How We Lost the Peace After the Cold War | Amb. Jack Matlock

## The lost peace after the Cold War The conversation with Ambassador Jack Matlock returns us to a deceptively simple but consequential question: how did the cautious, negotiated unwinding of the Cold War become the cascade of crises and wars we now confront? The discussion insists that the post‑1991 moment offered an opening to rebuild European and global security through inclusion and restraint. Instead, policymakers turned toward expansion, selective intervention, and the projection of a single system as a universal model. The consequences, Matlock argues in the discussion, were foreseeable—and they continue to shape the geopolitics of 2026. Matlock frames the divergence as a policy choice. Rather than treating the Soviet collapse as a condition requiring negotiated security arrangements that included Russia, Western leaders increasingly treated the moment as a triumph that could be consolidated by extending institutions, influence, and political models into formerly Soviet space. That reframing converted what had been a defensive architecture into one that, in practice, looked offensive to many in Moscow. The results, he warned during the exchange, include the destructive war in Ukraine, deeper instability in the Middle East, and an erosion of the very diplomatic capital that had ended the Cold War without a catastrophic war between superpowers. Beyond statecraft, the conversation stresses that missed opportunities compounded a broader decline in restraint. The United States’ heavier reliance on sanctions, the instrumentalization of financial power, and the tendency to take sides militarily in local disputes have not delivered durable peace. They have, instead, incentivized counter‑strategies and resilience among sanctioned states and enlarged the security dilemmas driving contemporary confrontations. ## Nuclear weapons and new technological risks One of the most sobering lines of the discussion is Matlock’s reminder that the end of the Cold War did not eliminate existential risk. Rather, the arms control architecture created in the Cold War era—treaties, verification mechanisms, and mutual understandings—was quietly unraveling. Matlock notes that the U.S. withdrawal from a string of arms control agreements since 2001 has removed institutional brakes that helped prevent escalation and misunderstanding. Complicating the picture, the conversation extends the risk horizon beyond nuclear arms to emerging technologies. Artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and cyber tools exponentially increase the speed and diffusion of destructive capabilities. Matlock observes that these technologies permit highly destructive acts to be conceived and executed by smaller actors, sometimes without a clear line of attribution. A future where small groups or individuals can develop biological agents or weaponize infrastructure is not speculative; it is an emerging fact that demands cooperative governance—yet cooperation is precisely what has become harder to achieve. The combined erosion of arms control and the democratization of destructive technologies creates a combustible mixture. Where diplomacy and mutual verification once limited incentives for careless escalation, economic pressure and public demonization now make miscalculation more likely. Matlock’s remarks point to a central paradox: while technological power diffuses, the political will for collective, long‑term stewardship of danger has weakened. ## How the Cold War actually ended The conversation insists on revisiting the mechanics of the Cold War’s end, because misreading that history has distorted policy ever since. Rather than a unilateral victory, Matlock emphasizes that the end came through negotiation and accommodation, particularly with leaders in the Soviet system who chose reform over confrontation. Mikhail Gorbachev’s internal transformations and willingness to negotiate created the political space for a peaceful transition. Matlock stresses that the Soviet Union’s collapse was internal in origin: economic strains, political ferment, and a reformist leadership created the conditions for change. Western policies and pressures played roles, but they did not “defeat” the USSR in the manner of a conventional triumph. Because the settlement was negotiated, it contained an implicit bargain—new security arrangements in Europe would have to account for the legitimate concerns of the successor Russian state. The failure to carry that bargain forward, Matlock argues, is what opened the pathway to subsequent contention. Understanding the negotiated character of that ending reframes NATO expansion, economic pressure, and the redefinition of spheres of influence as choices that could have been handled differently. The conversation suggests that a strategy built on magnifying a narrative of defeat rather than seeking inclusion produced avoidable friction. ## Reagan’s approach to diplomacy Among the more reflective parts of the discussion is Matlock’s comparison of diplomatic styles, with particular attention to Ronald Reagan’s practice. Reagan’s approach, the conversation notes, combined strategic firmness with personal respect and an insistence on not framing outcomes as “victory.” Matlock recounts how Reagan resisted gratuitous public insults toward Soviet leaders and favored quiet, pragmatic engagement on sensitive issues such as human rights. This perspective is not a nostalgic defense of Reagan so much as an argument about competence in negotiation. The conversation underscores a cultural lesson: successful diplomacy often requires empathy, theatricality used to create trust rather than triumphalism, and a recognition that public shaming of foreign leaders rarely helps domestic reform. Matlock recalls Reagan’s admonition that championing human rights openly can sometimes hurt those it seeks to help, and that progress is easier to attain when parties believe further concessions remain possible. The larger implication is that a foreign policy premised on persuasion and strategic patience—rather than moral absolutism or permanent camp alignment—creates more durable options for peaceful change. The conversation uses Reagan’s practice as a corrective to what followed in the 1990s and after: a tendency to celebrate “the end of history” and to conflate American success with the obligation to reorder other societies. ## NATO expansion and Ukraine’s neutrality The conversation turns granular when it discusses NATO enlargement and the constitutional position of Ukraine. Matlock argues that the trajectory of NATO expansion transformed a defensive