How We Lost the Peace After the Cold War | Amb. Jack Matlock

## Begrüßung und Matlocks diplomatischer Dienst The conversation with Ambassador Jack Matlock opens not as a memoir but as a meditation on a missed opportunity: a brief historical moment after 1991 when the architecture of European security might have been reconstructed to include, rather than exclude, the successor states of the Soviet Union. Matlock’s experience as the last fully serving U.S. ambassador to the USSR gives his remarks gravity, but the force of the discussion comes from its diagnosis — that choices made in the 1990s turned a negotiated end to a decades-long standoff into the seedbed of new conflicts. The stakes he describes are not merely territorial or political; they implicate the survivability of the international system in an age of nuclear overhang and rapidly proliferating destructive technologies. This is not a simple tale of good guys and bad guys. Throughout the exchange, Matlock repeatedly reframes the pivotal misunderstanding: the Cold War did not end because one side was vanquished, but because its internal dynamics changed and leaders on both sides negotiated a way to stop confronting each other as existential enemies. The problem, he argues, is that subsequent Western policy treated that negotiated settlement as a triumph rather than a foundation for inclusive security arrangements. From that misreading flowed policies that marginalized Russia, turned NATO into what many Russians saw as an offensive bloc, and made reconciliation harder to achieve. ## Der verlorene Frieden nach dem Kalten Krieg At the heart of Matlock’s critique is the notion that the peace that followed the Cold War was lost by political choice, not historical necessity. The immediate post-Cold War years were an opening — a chance to build an integrated European security order in which Russia had a legitimate voice. Instead, Western powers, particularly the United States during the Clinton administration, pursued enlargement of NATO and adopted a posture that many in Moscow experienced as exclusionary and threatening. Matlock places responsibility not on a single incident but on a pattern: supporting political forces abroad, intervening militarily in local conflicts, and using economic levers as instruments of coercion. That pattern, he suggests, corrupted what should have been a period of careful diplomacy. The result has been a recurring cascade of crises — in the Balkans, in Georgia, and most catastrophically in Ukraine — which have illustrated the limits and perils of treating regional disputes as zero-sum contests for dominance rather than opportunities for negotiated settlement. This account reframes contemporary Western-Russian antagonism as a feedback loop: policies intended to secure the West instead intensified Russian insecurity, which then produced reactions that the West treated as proof of malice. And by turning the post-Cold War era into a contest over spheres of influence rather than a cooperative reconstruction, both sides missed an opportunity to build long-term stability. ## Atomwaffen und neue technologische Risiken Matlock’s argument widens when he insists that strategic blunders are now potentially catastrophic because of the sheer destructive capacity modern technology puts in human hands. Nuclear arsenals remain large enough to render parts of the planet uninhabitable; the erosion of arms-control regimes at the start of the 21st century — including U.S. withdrawals from multiple treaties — has reduced mutual constraints and increased risk. Equally worrying in Matlock’s view is the democratization of destructive capability through digital and biological technologies. Artificial intelligence, cyber tools, and advances in biotechnology make it possible for small groups or even individuals to inflict outsized damage or to weaponize systems in ways that are hard to deter or attribute. A world in which anonymity and plausible deniability are built into violent modalities, he warns, is one in which conventional diplomacy is less effective and escalation becomes far easier. These are not abstract concerns. Matlock links policy choices to a broader ethical question: if states treat international relations predominantly as a competition for dominance and employ economic sanctions, proxy weapons, and public demonization as instruments, they erode the norms and institutions that once managed existential risk. In short, misreading the end of the Cold War and politicizing security without creating shared constraints makes catastrophic outcomes more likely. ## Wie der Kalte Krieg tatsächlich endete A crucial corrective offered in the conversation is Matlock’s insistence on how the Cold War actually concluded: through negotiation and internal transformation, not military defeat. He emphasizes Mikhail Gorbachev’s role in altering Soviet philosophy and practice, and stresses that the Soviet collapse resulted from internal dynamics as much as external pressure. That historical reading matters because it undercuts narratives of triumphalism that followed 1991 and made many Western policymakers comfortable with excluding Russia from the evolving European order. Matlock recalls the original intent among negotiators to construct a pan-European security framework. That intent was premised on reciprocity: the West would integrate Russia into the security architecture, and Russia would not seek to recreate an imperial order. When that plan was not pursued — when NATO enlargement went ahead without parallel arrangements to reassure Moscow — the foundation for durable peace eroded. The lesson he draws is specific: ending a geopolitical rivalry responsibly requires building institutions that reflect the legitimate security concerns of all parties. He also cautions against monolithic readings of entities like the Soviet Union and Russia. Conflating the communist empire with the Russian nation distorted both Western policy and popular perceptions. A more nuanced historical account, Matlock suggests, would have encouraged policies aimed at accommodation rather than containment. ## Reagans Ansatz zur Diplomatie The conversation turns to style as well as substance when Matlock contrasts Reagan-era practice with later strategies. He recalls Ronald Reagan’s approach as simultaneously firm in principle and pragmatic in method: public rhetoric against communism paired with private, respectful dialogue with Soviet leaders. Reagan’s warning against framing outcomes as “victory” — because declaring victory would make further progress impossible — is offered as a touchstone for diplomacy that seeks durable settlements rather than theatrical triumphs. Matlock’s point is not to romanticize Reagan but to argue that effective diplomacy often requires understanding the adversary’s perspective and managing public messaging so that concessions or negotiated compromises are politically feasible. Public demonization of leaders and escalation through sanctions and moral grandstanding, he implies, make statesmanship harder and increase the risk of miscalculation. The implication for today is plain: statesmanship that blends firmness with humility and private engagement is more likely to sustain peace than a posture of perpetual moral crusade. ## NATO-Erweiterung und die Neutralität der Ukraine One of the most substantive arguments Matlock makes concerns Ukraine’s constitutional commitment to neutrality in the 1990s and how that context was eroded. He contends that promising or even hinting at NATO membership for states with deep historical ties to Russia, such as Ukraine and Georgia, was bound to be provocative. From Moscow’s perspective these moves were not abstract but existential, touching on geographic buffers, ethnic kinship, and a centuries-long shared history. Matlock frames the NATO enlargement debate as a policy mistake that could have been avoided had Western leaders pursued an inclusive security system. He suggests that recognizing certain states’ ne