to prevent any American backsliding. Yet underneath that theatrical surface lie tensions, contradictions, and historical continuities that make the outcome far from certain and potentially perilous. ## NATO, Europe, and US power The Ankara summit revealed an uneasy blend of rhetoric and limited substance. The communique’s compact size belied the larger symbolic thrust: a Europe publicly declaring a tougher posture toward Russia while simultaneously promising to shoulder more of the burden. The political project is twofold—declare Ukraine’s survival as a kind of victory to justify continued support, and rearm Europe so that it can serve as a credible shield (and, implicitly, a tool) against Russian influence. Dr. Rich pushes back on two popular but simplistic narratives. One is the “US is withdrawing from NATO” thesis; the other is the “Europe is merely a vassal of Washington” argument. Both misunderstand the alliance’s intrinsic tug-of-war. Europe has indeed outsourced parts of its defense architecture to NATO, but that outsourcing is not a simple surrender of agency. European capitals want the United States to remain engaged because American commitment gives them strategic leverage; at the same time, the United States relies on European bases and logistical networks for global operations. The relationship is mutually enabling as much as it is hierarchical. This mutuality matters for two reasons. First, European rearmament is not a pure sign of autonomy but often dovetails conveniently with U.S. defense-industrial interests: more European spending tends to mean more arms purchases from American producers. Second, the political logic underpinning NATO 3.0 is less about a coherent grand strategy and more about hedging—locking Washington in, deterring perceived threats, and building an industrial-military ecosystem that sustains the present confrontation. Yet Dr. Rich warns that these grandstanding commitments are brittle. Electoral cycles, domestic politics, and shifting strategic priorities could easily produce backsliding, or worse, miscalculation. ## The long roots of anti-Russianism One of the most insightful strands of the discussion is the insistence that hostility toward Russia has deep historical and cultural roots. Dr. Rich situates contemporary Russophobia not as a post-2014 anomaly but as a long-running theme in Western political imagination. From elite networks cultivated over the twentieth century to cultural narratives that frame Russia as an externalizing “other,” the present hostility is nourished by institutions and memories stretching back centuries. This historical perspective complicates any straightforward account that pins the war’s origins solely on American manipulation or purely Russian revisionism. Yes, U.S. policy and transatlantic elite networks have played decisive roles—building institutions, funding think tanks, and perpetuating narratives that treat Russia as an existential rival. But beneath institutional policy is a substrate of cultural meaning: Russia has, for European elites and publics alike, occupied a liminal position as both part of “Greater Europe” and as its disruptive eastern margin. From the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries onward, political projects of empire, identity, and civilization made Russia into a contested symbol—sometimes partner, sometimes threat. Dr. Rich draws on this longue durée to argue that present-day political elites are embedded within epistemic bubbles—career politicians, military officers, and journalists whose networks reinforce a particular worldview. These networks are not merely conspiratorial cabals; they are institutional and social ecosystems that reproduce certain choices and interpretations. As a result, public debate on the continent is often skewed: elites mobilize fear and moral certainty about Russia, while alternative security options—like neutrality, regional partnerships, or integrative diplomacy—are marginalized. ## Civilization, realism, and fear The conversation also interrogates the ways “civilization” is invoked as a political frame. Appeals to civilizational difference—“we” versus “them”—are politically potent. They simplify complex histories into moral narratives that justify containment and confrontation. Dr. Rich warns that framing the conflict as a clash between liberal civilization and a barbaric Eastern other is both historically thin and strategically perilous. Civilization talk does rhetorical work: it makes coercion seem defensive and rearmament seem morally necessary. Dr. Rich insists that a more sober realism is missing from much of the debate. Realism here does not mean cold power politics alone but an attention to interests, costs, and balancing. The European drive toward militarization is driven partly by fear rather than a cool calculation of likely outcomes. Fear hardens policy choices: deterrence becomes the organizing principle, and the opposite of deterrence—friendship, accommodation, or neutrality—appears naive. Yet history shows that alliances built primarily on fear are brittle; when the feared adversary is personalized as a near-absolute evil, diplomacy becomes impossible and miscalculation becomes more likely. Practical realism would require asking hard questions about the sustainability of an open-ended commitment to Ukraine, the economic and human costs of continued escalation, and the strategic trade-offs involved in competing theaters (e.g., in East Asia). Dr. Rich highlights another paradox: the very militarization that Europeans pursue as insurance against Russia also increases the probability of escalation. When both sides organize their politics and economies around readiness for conflict, small crises can more easily snowball. ## Australia, Russia, and migration Taking the lens out to the antipodes, Dr. Rich reflects on how countries like Australia perceive the upheaval in Europe. From Canberra’s vantage, the drama unfolding in Ukraine and the broader transatlantic shifts are both distant and instructive. Australia’s foreign policy community watches the NATO reconfiguration with a mix of alignment and caution. The country is aligned with Washington and shares many institutional commitments, but it also faces its own regional imperatives in the Indo-Pacific that complicate automatic replication of European strategies. Migration was raised in the conversation as another dimension often overlooked in high-politics debates. Wars in Europe and beyond generate displacement pressures that have social and political reverberations far beyond bat