framework into one perceived as coercive by Russia. The early enlargements into Central Europe were tolerated, he notes, but the continued movement of the alliance—and especially the establishment of overseas bases and missile systems that could be reconfigured offensively—crossed a threshold in Moscow’s calculations. Ukraine emerges as the focal point of these dynamics. Matlock recalls that post‑Soviet Ukraine initially embraced a neutral constitutional posture, recognizing the sensitivities of being a neighbor to Russia and a new state with deep internal linguistic and regional divides. When Ukrainian politics moved toward removal of neutral language and clearer Euro‑Atlantic aspirations, the conversation argues, that shift inserted Kyiv into a geopolitical contest it was ill‑equipped to manage without massive external support and without addressing internal cleavages. Matlock’s account does not absolve Russian action; instead, he situates Russia’s behavior within a logic of threatened strategic space. The discussion suggests that Western policymakers underestimated how the symbolic and military expansion of alliances into former Soviet territory would be experienced in Moscow—and failed to offer an attractive, inclusive alternative security architecture that could have reduced the likelihood of conflict. ## Rebuilding mutual security If the disc

How We Lost the Peace After the Cold War | Amb. Jack Matlock Ambassador Jack Matlock reflects on the diplomacy that ended the Cold War and argues that Western leaders misunderstood its outcome. He discusses NATO expansion, Ukraine’s neutrality, sanctions, and the dangers of treating international relations as a contest for dominance. Drawing on his work with Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, Matlock contrasts negotiated security with attempts to impose political systems abroad. He also warns about nuclear weapons and emerging technologies, and explains why cooperation remains essential to preventing further global conflict. Jack's Links: Jack Matlock’s website: https://jackmatlock.com Looking Back to Look Ahead (free book): https://jackmatlock.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Lookng-Back.pdf Neutrality Studies Links: Neutrality Studies Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Support Neutrality Studies: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Neutrality Studies shop: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Time Stamps 00:00 Welcome and Matlock’s diplomatic service 01:33 The lost peace after the Cold War 05:20 Nuclear weapons and new technological risks 10:22 How the Cold War actually ended 19: 17 Reagan’s approach to diplomacy 24:33 NATO expansion and Ukraine’s neutrality 35:54 Rebuilding mutual security 44:15 Matlock’s books and lessons for today #Pascal Welcome back to Neutrality Studies today with a very special episode, because we have back again Ambassador Jack Matlock, the United States' last ambassador to the Soviet Union. I was not actually the last. #Jack Matlock I know people have said that, but no, I was succeeded by somebody else who was there for just a few months before the Soviet Union collapsed. That's right. #Pascal You went back to the U.S. in August 1989, right? #Jack Matlock That's right. I left in August, and Strauss was named, and he came in September. And, of course, then the Soviet Union broke up in December, and he became ambassador to Russia. #Pascal -- 1 of 11 -- Okay, so in the future, if I introduce you as the last full ambassador, as in who served his entire term, that would be technically correct, would it? All right. We leave that one aside. Ambassador Matlock, I really wanted to get an update with you in order to hear also your assessment about where we are in the world in 2026 after four and a half years of war in Ukraine and in something which some people by now are describing as, you know, an in-between period between two orders. Do you see it like that, or how do you understand the current situation of the world? #Jack Matlock Well, I think that we got off course in our foreign policy starting in the 1990s. And we had ended the Cold War and actually had Europe united in 1992. And I think that the decision made later... #Jack Matlock By, at that time, the Clinton administration to begin expanding NATO and also to fail to reach a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, something that there seemed to be hope for in the early '90s. And yet the inability of the Clinton administration then to insist that Israel continue on that course of negotiation. Those two things, I think, started us on the situation we are now. But on the expansion of NATO, NATO had been organized as a defensive alliance. But once the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War was over, when you started expanding it, it became an offensive alliance. And if you leave Russia out, something we should not have done, then you create a security threat to Russia. So that has now resulted in the very destructive war in Ukraine. And, of course, things in the Middle East have gone from bad to worse with the current war against Iran, which is creating violence and things throughout that area. Meanwhile, we see in the Pacific a worry about the increasing power of China. But I would have to say that I don't think China has been threatening others militarily. There is the worry that they might invade Taiwan. But in terms of military action against others, you just don't see it. And so I think the problem now has been, instead of using the peace at the end of the Cold War to lead the world into peaceful settlement of disputes, I think, you know, the United States has really started, you might say, these problems. They have arisen out of local circumstances. But trying to go in and support one side or the other militarily, I think, has involved us and has not brought about the sort of peaceful world. And this is happening within the context now of the ability of humankind, I say, to commit suicide, in effect. We have known that that was possible once nuclear weapons reached the quantity that they are. If they were ever used, all of them or even partially, it could literally make the planet uninhabitable. And so this was something that preoccupied us when we were ending the Cold War, and we thought we had those things under control. But beginning in this 21st century, the United States walked out of most of these arms control treaties. And now, with the violence in Ukraine, one in which the Europeans and the United States -- 2 of 11 -- are directly involved in supplying arms and munitions there against a nuclear power, I think really raises questions. But beyond that, as we see the development of artificial intelligence, there are real dangers there. And not necessarily that the artificial intelligence is going to turn against mankind. But the thing is, it is going to empower us, including, I would say, even small groups of people, not just nation states, to develop highly destructive weapons. I mean, you could have small groups or even individuals developing diseases for which we have no vaccination or cure, or in many other ways. You will find that this, for example, allows adversaries to attack the infrastructure of other countries, and often without the ability to make sure who is doing what. It can bring real chaos to the world, and this is developing very fast. And at a time, we seem to be fighting each other over all sorts of things and attempting to punish countries that do things we don't like with economic sanctions. And I think that this is not working and is creating a more and more dangerous world. #Pascal Hey, just a very quick note. The best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on neutralitystudies.com. Links below. See you there. You know, the way I completely agree with what you said, and the way that I see how countries can impact other countries, is that you have military power that can work on what other countries can do to you, what adversaries can do to you. And we have diplomacy, which usually works on what other countries want to do to you. And the big question in my mind is, why is it that at the end of the Cold War, the way you also described it and the way you directly worked on ending the Cold War, which was a deliberate decision, as you said before, that changed the want. There was no more want to oppose each other. The aspiration was to work together. How did we go from there to a moment where it seems that both sides, and especially the Europeans, have such a visceral hate for Russia and want to destroy Russia and want to have an adversarial relationship? And on top of that, how would we rekindle it back into a cooperative situation where the idea of coexistence becomes a thing again? Because right now this is gone. The idea of coexisting with Russia, at least for the Europeans, is completely, utterly gone. And the question to you as a great diplomat is, like, how do we recreate that kind of environment? #Jack Matlock I think that, number one, there was a widespread misunderstanding of how we ended the Cold War. We began to talk about it as if it was a defeat for the Soviet Union and a defeat for Russia. And first of all, let me say that the Soviet Union was not Russia of today. Too many people that today talk about Russia: does this, has this, has that. And, broadly speaking, the Russian Federation was part of the Soviet Union, which was a communist empire, much more than a Russian empire, and one which Gorbachev tried to change. He was a, I would say, a genuine—he became by stages a -- 3 of 11 -- genuine democrat, in the sense that he was trying to create a more democratic system. And as a leader of the Communist Party, he was able to take it out of complete control of the country. But then things got out of hand. But anyway, we ended the Cold War by negotiation, and it was to the advantage of everybody. There was nobody to defeat it. And we were able to do it because Gorbachev changed the basic philosophy of the Soviet system. Its foreign policy had been based upon the Marxist idea of class struggle, and that it was the duty of the Soviet Union to support revolutions in other countries, to bring about what they called socialism, which would develop into communism. You know, Marx, I think, did a very accurate estimate of the operation of capitalism at the time he was writing. Where he was off base totally was the predictions that he was making. And this, frankly, is true of most predictions, I think, of some utopian future if something happens. So, in effect, we seem to have taken over an aspect of that and saying that, as some said then, well, no, not that the system of capitalism and what we call democracy is the future of the world. And so it became. #Jack Matlock Fashionable to say that, well, the United States and its democratic allies should do their best to extend democracy in the world and to defend it. Well, that was very similar to what the Soviet Union, up to Gorbachev, had been trying to do—that is, spread what they called socialism in the world, which was supposed to become communism. I would say, by the way, it was not the socialism that Marx had predicted at all. I think it was more likely to be characterized as state monopoly capitalism. But that's another question. The problem was that, again, you had the prediction of some sort of utopia, which said that it was sort of the duty of what we call democratic countries to spread democracy and to do so by whatever means necessary. Now, when you think about it, that's a ridiculous idea. If democracy means control of the people and by the people in the countries where they are, how can an outsider create it for somebody else? They can't. And when you start trying to support certain factions in another country, you're probably going to do them harm because nobody wants outsiders interfering in what you consider your domestic affairs. But that's one thing. And then I would say also the United States did come out of, first of all, the Second World War and then the Cold War as the economically most powerful country in the world. And we had established a financial system that was very favorable to the United States. We were able to run increasingly, you might say, budgetary deficits and yet borrow money. And since we, in effect, control the movements of—not control, but supervise—the movements of capital and payments, this gave us, I'd say, tremendous power. We could run deficits when others couldn't, for example. But we started using that also as a political weapon. If a country is doing something you don't like, you start putting sanctions on them. And this, I think, has not helped things at all. It's made things worse. Right now, I think we are running dangerously high deficits. The United States now is over $40 trillion in debt. -- 4 of 11 -- And that's the government. And domestically also, debt is extremely high. And that is going to, I think, erode the value. And we, at the same time, are sanctioning countries, so that those who are being sanctioned, like Russia particularly, or Iran and China and others, are developing, I think, ways to deal with that. And so I think that these mistaken policies have overcommitted the United States. And an attempt, rather than to