The Next ESCALATION Against Russia | Dr. Jeff Rich Jeff Rich, Australian historian and creator of The Burning Archive, joins Pascal Lottaz to discuss NATO’s changing role, Europe’s growing military stance toward Russia, and the limits of the “US vassal” view. They trace the history and emotion behind anti-Russian feeling, question “civilization” as a political lens, and examine Australia’s ties to Russia, migration, and the US-led order. Jeff's great Interview with Richard Sakwa: https://youtu.be/3KZNua1O4rY Links: The Burning Archive Substack: https://jeffrich.substack.com The Burning Archive YouTube: https://www.youtube.com /@theburningarchive Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00: 00 Introduction and NATO 3.0 09:22 NATO, Europe, and US power 21:02 The long roots of anti- Russianism 36:00 Civilization, realism, and fear 50:28 Australia, Russia, and migration #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today again for an update with Jeff Rich, the always brilliant historian from Australia, who's running the Burning Archive Substack and YouTube channel. Jeff, welcome back. Thanks for having me, Pascal. Well, thank you for your wonderful contributions. And it's great getting to pick your brain again, because you've also been writing a lot and publishing a lot about what is happening from your perspective on the other side of the globe, in Europe. The Russia–Europe affair — what does that look like from Australia? A lot of us are very worried that we might be headed straight into a much bigger war between Russia and NATO, and you even call them NATO 3.0. Can you maybe explain that a little bit and what it looks like to you? #Jeff Rich Yeah, it's quite concerning, really, to me, about the risk of war, and quite a few people are comparing the situation to, like, the eve of World War I. The historian Odd Arne Westad published a book called *The Coming Storm*, which makes similar comparisons with the environment of fear and distrust and competition, I guess, between major powers that preceded World War I and led to that catastrophe, and a real concern that a similar thing might happen. And I've recently spoken also with Richard Sakwa, who's also very, very concerned about the prospect of the current war in Ukraine metastasizing, I guess, into a broader Russia–Europe war. And some of the reactions, I think, to the recent Ankara summit in NATO and in Russia would seem to say that what NATO itself is describing as NATO 3.0, the sort of new incarnation of a more Europeanized NATO, is itself almost a declaration of war against Russia. -- 1 of 15 -- So the Russian international affairs specialist Dmitry Trenin has published an article called *The Dangerous Logic of NATO 3.0*, where he says NATO 3.0 means war, and that for the first time since 1945, Europe has declared itself an enemy of Russia, an implacable enemy of Russia. So it's very, very concerning, I guess, both the rhetoric from Europe, some of the rhetoric from Russia, and also, from my perspective too, the apparent forgetting that the United States of America started all of this, and the United States of America is still very much the dominant military contributor and military power and architect of NATO. So if NATO 3.0 is a declaration of war between Europe and Russia, then it's also, I think, really a de facto declaration of war from the USA towards Russia. And too many people, I feel, are kind of forgetting that. #Pascal Yeah, the thing that worries me very much is that you see at the moment in Europe how all the people you talk to who are not basically in our part of the bubble, in our part of the commentariat, absolutely reject the notion that this entire Ukraine war was basically provoked by the United States. For them, it's absolutely clear that we have a war in Ukraine because Russia is an expansionist, fascist dictatorship that wants to expand its land. And therefore, once it's done with Ukraine, it will necessarily go to Europe. And even in Switzerland, when I talk to people and journalists, they ask me, well, is it possible for smaller states to live without security guarantees by larger states? I mean, somehow we need to deter the Russians, right? If we don't deter them, they will attack. And even to the Swiss, I have to explain that, look, if you make friends with the Russians, if you make friends with everybody, you don't need to deter them, right? Deterrence is something that you only actually need toward enemies. But if you build your security strategy around the logic of making friendships, then you end up with something that's more similar to what Oman has, which is, you know, partnerships on all sides, including Iran. But this idea has completely, utterly left the European continent. How do you think this is now impacting the way that the Europeans are approaching their, well, not the far future, but the immediate future of the next couple of years? How are you reading the signs that are coming out of Europe? #Jeff Rich Well, the signs that came out of the Ankara summit with the NATO declaration, which was like, it was far—well, apart from the thank you to the host—it was five paragraphs, less than 500 words, compared to, I think, the Vilnius summit from a couple of years ago. They produced a 40-page communique, very wide-ranging, talking about the Indo-Pacific and, you know, NATO's domination of the world. Whereas this Ankara summit has produced, you know, a communique that I guess matches the attention span of the United States president at the moment. So I think one of the things coming out of the NATO summit is there's the theatrical and the rhetorical display that's evident there in the communique, but it's a little bit harder to discern what the real processes underneath—the real levels of agreement and disagreement underneath—are. -- 2 of 15 -- And there's clearly some... even though there's clearly a pretty militant party. But the key outcomes I saw that Europe wanted to emphasize out of this NATO summit were, first of all, that it is, if you like, declaring a preemptive victory in Ukraine. Alexander Stubb has basically said Ukraine is winning the war. All it needs to win the war is to survive, because Putin's aim was to destroy Ukraine. Therefore, if Ukraine survives, it wins. Now, that's a pretty low bar, but I also interpret that as sort of locking the United States in behind keeping up the fight with Ukraine. And then the second big outcome is to rearm Europe, and this is the whole militarization process, which in some senses meets US objectives of increased defense spending, increased military industries in the United States. But the Europeans have also said that at the previous summit in The Hague, they'd made the 5% defense spending commitment, and this summit was all about showing that they could implement it. And between the lines, I wonder whether that also means that at the next summit, after the midterm elections in the United States, there'll be a little bit of backsliding and a little bit of saying, well, we said we would implement this commitment, but I'm not entirely convinced it will be implemented in quite the same way. But nonetheless, this whole rearming and militarization thing, based on the Ukraine model of drones, you know, conducting war without people losses from Europe's point of view, is very much an essential component of it. And then the third—another element—is to lock in the United States into the permanent war against Russia. NATO and most of the European states are really saying Russia is the enemy, and that we will not allow the United States to backslide out, as Trump has tried to do over the last 18 months, to sort of unilaterally withdraw from the Ukraine war. So that seems to be the positioning. I just don't know whether all of that is all that sustainable. #Pascal Hey, just a very quick note. The best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on neutralitystudies.com. Links below. See you there. What do you make of Brian Berletic's argument that, you know, overall, the entire US is kind of withdrawing from NATO—the story about the US putting pressure on the Europeans and wanting to take itself out—that all of that is actually just basically a camouflage for this other strategy that they also actually spoke about, the division of labor? Europe has to fight for the American empire against Russia, while the US then takes its forces and starts another front. I mean, they started another front with Iran, obviously, but the big one that they're dreaming about is, of course, China, which is absolutely lunatic, but these people are psychopaths. And we can be absolutely sure because they still produce these kinds of think tank papers and white papers and whatnot about a third front, about a war with China. And Brian Berletic's argument, of course, is that -- 3 of 15 -- this is all just show, and the entire point of the US saying that it withdraws is just a way to make the Europeans think, invest, or spend more money on weaponry, which they're mainly going to order in the United States, all under the guise of needing to do more yourself. Strategic autonomy, right? And then a few years down the road, we're going to read about how the relationship between NATO and Europe got much better again, and everything is rosy again. And whenever they want them to go from 5% to 6% or 7%, they just pretend again to be walking away, so that this is a constant game. On the other hand, we do have people who seriously interpret Donald Trump as somebody who wants to take the United States basically out of NATO and onto the North American continent. On which side does your interpretation fall? #Jeff Rich Well, I think both sorts of arguments are really based on a false understanding of the nature of NATO as an alliance and the US–European relationship. I mean, the continuity of agenda, this whole “it’s all just pretense” argument, I think, overstates American dominance. You know, there’s this whole “Europe’s vassals” and all that kind of stuff. Well, if Europe were vassals, then they’ve cleverly outplayed their sort of domineering master over the last 18 months and basically ended up getting the United States into the position that they want them to be in, which is to remain committed to the war in Ukraine in order to secure what they perceive as European defense and strategic interests. And I also think that the history of the NATO alliance has been a constant tug of war, if you like, between the European powers and the American powers. And that's often underappreciated, that it's actually been a long history of tension and a long history of partnership in which the United States has needed Europe as much as the United States has vassalized Europe. And in many ways, for me, the great lie about NATO is that Europe has become dependent on the United States for its defense. That is true in some ways. I'd say in some ways the European Union has largely—European states have largely, if you like, outsourced their defense and large parts of their foreign policy to NATO. And that's a chronic issue for Europe. But the other thing is that the United States is very dependent on NATO for its offensive actions around the world. I mean, the Ramstein bases, you know, all those German bases are absolutely critical to all the sort of, you know, West Asia sort of aggressive actions of the United States, as are the Britain–Cyprus bases and all the rest. The great complaint Trump had about NATO at this last summit was that he was not able to use NATO, the European bases, as the platform for an aggressive action by the United States against Iran, because certain states said, you know, we don't want you to use our base, our country, as a platform for yo